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ABSTRACT 
Current approaches to post-war state reconstruction are primarily dominated by the 
liberal peace thesis. These approaches tend to ignore the indigenous institutions, 
societal resources and cultural agencies of post-conflict societies, although such 
entities are rooted in the sociological, historical, political and environmental realities 
of these societies. Such universalised and ‘best practice’ approaches, more often than 
not, tend to reproduce artificial states. The Poro and Sande are the largest indigenous 
sodality institutions in the ‘hinterlands’—a pejorative term attributed to rural Liberia 
and Sierra Leone. Both the Poro and Sande exercise spiritual, political, economic and 
social authority. In this thesis, I use critical realism and the case study approach to 
investigate: a) the extent to which the liberal peace practitioners who are leading state 
reconstruction in Liberia and Sierra Leone recognised the role and potential utility of 
the Poro and Sande institutions; b) the extent to which the Poro and Sande were 
engaged; and c) the implications for the quality and viability of the reconstructed 
states. This evidence-based research suggests that the liberal peace project sidelined 
indigenous institutions, including the Poro and Sande, in the post-war recovery and 
rebuilding exercises.  The disregard for indigenous and emerging resources in the 
context of state reconstruction in Liberia and Sierra Leone has contributed to the 
resurgence of 19th century counter-hegemonic resistance from the sodality-governed 
interior of both countries.  At the same time, the reconstructed states are drifting back 
towards their pre-war status quo.  Authority structures remain fragmented, 
kleptocracy is being restored, webs of militarised patronage networks are being 
emboldened, and spaces for constructive dialogues are shrinking.  This thesis 
underscores the need for indigenisation as a complementary strategy to help reverse 
the deterioration, and to maximise gains from massive investments in peacebuilding. 
Sam Doe Final Thesis UB No. 04008980 iii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................... II 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................................IX 
DEDICATION ...................................................................................XI 
MAPS, FIGURE, TABLES AND BOXES................................................ XII 
ACRONYMS ..................................................................................XIII 
CHAPTER 1 
1.1 INTRODUCTION........................................................................ 1 
1.2 GENESIS OF THE RESEARCH ..................................................... 3 
1.3 OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY........................................................ 5 
1.3.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS ................................................................................... 6 
1.3.2 CORE ARGUMENTS OF THE THESIS ................................................................. 7 
1.4 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT OF THE THESIS ........................... 9 
1.4.1 THE DEBATE ON INTERNAL LEADERSHIP IN STATE RECONSTRUCTION......... 11 
1.4.2 PRO-INTERNATIONAL STATE RECONSTRUCTION DEBATE............................. 13 
1.4.3 DEBATES ON THE STRATEGIES AND OUTCOMES ........................................... 14 
1.4.4 GAPS AND CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE........................................... 17 
1.4.5 JUSTIFICATIONS FOR SITUATING THE WORK IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS18 
1.5 PORO, PEOPLE AND POLITICS IN LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE . 20 
1.5.1 SOCIAL OR EDUCATIONAL FUNCTION........................................................... 23 
1.5.2 SUPERNATURAL OR RELIGIOUS FUNCTION ................................................... 24 
1.5.3 POLITICAL FUNCTION ................................................................................... 25 
1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ................................................... 32 
1.6.1 CRITICAL REALISM AS THEORETICAL LENS.................................................. 32 
Sam Doe Final Thesis UB No. 04008980 iv 
1.6.2 FRAMEWORK FOR DATA ANALYSIS.............................................................. 36 
1.6.3 CASE STUDY APPROACH (CSA) ................................................................... 36 
1.6.3.1 Research Focus and Units of Analysis ................................................ 38 
1.6.3.2 Selecting Case Sites and Samples........................................................ 39 
1.6.4 FIELDWORK .................................................................................................. 40 
1.6.4.1 Data Collection Methods..................................................................... 41 
1.7 ACCESS AND ETHICAL CHALLENGES ...................................... 46 
1.7.1 ACCESS CHALLENGES .................................................................................. 46 
1.7.2 ETHICAL CHALLENGES ................................................................................. 48 
1.8 LIMITATIONS OF THE WORK .................................................. 51 
1.9 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS.................................................... 53 
CHAPTER 2 
2.1 INTRODUCTION...................................................................... 55 
2.2 NATURE OF THE STATE .......................................................... 56 
2.3 STATEBUILDING AND SURVIVAL ............................................. 59 
2.3.1 COLLECTIVE IDENTITY AND NATIONBUILDING............................................. 59 
2.3.1.1 Nationbuilding: A Working Definition ................................................ 59 
2.3.1.2 African State and the Nationbuilding Project ..................................... 62 
2.3.1.3 Outcomes and Consequences .............................................................. 66 
2.3.2 PUBLIC INSTITUTION AND SERVICE FUNCTION ............................................. 67 
2.3.2.1 Public Sector: A Working Definition................................................... 67 
2.3.2.2 Colonial Public Sectors....................................................................... 69 
2.3.2.3 Bureaucracy in Post-independence Africa.......................................... 71 
2.3.2.4 Persistent Explanations for Bureaucratic Decay in Africa................. 74 
2.3.3 GUARANTOR OF SECURITY ........................................................................... 78 
2.3.3.1 Security: A Working Definition ........................................................... 78 
2.3.3.2 Security in Post-independent Africa.................................................... 79 
2.4 STATE COLLAPSE: CAUSES AND MANIFESTATIONS .................. 84 
Sam Doe Final Thesis UB No. 04008980 v 
2.5 CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 88 
CHAPTER 3 
3.1 INTRODUCTION...................................................................... 90 
3.2 GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXTS OF LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE .... 91 
3.2.1 PEOPLE AND DEMOGRAPHY.......................................................................... 92 
3.2.1.1 Demographic Composition.................................................................. 93 
3.2.1.2 Reasons for Migration......................................................................... 95 
3.3 PRE-COLONIAL POLITICAL ORDER ......................................... 97 
3.3.1 STATE-LESS POLITICAL SYSTEMS ................................................................. 97 
3.3.2 STATE-BASED POLITICAL SYSTEMS ............................................................ 100 
3.4 THE BIRTH OF THE WESTPHALIAN STATE IN SIERRA LEONE 
AND LIBERIA................................................................................. 106 
3.4.1 FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE.......................................... 108 
3.4.1.1 Political Idea of Liberia and Sierra Leone........................................ 109 
3.4.1.2 Constitutional Orders........................................................................ 111 
3.4.1.3 Hinterland Structure of Governance ................................................. 114 
3.4.1.4 Consolidating State Regime in Sierra Leone..................................... 116 
3.5 PORO AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL............................ 119 
3.5.1 COLLISIONS BETWEEN STATE AND PORO POLITICAL AUTHORITY BUILDING....
 ................................................................................................................... 119 
3.5.2. COLLISIONS BETWEEN PORO AND OTHER RELIGIONS................................. 123 
3.6 NEO-PATRIMONY AND KLEPTOCRACY IN LIBERIA AND SIERRA 
LEONE .......................................................................................... 124 
3.6.1 DECLINE OF NEO-PATRIMONY, KLEPTOCRACY, AND STATE DECAY........... 127 
3.6 CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 129 
CHAPTER 4 
4.1 INTRODUCTION.................................................................... 133 
Sam Doe Final Thesis UB No. 04008980 vi 
4.2 SKETCH OF THE CIVIL WARS ................................................ 134 
4.3 CAUSAL THEORIES ON LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE CIVIL 
WARS............................................................................................ 138 
4.3.1 THE GREED AND GRIEVANCE DEBATES...................................................... 138 
4.3.1.1 The Primacy of Grievance................................................................. 138 
4.3.1.2 The Primacy of Greed ....................................................................... 140 
4.3.2 IDENTITY: ETHNICITY IN LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE ............................... 146 
4.3.3 CULTURALIST THESIS ................................................................................. 151 
4.3.4 SPILLOVER EFFECTS AND REGIONALISATION ............................................. 153 
4.3.5 THE POSITIVES OF CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE............................................. 156 
4.4 CRITICAL REVIEW OF INTERVENTIONS................................. 157 
4.4.1 INTERNAL INTERVENTIONS......................................................................... 157 
4.4.1.1 Civic Persuasive Interventions .......................................................... 157 
4.4.1.2 Civilian Resistance and Counter-insurgency .................................... 160 
4.4.1.3 Critical Analysis of Civic Interventions ............................................ 162 
4.4.2 EXTERNAL INTERVENTIONS........................................................................ 164 
4.4.2.1 Mercenaries and Private Military Companies .................................. 164 
4.4.2.2 Bi-lateral Interventions ..................................................................... 164 
4.4.2.3 Multilateral Intervention: ECOWAS and the UN.............................. 165 
4.5 CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 170 
CHAPTER 5 
5.1 INTRODUCTION.................................................................... 173 
5.2 THE ROLE OF THE PORO IN DDR/SSR ..................................... 174 
5.2.1 CONVENTIONAL VS PORO INDIGENOUS APPROACH TO DDR...................... 176 
5.2.1.1 Disarmament, Demobilisation and the Poro (and Sande) ................ 178 
5.2.1.2 Conventional vs Indigenous Poro and Sande Reintegration Strategies..
 ........................................................................................................... 180 
5.2.1.3 Poro Interventions for Self-renewal in DDR..................................... 183 
5.2.2 PORO AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM ...................................................... 187 
Sam Doe Final Thesis UB No. 04008980 vii 
5.3 THE ROLE OF THE PORO IN RETURN, RESETTLEMENT, AND 
REINTEGRATION........................................................................... 191 
5.3.1 PORO’S SELF-RENEWING INTERVENTIONS .................................................. 194 
5.4 CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 210 
CHAPTER 6 
6.1 INTRODUCTION.................................................................... 211 
6.2 CURRENT PRACTICE OF STATE RECONSTRUCTION................ 214 
6.2.1 FROM EMERGENCY TO RECOVERY PHASE OF STATE RECONSTRUCTION .... 216 
6.2.1.1 Restoring Security ............................................................................. 218 
6.2.1.2 Restoring Political Authority............................................................. 223 
6.3 INSTITUTION BUILDING AND STATE CONSOLIDATION ........... 226 
6.3.1 BUILDING POST-CONFLICT SECURITY AUTHORITY..................................... 229 
6.3.2 BUILDING POLITICAL AUTHORITIES ........................................................... 235 
6.3.2.1 Architecture for Democratisation...................................................... 236 
6.3.3 PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM............................................................................ 239 
6.4 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR INDIGENISATION ............... 242 
6.4.1 DEFINING THE CONCEPT............................................................................. 242 
6.4.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK........................................................................ 243 
6.4.3 FRAMEWORK OF INQUIRY FOR INDIGENISATION......................................... 246 
6.4.1.1 Transformation .................................................................................. 248 
6.4.1.2 Comprehensiveness ........................................................................... 250 
6.5 CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 251 
CHAPTER 7 
7.1 INTRODUCTION.................................................................... 253 
7.2 KEY FINDINGS...................................................................... 255 
7.3 STRATEGIES FOR INDIGENISING STATE RECONSTRUCTION ... 262 
Sam Doe Final Thesis UB No. 04008980 viii 
7.3.1 IDEATIONAL TRANSFORMATION ................................................................. 262 
7.3.1.1 Social and Political Dialogue ........................................................... 263 
7.3.1.2 Civic Education ................................................................................. 265 
7.3.2 INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION ............................................................ 266 
7.3.2.1 Stocktaking Exercise.......................................................................... 267 
7.3.2.2 Constitutional Basis for New Institutional Arrangement .................. 268 
7.3.2.3 Vision for a New Institutional Order................................................. 268 
7.3.2.4 Institutional Design ........................................................................... 269 
7.3.2.5 Monitoring Regimes .......................................................................... 269 
7.3.3 HARNESSING EMERGING RESOURCES......................................................... 270 
7.4 CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 272 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................. 274 
ANNEX 1:.....................................................INTERVIEW INSTRUMENTS A-E 
 
Sam Doe Final Thesis UB No. 04008980 ix 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
Embarking on a PhD journey while working full-time has been the most challenging 
experience I have faced thus far.  Had it not been for my children and colleagues 
pestering me, this project would have dragged on beyond four years.  My daughters, who 
began pursuing their undergraduate degrees a whole year after I started work on this PhD, 
would periodically remind me that they were nearing completion of their degrees. Seeing 
them fast catching up with me, I had to find the extra energy to accelerate my own work. 
My colleagues, including Dr. Isaac Albert, Dr. Martin Schulman, David Nyheim, Mack 
Capehart Mulbah, Helena Tokpah Sampson and Clementine Lue Clark, among others 
who I’ve worked with over the years, had stopped communicating with me to protest the 
delay in completing this project. Veronica Tolbert, my partner and friend, remained 
supportive throughout my PhD journey.  In particular I must mention my field advisors, 
without whose willing participation it would have been impossible to research a very 
difficult subject. They, being Poro and Sande initiates themselves, facilitated the 
invitation of a stranger into their closed Poro world. They include Pewu Subah, Sampson 
Varpillah, Leymah Gbowee and Oscar Bloh in Liberia, and Professor Joe D. Alie, Gladys 
Koroma and Bababara Bangura in Sierra Leone.  I also received support in the field from 
local organisations, including the national chapters for the West Africa Network for Peace 
building (WANEP) in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the Foundation for International Dignity 
(FIND), ABC-Development and the Grass-roots Empowerment Movement (GEM).  
Above all, I extend my gratitude to Professor David Francis and Dr. Joao Gomes Porto, 
my supervisors at the University of Bradford, Peace Studies Department.  I owe special 
thanks to Prof. Francis for his prompt responses to my work throughout the exercise.  His 
critical comments and insistence on quality pushed me to extend the limits of my 
capabilities. While I alone am accountable for any errors in this thesis, whatever positive 
Sam Doe Final Thesis UB No. 04008980 x 
feedback this work may enjoy is largely to the credit of my supervisors’ contributions and 
guidance.  
Sam Doe Final Thesis UB No. 04008980 xi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DEDICATION 
 
 
 
 
 
I dedicate this thesis to the nameless child whose slow death from 
starvation in the Liberian civil war has forever changed the course of my 
life.  His last beckoning to a society that failed its children remains the 
light in my path. 
Sam Doe Final Thesis UB No. 04008980 xii 
MAPS, FIGURES, TABLES AND BOXES 
 
MAPS 
Map of Liberia         102 
Map of Sierra Leone         102 
 
FIGURES 
 
Figure 1.1 Interactions of State and Poro Sodality     44 
Figure 1.2: Unit of Analysis        50 
Figure 3.1: Political Structure of the Temnes      113 
Figure 3.2: Structure of Governance of the Hinterland in Sierra Leone   131 
Figure 3.3: Structure of Governance of the Hinterland in Liberia    133 
Figure 4.1: Contemporary International State Reconstruction Model  189 
Figure 6.2: Indigenisation Model of Inquiry        239 
Figure 7.1: Comprehensive and Transformative Institution Building Process  261 
 
TABLES 
 
Table 2.1: Indicators of Institutional Crisis      79 
Table 3.1: Demographics of Liberia and Sierra Leone     105 
 
BOXES 
 
Box 5.1:  Indigenous Ex-combatant Reintegration of the Kwa-speaking People 180 
Box 6.1: SSR in South Africa        223 
 
 
 
Sam Doe Final Thesis UB No. 04008980 xiii 
 
ACRONYMS 
 
ACRM Anti-Corruption Revolutionary Movement 
ACS   American Colonisation Society 
AFL Armed Forces of Liberia 
AFRC Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
AI Amnesty International 
APC All People’s Congress 
BWIs Bretton Woods Institutions 
CDF Civil Defence Force 
CDWS  Comprehensive Drawdown and Withdrawal Strategy 
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
CSA Case Study Approach 
CSO Civil Society Organisation 
CVT Centre for Victims of Torture  
CWG ER Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery 
DDCs District Development Committees 
DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 
DDRR Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and 
Reintegration 
DDRR-SIF Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and 
Reintegration Strategy Implementation Framework 
DfID Department for International Development 
DR Congo Democratic Republic of Congo 
ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States 
Monitoring Group 
ECOWAS  Economic Community of West African States 
EO Executive Outcomes 
Sam Doe Final Thesis UB No. 04008980 xiv 
FGI Focus Group Interview 
FIND Foundation for International Dignity 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GooB Government out of a Box 
GTF Gender Task Force 
HIV/AIDS Human immunodeficiency virus/ Acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome 
IA International Alert 
IBL Institutionalisation before Liberation 
IDDRS Inter-Agency Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration Standards 
IDPs   Internally Displaced Persons 
IFMC   Inter-Faith Mediation Committee 
IMATT  International Military Advisory and Assistance Team 
INGO International non-governmental organisation 
INPFL Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
IR International Relations 
IRC-SL Inter-religious Council in Sierra Leone 
IRIN Integrated Regional Information Networks 
JIU Joint Implementation Unit 
KII Key Informant Interview 
LCC Liberia Council of Churches 
LDF Lofa Defence Force 
LFF Liberia Frontier Force 
LPA Lome Peace Agreement 
LPC Liberia Peace Council 
LURD  Liberians United for Reconciliation and Development 
MARWOPNET Mano River Women’s Peace Network 
MDF   Maryland Defence Forces 
Sam Doe Final Thesis UB No. 04008980 xv 
MODEL  Movement for Democracy in Liberia 
NCC National Constitution Commission 
NCDDR National Commission for Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration 
NCPSL Network for Collaborative Peacebuilding in Sierra 
Leone 
NCRRR National Commission for Return, Resettlement and 
Rehabilitation 
NDI National Democratic Institute 
NGOs Non-governmental organisations 
NMC   National Muslim Congress 
NPFL   National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
NRC National Reformation Council 
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 
PAL Progressive Alliance of Liberia 
PPP   Progressive People’s Party 
RRO   Regional Reintegration Office 
RRR   Return, Resettlement and Reintegration 
RUF   Revolutionary United Front 
SAP Structural Adjustment Policy 
SBA Subah Belleh Associates 
SDF Sinoe Defence Force 
SLA Sierra Leona Armed Forces 
SLCS Sierra Leone Council of Churches 
SLMC Sierra Leone Muslim Congress 
SLPP Sierra Leone Peoples Party 
SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
Sam Doe Final Thesis UB No. 04008980 xvi 
ULIMO United Liberation Movement of Liberia 
ULSU University of Liberia Students Union 
UN   United Nations 
UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone 
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme 
UNF   United National Front 
UNHCR  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
UNICEF  United Nations Children Education Fund 
UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia 
UNOMIL United Nations Observers Mission in Liberia 
UNOMSIL United Nations Observers Mission in Sierra Leone 
WB World Bank 
WANEP West Africa Network for Peace building 
WIPNET Women in Peace building Network 
WODAL Women Development Association of Liberia 
WPM Women’s Peace Movement 
 
 
 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
“When the peacekeeping troops and relief workers depart, when the extraction companies 
return, when the miracle of the free market is nowhere to be found, the cycles of deprivation 
and violence reappear…the rondelet then begins anew” (Tirman, 2004: 9).   
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the end of the Cold War and the subsequent withdrawal of strategic support by 
the Cold War powers—the Soviet Union and the United States of America—from 
African states, the continent has seen a sharp rise in state implosion, often 
accompanied by protracted civil wars.1  The liberal peace project of external 
interventions for post-conflict statebuilding has grown apace.  Africa has played host 
to the largest number of liberal peace post-conflict state reconstruction projects.2  
Given the growing social, economic and political debility in the continent, this trend 
will likely continue in the foreseeable future.  The new statebuilding endeavour, as 
observed by David Chandler (2005), is in marked contrast to the political norm that 
governed the post-independence and Cold War periods in Africa.  During those eras, 
the lack of consensus on what constitutes the state, coupled with the determination to 
protect the new states from their former colonial powers, curtailed international—
especially multilateral—involvement in statebuilding in Africa (ibid).  An emerging 
normative framework that places responsibility for the safety and well-being of 
individuals at the centre of global politics, and a growing awareness of the 
                                                
1Nana Poku in his chapter ‘Context of security in Africa’ in Peace & Conflict in Africa, David Francis ed. (2008), 
indicates that over 42 wars, mostly civil, were fought in Africa between 1970 and 2006. Fourteen African 
countries were involved in armed conflicts in 2006 alone, accounting for 69% of all war-related deaths globally in 
that year.  
2Roland Paris (2006) records that 12 of the 22 major post-conflict peacebuilding and statebuilding operations of 
the United Nations between 1989 and 2005 were in Africa, including in Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Liberia 
(twice), Rwanda, Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire and Sudan.  
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globalisation of insecurity, present compelling justifications to the international 
community to rebuild collapsed states and ensure the reconstitution of failing states.3  
 
Although indigenous sodality institutions are the bedrock of politics and security in 
most African states, especially in West Africa, these were either neglected or 
exploited in state formation and statebuilding during the colonial and post-colonial/ 
post-independence eras.4  The contemporary liberal peace statebuilding projects 
continue to subject indigenous institutions (generally) and indigenous sodality 
institutions (specifically) to the same abuse.  This persistent disregard for, or at best 
the exploitative use of indigenous political institutions, has prompted me to embark 
on this work. I advance indigenisation as a framework of inquiry and strategy for 
building more viable states after collapse, as a complement to the liberal peace thesis.  
I apply the proposed framework to the case of Liberia and Sierra Leone to explore the 
efficacy and potential utility of the Poro and Sande sodalities—the dominant 
indigenous political institutions in both countries—in ongoing internationally led 
post-conflict state reconstruction efforts. 
 
In Section 1.2 of this introductory chapter, I briefly reflect on the genesis of the thesis.  
Section 1.3 is devoted to an overview of the thesis, in which I present its central 
arguments and core research questions.  Section 1.4 discusses the background and 
context of the work, noting current debates on state reconstruction and the gaps in 
                                                
3The Canadian-sponsored Responsibility to Protect doctrine, reinforced by the Ogata Human Security Report, is 
credited for the global emphasis on human as opposed to state security.  As a consequence, international 
intervention has gained a new lease of life, which is extensively discussed in this chapter and in chapter 3 of the 
thesis.  Full details on the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 
published in 2002, is available on http://www.iciss.ca/report-en.asp, while the final Report of the Human Security 
Commission is available on http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/index.html. 
4As discussed later in the chapter, indigenous sodality institutions are dismissed as African spiritism, which lacks 
any political agency and whose engagement could undermine secular institutions, such as those of the state. Where 
they were mentioned, especially in Liberia and Sierra Leone, elements of indigenous sodality institutions were 
recreated and deployed as proxies of the colonies and later of post-colonial state regimes in the infamous indirect 
rule system exercised over the ‘hinterland’. 
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scholarly and policy literature, to which this work contributes.  Section 1.5 undertakes 
a substantive review of the Poro sodality institution, noting its origin, political and 
security agencies, and also its problematic aspects.5 I discuss the research methods, 
including a justification for adopting critical realism and case studies as the epistemic 
basis and research methods for the work, in Section 1.6.  Researching secretive 
sodality institutions such as the Poro and Sande posed serious ethical and access 
challenges. I have, therefore, devoted Section 1.7 to elucidate the strategies and steps 
I took to address these challenges throughout the project.  Section 1.8 discusses the 
major limitations of this work. I conclude the chapter with an outline of the rest of the 
thesis in Section 1.9.  
 
1.2 GENESIS OF THE RESEARCH 
 
Despite more than five decades of turbulent statehood in Africa, diehards of the 
Treaty of Westphalia still dismiss the proposition that structures and institutions 
established to oversee the socio-political life of any people must resonate with their 
worldview and be rooted in their context (Clapham, 2003; Ottaway, 2003; Chandler, 
2005; Mazrui, 1995; Sawyer, 2005).  Even when the quasi-African6 state built on the 
legacies of colonialism collapses, they are in a hurry to piece together the fragments.  
As observed by Roland Paris (2004), the only improvement that the international 
state-reconstruction and peacebuilding project makes to post-collapsed states is to 
impose ‘democratisation’ and ‘marketisation’ agendas upon them—even if the post-
war institutional environment is too feeble to carry the weight of the competitive 
                                                
5I discuss interactions between the Poro and the Liberian and Sierra Leonean states in Chapter Three. 
6Robert H. Jackson first coined the phrase ‘Quasi-states’ to describe post-independent African states.  He indicates 
that African states possess quasi existence, in that their statehood is only based on international de jure conferment 
and totally lacking in empirical statehood.  They enjoy little or no domestic legitimacy and are incapable of 
performing the core functions typical of a state.  See Jackson, R.H., Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International 
Relations and the Third World (Cambridge, 1990). 
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culture inherent to ‘democratisation’ and ‘marketisation’.  This scenario became real 
to the researcher during both the civil wars and the ongoing internationally led state 
reconstruction projects in Liberia and Sierra Leone.7  The following incidents 
prompted this academic journey.   
 
In May 1996, it was clear that the war-ravaged people of Sierra Leone were least 
prepared for any so-called ‘democratic elections’. Yet the international community, in 
a hurry to re-establish the state and exit, insisted on elections.  A majority of the 
country was under the control of the infamous Revolutionary United Front (RUF), 
who instituted the barbaric limb-cutting strategy as a direct protest against the general 
elections.  The international community assumed no responsibility for the horrible 
danger to which they exposed Sierra Leone.  Barely a year after Sierra Leone’s 
bloody elections, the same international community, after a hurried disarmament and 
reintegration process, insisted on elections in Liberia.  At the time, echoing the hold 
of the RUF over Sierra Leone, Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(NPFL) was in charge of over 80% of Liberian territory.  With the memory of Sierra 
Leone fresh in the minds of traumatised Liberians, they overwhelmingly voted for 
Taylor as their president.  The international community then blamed Liberians for 
being foolish enough to elect a warlord and an internationally recognised criminal.  
The shattered and ‘criminalised’8 state was placed under both military and economic 
sanctions.  In less than a year, another round of war resumed and thousands of 
Liberians paid the ultimate price.9 
                                                
7As a regional civil society leader and peacebuilding practitioner in West Africa, I interacted intimately with both 
processes. 
8A word coined by Bayart, Ellis and Hibou in their book The Criminalization of the State in Africa, to argue the 
existence of a functional link between power, war, economic accumulation and illicit activities within African 
polity.  They claim that the state has become the instrument for crime on a global scale, mostly in Africa.   
9As though lessons were not learnt from the first failed disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme 
of 1997, the international community insisted on the immediate resumption of disarmament in December 2003 at 
Sam Doe Final Thesis UB No. 04008980 5 
Aside from these hasty, often uninformed decisions and their attendant devastating 
consequences, at no time has the international community found fit to ask whether the 
collapse of the state was a consequence of the foundations on which it was 
established, or whether there were resources inherent in the society that could serve as 
a basis for reconstruction.  The researcher has been part of campaigns for indigenous 
inputs, if not leadership, in state reconstruction.  While the campaigns offer all the 
reasons for state reconstruction to be informed or led by indigenous institutions, there 
has been no evidence-based analysis of the efficacy and relevance of indigenous 
institutions to state recovery and reconstruction. Hence the long journey which 
culminated in this thesis.  
 
1.3 OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
 
In this work, I advance indigenisation as a conceptual framework and an approach to 
state reconstruction to complement (with a minus)10 Roland Paris’s 
‘Institutionalisation before liberalisation (IBL)’ approach to post-conflict 
peacebuilding.11  I apply the proposed framework to the case of Liberia and Sierra 
Leone by exploring the efficacy and potential utility of the Poro (and Sande) 
sodalities12 in state reconstruction and sustenance and, when ignored, in undermining 
the viability of the developing post-collapsed states in both countries.  The work 
                                                                                                                                      
the end of the second phase of the Liberian civil war.  The interim government, established after a 75-day peace 
negotiation in Accra, Ghana was barely constituted and the multinational peacekeeping force had not yet taken 
positions across the country. That hurried disarmament, in spite of protests from within the international 
community itself as well as from civil society organisations within Liberia, led to the death of dozens of Liberians 
and the loss of property worth millions of US dollars. 
10I add a minus because, as will be discussed in Chapter 6, I challenge Roland Paris’s call for long-term 
international trusteeship as a solution for institutionalisation of effective and responsive government.  Such a call, I 
argue, has forgotten the decades and centuries of colonial dominance under the guise of imposing civilisation and 
to ‘build modern states’ in colonised territories.  If external authoritarians did not build effective institutions then, 
they will not be able to do so now either, and certainly not in the time Paris would suggest. 
11Opposing Paris’s strong argument for international control of the process, I argue that the project should be led 
from within.  
12The Poro and its female version, the Sande, are the largest indigenous sodality as well as political institutions in 
the Guinea Coast, which includes areas covering present-day Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire. 
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specifically aims to: a) explore the nature of interactions between the Liberian and 
Sierra Leonean states and the Poro and Sande sodalities, noting the implications for 
the decay and eventual collapse of both states; b) explore the role and potential utility 
of indigenous institutions and mechanisms, particularly indigenous sodality 
institutions, in contemporary state reconstruction initiatives in Africa; and c) propose 
indigenisation as a conceptual framework and an evidence-based research strategy for 
understanding and harnessing indigenous mechanisms as resources in post-conflict 
state reconstruction.  
 
1.3.1 Research Questions 
 
To achieve the objectives outlined above, this work attempts to address the following 
core question: In what ways might the Poro (and Sande) sodalities contribute to or 
undermine the reconstruction of collapsed states in Liberia and Sierra Leone? 
Specifically, the work will explore the following research questions: 
 
1. Did international state reconstruction efforts in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
recognise and/ or engage the Poro and Sande in recovering and rebuilding the 
collapsed states? 
2. In what ways did the international effort affect the self-renewing agencies of 
indigenous systems, particularly the Poro and Sande sodalities? 
3. In what ways did the Poro and Sande impact the achievement of the following 
post-conflict state reconstruction and peacebuilding sub goals, and what 
lessons can be drawn to inform future post-conflict state reconstruction efforts 
in Africa? 
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• Post-conflict disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration and security 
sector reform 
• Return, resettlement and community revitalisation 
• Re-establishing structures of local governance 
4. What is the quality of state systems emerging from the state reconstruction 
efforts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and how did interaction or non-interaction 
with the Poro and Sande affect such quality?  
5. What strategies are appropriate for harnessing indigenous resources in 
rebuilding collapsed states?  
 
1.3.2 Core Arguments of the Thesis 
 
Drawing from four years of research work on the extent of interactions between the 
internationally driven liberal peace approach to post-conflict state reconstruction and 
indigenous institutions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, I advance three inter-related 
arguments:   
 
1. That the growing decay and collapse of the state in Africa is telling evidence 
that the African state is yet to take root in Africa.  All attempts to ‘Africanise’ 
(Shraeder, 2004), ‘traditionalise’ (Chabal and Daloz, 1999) or even ‘insulate’ 
(Kukah, 2003) the state from Africa’s own political, security and economic 
realities have failed to establish viable states in most of Africa.  As a 
consequence, nearly all states in Africa have suffered conditions of fragility 
and, sometimes, violent collapse. Ali Mazrui (1995) suggests that the 
turbulence is a manifestation of the violent configurations taking place 
between African indigenous institutions, discourses and political cultures and 
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those of the Westphalian state.  I further Mazrui’s observation by arguing that 
collapse is not only a manifestation of the configuration process, it is the 
threshold for state reproduction.  This ‘ripeness’ for political transformation 
potentially offered by collapse is more likely to be realised if it is established 
and informed by the emerging political agencies and foundations resulting 
from the long and violent configuration process.  There is the tendency in 
international post-conflict state reconstruction practice to treat state collapse as 
an aberration.  A result is the tendency to dismiss building blocks emerging 
from the violent collapse—building blocks on which post-conflict states 
should have been established to ensure viability and sustainability.  In place of 
the conflict-induced building blocks, the international state reconstruction 
architects tend to introduce prefabricated, externally borrowed institutions and 
systems.  This practice risks reversing the transformative gains from the 
violent configuration, thereby re-establishing conditions that are prone to new 
violent collapse.  
 
2. The state has interacted with indigenous institutions ever since the state was 
introduced in Africa, despite earlier state-builders, influenced by the 
imperialist doctrine of Terra Nullius13, remaining oblivious to this fact.  Those 
recognising the interaction blame indigenous institutions and practices for the 
failure of the state and insist that all efforts should be mobilised to protect 
African states from African societies.  Aside from the negative criticism, there 
is little mention of possible contributions indigenous mechanisms may have 
made to state survival.  I argue that the Eurocentric reactions to African 
                                                
13Terra nullius was a doctrine used by colonialists to justify their conquest.  It means that all lands conquered were 
said to be empty before the arrival of the colonialists.  This suggests that the lands were devoid of people, history, 
culture and meaning. 
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indigenous institutions account for the mutually destructive relationships 
which were established between indigenous and state institutions.  I posit that 
more constructive interactions guided by the culture of dialogue and mutual 
understanding are likely to yield mutually reinforcing relationships, which 
could lead to institutional congruence and the reproduction of durable, 
resilient and responsive states in the context of state collapse.  
  
3. Critical realism offers a useful lens in examining the political agencies of 
African indigenous sodality institutions and the implications for their 
interactions with state institutions.  Critical realism argues that all mechanisms 
are possessed with powers and liabilities, which account for their ability to 
generate or reproduce.  These determine the extent to which the mechanism 
will influence or be influenced by other mechanisms in its context.  Such 
mechanisms can be transitive (the socially produced objects) or intransitive 
(natural objects that are not socially produced).  I argue that the transitive and 
intransitive framework provides a strong theoretical lens and analytical 
framework for understanding the implications of interactions between 
indigenous institutions, formal state institutions, and the larger environment in 
context.   
   
1.4 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT OF THE THESIS 
 
The scale and impact of the multilateral state reconstruction project and its primacy to 
the international policy agenda, as Chandler (2005) has rightly judged, presents a 
conundrum for which a steep learning curve is a necessity.  The debate revolves 
around three key questions: a) who is in the lead in reconstructing collapsed states and 
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what is the moral, legal and strategic basis for their role, b) how are states being 
reconstructed, and c) how viable are the outcomes.  While few still agitate for “a 
sovereign state to be treated as an independent political unit… and it be allowed to 
pursue its domestic affairs without external interference…” emerging frameworks and 
doctrines have weakened this claim (Koji, 2003:11).  In 2001, the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) issued a report affirming 
that ‘where gross human rights abuses are occurring, it is the duty of the international 
community to intervene, over and above considerations of state sovereignty’ (ICISS, 
2001). Endorsing the report, the UN General Assembly at the 2005 World Summit 
declared, “Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from 
genocide, war, crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity…”14 However, 
in the event that a state is incapable and/ or is complicit in these crimes, the 
international community is “…prepared to take collective action in a timely and 
decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the UN 
Charter…”15 The human security argument is reinforced by the growing realisation of 
the interdependency of global security.16  Mark Duffield (2007), citing Tony Blair’s 
claims on the internationalisation of insecurity17, notes that the intent behind the 
clamour to spread liberal peace values across the world is more towards protecting the 
liberal world and its way of life rather than saving war-ravaged communities in the 
                                                
14
Paragraph 139 of the Millennium +5 Outcome Document (September 15, 2005).  Available on 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire.  Accessed 21/02/07. 
15Ibid. It is also important to note that proponents of the sovereignty thesis are weakened each time tyrants and 
warlords display grotesque crimes, such as those associated with, in the case of West Africa, the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) of Sierra Leone, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), the Liberia United for 
Reconciliation and Development (LURD), and Taylor’s Liberia. For more on this argument, please see Integrated 
Regional Information Networks (2006) “Justice Unfettered? Internationalising Justice in the Human Rights Era” 
(www.globalpolicy.org, accessed on 21/02/2007) 
16Speiser and Handy in their article “The State, its failure and External Intervention in Africa” (Centre for the 
Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, Working Paper No. 175/05) indicate that European and American 
policymakers, thanks to the horrible events of 9/11, have realised that “state collapse whether in faraway Africa or 
next-door Eastern Europe or Haiti with its attendant vices threatens ‘Western’ security, prosperity, and way of life” 
(p. 2-3). 
17
Tony Blair’s policy argument on the internationalisation of insecurity was articulated in his August 1, 2006 
speech on World Politics, World Affairs Council, Los Angeles, available at http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk, cited in 
Mark Duffield, “Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples”. 
Sam Doe Final Thesis UB No. 04008980 11 
impoverished world.18  Rather than belabour an already decided debate on the moral 
and legal positions19, both sides now argue from an operational basis. The dominant 
debates centre on whether insiders or outsiders should take the lead in state 
reconstruction, and on the quality of the outcomes of reconstruction.  A review of the 
positions is necessary. 
 
1.4.1 The Debate on Internal Leadership in State Reconstruction 
 
Christopher Clapham doubts whether outsiders can actually reconstruct a state for any 
people.  His argument is based on his thesis that all states must be built on 
foundations of strong social capital and indigenous “raison d’etre” (Clapham, 2003: 
35).  Marina Ottaway (2003) takes the debate further by contending that “External 
actors may build organisations but,” she insists, “they cannot build institutions” (p. 
259).  If Sillitoe’s (2002) claim that institutions are forms of discourse is anything to 
go by, then Ottaway is right. Institutions can only be built, or at least given life and 
raison d’etre, from within.  Sawyer (2005) agrees with the discursive claim for 
institution building.  He contends that durable institutions are those that are developed 
through processes of decision-making characterised by informed discourse among a 
society’s people.  Such an internally induced institutional reconfiguration and 
transformation process, Chandler posits, “results in the building of domestic 
consensus, a sense of political community usually after a real clash and eventual 
                                                
18Duffield also reminds us that the direct links between poverty and the production of terrorists is not that obvious.  
Otherwise Africa, and not the Gulf and Asian regions, should have topped the list of terrorist producing regions 
globally.  He also reminds liberal enthusiasts that while these impoverished regions, particularly in Africa, assume 
the blame for their fate, we must not forget that their predicament is intimately linked to the liberal practice of 
capital accumulation and dispossession. 
19For a detailed review of the legal debate on humanitarian intervention, please see Wheeler, Nicholas J., Saving 
Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in InternationalSociety (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000); Wheeler, 
Nicholas J. and Alex J. Bellamy: ‘Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics’ in Baylis, John and Steve Smith, 
(eds.), The Globalisation of World Politics 3rd ed., (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004); and Verwey, W., 
‘Legality of Humanitarian Intervention After the Cold War’ in The Challenge to Intervene: A New Role for the 
United Nations?, Ferris, E. (ed.), (Life and Peace Institute, Upsala, 1992). 
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reconciliation of existing social forces,” indigenous or otherwise (2005: 5).  “Outside 
interventions,” de Waal contends, interfere with this process instead of hastening or 
strengthening it (Waal, 1997: 639, cited in Moore, 2004:2).  He goes on to argue that 
current practices hinder the development of strong bonds between state and society 
and therefore undermine the development of “democratic good governance”—the 
pretext under which the international community embarks on the project in the first 
place (ibid).20  Martin Doornbos (2003) focuses on the insider-outsider relationships 
being established as a result of current practices.  He observes that the overwhelming 
and rapid intervention of external actors in state reconstruction tends to create internal 
and external dichotomies in which internal actors are disempowered either by the 
mere presence and capacity of the external actors, or the domineering and usurping 
tendency of international state reconstruction practices.  As for Tirman (2004), he 
alleges that the assumption “that ‘better coordination’ or ‘good governance’ will take 
care of post-conflict state reconstruction duties, as claimed by ‘humanitarian 
internationals’ is not only a managerial and imperialist mindset, it is often a prelude to 
failure” (p 3).  Judging from indicative outcomes in Sierra Leone and Timor Leste, 
among others, Tirman, as cited at the beginning of the chapter, is pessimistic about 
the externally driven project.  Chesterman, Ignatieff and Thakur (2005: 9), drawing 
from a range of studies, arrive at an emphatic conclusion: “states cannot be made to 
work from the outside”. 
 
 
                                                
20One concrete example de Waal cites is the question of accountability.  While much of the international 
interventions usurp state functions, the international community is often not subject to domestic claims for 
accountability.  This lack of accountability to the public it serves undermines liberal democratic practice.  The only 
hope, de Waal concludes, is for those being saved to assume ownership of the process, but he falls short of 
proffering strategies on how this could happen. See Alex de Waal (1997) Famine Crimes: Politics and the 
Disaster Relief Industry in Africa. 
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1.4.2 Pro-international State Reconstruction Debate 
 
In response to critics of internationally driven post-conflict state reconstruction, 
Moore (2004: 8), citing Edward Luttwak21, asks, “Should one give war a chance… 
can one really believe that the humanitarian international is slowing the wheels of 
history and thus stalling the emergence of a strong indigenous, and one hopes against 
hope, liberal democratic bourgeoisie?” as charged by de Waal and others?  While 
acknowledging the limitations of current approaches and the need for improvement, 
Moore doubts whether internal leadership is a viable option, or whether things will 
get any better if the international community adopts a hands-off approach22.  Contrary 
to de Waal’s and Doornbos’s claim of negative consequences, Moore contends that 
international intervention strengthens the beneficiary state to the extent that it is 
“capable of coping with the ravages of a new world ‘order’” (p. 2).  Moore reminds 
proponents of ‘internal leadership’ that we are in an era when states “have been 
effectively drawn into multileveled and increasingly non-territorial decision-making 
networks that bring together governments, international agencies, non-governmental 
organisations…” (ibid).  Although current practices in state reconstruction and 
humanitarian intervention “will not lead to de Waal’s imagined statist status quo 
ante,” Moore insists it “contributes to the creation of a new and partially globalised 
‘state class’ and citizenry better equipped to deal with the global processes of state 
and societal restructuring in which war-torn societies are most intricately intertwined” 
                                                
21The citation of Luttwak’s work, which argues for war conclusion disregarding the self-perpetuating tendency of 
war driven by war economies, seems an attempt to dismiss the arguments of de Waal.  Nowhere did de Waal argue 
for letting wars reach their full conclusion.  His argument is about highlighting the resources emanating from 
conflict situations and allowing these emerging agencies to find full expression in the transformative process set in 
motion by the violent conflict.  
22Rwanda comes to mind as an example of what happens when the international community chooses not to 
intervene.  Although the liberation of Rwanda can be credited to internal leadership through the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front, the price of the international community’s decision not to intervene was so grave that this inaction continues 
to weigh heavily on the international conscience.   
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(ibid).23 He, however, admits that the current efforts of state reconstruction are 
inadequate, but declines to acknowledge any possible negative effects from the 
deficiency.24  As for Wheeler (2000), he reminds us of the moral imperative: wealthy 
nations are under obligation to “save strangers”.  He is more emphatic in expressing 
doubt about domestic leadership in state reconstruction.  He contends that in the 
contexts of collapsed states, where the minimum social and political cohesion of the 
society has eroded, leaving so-called indigenous leaders and institutions to restore the 
state is an illusion (ibid).  
 
1.4.3 Debates on the Strategies and Outcomes  
 
Aside from the insider-outsider debates, there are those who focus on the strategies 
and quality of states being rebuilt. Chandler (2005) questions the international 
community’s technical and administrative approach to state reconstruction, where 
external actors define the rules and procedures, often from a claim to best practice.  
Duffield is more categorical.  He argues that post-conflict international actors in post-
conflict contexts operate “…essentially Newtonian and machine-like in conception 
[where the process is viewed] precisely as an attempt to close down one machine so 
that another can be ‘kick-started into life’” (Duffield, 2001: 85).  Kumar (1997: 27) 
offers a more comprehensive description of how the project is delivered, which I 
adopt as follows:   
                                                
23The same claim that African political elites are better placed to rule since they know the centre, speak the 
language of the colonial masters and are trained to operate the complex state institutions was made at 
independence.  Although that assumption has woefully been proved erroneous, the current actions of the 
international community seem oblivious to this reality.  
24Moore calls for “longitudinal studies to assess the efficacy of current approaches in contributing to ‘democratic 
state-ness’ in new and renewed states” (p. 4).  Such studies, Moore avers, will deepen our “understanding on how 
[international interventions] affect processes of state building and democratisation in war-torn societies, and how 
they are altered by contemporary modes of globalisation” (p. 4).  Until then, he insists, the argument against 
international state reconstruction projects is speculative.  But by the same token, it is difficult to establish Moore’s 
own claim that the project does create a ‘globalised state-class’ citizen capable of engaging the global, even if it 
means total ignorance of the local. 
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• The project is often designed with limited flexibility in terms of time and 
resources;  
• There is a tendency to apply untested intervention models, and when they fail with 
disastrous consequences, no culpability is established;   
• The post-conflict state reconstruction context is often swarming with a multitude 
of international actors who represent varied and sometimes irreconcilable 
interests; 
• Not only are there limited coordination strategies and mechanisms, there is ‘turf’-
defending and deliberate resistance to coordination; 
• The bureaucracy is replete with red tape and intentionally designed to be 
incomprehensible; 
• Projects are often inappropriately placed to serve the respective national political 
interests, rather than address felt needs;   
• Local communities are objectified and seen as helpless and ignorant recipients of 
international assistance;  
• Where there are successful local initiatives, they are romanticised and, like 
Christopher Columbus, the international actors who first encounter these scattered 
success stories report them as their own;  
• The international state reconstruction project is very expensive and, given the 
limited input of local actors, unsustainable.   
 
Kumar concludes his observation by arguing that while the international community 
may have many years of experience and technical knowledge in economic and to 
some extent social reconstruction, it’s knowledge is limited when it comes to political 
(or state) reconstruction (ibid).  Paris (2004) adds to the debate on the epistemic basis 
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for the project. He argues that the internationally driven state reconstruction project is 
an extension of the liberal peace thesis, but with a minus. While Paris’s diagnosis of 
the problem is accurate, his prescription is more likely to worsen the condition of the 
patient.  I return to the liberal thesis and Paris’s prescription in Chapter 6.   
 
For now, it is worth noting that the debates in the literature so far remain shallow.  
While proponents of domestic leadership have strong arguments on their side, they 
fail to address the total breakdown of the social fabric, entrenchment of cleavages, 
and the lack of financial and human resources that often dog post-collapsed states.  
Besides, there is the generalisation that whatever is ‘within’ has the legitimate claim 
to the project.  The perennial confrontation between indigenous institutions in Africa 
and the elites who took over the state and drove it to collapse is not recognised in the 
debate (Davidson, 1992).  This also applies to the insidious corruption of indigenous 
institutions over the last decades and even centuries, which transformed them into 
what Abraham (1978) calls “personal amorphous” structures.  These, under the 
tutelage of the settler states, exercised what I would call personal amorphous authority 
in the interiors of Liberia and Sierra Leone.  This domestic indigenous and domestic 
conventional divide remains a threat to any attempts at rebuilding from within (I 
return to the settler-state and interior divide in Chapter 3).  While the verdict is yet to 
be passed on the externally led process, one only needs to draw from history to 
establish a pattern and speculate on the possible outcomes.  All this reinforces 
Clapham’s observation that “…state reconstruction has become a far more complex 
and ambivalent business under the pressures of globalisation” (Clapham, 2003: 41).  
And as Holzgrefe and Keohane (2003) concede, “current theorising of state 
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reconstruction takes place in a state of evincible ignorance” where the “…empirical 
claims are little more than guesswork” (cited in Tirman, 2004: 3).  
 
1.4.4 Gaps and contribution to the Literature  
 
I have already outlined conceptual and operational gaps in the state reconstruction 
project in the previous section.  Here I focus on a specific gap, which is the absence of 
indigenous sodality institutions in the discourse of rebuilding collapsed states in 
Africa.  There is a burgeoning body of literature on African indigenous systems, 
processes and institutions and their role in conflict resolution and peace building, 
local governance, medicine, security, etc.25 Such growing articulation of what Africa 
has to offer both to itself and further to the world is a welcome effort that was hitherto 
dismissed, particularly during the heydays of colonialism.  Nevertheless, one 
indigenous institution that is less prominent in the emerging Africanist scholarly 
international relations (IR) discourse is the indigenous sodality institution— 
pejoratively branded as ‘secret societies’ by earlier anthropologies.  Their political 
agency and potential role in statebuilding and sustenance are less known.26 Few 
regard African indigenous sodality institutions as political structures.  Others regard 
them as spiritual entities and, given their secretive and mythical character, 
impenetrable and intellectually unmanageable (Richards et al, 2005; Ellis, 1999).  
                                                
25The World Bank’s Indigenous Knowledge project has developed a compendium of indigenous resources, ranging 
from medicine and dispute resolution mechanisms to agricultural technology and governance.  This comprehensive 
collection of indigenous knowledge is also silent on indigenous sodalities, particularly their social and political 
roles.  For more details, see World Bank Indigenous Knowledge Database Africa Region, available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ik/guidelines/.  Also the list of African and non-African Africanist scholars is 
growing at a phenomenal rate. This includes: Duba et al (1997), Honey and Heifer, Grasses, Milk and Water: A 
Heritage of diversity in Reconciliation, Mennonite Central Committee, Nairobi: Kenya; Gluckman (1973) Custom 
and Conflict in Africa, Basil Blackwell: Oxford; Solanke (1092) ‘Traditional Social and Political Institutions’ in 
Olaniyan: 27-37; Finnegan (1967) Limba Stories and Storytelling, Clarendon Press: Oxford; Mamdani (1996) 
Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Colonialism, Princeton University Press: Princeton.  
26To my knowledge, very few draw links between African sodalities and African politics and those who do 
including Patrick Chabal (1986; 1994; 1996; 1997; 2002), Daloz, J.P. (2002); Hyden, G. (1980; 1997; 2006); Ellis 
(1999) and Christopher Clapham (1997) speak of the destructive effects of indigenous sodalities to the state. 
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Contrary to the generalisation that indigenous sodality institutions in Africa lack 
political agencies, the Poro (and Sande) sodality in the Upper Guinea Coast of West 
Africa has served as the sole political institution and guarantor for security and social 
order and wellbeing in the interiors of Liberia and Sierra Leone.  Beaming the 
scholarly spotlight on the Poro sodality in this emerging wave of state reconstruction 
introduces a much-neglected area into the theoretical investigation of the state and 
politics in Africa.  This is critical for societies such as Liberia and Sierra Leone, 
where the dominant political systems predating colonialism and the establishment of 
the Westphalian state were sodalitous in nature.  They continue to hold sway in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone despite centuries of systematic efforts to silence and/ or 
destroy them.   
 
 1.4.5 Justifications for Situating the Work in International Relations 
 
I establish this work in the international relations (IR) discourse.  However, by 
attempting to bring indigeneity, the subject of the work, into the IR discourse is to 
introduce what Beier refers to as “multiple cosmologies” and thereby negate IR’s 
basic premise, which upholds Western concepts of power, security and autonomy as 
universal tenets (Beier, 2004: 3).  This is bound to suffer backlash from diehard IR 
conservatives.27 For them, the state as defined in the Treaty of Westphalia is the sole 
unit of analysis in international relations and that indigenous political systems are 
subjects of anthropology—the study of social microcosm. The relegation of 
indigenous politics and institutions to anthropology, Beier observes, was a 
                                                
27
Hegel and his call to “Forget Africa”, Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations, Robert Kaplan’s ‘Coming 
Anarchy’ and ‘New Barbarism’ theses, and Patrick Chabal and J.P. Daloz claims of Africa’s patrimonial order 
encroaching on the pure and unadulterated Westphalian state, are just a few of the many IR scholars and students 
who could challenge the introduction of sodality in IR discourse.  
Sam Doe Final Thesis UB No. 04008980 19 
consequence of claims made during the heydays of colonialism which postulated that 
‘primitive’ peoples were neither capable of forming societies of the sorts known in 
Europe, nor did they “represent any authentic political claim” (ibid).  Hegel, cited in 
Franke (2009), was more categorical in articulating the Eurocentric stereotype about 
Africa: 
 
At this point we leave Africa, not to mention it again.  For it is no historical part 
of the world, it has no movement or development to exhibit.  Historical 
movement in it—that is in its northern part—belongs to the Asiatic or European 
world.  What we properly understand by Africa is the unhistorical, 
underdeveloped spirit still involved in the conditions of mere nature, and which 
had to be presented here as on the childhood of the world’s history (p. 3).28 
 
Franke rightly observes that such stereotypical presentation of Africa has undermined 
Africa’s potential to contribute to the IR discourse (2009).  As a consequence, 
“International Relations is impoverished by a restrictive cosmology that does not 
admit to a full range of imaginable possibilities” (Beier, 2005: 26).  The usurpation 
and deliberate silence of IR on indigenous institutions, Beier contends, makes the 
discipline guilty of the “violences of erasure” (p. 67).  Holsti (1996) observes well 
when he said that although current IR, security and peace studies literature is growing, 
these remain inadequate in deepening our understanding of current international 
dynamics.  He dismisses the overprotection of disciplinarity in IR as a selective 
disregard for the eclectic origin of IR (cited in Beire, 2005).29  This work adds to the 
growing voices insisting on a rethink of Hegel’s Eurocentric claims about Africa.  
More importantly, the introduction of sodality institutions as political institutions with 
                                                
28
See Franke, B. (2009) Security Cooperation in Africa: A Re-appraisal, First Forum Press. 
29Again this work is not suggesting that efforts are not underway. Much work has been done to expand the 
discourse and the number of African voices active in the debate has grown at impressive rate.  The list includes 
people like David Francis, especially his recent works on Peace and Conflict in Africa (2008), The Politics of 
Economic Regionalism: Sierra Leone in ECOWAS (2001) and his edited book of Civil Militias: Africa’s 
Intractable Security Menace (2006); George Ayettey in his book Indigenous African Institutions (1991) and Africa 
Unchained: The blueprint for Africa’s future and Mamdani’s (1996) Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa 
and the Legacy, among many others.   
Sam Doe Final Thesis UB No. 04008980 20 
functions usually in the domain of the state brings fresh debates and offers a new 
window to a rich and under-explored area of Africa’s political development.  This in 
my view remains a critical missing link in what is becoming a lively and crowded 
debate on the political relevance of Africa in the IR discourse. 
 
1.5 PORO, PEOPLE AND POLITICS IN LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE 
 
This work is about the Poro sodality and its female version, the Sande, and their role 
in post-conflict state reconstruction in Liberia and Sierra Leone.  It is therefore 
prudent to begin with an in-depth review of the sodalities. Sodality30 institutions were 
the dominant features of political and social life in the Upper Guinea Coast.31  Among 
the dominant sodality institutions in Liberia were the Poro and Sande, Bodio, Neegee, 
Susha, Toya, Kala and Uama-yama.  In Sierra Leone, aside from the Poro and Sande, 
there are the Ragbenle, Wonde, Humoi, Njayei, Tuntu, Thoma, Yasi and Gbangbe 
(Little, 1965; Ellis 1999).  The re-captives and the repatriates also had an abundance 
of sodalities, of which the Freemason and the United Brother Friendship dominated as 
avenues through which the free slaves expressed brotherly and sisterly solidarity, 
preserved social order and advanced Black Pride (Sawyer, 1992).  All accounts 
indicate that of all the sodalities in the region, the Poro and Sande were the most 
pervasive in the lives of ethnic groups that practiced them (Ellis, 1999; Little, 1965; 
d’Azevedo, 1969; Ferme, 2001; Sawyer, 1992).  Sawyer (1992) describes the Poro as 
“…the countervailing and reinforcing authority in all Mel and Mande societies” 
(p.48).  As universal membership sodalities, all individuals born to the tribes are 
required to undergo the Poro and Sande initiation rites.  Watkins describes the 
                                                
30The word sodality comes from the Latin word ‘sodalitas’ or ‘fellowship’.  It refers to bonded institutions, 
societies, and individuals in a spirit of fraternity. I prefer the term to the pejorative ‘secret society’ that 
anthropologists used to describe the Poro and other sodality institutions in mostly Africa.   
31
This includes areas that are known today as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire. 
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initiation process as “complete rite de passage” through which members of the 
communities were ushered into adulthood and enjoined, as citizens, to perform all the 
sacred and secular duties expected of citizens in their societies with diligence and zeal 
(Watkins, loc. Cit: 671).   
 
The Poro (and the Sande) is hierarchical and secretive.  Its ultimate powers reside in a 
high priest whom, for a lack of better word, Watkins refers to as “grandmaster”.  He 
must not be seen by the community, and dons a mask and costume to that effect. The 
‘grandmaster’ is expected to have, in addition to spiritual powers and characteristics, 
in-depth knowledge of the ethnic community and all things that facilitate life in the 
society, and command the respect of chiefs, elders, children, women and the entire 
community (Brown, 1967: 69). The grandmaster is represented in communities by 
Zoes (or priests), who are selected from prominent families whose ancestors are said 
to have made a pact with the spirits of the ancestors (Harley, 1941).32  The Zoes, 
constituted as the Poro Council, serve as the Electoral College and adjudicators in all 
Poro-practicing societies, although the grandmaster has the final say.  A third level of 
leadership is the council of elders (known among the Sande as the Soweisia), who 
play the role of teachers and guardians both during the extended initiation rites and 
throughout the life of an individual.  The Poro depends on its youth population to be 
its foot soldiers, and on a select group of men commonly known as the traditional 
hunters.33  Although the Poro sodality covers four countries and more than 25 ethnic 
groups in the Upper Guinea Coast of West Africa, it has no centralised governing 
                                                
32The grandmaster rarely participates in the affairs of the society. The grandmaster appears and arbitrates only in 
times of war and during major inter-tribal disputes between Poro practicing communities.  The chiefs and council 
of elders are charged with the administration of the state, regions, and communities. 
33
These include the Kamajors, Kaprs, Tamaboros, Donzos, etc.  
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structure.  Each ethnic group has its own structure drawing from the same set of 
beliefs, values and practices.34   
 
There are mixed accounts regarding the origin and purpose of the establishment of the 
Poro and Sande sodalities.  Some speculate that the Poro emerged as a supra-national 
institution with secular and supernatural powers to respond to political and military 
instabilities that existed in the Guinea Coast, and for which “petty diplomacies” and 
cross-ethnic cooperative mechanisms were inadequate (Richards et al, 2005: 13).35  
Others suggest that the sodality was the dominant political institution in the Malian 
Empire until around 900 AD, when the royal elites converted to Islam and outlawed 
the institution (Key Informant, Gbarnga, 2006).  The peripheral tribes who maintained 
the practice in the Empire might have carried it down south as they escaped further 
invasions.  Whatever the origin, what is not disputed is the fact that the Poro and 
Sande are essentially a political construct which, by the time the states of Liberia and 
Sierra Leone were introduced, had survived over a millennium and spread to nearly 
all ethnic groups in Sierra Leone, Liberia and the forest regions of Guinea and Cote 
d’Ivoire (Bellman, 1984).  They maintain their ubiquitous presence till this day, 
despite state repression and the pressure from modernity.  This enduring power, Little 
(1965) indicates, is a consequence of the meaningful function of the Poro and Sande.  
He identifies social, political and spiritual functions which the sodalities perform in 
practicing societies. A brief description of the functions is necessary.   
                                                
34In order to forge inter-ethnic cohesion and foster pan-Poro sodality, all ethnic groups operate the Poro bush 
schools in languages other than their own language. For instance the grandmaster, when speaking to a Kpelleh 
community, would speak in Lorma or Vai, etc.  Also, teachers are drawn from other ethnic groups to facilitate 
inter-ethnic interactions.  It is also important to note that the Liberian government made attempts to centralise the 
Poro in the 1930s.  They established an apex body to oversee the sodality and designated a special place in Central 
Liberia as its headquarters.  That attempt proved disastrous for both the government and the institution itself.  It 
created internal squabbles and resistance within the sodality, which further exacerbated social disorder in the 
hinterland. 
35During the turbulent 16th to 17th century period in the Guinea Coast region, Richard et al (2005) suggests, the 
Poro and Sande were used by the societies to “preserve trade secrets, coordinate war, impose peace and maintain a 
common cultural front against the expanding empires” (p. 12). 
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1.5.1 Social or Educational Function  
 
The knowledge and history of the ethnic community, including essential life skills 
that the ‘grandmaster’ is reputed to possess, must be transferred from generation to 
generation through education; hence, the Poro and Sande sodalities operate an 
elaborate educational system.  While the Poro, through the educational system, 
controls the transformation of boys to men, the Sande is tasked with supporting and 
facilitating the transformation of girls into women.  Over a period of four years (for 
boys) and three years (for girls), the school moulds boys and girls through various 
subjects and methodologies39 to foster unity among them, preserve and, when 
necessary, defend the society’s way of life (Brown, 1967: 69).36 It is also at the school 
that an initiate’s individuality is subsumed under the collective identity of the ethnic 
community; thus elevating social collectivism above individuality.  A big part of the 
Sande transformation process is to instil morality and proper sexual comportment in 
young women (Bledsoe, 1980; MacCormack, 1975).37  Just as boys are circumcised 
during their initiation ritual, the clitoris and part of the labia of girls are also excised 
during their rites of passage in the Sande School (MacCormack, 1975: 157).  
Womanhood begins and ends with the Sande, as the sodality remains integral in the 
lives of its initiates until death.38   The transformational emphasis of the Poro and 
                                                
39
The contents of courses taught in the Sande School varied from those of the Poro.  Girls learned how to take care 
of their homes, grow gardens, tell stories to their children about the origin, myths and values of their ethnic group, 
and how to conduct themselves when in public. They also take health courses including knowledge of basic herbs, 
guides to fertility, etc. Boys were trained to respect elders and women, take pride in their traditions, support their 
families, and discharge their kinship obligations with dignity. They also learned skills in warfare, drumming, 
dancing, basic civil engineering, hunting and singing; and general knowledge in history, law and religion.  The 
core values the Sande School inculcates in girls include chastity, compassion, hard work and how to foster unity 
and social healing.  Boys and girls are marked as members of the ethnic group.  In addition, female genital 
mutilation is practiced on girls and circumcision on boys. 
36
As indicated earlier, although Poro and Sande are not centralised, the contents and methodology of the schools 
are similar. Besides, as a way of fostering pan-Poro solidarity, boys from one ethnic group could attend the school 
in another. Teachers and initiates are also moved between groups. Also, in many Poro-governed societies, the 
duration of the bush school has been reduced to allow boys and girls to attend formal schools. The cross-ethnic 
pan-Poro sodality was the central mechanism for promoting pluralism and inter-ethnic harmony 
37It is important to stress here that the definition of who is or is not a child in Poro society goes beyond the 
universal biological consideration of childhood.  While physical growth or age is one factor, in Poro society the 
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Sande on producing individuals of good character, dignified in their deportment and 
productive for their respective societies, distinguishes these institutions from other 
educational systems that place greater emphasis on cognitive development.39 This, 
however, is not to suggest that the rites de passage of the sodalities do not have 
serious excesses.  I shall discuss the excesses in section 1.5.4. 
 
1.5.2 Supernatural or Religious Function  
 
Although the Poro was organised primarily for social, political and security reasons, 
Harley (1941) insists it was established not only to end wars and build camaraderie 
amongst communities, but also to “reduce the entire pervading spirit world to an 
organisation in which man may participate…” (opt. cit.: 7).  The Poro, Harley 
continues, was the “…mechanism by which man might contact the spirit world and 
interpret it to the people, where men became spirits, and took on god-hood…” (ibid).  
While Harley’s supposition can be dismissed as a Eurocentric exaggeration of the 
unknown, it is agreed that the Poro is based on the ethos that god and the spirits are 
invisible and that ancestors are the intermediary between humans and the spirit world.  
Power, it is believed, is a gift from the gods, which they give to individuals as they 
see fit.  Those who are possessed by these supernatural powers are accountable only 
to the ancestors and to the council of Zoes, who represent the ancestors in the material 
world (ibid).40  
                                                                                                                                      
“rites de passage” concludes childhood.  This means end of childhood and is synonymous with acquiring 
citizenship.  Until someone undergoes these rites, he is considered a child, which means exclusion from activities 
in society in which only adults may participate, including owning land, marriage, participating in public 
discussions (in the case of males) and women’s issues (in the case of females). 
39I argue in chapters 6 and 7 that the Poro educational system provides the most comprehensive approach to citizen 
and civic consciousness building. 
40While in this view accountability seems confined to the small group of spirit-imbued individuals comprising the 
council of Zoes, there were norms regarding their relationship with members of their society, which regulated any 
possible excesses.  This is not to suggest that such understanding was not prone to abuse of power and the creation 
of authoritarian regimes.  As will be discussed later, Poro societies used repression and suffering as indication of 
the ancestors being angry with their leadership.  In such instances the entire community either relocates, 
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1.5.3 Political Function 
 
Little (1966) indicates two overlapping phases of governance in Poro-governed 
societies: a) the civil phase and b) the religious phase (cited in Brown, 1967).  In the 
civil phase, governance focused on the management of the towns—providing welfare, 
attending to health issues, ensuring order and respect for the norms of the society—
while the religious phase was concerned with issues of emergency such as wars and 
cross-ethnic politics (ibid).  Little claims that it was in the latter phase that the 
authority of the Poro superseded that of the community chiefs (ibid).  Although both 
Harley and Little refer to their second phase as religious, their description is entirely 
political.  Theirs and all other accounts consistently indicate that Poro and Sande 
councils throughout the Upper Guinea Coast served as electoral colleges, declarers 
and negotiators of wars, adjudicators of disputes, guarantors of social order, 
regulators of trade and commerce, and preservers of the environment, societal norms, 
values and histories (Ferm, 2001; d’Azevedo, 1962; Sawyer, 1992; Little, 1965).  
Little (1965) has argued that the Poro and Sande were the principal means by which 
the areas known today as Sierra Leone, in particular, were governed.41  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
abandoning their Zoes for more benign leaders, or replaces them with better leaders.  Besides, the selection of 
leaders and highest Zoes from the council of Zoes was a rigid process. I return to this in Chapter 3. 
41Branding these political activities as religious seems, to the researcher, an attempt to perpetuate the Eurocentric 
claim that indigenous institutions and societies, especially in Africa, are incapable of innovating and operating 
political institutions. 
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1.6 CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE PORO AND SANDE: RATIONALE 
AND PROBLEMATICS  
 
1.6.1 Rationale of Poro and Politics   
 
The emergence of political institutions rooted in myth is not unique to the Poro-
governed societies.  Simmel (1901) argues that all societies depend on “illusion as to 
their powers and … superstition with reference to God” to sustain themselves and 
instil order (ibid: 3).42  Far from the moral valuation of secrecy, therefore, Simmel 
contends, “[secrecy or sodality] is the greatest accomplishment of humanity” (ibid: 4).  
I am not suggesting here that all societies are therefore sodalitous, nor am I 
contending that sodalities are entirely good.  In fact, Simmel identifies two 
characteristics that distinguish sodalities from all other societies.  Firstly, sodalities 
are autonomous, exclusive and separatist (ibid: 8).  However, while they appear 
exclusionary to the rest of the world, the firm boundaries which encircle them 
facilitate the spirit of unity and fraternity within (ibid).  Secondly, sodalities are a 
product of intentional and deliberate socialisation processes, and not of natural growth 
processes.  In the case of the Poro, the communal growing together is carefully 
carried out through well-defined socialisation techniques, the most important of which 
includes the discipline of silence, which Ferme (2001) and Bellman (1984) refer to as 
ifa mao;43 the symbolic eating, digesting and rebirthing44 of initiates by the 
grandmaster; and concealment45 of the identity of the grandmaster.  
                                                
42Secrecy and secret institutions have dominated the control of the Westphalian state across Europe and North 
America.   In the cover story of the February edition of New African No. 470, the editors ask whether secret 
societies are not the way forward for Africa.  They argued that sodalities like the Freemasons, the Skull and Bones 
and the Bohemian Grove, among others, have exerted great influence on the civilisation and development of 
Europe and America. 
43Ifa mao is a Kpelle phrase, which means ‘do not speak of it’.   Simmel indicates that all secret societies are 
highly dependent on the capacity or the inclination of the initiated to keep the secret and eschew betrayal (p. 23).  
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Given that these so-called secrets for which the Poro is considered adverse in 
Eurocentric polity are held by entire societies and across ethnic groups, I contend that 
the emphasis of the sodality was not so much on creating endogamous, separatistic 
societies shrouded in secrecy.  Rather, it was a process of establishing an expanded 
union of multiple ethnic groups with the aim of evolving a nation.  The process of 
secretiveness therefore provided a sense of nationalism couched in a feeling of 
superiority and separateness.  By the end of the 18th century, Little (1965) observes 
that the Poro and Sande nation-building project had extended to all groups of the Mel-
and Mande-speaking people.  They had one cosmology, one belief system—a symbol 
around which they united.  There was an effective pan-Poro security architecture, 
which monitored the trade routes, protected the diverse societies from invasion and, 
most importantly, facilitated an emerging shared history.46 While it is arguable 
whether the Poro would have incorporated the egalitarian Kwa-speaking people47, 
especially in the southeast of Liberia, its grip was far-reaching, embracing over 10 
million people in a contiguous territory under an evolving national tent.48  
                                                                                                                                      
Rather than rely on sanctions or the threat of these to ensure the secret is kept, the Poro teaches initiates various 
skills on how to be tactful in speech and thereby remain truthful to ifa mao (Harley, 1941). 
44Those thus rebirthed are said to constitute an interdependent community bonded by the unsaid.  Such 
interdependency, according to Simmel, lends a form of union and sense of superiority over outsiders (ibid: 28).    
45Richard et al (2005) refer to the grandmaster as the “Great Masked Thing” (18) and Gibbs (1965) emphasises 
that the “…masquerade is no mere frivolity… it generates the deference and fear that must surround [the 
grandmaster] if the Poro is to carry out its social and political control functions that link it to political institutions” 
(219-220).  Simmel (1901) therefore observes rightly when he points out that by concealment, all sodalities 
transform their leaders into “…terrible, powerful, and threatening” beings in order to instill fear and awe in their 
members (28).  It is the fear and awe that makes it possible to exercise absolute sovereignty over and command 
absolute loyalty from members. 
46The nation-building process of the Poro and Sande, according to Seyon, involves the socialisation of members of 
the new political community formed by integrating smaller communities in order to solicit their devotion and 
loyalty to the state and its leaders.  All this clearly justifies the Poro and Sande’s intense processes of education 
and transformation of individuals into citizens, as described in this chapter.  
47Marcomack records that even though the Poro was not successful at incorporating the Kwa-speaking people, 
many Kwa-speaking ethnic groups, including the Islamised ethnic communities, adopted the Sande.  So while the 
Poro was confined to the Mande and Mel communities in the Guinea Coast, the Sande was far-reaching, 
embracing the egalitarian Kwas along the coast and the Islamised Fulah and Mandingo ethnic groups that spread 
throughout both countries and across the West Africa sub region.  
48More importantly, even though confederacies and large states were developed among societies, especially in 
Poro-governed regions, no attempts were made to develop centralised political structures.  The Poro remained 
decentralised even in the same confederacies—coalescing while at the same time maintaining individual social and 
political structures of the various communities.  The introduction of Europe—from the days of slavery to 
colonialism, and later the establishment of the Westphalian state—added alien elements to the configuration 
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Notwithstanding its central role in organising the social, political, economic, religious 
and security spheres of rural peoples in Liberia and Sierra Leone, there are some 
practices of the Poro and Sande which conflict with basic freedoms and human rights.   
 
1.6.2 Problematics of the Poro and Sande 
 
The single most important area where the Poro comes into direct conflict with 
dominant contemporary discourse on civility, human rights and democratic freedom is 
its discourse and exercise of power.  Contrary to Foucault’s thesis that power exists in 
webs of relationships, Poro and Sande communities are socialised to believe in what I 
call a triangular power structure (O’Farrell, 2005).  In this structure, the gods are 
creators and givers of power; the gods select a few individuals and imbue them with 
powers; while the mass of the society are predestined as mere subjects. This notion of 
power clearly demarcates Poro and Sande communities into enclaves of the powerful 
and mass of the powerless.  How the gods select individuals to be worthy of 
possessing and exercising powers is hereditary.  This means that once the gods choose 
an individual, his/ her heirs would naturally inherit the powers. While power in Poro 
and Sande communities is manifested in the ability of the powerful to do and produce 
things, which the community consider extraordinary and meaningful, the most 
important exercise of power is the ability of the powerful to inflict harm, including the 
mysterious taking of human life and control of all resources in the community.  A key 
informant in Monrovia identified the life threatening myth as the main resource by 
which the powerful subject the rest of the society to social, economic and political 
quiescence (Key Informant, Monrovia, 2006). 
                                                                                                                                      
process by placing emphasis on assimilation and centralised hierarchies.  The consequence of this institutional 
collision, particularly between the state and the Poro, is the subject of subsequent sections. 
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Notwithstanding the establishment of councils of Zoes to protect all Poro 
communities from the arbitrary use of power, the fact that power is controlled by a 
privileged few who are accountable only to the gods predisposes Poro and Sande 
communities to the exploitation of despots and autocratic leaders.  Dunn and Tarr 
(1988) indicate that by the end of the 19th century, all countervailing institutions and 
modalities, which ensured that the powerful were held accountable, were severely 
weakened as the powerful few forged partnerships with slavers and colonial powers.  
The powerful few emerged as despots, while their new sources of power became the 
slavers and colonialists instead of the gods.  Senyon and Tarr indicate that it was easy 
to replace the gods with the slavers and colonialists, since the latter were removed 
from the day-to-day lives of the people and had the ability to exercise overwhelming 
violence.  As a consequence, as Arthur Abraham observes, what remained as political 
and governance systems of the Poro and Sande communities at the end of the 19th 
century were power structures controlled by despots who exercised arbitrary rule. 
These repressive regimes set in motion the weakening of rural polities and the rise of 
instability (Sawyer, 1992).   
 
The Poro and Sande’s elite power structure, which is also shrouded in myth, manifests 
itself in the communities in three important ways: a) the control of speech, b) control 
of women’s sexuality, and c) exclusion and marginalisation of youth and ‘strangers’.  
 
Control of Speech and Freedom of Expression:  A central part of the Poro and Sande 
sodalities rites de passage is to define power relations, inculcate power discourse and 
impose limits of power and powerlessness on individuals.  There is no dialogue or 
questioning of the power arrangements.  These are shrouded in myth and guided by 
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rigid, sometimes fatal consequences for those who attempt to rebel against or even 
question these arrangements. As part of its initiation exercises, initiates are entrusted 
with secrets of the community.  The law of ifa mao is imposed through oath to ensure 
that initiates do not violate the law. In other words, all members are enjoined under 
the laws of ifa mao not to disclose the secret. While control over speech is projected 
as an effort to keep the secrets of the community, critics of the sodalities argue that 
the process is ultimately aimed at ensuring quiescence and silence.  In this view, ifa 
mao violates freedom of speech and self-expression. A key informant in Freetown 
alleged that aside from keeping a community’s secret, control of speech is also aimed 
at preventing resistance and the emergence of critical voices against the privileged 
class.  In addition to the law of ifa mao, structures and spaces of communication are 
determined by age, gender and degree of ‘citizenship’.  By citizenship I mean that in 
Poro and Sande societies, those outside of the community including those who are 
non-initiates, have added restrictions on where and how they speak.  For instance 
youth and women are not allowed to speak in the presence of male elders, while 
young girls are expected to constrain their speech when in the presence of female 
adults. These fault lines undermine the building of plural and yet cohesive societies 
beyond initiates of the sodalities. 
 
Control of Female Sexuality (FGM): Aside from its social functions, a major part of 
the Sande sodality is the control of women’s sexuality. Girls who undergo Sande 
initiation rites undergo a process wherein parts of their clitoris, labia or mons pubis 
are excised.  Many ethnic groups in Liberia and Sierra Leone—including non-Poro 
groups—practice female genital mutilation (FGM). For instance, amongst the 
Mandigos who converted to Islam FGM is practised on infants. According to 
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Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (2007), over 95% of all women in 
Sierra Leone have undergone FGM.  It is important to note that the practice of FGM 
is not unique to the Sande sodality.  According to the WHO (1995) report on female 
genital mulilation, about 28 African countries practise FGM.  The report indicates that 
FGM prevalence rates are 97% in Egypt, 98% in Somalia, 94.5% in Eritrea and 
93.7% in Mali.  Another important point is that all of the countries with the highest 
prevalent rates are also countries where Islam—the strongest and longest opposition 
to the Poro sodality—is the predominant religion.  Notwithstanding its popularity and 
the strong evidence that the practice did not originate within the sodality, its adoption 
by the sodality has serious negative health and social consequences. WHO cites 
disfiguration of female body parts, high rates of maternal mortality and increased 
susceptibility to blood borne diseases including HIV/AIDS as the serious health risks 
that can be caused by FGM.  The second negative effect of FGM practice is its 
explicit control over women’s sexuality.  Some including Ellis (1999) and Richards et 
al (2004) contend that the Sande’s emphasis on chastity is a form of repressive control 
of the sexuality of women, which extends to other spheres in society, including 
political and economic spheres.  The excision of parts of girls’ reproductive system 
extends the abuse to violation of women’s integrity.  
 
While some of these allegations are accurate, my argument is that rather than give the 
sodalities support to abandon FGM, many advocates are campaigning for the total 
elimination of both sodalities.  Such sweeping campaigns not only ‘throws out the 
baby with the bath water’, they fail to offer alternatives that guarantee the social order 
and values which members of these communities learn and practice through the 
sodalities. Turning a blind eye to the constructive contributions Poro and Sande and 
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other sodality groups have made to social order and inter-group cohesion, I contend 
could delay post-conflict reconstruction. As I argue throughout the thesis, there is the 
need to support societal institutions such as the Poro and Sande to reinvent 
themselves, while ridding their institutions of practices that contravene fundamental 
human rights and freedoms. The most desirable outcome would be to evolve a 
synthesis between indigenous and state institutions and polities.  Dialogue with the 
two processes, in my view, will lead to the building of more viable, resilient and 
responsive states and societies. 
 
1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
1.6.1 Critical Realism as Theoretical Lens 
 
Critical realism propounded in the works of Roy Baskhar (1975 and 1989), Andrew 
Sayer (2002) and Archer (1995), among others, offer both a theoretical lens and a 
framework of analysis, which are suitable to assess the inherent powers and liabilities 
of mechanisms, and their interactions with mechanisms in the context.  This resonates 
with my aim to assess interactions between the state and the Poro sodality and the 
implications for the viability of both entities. Critical realists argue that empirical 
science has focused more on socially-produced objects, which they call transitive 
objects, to the neglect of intransitive objects, the “natural and social realities that are 
neither a product of, nor constituted by our theories about the world” (Baskhar 
1975:12).49  Figure 1.1 below illustrates my adoption of critical realists’ theoretical 
framework.  
 
                                                
49This transitive-intransitive dichotomy to the positivist only means theories, discourses and worldviews of the 
West against all other realities that do not fit into Western constructs. 
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Figure 1.1 Interactions of State and Poro Sodality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONTEXT: Demography, Ecology, Geography, Ethnicity, Population density, etc. 
 
In Figure 1.1, the first box contains structures and agencies intrinsic to the state—a 
transitive object that is illustrated in the second diagram.  The third is the Poro, also a 
transitive object, while the fourth contains the structures and agencies inherent to the 
Poro.  Both the state and the Poro interact with each other in the institutional 
environment as well as with natural realities—intransitive objects—in context.  Some 
of the natural intransitive objects include demography, ecology, geography, 
population density, ethnicity, etc. Post-independence state builders in Africa assumed 
that by establishing elements50 inherent to the Westphalian state, with disregard to the 
transitive and intransitive objects in its context, the state would operate originally and 
unimpeded.  Consequently, while institution building, training bureaucrats, 
establishing constitutions and laws, etc. were prioritised, little attention was paid to 
demographic composition, ecological conditions, cultures, history, geography and 
indigenous institutions.  Critical realism argues that the extent to which an object is 
influenced by or influences other objects and the natural context depends on its 
generative powers and liabilities.  It is these interactions which account for the 
“reproduced objects” (Baskhar, 1975) or “synthesis” (Archer, 1989). Clapham 
observes that because mechanisms outside of the state in African contexts, including 
                                                
50These include bureaucratic institutions and bureaucrats, constitutions and laws, military and other security 
apparatuses, defined territories and so-called citizens, etc. 
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sodality institutions, were given little consideration in the statebuilding and 
management equation, they have inadvertently undermined the performance and 
viability of the African state (Clapham, 2001).  Again, the lack of recognition of the 
intransitive objects in the current state reconstruction processes in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, it can be postulated, increases the risk of entrenching the crisis of state 
formation and statebuilding. 
 
A second critical realists’ theoretical lens adopted in this work is its interpretation of 
the structure-agency debate.51  Proponents of the ‘structure’ thesis argue, “while 
people choose their actions, they make their choices from cultural codes, discourses, 
or socialisation processes which they do not choose” (Carter and New, 2004: 4).  It 
does not seem to matter how the structures are formed or whether they are 
transplanted from another social reality or not.  Once they are brought into existence, 
structuralists would argue, “they become the movers and shakers of human actions” 
(p. 6).  A frequently cited example is the state.  In the thinking of structuralists, the 
state has become “an agent of protean omniscience, penetrating in profound ways 
every aspect of social life, leaving no room for social action to challenge or modify 
the state” (Goldberg, 2001: 293).  Aside from its pervasive character, the state has the 
tendency to pervert social systems in societies it dominates (ibid). The agency thesis 
argues to the contrary.  It contends that humans, not structure, are the “…causal 
primacy in explaining the social world… which is basically a product of people’s 
thoughts, habits and conversations” (Hird, 2002: 587).  Giddens proposes a third 
view, which he calls structuration.  Giddens insists that both structure and agency are 
                                                
51The social science dictionary defines agency as the capacity of humans to act independently and to make their 
own free choices, while structures refer to institutions, culture and social codes which constrain or influence 
individual actions.  See online Social Science Dictionary, available at http://bitbucket.icaap.org/dict.pl, accessed 
07/05/09. 
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conjoined, mutually reinforcing (and at times undermining) forces, which cannot even 
be analytically separated (Giddens 1984).  Recognising that people draw upon their 
inherent and learned transformational agency to shape structures, Giddens also agrees 
that structures, once formed, influence people’s actions (ibid).  Roy Baskhar (1989) 
builds on Giddens’ structuration thesis with a critical realist’s thinking.  Critical 
realists agree that both structure and agency are mutually reinforcing, but go beyond 
that to inquire about the capacity of either structure or agency to influence a 
phenomenon.  Essentially, two key questions that guide critical realists’ inquiries are: 
a) what are the powers intrinsic in a structure (in this case the state or indigenous 
sodality) that account for its capacity to influence change in people or society in 
general? And b) what are the vulnerabilities or predispositions intrinsic in the 
structure that makes it susceptible to change by humans or society in general?52  The 
structure/ agency debate has been at the centre of sociological theorising for 
generations, and I have no intention to recount the debates. The allusion is made here 
to point out the implication for the institutional interactions between the state and the 
Poro sodality in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and how elites of both institutions 
exploited the contradictions.53  
                                                
52Baskhar indicates that people are the only beings “capable of reflecting upon and so seek to alter or reinforce the 
social arrangements they encounter for the realisation of their own interest” (Baskhar, 1975, cited in Carter and 
New, 2004: 5). Critical realists identify endurance and constraining powers as the essential powers of structures, 
while agencies are possessed with powers of reflexivity, self-consciousness, intention, cognition, and emotion 
(Carter and New, 2004). 
53While this historical analysis provides compelling clues to the proposition of this work, it should in no way 
detract from its aim, which is to assess the efficacy and potential utility of the Poro in state reconstruction and 
quality of interactions (intended or unintended) between the externally driven statebuilding project and the Poro.  
It is important to note here that critical realism is not the same as scientific realism and realism in international 
relations (IR).  In fact its tenets seem to contradict both scientific and IR versions of realism.  Scientific realism is 
based on the claim that if a proposition is scientifically proven to be true in one place at a given time, it is true 
everywhere at all times.  It also claims scientific knowledge is independent of what people think (Harrington, 
2005).  IR realism flows from scientific realism as it holds the view that relations between and within states are 
best understood in terms of “struggles for power and self preservation disregarding all differences of political 
ideologies” (ibid: 295).  Given that a mechanism is influenced by agencies and structures inherent both to its 
nature and outside in its context, the claim of absolute truth everywhere and at all times is one this study aims to 
challenge.   
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1.6.2 Framework for Data Analysis 
 
Pawson (2006), drawing on the central argument of critical realism, offers an 
evidence-based framework for data analysis, which I also adopt in this work.  Pawson 
suggests that research conducted using a critical realists’ theoretical lens and which 
aims to influence policy, must be based on what he calls “weight of evidence” (p. 27).  
The weight of evidence is established by the quality of primary research and the 
extent of triangulation. Since critical realists aim to observe interactions between 
phenomena, Pawson indicates that the analysis should arrive at a synthesis which, he 
adds, contains three elements—mechanism, context and outcome.  Although all 
mechanisms (M) are imbued with causal powers (P) and liabilities (L), they are not 
the only drivers of the mechanism.  Realists contend that the actions of mechanisms 
are contingent on the context (C) wherein they exist.  The context is also imbued with 
powers and liabilities.  The combination of the inherent powers (P) of a mechanism 
(M) and its context (C) determines the range of outcomes (O) it produces or 
reproduces (2006).  The case is therefore made that the outcomes of the international 
reconstruction process are not only driven by the actions of external interveners, they 
are also contingent on other mechanisms (powers and liabilities) in context.   
 
1.6.3 Case Study Approach 
 
The choice of the case study approach (CSA) also deserves some explanation.  A key 
principle for researching indigenous resources is “wholeness and depth”, which 
resonates with CSA (Grenier, 1998: 31).  Yin (2003) and Stake (1995) argue that 
CSA is the most appropriate method if the inquiry is concerned with the “how” and 
“why” of a social phenomenon and if “the boundaries between the phenomenon and 
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its context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2003: 11). CSA is different from other 
qualitative research strategies because of its openness to the use of indicative a priori 
propositions.54 Beginning with propositions, however rudimentary, in my view seems 
appropriate for a PhD effort.  Besides, limits of financial resources and time for the 
study made it unwise to choose an ethnographic approach whose validity depended on 
the duration of my presence in the “natural setting” of the phenomenon. CSA also 
leans towards a qualitative mode of inquiry and has been the most preferred approach 
in studies conducted by critical realists (Pawson, 2006).  
 
Critics of CSA dismiss the strategy because it is not “generalisable”, and that 
researchers adopting the approach tend to select cases that promote their a priori 
indicative propositions (Punch, 1998: 153).  There is also the tendency for the over-
representation of historical cases to the disadvantage of the here-and-now (Silverman, 
2005).  In order to minimise the shortfalls of CSA and the qualitative mode of inquiry, 
I outline detailed descriptions of the theoretical and philosophical grounding of the 
work, as well as the basis for selecting the research contexts, participants and units of 
analysis.  In addition, all aspects of the study were subjected to regular scrutiny by my 
supervisors; some aspects by the advisory committees I set up during the fieldwork in 
each country, and doctoral peers at the Peace Studies Department who are also 
researching similar contexts, albeit with a different focus. These safeguards should be 
the basis for judging the quality and truthfulness of this work.  Besides, a study on the 
interactions between indigenous structures and agencies and those of the state cannot 
be generalised, given the spatio-temporal specificity of indigenous structures and 
agencies, particularly sodality institutions.  I therefore make no claims to 
                                                
54Straus (1987) indicates ethnography and grounded theory, which are also appropriate in researching social 
phenomena such as sodality institutions in context, focus wholly on “discovery” and the deriving of theories 
exclusively from the “natural setting”.   
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generalisability, measurability and objectivity—the positivist’s criteria for valid 
research.55 Max Weber (cited in Outhwait, 1998: 24), while acknowledging that the 
qualitative approach is “necessarily perspectival and value-laden,” contends “it could 
be objective, in the sense of having validity and scope beyond its original context.”  
Bassey (1981: 84-85) is more categorical.  He insists knowledge is not only intended 
for generalisability and objectivity.  As long as the research is carried out 
systematically and critically with the aim of ameliorating social conditions, “if it is 
relatable, and if the work extends the boundaries of existing knowledge of the 
subject,” Bassey argues, “it should be judged as a valid form of research” (cited in 
Bell, 2004: 11-12).56  
 
1.6.3.1 Research Focus and Units of Analysis 
 
The focus of this work is on the interactions between the Poro sodality and state 
institutions in current state reconstruction processes in Liberia and Sierra Leone.  The 
primary dependent variable for the work is therefore the state.  Whether de facto or de 
jure or both, the state’s viability is assessed based on its performance and the degree 
of domestic and international legitimacy it enjoys.57 Security, operating an efficient 
and effective bureaucracy, and providing national identity—the core functions of the 
                                                
55As indicated consistently in this chapter, my aim was to undertake an in-depth and systematic study whose 
findings could deepen understanding on the political relevance of the Poro in state reconstruction and sustenance 
and thereby inform future studies on the political agency of African indigenous sodalities.  Besides, the choice of 
cases was based on the state, which is the dependent variable in the work.  Reference is made to history only 
where appropriate, as the phenomenon being studied is a work-in-progress in both contexts.  The work must 
therefore be judged on its own merit and not from generalisation about a strategy whose application is inherently 
context-specific. 
56Elizabeth Chell (1998) “Critical Incident Techniques” in Qualitative Methods and Analysis in Organizational 
research: A practical guide, G. Symon and C. Cassell (eds.), also contends that qualitative research should be 
judged as valid once it broadens insights and understanding of the social phenomenon under inquiry and produces 
a coherent account that makes sense.  Devatak (1995) also argues that when a research work based in critical 
theory such as critical realism is judged, it must be on its ability to reflexively reveal oppressive structures and 
how it creates spaces for the oppressed to conceptualise their own world—not on the basis of objectivity.    
57
Performance here is understood as the efficient and effective delivery of all services expected from a state 
system, while legitimacy is the level of acceptability the state enjoys from both those within its territory and the 
international community. 
Sam Doe Final Thesis UB No. 04008980 39 
state—are the independent variables in this work.  From the point of view of critical 
realism, the performance of all mechanisms is contingent on its context.  There are 
multivariate intransitive and transitive objects in context.  For the purpose of this 
work, I focus on the Poro and Sande indigenous sodalities, their interactions with 
current internationally-led state reconstruction projects, and the viability of the state 
reproduced through the international process.  On the question of interaction, I assess 
the extent of recognition and engagement of the Poro and Sande in recovery and 
reconstruction of state and societal institutions. Table 1 below illustrates the 
dependent and independent variables of the work. 
 
Figure 1.2: Unit of Analysis 
Case Study Unit of Analysis 
 Poro, DDR and emerging security architectures  
 Poro, community revitalisation and nationbuilding  
 Poro, public sector reform and local governance 
The Poro and the State 
International intervention and Poro 
 
 
1.6.3.2 Selecting Case Sites and Samples 
 
For the selection of the countries, sites and participants, I adopted the purposive 
sampling technique.  As indicated by Silverman (2005), purposive sampling allows 
the researcher to choose a case, site or respondent that illustrates some features of the 
phenomenon being studied, while using predetermined criteria to guide the selection 
process (ibid).  I adopted Stake’s case selection criteria in this work.  These include 
balance, varieties, accessibility, hospitality of the sample population, researchability 
of the case, and the learning opportunities in the selection process (1998: 102).  
Liberia and Sierra Leone were selected as countries of focus because they: a) have a 
unique history within the African continent as countries established by (in the case of 
Liberia), or with the influence of (in the case of Sierra Leone), freed and recaptured 
slaves returned to Africa; b) are amongst the first post-Cold War collapsed states that 
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are being reconstructed by the largest multilateral interventions since the 
establishment of the United Nations; c) are neighbours with common ethnic groups; 
and d) are arguably the only countries in Africa where the Poro and Sande sodalities, 
or generally the politics of sodality, dominated and has been in constant collision with 
state institutions.  I also situated the study in three cities each in both countries: 
Monrovia, Gbarnga and Voinjama in Liberia and Freetown, Bo and Kambia in Sierra 
Leone.58  
 
1.6.4 Fieldwork 
 
I spent a total of seven months (June-December 2005) undertaking fieldwork in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone.  Most of this time was spent in Liberia.59  I visited Sierra 
Leone twice and spent a total of four weeks in the country.  I visited and conducted 
focus group and key informant interviews in Monrovia, Gbarnga and Voinjama (in 
                                                
58Monrovia and Freetown are the capital cities of Liberia and Sierra Leone, respectively.  They are the seats of the 
coastal states established by the freed slaves and colonialists.  As cosmopolitan cities, many of their inhabitants 
became disconnected from the norms and values of the hinterlands. These cities were dominated by the ‘civilising’ 
projects of the freed slaves and the British colonial empire.  The relevance of the Poro in the social life of 
inhabitants compared to the hinterlands is limited.  Gbarnga and Bo were selected because they are considered the 
hubs of Poro dominance; while Kambia and Voinjaman are cities, though situated in the Poro-dominated 
hinterland, that are increasingly populated by converts of Islam and ‘born-again’ Christians who are in open 
confrontation with practices of the Poro.  The clash of Islam and ‘born again’ Christians on the one hand against 
the Poro on the other has added to the destabilisation of the interior over the years, which was first instigated by 
state penetration and repression.  How these cities are recovering and the extent of state reconstitution provide 
considerable clues to the quality of the state reconstruction project.   
59During my time in Liberia, I served as consultant to undertake a summative evaluation of International Alert’s 
Rural Media and Peace Project (3 weeks); as Senior Fellow accredited by King’s College London to the University 
of Liberia’s newly established Kofi Annan Centre for Conflict Transformation (3 months); and as International 
Consultant to the Evaluation and Strategic Coordination Unit of UNMIL, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (4 
months).  These opportunities gave me exposure to in-depth policy and natural dynamics on the ground.  More 
specifically the IA project, which focused on post-conflict communication structures and effect with emphasis on 
rural communication, took me to five counties, including the three counties selected for this work.  With the 
University of Liberia, I conducted a comprehensive assessment of roles of NGOs, public institutions, and UN 
agencies in Liberia’s reconstruction and how to develop the needed human capital for the reconstruction project.  
At the UN, I participated in the development of the UN’s Common Country Assessment, the Interim Poverty 
Reduction Paper, the Comprehensive Drawdown and Withdrawal Strategy (CDWS), and a mid-term evaluation of 
the disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR) programme.  Serving in these capacities 
afforded me the opportunity to immerse myself in the very active post-conflict reconstruction dynamics in Liberia, 
and to test some of my propositions in real life situations.    However, limited resources did not allow for such 
engagement in Sierra Leone.  A comparative review of the interactions of state reconstruction actors in both 
countries was therefore not possible.  It is important to point out that observations conducted during this period 
were not as systematic and repetitive as would be required in the participant observation method.  The emphasis 
here is on the in-depth experience I gained during these assignments.   
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Liberia) and Freetown and Bo (in Sierra Leone).  I was unable to visit Kambia as 
originally planned, due to financial and other constraints.  However I was fortunate to 
interview a number of Kambia residents who had come to Freetown for a workshop 
organised by the Network for Collaborative Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone (NCPSL).  
I also conducted interviews with staff of a local NGO, ABC-Development, who 
operate in Kambia.  The extended period spent in Liberia afforded me the opportunity 
to immerse myself in the very active post-conflict reconstruction dynamics in the 
country.60  Although I was not able to spend as much time in Sierra Leone, many of 
the UN staff in Monrovia were among those who led the recovery process in Sierra 
Leone.  I benefitted from their hindsight as they constantly referred to their 
experiences in Sierra Leone.   
 
1.6.4.1 Data Collection Methods 
 
I adopted qualitative focus groups and individual interviews as primary data 
collection methods, complemented by literature review and documentary research.  I 
review the data collection methods in this section.  
 
Literature and Documentary Research:  Throughout the project, more so in the first 
two years, I undertook a substantive literature review.  I organised the relevant 
literature in four categories: a) state formation, nationbuilding, state collapse, and 
reconstruction with a focus on the contemporary liberal peace project; b) historical 
development and collapse of Liberia and Sierra Leone; c) Indigenous sodality 
                                                
60During the consultancies, I informed the institutions that I was undertaking research work for my PhD studies.  
In fact I was invited to serve in UNMIL’s Strategic Evaluation and Coordination Unit to help in their own 
reflection process.  My supervisor at the UN occasionally requested me to share my findings and suggestions on 
areas where the mission could improve.  I agreed not to share or quote any documents that are classified.  
References made to the UN or to the works of King’s College and IA in Liberia are those they have already placed 
in the public domain.  
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institutions in the Upper Guinea Coast with a focus on the Poro sodality; and d) 
conflict analysis, including current debates on contemporary violence and intrastate 
conflicts.  I then organised an indicative bibliography of the key authors in the 
respective areas, which I discussed and agreed with my lead supervisor before 
embarking on the in-depth review exercise.61  The literature review exercise proved 
vital in exposing me to the dominant debates, thereby facilitating my articulation of 
the contributions this work sets out to make to scholarly and policy literature on state 
reconstruction.  The exercise also informed the design of the research plan for my 
fieldwork. I undertook extensive documentary research in the field.  Materials 
consulted included UN and government reports, NGO and INGO research papers, 
including advocacy materials from groups like Global Witness, Human Rights Watch, 
Amnesty International and International Crisis Group.  I also reviewed new policies 
and legislations, newspapers, journals and numerous Internet sources.62  
 
Like the rest of the social science research data collection methods, literature and 
documentary review carry inherent weaknesses and strengths.  The dominant 
criticisms include the question of validity and selection bias.  Lustick (1996) observes 
that there is a tendency for researchers to gravitate to secondary sources that back 
their thesis, while dismissing those with a compelling counter-thesis.  There is also 
the temptation of taking for granted the political angles and circumstantial influences 
which tend to shape authors’ narration of the ‘truth’ (1996).  To address this 
weakness, I took seriously Lustick’s suggestions as safeguards during the work.  
These include: a) a commitment to identify potential political angles and biases in all 
                                                
61The bibliography was expanded as I reviewed references for the original bibliography.     
62I regularly monitored the many radio talk shows and newspapers in both countries.  Some of the radio programs 
were ‘call-in’ programs.  With full coverage of both countries by a number of GSM cell phone companies, calls 
came from the length and breadth of the countries, thus giving me a sense of how ordinary people were 
interpreting and engaging the ongoing state reconstruction processes.   
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secondary sources and ensuring thorough triangulation for their verification—a strong 
recommendation of critical realism as well.  The healthy debates I had with my lead 
supervisor and colleagues also exposed me to a range of alternative angles to some of 
the literature.  I also made use of critical reviews of works of the key authors posted 
on a range of Internet sources.  Despite its inherent weaknesses, literature and 
documentary review has inherent strengths that are particularly crucial when studying 
social phenomenon with historical development, as well as patterns and regularities 
from interactions with other social phenomena, in context.  The stability and 
cumulative accounts of the development of the state and its interactions with 
indigenous systems like the Poro could not be obtained, or at least understood, 
without reviewing literature and documents and establishing patterns and regularity.63 
 
Focus Group and Individual Interviews: While documentary and literature research 
shed much light on historical developments and interactions, they were limited in 
understanding the ongoing state reconstruction dynamics and to establish a “weight of 
evidence” (Pawson, 1996).  I therefore undertook extensive qualitative focus group 
interviews (FGIs) and key informant interviews (KIIs) as the primary data collection 
methods.64  The focus group discussions were centred on the broad lines of inquiry 
outlined in the semi-structure interview guide I developed, while the detailed 
questions were used in the key informant interviews (Please see annex 1 for Interview 
                                                
63The key here is remaining vigilance as proposed by Lustick.  Throughout the work I constantly ask myself two 
key questions about every literature and document: a) who is the author and what is his/her general theoretical 
orientation.  In other words what side of the debate is he/she on? And b) why was the document or literature 
written and for whom?  These were extremely useful in the way I judged written pieces of information.   
64Literature review and initial documentary research as indicated earlier helped me to develop detail semi-structure 
interview instruments.  Please see Annex 1 for interview instruments. 
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Instrument).  As indicated in Table 1.1, I conducted a total of 21 focus group 
interviews with 260 participants and 52 individual interviews.65  
 
Table 1.1: Breakdown of Focus Group Interviews 
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The interview processes helped me explore the individual and general perceptions 
about state reconstruction and how local Zoes in particular perceive the process vis-à-
vis its impact on Poro and Sande authorities and structures.  Most importantly, local 
political, social and developmental agencies emerging from the war were better 
discussed and given voice during the exercise.66  The KIIs were mostly selected from 
participants in the FGIs as a way of deepening discussions from the FGIs.  Other key 
informants including political leaders, Zoes and leaders of the international 
community were directly contacted.67  I conducted all the interviews in English, 
Creole, and what is known as ‘Liberian English’, all of which I speak and understand.  
I also, with the consent of participants, tape-recorded most of the interviews 
                                                
65This does not include follow-ups, workshops and seminars I facilitated and/or attended.  Also, data collection 
methods adopted in this work are not without weaknesses.  How one validates the monotony characteristic of post-
conflict communication patterns and at the same time pursues the predetermined line of inquiry was one challenge 
I faced in the use of the interview method.  There were double challenges in the use of documentation.  First, it 
was difficult to access historical documents, particularly in Liberia. Secondly, numerous research works have been 
undertaken in both countries over the last decade.  While the availability of this large volume of work was useful 
to establish evidence, sifting through the vast number of documents was extremely difficult. 
66Having focus group meetings in separate groups with women, youth, national NGO leaders and international 
actors also ensure safe spaces and some sense of equality, which facilitated some measures of openness and active 
participation.  The focus group discussions were organised in a way to foster dialogue and thereby build on the 
emerging expanded public spaces where ordinary people contribute to public issues.  I did not only aim to extract 
information, but also to empower. 
67Selection of respondents for the individual interviews was also based on purposeful sampling.  I directly 
contacted those who were well informed about the subject, willing to share and available.  Some respondents were 
recommended either by participants of the focus group or another key informant. 
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conducted in Monrovia and Freetown, while majority of those conducted in the 
countryside did not allow for tape recording.68   
 
The qualitative interview method also has a number of weaknesses.  Firstly, critics of 
the method allege it is difficult to separate the researcher’s biased interpretations from 
the “pure” data in qualitative interviews (Silverman, 2005).  Second, there is the 
particular challenge of interviewing in the post-conflict context.  Burton describes the 
dysfunctional communication pattern common in post-war contexts as ‘telling’, a 
monotonous and embellished communication practice (1978: 37, cited in Finlay, 
2001: 57).  Two focus group discussions in Bong County vividly illustrated this 
challenge.  All 26 women who participated in the discussions reported loss of a family 
member.  As a consequence, the focus group discussions were hijacked by 
discussions on the multiple losses of the women.  The women tended to be repetitive, 
recounting the traumatic experiences over and over and again as if they were eliciting 
sympathy from me.69  Third is the question of trust.  Liberia and Sierra Leone were 
just emerging from devastating civil wars that tore apart the social fabrics and 
destroyed basic institutions.  In some FGIs it was difficult to establish an environment 
                                                
68In some individual interviews, especially with Zoes, I was not allowed to take notes or use a tape recorder. In one 
of the key informant interviews in Gbarnga, one elder noted that he was surprised that anyone outside the practice 
thought that it had anything to offer the country.  “…they think they can fix our country without us…” he noted in 
an apparent tone of sarcasm.  In my introduction of all interview sessions, I made sure that I shared the purpose of 
the exercise and emphasised that I was aware of the value of not discussing elements of the Poro and Sande that 
bind the communities.  I acknowledged the value of the practice and indicated that my interest was in the 
contribution the Poro and Sande could make in restoring our broken societies and political orders. This 
introduction was an effective door-opener. 
69Rather than dismiss the womens’ apparent cry for a listening ear, I spent three hours just listening to their stories.  
My experience in psychosocial counselling proved useful.  I also encouraged the women to set up small social 
support associations where they could recount their experiences and support one another.  I also linked them to the 
Women in Peacebuilding Network, which is a regional support group that is active in both countries.  In my 
conclusion of the session, I emphasised that the aim of my study is to find within our own society ways by which 
we can address some of the challenges they outlined in their personal stories.  I specifically asked whether there 
were practices in the Sande (all the women were practicing initiates of the Sande) and Poro that could help us 
rebuild our society and whether those who have come to help us were engaging these local resources. I asked 
whether the women would be available the following week to discuss the questions.  They consented and I went 
back and conducted the interview.  The level of openness and generosity to help me with my work was 
overwhelming.  While this proved successful for me, I am not suggesting that all researchers who encounter such 
situations should present themselves as counsellors.  Referral to competent practitioners would be the best option.  
In my case, I had 12 years of experience in trauma counselling and working in both countries as a trauma 
counsellor.    
Sam Doe Final Thesis UB No. 04008980 46 
of trust, which was necessary for open and honest participation.  Besides, not all 
members in the focus group meetings were practicing Poro and Sande initiates.  There 
were those who had converted to Islam and Christianity and were averse to the 
practices of the Poro.70  Although I started most of the difficult FGI sessions with 
trust building exercises, they were inadequate to create the necessary environment in 
some situations.  In such cases of lack of trust, results from the FGI were limited and I 
relied heavily on the follow-up key informant interviews.  Finally and most 
importantly, the culture of “ifa mao” (do not speak it) to outsiders was a particular 
challenge, especially on the questions of authority, security and powers.  As discussed 
in depth in the following section, I relied on local field advisors to physically carry 
me to some key informants, especially Poro elders.71  The challenges I encountered 
during the project can be categorised as access and ethical challenges.  How I 
addressed them during the project is the subject of the following section.   
 
1.7 ACCESS AND ETHICAL CHALLENGES 
 
1.7.1 Access Challenges 
 
The degree of access challenges any researcher faces is essentially determined by the 
researcher’s identity, research topic, and the context in which the work is conducted 
(Ringmar, 1996).  In Liberia and Sierra Leone I am generally known as a political 
activist and a peacebuilding practitioner.  But being Liberian, I was viewed in Sierra 
Leone as one from the “geography of enemies”, while to the Poro I was from the 
                                                
70Youths in Monrovia had limited knowledge about the Poro and its influences in rural communities, while youths 
in the rural communities, many of whom became members of the fighting forces like the Civil Defence Forces, 
had strong opinions about the role of the Poro sodality in the reconstruction process in their respective 
communities. 
71They assured elders that I was seeking the help of the Poro and Sande in the rebuilding process.  Some 
introductions were done in local languages that I did not understand. I was unable to ascertain whether that 
affected the quality of the interviews.  However, a thorough triangulation process helped to minimise any possible 
false stories.    
Sam Doe Final Thesis UB No. 04008980 47 
“geography of strangers”.72  The latter identity posed a difficult challenge to access 
traditional leaders, especially elders and priests of the Poro sodality.  To overcome 
these challenges, I implemented the following safeguards.  On arrival in both 
countries, I conducted a feasibility study in each of the capital cities with prominent 
government officials, academics and individuals who, though members of the Poro 
and Sande sodality, are actively engaged with the political development of both 
countries.  I wrote formal letters with a two-page summary of the project to three 
persons in each country, asking them to serve as my field advisors.73 In addition to 
arranging interviews, calling and speaking directly to key informants about the 
project, as well as helping to locate resource materials, all the advisors granted me 
regular one-on-one meetings for the purpose of triangulation.74 I also identified and 
engaged some local NGOS to help me to: a) identify gatekeepers, b) provide an 
overview of the local context, and c) assist me in establishing local community 
relations.  In addition to these safeguards, my prior engagements and credibility in 
both countries proved invaluable to the exercise.75 In retrospect, the innovation of 
establishing local field advisors proved not only useful in accessing high quality 
                                                
72Ringmar coined the phrase “geography of enemies” to describe divided societies in which the researcher could 
be seeing as coming from the other side of the divide and therefore could be misled in interview processes.  I 
adopted the phrase to the concept of strangers, which is also strong in Poro society where outsiders are not 
necessarily enemies but strangers who must be kept on the outside, while demonstrating the spirit of generosity to 
them.  I describe myself as from the ‘geography of enemies’ because due to the role Charles Taylor played in 
Sierra Leone’s conflict, many Sierra Leoneans where ambivalent about Liberians in general during the height of 
the conflict.  Although that was not the case during the research as Liberians and Sierra Leoneans united to 
disassociate themselves from the onslaught of Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh. 
73These include: Pewu Subah, senior partner of Subah Belleh Associates (SBA)—one of the oldest management 
and research firms in Liberia and an initiate of the Poro sodality; Sampson T. Varpilah, deputy minister for health 
and social welfare (Poro initiate), and Leymah Gbowee, leader of the women’s movement in Liberia (Poro 
initiate).  In Sierra Leone Professor Joe D. Alie of Fourah Bay College and a well respected member of the Poro 
sodality, Walter Carew, Program Manager of the Christian Health Association of Sierra Leone, and Gladys 
Koroma, Coordinator of the Women in Peacebuilding Network in Sierra Leone. 
74While this became necessary to accommodate the schedules of the advisors, it proved useful as I was privy to 
information that would never have been revealed in large meetings 
75The following NGOs and CBOs served as my local partners.  In Sierra Leone they were: Peace Studies 
Department at Fourah Bay, National Accountability Group, ABC-Development in Kambia, and the Foundation for 
International Dignity in Kenema, Bo and Freetown.  Local partners in Liberia were West African Network for 
Peacebuilding (WANEP-Liberia), Women Initiative and the Peacebuilding Resource Center.   
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information, it increased the sense of ownership on the part of the advisors and their 
respective communities, a key principle of critical theory.76  
 
1.7.2 Ethical Challenges 
 
Ethics supplants the practicality argument of research for the moral and legal 
argument.  Descombe (2002), Bulmer (2001) and the Social Research Association’s 
Ethical Guidelines (2003) have all asserted that under no conditions should the desire 
for knowledge and ‘truth’ supersede the respect for human dignity and safety.77 The 
issues of ethics were even more pertinent to this work, considering the subject I set 
out to study.  The Poro and Sande are shrouded in secrecy which, as I indicated, is 
guided by oath, threats and real punishment for those who breach ‘ifa mao’ (do not 
speak of it).78  Another critical challenge I had to deal with was the risk of being 
perceived as an inquisitive and intrusive outsider, who wants to invade the private 
domain of the sodality.  To address these challenges, in addition to strategies outlined 
to address access, I made efforts to adhere to the core ethical principles of social 
research.  These include a) consent, b) confidentiality, c) anonymity, d) justice, and e) 
‘do no harm and do good’.  
 
Consent—To address concerns of consent, I ensured a full disclosure of my intent of 
the study, including its benefits to the communities, especially the Poro and Sande, as 
                                                
76Also new developments such as the arrest and trial of President Charles Taylor in the Hague and the renewed 
sense of hope that it generated in countries of the Mano River region contributed significantly to the favorable 
climate and cooperation I enjoyed during the fieldwork.    
77Besides the imperative to respect the dignity of all those studied, the SRA contends that good research enhances 
future access to research subjects and their communities, while bad research destroys the opportunities for access 
and thereby undermines the development of social research in general (SRA’s Ethical Guidelines, 2003: 22).  The 
University of Bradford therefore avers that researchers within its jurisdiction must conduct their study in the “most 
conscientious and responsible manner possible…” (Code of Practice for Ethics in Research, June 2003:1). 
78During the period of the research, in the bid to reassert itself, the Poro and in a few cases the Sande were 
involved in acts of resistance and violence, including abduction and forced initiation of youths and Muslims who 
reject the practice.   
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well as the risks of participating in the research.  I emphasised that I was conducting 
the research to assess whether there is a place for the sodality in the rebuilding 
processes.  I sent a two-page summary of the project to key informants who were 
literate, and explained the project to my field advisors who in turn explained it to 
local chiefs and women to whom I was referred.  I also began each interview session 
with an introduction of the project and emphasised that it was voluntary and that no 
one was obliged to participate or continue when the process felt uncomfortable for 
them.  Throughout the project, I kept the field advisors and some key informants 
informed of my progress.  While the introduction of the field advisors was effective in 
granting me access, I was aware that being introduced by someone who command 
respect in his/ her respective community had elements of coercion.  To assure 
participants of their freedom to participate, or not, I emphasised that they were not 
forced to continue the process, and that this was my personal work in which the 
advisors had no personal stake.  I assured them that I would not report any part of the 
conversation back to the person who introduced me, nor would I inform the latter if 
the participants chose to withdraw from the process.  With most of the population 
unlettered, I did not insist upon written consent, although in some instances in 
Monrovia and Freetown most of the participants granted written consent.    
 
Confidentiality—I assured participants that the information that I obtained from them 
would be handled with the utmost care.  All recorded interviews are in my possession 
and away from both countries.  They will continue to be kept in a safe place three 
years after the submission of this work and discarded thereafter.   
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Anonymity—I assured all participants that names would not be attributed to any 
quotes, nor mentioned in the work.  No information which identified the participants 
and key informants was used in my write up.  I adopted the phrase ‘key informant’ or 
‘participant’ to refer to all citations in the work. As agreed with most of the 
participants, their names are not included in this work.   
 
Justice—Critical realism, which is also based on critical theory, emphasises issues of 
justice.  The questions a) who are included in focus group meetings and who are 
excluded, b) who dominates the interview process and who is silent, and c) how to 
facilitate equal participation, occupied me during the fieldwork.  To address this 
concern, I devised a representative distribution of categories to include youth, women, 
elders, academic, international actors, etc—and an adequate number under each 
category—to be interviewed prior to the fieldwork.  This balance was necessary to 
ensure the voices of the weak and strong, the marginalised or the actively engaged, 
were heard and represented in this work.   
 
Do no harm and do good—Kvale recommends that researchers must undertake a 
clear risk/ benefit calculation before deciding to conduct a social research (1996).  
The potential benefits to subjects and the larger society should outweigh the risk of 
harm to warrant a decision to carry out a study.  Two key questions informed my 
judgment: a) will this benefit the post-war societies? and b), will this benefit or at 
least not harm the individual participants who will offer to participate?  I was also 
aware of the risks of some participants misinterpreting the qualitative interview as 
psychosocial counselling sessions, especially since questions on societal healing 
mechanisms were part of the lines of inquiry.  In the situations where traumatic issues 
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arose, I suspended the interview process, listened to the participants and 
recommended relevant organisations for follow-up.  Discussing anything about the 
Poro and Sande raises concerns in rural communities, which have legitimate 
gatekeepers who protect the interests of the sodalities. In this regard, my field 
advisors helped by explaining the purpose of the exercise to the local chiefs.  I also 
kept the local chiefs and Zoes informed of my work.79   
 
1.8 LIMITATIONS OF THIS WORK 
 
This work is necessarily limited in focus, scope and time.  Although there are many 
other social forces active in the post-conflict reconstruction contexts of Liberia and 
Sierra Leone, including over a dozen other sodalities, the work strategically focuses 
on the Poro and Sande sodalities as primary intervening variables in state 
reconstruction.  The choice is informed by the fact that both countries have strong and 
consistent historical accounts of the political rivalry between the Poro sodality and 
state institutions.  These have led to recorded institutional failures and armed 
violence.80  More significantly, the Poro remains the largest institution for social 
order, economic well-being and security in over 80% of rural Liberia and Sierra 
Leone.  Its dominant political, economic and social roles would be evident in post-
conflict Liberia and Sierra Leone.  
 
                                                
79I also emphasised during the interview process that participants should not feel obliged to tell me anything that 
would threaten their personal security.  I indicated that when my questioning touched on anything sensitive, they 
should feel free to let me know. In cases where I was reminded, I immediately changed the line of questioning.   
80The work also explores the ‘alliances of convenience’, which was established between the Poro and the State 
including the most recent security pact between the Sierra Leone state and the Poro, in which mass mobilisation of 
Poro warriors reminiscent of 19th and 20th century mobilisation of the Poro for war took place.  Francis and Alie 
indicate that the alliance which made the Poro a part of the state’s war-fighting machine has resuscitated the old 
debate about the marriage between Liberia and Sierra Leone and the Poro. See Francis, D (ed., 2005), Civil Militia. 
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A second limitation is time.  I have focused on the current state reconstruction process 
with only anecdotal reference to history.  The fact that state reconstruction in both 
countries is ongoing makes it difficult to determine a cut-off point to assess impact 
and make conclusive claims about the process.  In addition, I am of the view that a 
comparative review of the dynamics between the Poro and other indigenous 
institutions and statebuilding at independence, and during the present post-collapsed 
state building processes, would have provided a comprehensive view and critical 
lessons.  The lack of resources and time informed the decision to conduct a time-
bound case study with a focus on the current dynamics of interactions between the 
Poro and the state.  This, however, does not reduce the significance of this work.  A 
more in-depth study of current dynamics would be invaluable to future researchers 
who might want to compare the two periods in Liberia and Sierra Leone’s history.   
 
Yet another limitation of this work is the scope for the fieldwork.  I selected three 
communities out of several from each country where the dynamics of statebuilding 
and the perspectives of multi-stakeholders were engaged.  The choice is again a 
consequence of time and resources.  I, however, argue that the communities were 
strategically selected to provide useful clues with a strong potential for relatability.  
For instance, Freetown and Monrovia currently host about half of the populations of 
the respective countries.  The cosmopolitan natures of these cities have provided 
unique dynamics between indigeneity and the modern state in the past.  Currently the 
bulk of the state reconstruction projects are present in these capitals, and considering 
the mass internal displacement which emptied the countryside into the cities, one can 
argue that for the first time in the history of both countries, the ‘barbaric hinterlands’ 
have intimately encountered the ‘civilised’ coastal settler states.  This encounter is a 
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real-time manifestation of interactions between the state and the Poro (and Sande).  
Bo in Sierra Leone and Bong in Liberia are considered the largest concentrate of 
Poro-practicing groups.  The study in both contexts gave me a sense of the ‘natural’ 
settings of the Poro. Kambia and Lofa are considered the communities where the Poro 
has come into direct confrontation with other social institutions like Islam and 
Christianity.  The mix of religious and political confrontations in these cities provided 
useful clues into the local governance, as well as social dynamics vis-à-vis state and 
Poro society interactions.     
 
1.9 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
The work is divided into seven chapters.  Chapter 1 looks at the overview of the 
thesis, my motivation for embarking on the project, background and context of state 
reconstruction, detailed accounts of the Poro and methodology adopted in the work. 
Chapter 2 looks at the state-building process in Africa, noting how the African state 
has managed to survive and why it seems to be losing the survivor struggle.  Within 
the context of globalisation, the chapter considers the intervention of the international 
community both in statebuilding, collapse, reconstruction and maintenance. Chapter 3 
looks at debates on statebuilding in Liberia and Sierra Leone.  It traces the historical 
development and trajectories of Liberia and Sierra Leone.  The chapter argues that the 
twin states met a common fate—state collapse—because of the foundations on which 
they were established. Chapter 4 undertakes an analysis of the civil wars in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone.  It engages with the dominant debates on the sources and dynamics 
of the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone and challenges the claims that both civil 
wars are caused by greed and ethnicity alone. Chapter 5 is the case study in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone on the role of the Poro in recovery and reconstruction.  Chapter 6 
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draws lessons from the case of Liberia and Sierra Leone to theorise indigenisation. It 
begins with a further review of existing debates and theories on state reconstruction 
and argues for indigenisation as a complement to the liberal peace approach to 
statebuilding.  It looks at indigenisation as framework for analysis to deepen 
understanding of interactions between indigenous mechanisms and the liberal peace 
project. Chapter 7 offers the conclusion and key findings.  It ends with a policy 
proposal on indigenisation of state reconstruction as a complement to the liberal peace 
project.  
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CHAPTER 2 
STATEBUILDING, SURVIVAL AND COLLAPSE IN AFRICA  
 
“…Over these disastrous millennia there have been Africans concerned to work out solutions to 
our problems and to act on them.  The traces these makers left are faint, because in the 
continuing triumph of Africa’s destroyers the beautyful ones [though born] were murdered, the 
land poisoned.  Now wherever future seed seeks to take roots, it strikes sand.” (Ayi Kwei 
Armah, 1995)  
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
African states have gained notoriety as the most described in global politics.81  
Therapies for the ailing states are also legion.82  But none of the multitude of names 
and therapies has managed to reverse the fate to which African states were 
condemned at their inception.  One after the other, the states are crumbling.  A 
majority of those that are yet to crumble have degenerated so much that they can 
barely stay afloat politically, socially and economically.  The continent, despite its 
abundant natural endowments, has remained the poorest, contributing less than 5% of 
global GDP.83  Notwithstanding the ongoing tragic situation in many African states, 
the scale of state failure and collapse in Africa since the end of the Cold War has 
sparked fresh interrogation and dialogue on the relationship between statebuilding, 
state builders and state collapse.  One worrying observation is that such inquiry, 
instead of reflecting on the origin of the post-colonial African state to fully understand 
its failure and collapse, places emphasis on proximate factors like ethno-politics, 
bureaucratic failure, war economies and regionalisation of insecurity.  I make the case 
that collapse presents us with an opportunity for a new beginning, and this is only 
                                                
81Thandika Mkandawire in his article, “Thinking about Developmental States in Africa”, summarises the 
derogatory names carried by states in the continent.  They are branded as, “… the ‘rentier state’, the ‘over-
extended state’, the ‘parasitical state’, the ‘predatory state’, the ‘lame leviathan’, the ‘patrimonial state’, the 
‘prebendal state’, the ‘crony state’, the ‘kleptocratic state’, the ‘inverted state’, the ‘shadow state’, etc.”   
82Mkandawire also provides an excellent summary of the therapies:  “[African] states are urged to “de-link” from 
their societies, to reduce themselves, to stabilise the economy, to privatise the economy, to engage in “good 
governance”, to democratise themselves and society, to create an “enabling environment” for the private sector, to 
empower women and civil society, to respect human rights, etc. 
83See Progressive Policy Institute (http://www.ppionline.org/ppi_ci.cfm). 
Sam Doe Final Thesis UB No. 04008980 56 
possible if we extend the inquiry to the point where we started.  The chapter will 
therefore discuss the political and historical development, survival, failure and 
eventual collapse of the African state.  The chapter begins with a discussion on the 
nature of the state and its historical development.  It then focuses on how states in 
Africa have performed in delivering on the core functions of the state.  With this 
background, the chapter shifts focus to the increasing failure and collapse of the 
African state.  The analysis is then applied in Chapter 3 to discuss the development, 
survival and eventual collapse of Liberia and Sierra Leone.   
 
2.2 NATURE OF THE STATE 
 
As observed by Francis (2005), what exactly constitutes a state has been a subject of 
controversy.  Tilly defines the state as “relatively centralised, differentiated and 
autonomous organisations successfully claiming priority in the use of force within 
large, contiguous and clearly bounded territories” (1990: 43).  Michael Mann (1984) 
summarises the notion of state as: a) differentiated institutions, b) centrality, c) 
binding authority, and d) defined territory (p. 112). Mohan and Zack-Williams (2004) 
add sovereignty, constitutionality, public bureaucracy, legitimacy and citizenship to 
the list of state characteristics.  It is the aggregate of these elements that constitute the 
state.  Duvall and Freeman (1981) concur with the institutionalised nature of the state, 
but shift focus from the aim to dominate to the aim to govern.  There is a significant 
difference in the nature of a ‘dominating’ state from that of a ‘governing’ state.  
While the former commands obedience through coercion, the latter negotiates 
acceptance from the public through service.  Dominance and governance are not 
mutually exclusive characteristics of the state, as both theorists would have us 
believe.  Mann (1984) reminds us that the dominating and governing characteristics 
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are inherent to statehood, but points out that the state as an institution of governance 
is an outcome of state maturity (1984).  He indicates that all states begin as an 
institution of dominance—exercising “despotic power” to instil order and consolidate 
control of their territories.  They then mature to what the author calls “infrastructural 
power” (p.113-116).84  As for Mamdani (1996), a viable state is a “civic state”, which 
enjoys widespread acceptance from the people it claims to administer. 
 
Robert Jackson focuses on sovereignty as critical to the nature of the state.  
Sovereignty confers on the state “the right to control a given expanse of territory and 
the people living on it and in the process the right to make and enforce such rules, or 
laws, as is deemed necessary” (1990: 30).85  Jackson distinguishes two types of 
sovereignty—juridical and empirical.  Juridical sovereignty is the recognition a state 
enjoys from the international system, while empirical sovereignty is conferred on a 
state domestically as a consequence of performance and acceptance.86  There are other 
equally important characteristics of the state aside from its ‘institutionalised’ and 
‘sovereign’ nature. Raymond Carré de Malberg (1920) would prefer to describe the 
state as “a community established on a territory of their own and possessing a higher 
power of command and coercion” (cited in Wolf and Resnick, 1986: 162).  This 
definition, in my view, makes three important assumptions.  First, the concept of a 
community on its own territory suggests that the state is a product of a pre-existing 
                                                
84In other words, it is only a state with demonstrated dominance, one that commands obedience from its population 
that can effectively govern.  The ‘despotic power’ characteristic of the state could fit well into Hobbes’ Leviathan, 
while the ‘infrastructural power’ concepts explain classical liberalists’ rule-governed states.  As will be discussed 
later in the chapter, the African state did not have the luxury of maturing from one phase of state development to 
another.  At their inception or at least at the point when they were handed over to Africans, the states were 
expected to exercise authority while at the same time perform effectively. 
85Sovereignty is both internal and external.  Internal refers to the supreme authority to make and enforce laws for 
the territory and external refers to the interaction with the outside world. 
86Jackson notes that at independence, although African states did not have what Schwarzenberger refers to as the 
“sociological, economic, technological, psychological wherewithal to declare, implement, and enforce public 
policy domestically and internationally,” they were generously granted juridical sovereignty by their formal 
colonial powers (cited in Zaum, 2007: 3). 
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political community.  The second follows the first assumption.  If the state is a 
product of a pre-existing political community, then the institutions and discourse of 
the state are organic to the political community, which gave birth to it.  A third 
assumption is the concept of ‘own territory’.  This suggests that a state is first and 
foremost indigenous—a collective of people already on their land with shared 
political aspirations.  A state established in such a context is primarily emergent rather 
than superimposed on the context (Eisenstadt et al, 1988).   
 
Contemporary conceptions of the state have abandoned its organic nature and placed 
emphasis on building rational legal bureaucracies from the outside.  George Jellinik87 
(cited in Speiser and Handy, 2005: 9) sums up the current understanding of the state 
as “a community where citizenship is realised and where state authority is seen as a 
legitimate capacity to rule over people…” This definition makes no allusion to pre-
existing political consciousness and organic political institutions in the context in 
which the state is to be established.  Rather, it assumes that the state can operate in a 
context devoid of political community and institutions, until it produces them.  
Arguably, nowhere else was this concept of statebuilding minus state formation88 
applied effectively, compared to Africa (Eisenstadt et al, 1988).  Colonialism 
dismantled and/ or perverted pre-existing emerging political communities, 
reconstructed indigenous demography and established a colonial state to exercise 
control over them (Clapham, 2001).  
 
 
                                                
87George Jellinek is credited for the three-part notion of the state, which is drawn from his Staatsrechtslehre.  
Speiser and Handy notes that this notion has had broad acceptance in the 20th century.  
88State formation is an evolutionary process in which dynamics of territorial growth, contraction and withdrawal 
lead to the formation of hierarchical political structures. 
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2.3 STATEBUILDING AND SURVIVAL 
  
In the following section I discuss how states in Africa were developed and survived in 
terms of the performance thesis which Zartman identifies as: a) mobilising collective 
identity and nationbuilding; b) operating public institutions or bureaucracies; and c) 
guaranteeing the security of the population (1995).   
 
2.3.1 Collective Identity and Nationbuilding  
 
As a sovereign authority, the state is expected to provide and/ or represent the 
collective identity of the people in its territory, as well as serve as the arena of politics 
(Zartman, 1995).  This entails, to a large extent, nationbuilding or building of a 
political community.     
 
2.3.1.1 Nationbuilding: A Working Definition 
 
Nationbuilding involves “a process whereby individuals and communities are 
socialised into a larger political community and to which they remain devoted and 
loyal” (Ake, 1967: 486, cited in Seyon, 1972: 20).  The glue that tends to hold such a 
community together includes “common language, territory, economic life, and 
psychological make-up manifested as a shared history and culture” (ibid).  Others shy 
away from linking nationbuilding to primordial materials.  Ernest Renan prefers to 
describe the project as a grand solidarity building exercise, which produces a 
community that prides itself in the sacrifices they have made for their community and 
those they are prepared to make in the future (Renan, 1882, cited in Ozkirimli, 2005: 
19).  Such a community need not be genetically related.  What makes their 
community seem primordial is the valour that runs through their individual veins to 
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make the ultimate sacrifice on behalf of their community.  Miller (1995) indicates that 
the continued willingness to make such sacrifice from generation to generation is only 
made possible because each member believes that they belong together and they share 
common existential characteristics.  The belief is codified and maintained from time 
to time through a range of socialisation processes, including history and education, 
and in the case of Poro communities through the rites de passage.  Arguably Seymour 
et al (1996) offer a more contemporary definition of nationbuilding: “…a community 
of equal, rights-bearing citizens united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of 
political practices and values” (p. 32).  Here the emphasis is on human rights, politics 
and patriotism, leaving out primordial elements.  
 
In addition to its eclectic and continuous nature, the process of nationbuilding, 
according to Stein Rokkan, is undertaken vertically and horizontally.  He describes 
vertical nationbuilding as a process that “brings together the bottom of society and a 
distant and aloof state structure and elites at the top” (1975: 570).   The aim of the 
vertical process is to create and mobilise public acceptance of state identity, including 
its values and practices. Rokkan identifies four inter-related phases in vertical 
nationbuilding: a) economic and cultural unification of the range of elites at the top; 
b) enlisting the masses in the civic arena through education and conscription in the 
military; c) facilitating the active participation of masses in public affairs; and d) 
ensuring equitable distribution of public welfare across society (ibid).89  The 
horizontal dimension, on the other hand, is concerned with coalescing the social 
values, histories and aspirations of the various communities as the heritage of the 
collective.  It is about bonding and bridging in order to construct a collective identity.  
                                                
89While shying away from indicating how long it takes to achieve the phases, Rokkan contends that it took Europe 
several centuries to achieve nationhood.   
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In pre-colonial Africa, as is the case in Poro-governed societies, horizontal 
nationbuilding tends to precede vertical nationbuilding.  Whatever the case, a nation 
or a politically cohesive community is finally consummated when, in the words of 
Seymour et al (1996), the process achieves “value consensus” and “cultural 
homogeneity” (p. 32).  Calhoun adds that the ‘value consensus’ and ‘cultural 
homogeneity’ should be entrenched in “immediate knowledge system” and 
“unquestioned belief” (1997). Acton (1967) however challenges the ‘cultural 
homogeneity’ goal while embracing ‘value consensus’.  He would prefer, and I 
concur, cultural plurality rather than cultural homogeneity.  He insists that the goal of 
nationbuilding need not lead to ‘uniformity’ of identity. The process should aim for 
diversity and harmony, celebrating the ‘heterogeno-national’ rather than ‘homogeno-
national’ state.  Such was the practice in pre-colonial Africa, where multiple ethnic 
groups created coalitions of multiple ethnicities and nationalities glued together in 
solidarity.  
 
Also important to Rokkan are the drivers of the process.  The dominant classical view 
of the drivers of nationbuilding is the politics of enmity.  Parker et al (1992: 5) 
indicates, “[a] nation is ineluctably shaped by what it opposes” and by which “…it is 
forever haunted.”  But do we need an image of the enemy to exist, or just the 
consciousness of difference?  As Tamir (cited in Ozkirimli, 2005) argues, although 
human beings need the ‘other’ to critically reflect on their culture, this does not need 
to evoke fear, enmity or dehumanisation.  Rather the difference can be “…a source 
for comparison, learning, borrowing…” (ibid). Rokkan (1975) and Einstadt et al 
(1988) identify more positive drivers.  Einstadt et al (1988) argue that nations are the 
outcomes of the natural evolutionary process of cultural congruency achieved through 
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interaction, while Rokkan identifies leadership as an important driver in addition to 
interaction.  He argues that leadership can accelerate or stifle the process of building 
nations or political communities.  Keeping in mind that the essential characteristics of 
‘nation’ or political community include ‘value consensus’ and ‘cultural homogeneity’, 
or ‘plurality’ achieved through ‘territorial boundedness’, ‘immediate knowledge 
system’, ‘unquestioned belief’, and effective leadership, how have post-colonial 
African states fared in the nationbuilding project?  
 
2.3.1.2 African State and the Nationbuilding Project 
 
Lofchie’s observation, made two decades into independence in Africa, adequately 
captures the predicament of statebuilders in the continent:  
 
“While the nationalist in Europe and some other parts of the world could appeal 
to a reasonably clearly delimited people already in part aware of their identity 
through long experience some share in a common destiny, normally including a 
common language, the African statebuilders are expected to undertake the 
entire task of nationbuilding, all at once…” (Lofchie, 1971: 8, cited in Seyon 
1977).   
 
To understand the development of political community in the context of the African 
state, one needs to understand policies and practices adopted in the various colonies 
of Africa.  This is necessary because many post-independence African states were 
created with institutions and cultures from the colonial era.  Did the colonialists have 
the transformation of their colonies into independent states as part of their long-term 
goal? And if so, did they contribute to building political communities? How did the 
inheritors of the colonial states fare in furthering the political community building 
exercise (if they inherited one) and what have been the implications?   
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Colonial Policies and Implications for Nationbuilding: The colonial project in Africa 
was carried out with diverse policies and instruments.  While the British pursued 
“Indirect rule”, the French adopted “Direct rule” and assimilation of their colonies 
into the French civilisation (Duignan and Gann, 1975).  The British were aware that 
they would eventually leave and were intent on maximising colonial gains on the 
cheap, while the French were intent on achieving their psycho-spiritual mission of 
civilisation and Christianisation (Page and Sonnenburg, 2003).  Educational systems 
in the two policies also varied.  The British had separate education for their colonies, 
while the French opened their educational system to their colonies (Duignan and 
Gann, 1975).  In the practices adopted by indirect rule, systematic efforts were made 
to keep African societies fragmented, while the French were keen to separate Africans 
from Africa (ibid).  Indigenous mechanisms for building political communities, 
including indigenous authorities like the Poro, were either dismantled or corrupted.90  
Belgium pursued a ‘paternalistic’ policy, which assumed that what was best for 
Africans was to improve their material wellbeing while exercising authority over 
them.  Germany and Portugal focused on exploiting the labour of their colonies (ibid).  
They, especially Germany, adopted repressive policies to tame their colonies.  All of 
the colonial masters systematically avoided educating the African about African 
history.  All developed stereotypical attitudes about African cultures and religions and 
reproduced the stereotypes as ‘civilising education’.  Despite over two centuries of 
colonial dominance, no efforts were made to engage any of Rokkan’s four-phase 
models of evolving political communities.91  Aside from imposing territorial 
delimitations, constituting armies, producing national flags and civil administration, 
                                                
90The British indirect rule policy also established dual polities.  For instance, the settler state of Sierra Leone was 
governed under the British Crown while the ‘natives’ in the Protectorate were governed under the range of 
hinterland jurisdictions.   
91It can be argued that rudiments of civic consciousness, which contributed to the struggle for independence, were 
present at independence.  These were building blocks for building civic communities in the new states.  
Unfortunately the independence leaders moved swiftly to destroy the civic foundations. 
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no efforts were made to achieve ‘value consensus’ and ‘cultural homogeneity’ or 
‘cultural pluralism’; no ‘knowledge systems’ and ‘unquestioned beliefs’ developed 
for the emerging political communities, and no public arena where civic engagement 
could grow was developed.92  
 
Post-independence nationbuilding:  It is fair to say that although the state which was 
handed down had few qualities of political communities, opportunities for 
nationbuilding were present at independence.  At the dawn of independence, African 
communities in the various territories were mobilised and excited about national 
freedom.  The question of belonging or not belonging to the imposed territories did 
not arise.  All were mobilised against the perceived or real ‘enemy’, the colonial 
powers.  The popular movements that gave rise to most of the independence struggle 
maintained healthy relations with the new elites.  There were some attempts at 
constructing political communities.  Some like Kwame Nkrumah, in addition to his 
dream of a United Africa, hoped that political communities could be galvanised 
through soccer.  Others like Leopold Senghor of Senegal and Julius Nyerere of 
Tanzania constructed new ideologies to define their people.  Many abandoned the 
multi-party system they negotiated at independence for single party politics in the 
name of dismantling ethnic cleavages and constructing broader political communities.  
But instead of rallying their disparate societies through the one-party system, the new 
political class turned the one-party system into a vehicle for autocracy (Davidson, 
1992).  Neither soccer nor single party politics or Africanist ideologies delivered 
                                                
92To the colonialists, it was too risky to build political communities in the colonies.  Besides, they may have 
assumed that Africa did not need to bother with political communities, assuming that the ‘colonial centres’ by 
default would produce the identity and meaning necessary to keep Africans under some sort of political tent—state 
or otherwise. 
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cohesive political communities to Africa. If at all, single party politics entrenched 
ethnic cleavages and hegemony.    
 
To protect themselves from the disgruntled populations, the inheritors of the colonial 
states adopted and perfected hybrids of the range of colonial policies—from 
repression, to divide and rule, to indirect rule (now rebranded as neo-patrimony and 
clientelism), to extraction and capital flight (also branded as political graft).93  They 
also insulated themselves from their society.  Hassan Kukah graphically describes the 
insulationist tactics:   
 
The relationship between civil society and states in Africa seems to have some 
of the basic characteristics of a fortified city.  In the fortified city, 
communication between those inside and those outside is severely restricted by 
the nature of the fort itself.  So there are naturally outsiders and insiders.  The 
thicknesses of the wall, its height, its impenetrability, are what make it a 
respectable fort… These characteristics are supposed to inspire awe and 
intimidation in the minds of observers… The result, of course, is that the 
fortified city is a barricade, a siege: those inside cannot come out and those 
outside cannot go in (Kukah, 2003: 49) 
 
The outsiders resorted to other means to ensure their personal well-being, security and 
sense of identity.  For instance, many continued with indigenous economic and social 
institutions and security systems in parallel to whatever elements of the state reached 
their rural communities (Kimathi, 2005).  Kukah and Kimathi’s arguments 
graphically illustrate some aspects of the political behaviour in Africa, but it is only 
half the story.  While elites might have fortified their positions in the state, they 
preyed on society to sustain the bloated patronage system they presided over.  Natural 
                                                
93For instance, as indicated in Chapter 1, rather than build on advanced efforts at nationbuilding which the Poro 
sustained over six centuries, the colonialists and their heirs demonised the institution, violently dismantled its 
structures and relegated it to dormancy.  In other words, the majority of post-colonial African leaders seemed 
content with the colonial state handed down to them with its centralised administrative structures, extractive and 
exploitative government institutions, incomprehensible bureaucracy, military capacities and hurriedly crafted 
constitutional order.   
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endowments in rural communities were exploited while the livelihoods and ways of 
life of rural peoples were ravaged.  Indigenous institutions like the Poro and Sande 
also established themselves as rural kleptocrats—abandoning all regulatory regimes 
of the sodalities.  Also, those outside took advantage of any opening to jump into the 
fort and sometimes throw overboard those who kept them away, in the form of coups 
and insurgencies.  They then continued the fortification tactics.94   
 
2.3.1.3 Outcomes and Consequences 
 
Fifty years on (over 160 years in the case of Liberia), African statebuilders are yet to 
transform the multiple social cultural systems in their loosely demarcated territories 
into political communities.  This lack of a cohesive social frame within which the 
multiple communities could derive collective meaning and identity has undermined 
the building of legitimacy and loyalty, social and public trust, as well as shared 
meaning and values.  Pye and Verba’s emphatic statement made barely five years into 
independent statehood in most of Africa—that “unless those individuals who are 
physically and legally members of a political system… are also psychologically 
members of that system, orderly patterns of change are unlikely”—is substantiated by 
the disastrous failure of the state system in most of Africa (1965: 529, cited in Seyon 
1977: 6).  The absence of a sense of collective identity and shared meaning has given 
way to “political apathy, social atomisation and irresponsibility” (Benner, 1997: 190-
206).  This calamity is a rude reminder that a politically conscious community is a 
                                                
94In addition, as will be discussed later in Chapter 3, the Americo-Liberians in Liberia and the Creole settlers in 
Western Sierra Leone maintained a separation between their settler state and the indigenous population.  The 
recurrent contentious issue throughout Liberia’s history had been whether to expand the state and its national tent 
to include the indigenous population, instead of the indigenous people resisting the state system.  In both cases, as 
was the case in most of Africa, the failure of the state was primarily driven by the exploitation and reinvention of 
indigenous political systems such as the Poro and Sande as institutions of ethnocracy and gerontocracy. 
Sam Doe Final Thesis UB No. 04008980 67 
necessary condition for viable statehood.  It remains the outstanding project which 
contemporary statebuilders in Africa cannot and must not overlook.95   
 
2.3.2 Public Institution and Service Function 
 
The second most important function of the state is the maintenance and operation of 
public institutions.  In Weber’s rational-legal state, the basic tenet is that “individuals 
in public positions possessing power over their fellow citizens exercise that power in 
accordance with a legally defined structure directed towards a publicly acknowledged 
goal” (Clapham, 1985: 44).  Without such a stable politico-legal framework, the state 
is unable to accumulate human, social and economic capital for its sustenance (ibid.).  
Here I briefly interrogate the origin and effectiveness of public institutions in colonial 
and post-colonial Africa, and to make the case that while the African state held fast to 
authority or the “African Leviathan”, their rot began from failure of the bureaucracies 
and the meaningfulness of the alien discourse to the local.  
 
2.3.2.1 Public Sector: A Working Definition 
 
The goal of public institutions is to deliver services in a range of sections including 
security, health, education, roads, etc.  Max Weber’s bureaucracy has four major 
characteristics: a) it establishes and operates based on fixed jurisdiction; b) it is an 
ordered system with superiors and subordinates; c) management is based on written 
                                                
95It was naïve on the part of statebuilders to imagine that post-colonial states could survive without politically 
conscious and cohesive communities (Ozkirimli, 2005).  Even those who still doubt the links between a politically 
cohesive community and state efficacy acknowledge that its absence greatly weakens the state and undermines the 
building of trust and the culture of accountability (Clapham, 2003).  Karl Marx, in the preface to A Contribution to 
the Critique of Political Economy argued emphatically “…it is not the consciousness of man that determine their 
existence but their social existence that determines their consciousness.” If one were to rephrase Marx’s argument, 
one can say that it is not the atomised, interest-seeking individual citizen who creates a conscious political 
community, but that a conscious political community creates individual citizens.  This argument presupposes that 
rather than develop individuals, African states needed to pay attention to the creation of conscious communities.  It 
was not enough that once the colonial states had established relatively ordered and peaceful territories with the 
various ethnic communities, that these could automatically translate into politically conscious communities. 
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procedures; and d) specialised individuals and specialised knowledge are required for 
its operation.96  Weber points out that public institutions mature into these 
characteristics over a long period of time (cited in Borgatti, 1996).97  The viability of 
public institutions, drawing from Weber’s description and the common expectations 
from citizens, I argue, can be measured by three core indicators: a) the quality and 
coherence of the institution; b) its distributive capacity; and c) extent of public 
consent and cooperation.  These core indicators, as illustrated in Table 2.1, are further 
manifested in a range of behavioural indicators, which tend to be unique from context 
to context.   
 
Table 2.1: Indicators of Institutional Crisis 
Coherence Consent and Cooperation Distributive Capacity 
• Conflict between public 
institutions on 
mandates and 
responsibilities 
• Resonance and 
acceptance of public 
and societal values 
• Politicisation 
• Visibility and loyalty to 
alternative institutions 
• Resistance to tax payment, or 
tax evasion  
• Explicit disrespect for public 
goods and facilities 
• Exclusion 
• Disproportional allocation of 
state resources to public 
sectors 
• Disproportional delivery of 
services (e.g. urban-rural) 
 
If one applies the above indicators to public institutions in Africa, one is confronted 
with the fact that nearly all states in the continent have failed to operate efficient and 
effective public institutions.  For instance, before the civil wars consummated their 
collapse, public institutions in Liberia and Sierra Leone had degenerated not only into 
states of disrepair, but their rot had begun to engulf their respective societies.  It is fair 
to say that at independence, most African states inherited relatively well-functioning 
bureaucracies, albeit with variations.  The economic health of most countries at 
independence testifies to the relative effectiveness of the bureaucratic structures.  
Bello (2009) indicates that during the period when the African states were being 
                                                
96
Available at http://www2.pfeiffer.edu, accessed 04/07/2007.  
97
Stephen P. Borgatti provides an excellent summary of Marx Weber’s rational bureaucracy on 
www.analytictech.com/mb021/bureau.htm.  
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handed to their respective inheritors, the net food export of the continent was 1.3 
million tons a year.98  From all indications, a number of African states inherited 
considerable financial reserves at independence.  So what went wrong? Why did the 
relatively healthy bureaucracies disintegrate so quickly?  Some say it is at the colonial 
origin of public institutions (Acemoglu et al, 2000)99, while others argue it is at their 
maintenance in post-independence Africa (Chabal and Daloz, 1998; Baryat et al, 
1999; Speiser and Handy, 2005) and yet others trace it to the tropical and diseased 
climatic conditions (Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger, 1999).  Let us review the dominant 
causal debates on the inefficacy of the public sector in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
2.3.2.2 Colonial Public Sectors   
 
Acemoglu et al (2000) trace the rapid institutional disintegration in Africa to the 
colonial construction of the public sector.  They argued that colonialist policies in 
establishing and managing bureaucracies were informed by the environmental 
conditions of the colonies.  Where weather and diseases made it uncomfortable for 
long-term residence, as in the case of West Africa, the colonialists established 
“extractive institutions”, while in colonies with more favourable habitable conditions, 
the bureaucracies were more “constructive” (ibid).  In the favourable colonies, the 
colonialists built state bureaucracies akin to those in their respective centres.  These 
included “checks and balances on state power, fostering private entrepreneurship, 
trade and innovation” (Acemoglu et al, 2000: 1375).  They also built the 
infrastructures—roads, real estate, railways, utility systems, etc.  Conversely, the 
extractive policy included “legal constructs endowing the state with large powers and 
                                                
98
For more details, see Bello, Walden (2009) The Food Wars, Verso: London. 
99
For more detail on the links between colonial bureaucracy and those of post independence African states, see 
Acemoglu, Daron, Johnson and Robinson (2000), “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An 
Empirical Investigation,” NBER Working Paper #7771   
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few constraints, and which were designed to effectively transfer natural resources to 
the colonisers while stifling private initiative and commercial development in the 
colonies” (ibid).  Colonial educational policies also accounted for the quality of 
human capital developed in the colonies.  In favourable conditions, the colonialists 
established considerable human capital development capacity, which they managed 
themselves.  In unfavourable colonies, these resources were few.  In both instances, 
the colonialists managed most of the professional functions while locals were mostly 
clerks, errand officers and guards.  As a consequence, the abrupt departure led to the 
rapid decline of the bureaucracy and public institutions.  Sachs and McArthur (2001) 
disagree with Acemoglu et al’s links between colonial practice and failure of the 
public sector in Africa.  Instead they argue that geographically related variables such 
as malaria and low life expectancy are to blame for low productivity and weak 
bureaucratic performance in Africa.  It seems to me, however, that the arguments 
Sachs and McArthur advance in their critique of Acemoglu et al’s work tend to 
reinforce the core argument which Acemoglu et al advance that inhospitable 
conditions, whether health or geography influenced colonial practices and post-
colonial human capacities.  The evidence in the difference between West Africa and 
the rest of Africa in terms of infrastructural and institutional development is 
undisputed.  However, sub-Saharan Africa’s woeful public sector performance cannot 
be attributed to colonial legacy and geographical determinants alone.  We must also 
investigate the place and power of agency, especially since the state was handed down 
to Africans.  
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2.3.2.3 Bureaucracy in Post-independence Africa 
 
African scholars like Francis (2005), Olukoshi (1998), Mohan and Zack-Williams 
(2004), Zack-Williams et al (2000), among many, while insisting that colonialism 
shares most of the blame for bureaucratic failure in Africa, concede that post-colonial 
nationalists and those who came after them have and continue to fail Africa.  They 
identify the politicisation and de-professionalisation of state bureaucracy, graft, 
mediocrity, patronage, etc. as vices which the nationalists introduced and/ or 
perfected in the colonial states.  Also, rather than pay attention to the development of 
the state bureaucracy, inheritors of the African states leaned towards politics and 
authority—the ‘African Leviathan’.  As a consequence, this school argues, decline of 
state bureaucracy was accelerated at an unprecedented pace on the day the state was 
handed to the nationalists.  Most western scholars however insist that it is Africa’s so-
called nationalists who corrupted the excellent state system bequeathed to them at 
independence, with historical, sociological and cultural materials from the continent 
(Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Speiser and Handy, 2005). The only blame that colonialists 
share, they argue, is the manner in which they handed over the state.  Jackson (1993) 
contends that the root of the problem was in the takeover: 
 
“Africans were catapulted by the rush of events into the state system of the 
latter twentieth century with very limited preparation for large scale self-
government and still attached to indigenous practices and institutions of which 
most were rooted in kinship duties and clan or tribal identities that were 
contrary to the obligations and other requirements of modern sovereign 
statehood” (Jackson, 1993: 140, cited in Speiser, 2005: 15).   
 
Others trace the problem to the African context.  They argue that conditions in Africa 
have been particularly anathema to the public institution model defined by the 
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Western state system (Herbst, 2000; Jackson, 2001; Reno, 2000; Clapham, 2001). 
Daloz and Chabal (1999) went even further to question any claim that bureaucracy 
and governmentality were evolving in pre-colonial Africa.  They argue strongly that 
state institutions are not just any “centralised political structures presiding over the 
destiny of a given people in a given geography”, nor can anything like it emerge from 
organic political formations in non-western societies (1999: 54).  Rather, development 
of the modern state is independent and as an [pre-designed] entity, its viability 
depends on being emancipated from the society in which it is transplanted (ibid). 
Beier (2005) observes that this type of claim is born out of the presumption that 
“…the state is the sole legitimate expression of the political… absent of the state; no 
advanced politics could be imagined to exist” (p.11).  Such claims in my view are too 
simplistic, because they tend to reduce Africa’s complex political malaise into a 
single cause-and-effect, while upholding the Western state system as a universal 
model.     
 
While the greed and terror which overwhelmed Africa are inexcusable, the bickering 
about who is or isn’t to blame tends to divert much needed energy from rethinking 
governmentality and bureaucracy in failed and post-collapsed states in Africa.  I want 
to move the debate back to the question of structure, agency and context.  The claim 
that a structure can be transplanted and not be affected by its context and the people 
for whom it was constructed is not only naïve, it is also the height of chauvinism.   If 
the proposition that interactions between structures, agencies and contexts results in 
reproduced structures, agencies and contexts, then the questions we should be asking 
are: a) how potent are each of the three elements in the configuration process? And b) 
what is likely to emerge in light of the individual quality?  
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In addition to the colonial and contextual factors, there were also exogenous factors 
that contributed to the bureaucratic decay in Africa.  The most popular culprit is the 
infamous structural adjustment policy (SAP).  Influenced by the Wilsonian neo-liberal 
thesis, the Bretton Woods institutions (BWIs) argued that by reducing state 
bureaucracy to efficient levels, deregulating the private sector and allowing import-
export balances to be dictated by market forces, economies of developing countries 
would resuscitate and experience growth (Olukoshi, 1998).  At the heart of SAP was 
the notion of allowing the ‘invisible hand’ the chance to advance development.  The 
policy failed to appreciate the fact that there must, first and foremost, be a core 
mercantilist class in the context to nurture the growth of the primacy of the private 
over the public in the economic realm.  Notwithstanding the sometimes non-existent 
foundation for private entrepreneurship in most African countries, the BWIs 
demanded that nearly all African countries implement SAP in order to continue to do 
business with the BWIs.100  Nearly all African countries acquiesced under such 
pressure and religiously implemented the infamous policy.  Unfortunately, the 
promised prosperity became an illusion (Olukoshi, 1998).101 
 
                                                
100Olukoshi (1998) outlines the key policy conditionality as: “devaluation of national currencies, trade 
liberalisation, foreign currency transaction, price and interest rate deregulation, promoting of cost-cutting and 
deficit-reducing measures, retrenchment of workers in the public sectors, liquidation of public sector firms, among 
others (p. 2).  It also called for cutbacks on social projects like housing, education, health, etc. 
101Proponents of SAP argue that to blame Africa’s woes on a policy, which in actual fact intended to address a 
glaring African economic and governance disease, is to take the blame game too far.  While agreeing that the 
blame game will take Africa and Africans nowhere, it makes sense to learn from mistakes; and SAP was one of 
those mistakes with disastrous consequences in Africa.  SAP was analogous to or even arguably an economic 
extension of the evangelical and missiological expedition of colonialism and neo-colonialism. It fails to 
acknowledge that political, social and economic conditions are not the same in all states.  It was absurd to assume 
that its universal prescription would heal all diseases.  Most importantly, the retraction of the public sector 
assumes that there was an emerging or existing mercantile class who would step up to the plate.  The error in this 
assumption turned Africans into mere consumers of western commodities, leading to the astronomical rise in 
imports and near disappearance of export capacities on the continent. Some proponents of SAP have 
acknowledged that rather than prosperity, the policy which they implemented with evangelical fervour has not 
only failed, it has accelerated the failure and collapse of most states in Africa, although there is yet to be formal 
apologies or some reparations for this significant policy failure across the developing world including its biggest 
casualty—Africa.  
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2.3.2.4 Persistent Explanations for Bureaucratic Decay in Africa 
 
Despite compelling evidence that suggests that public institutions in Africa failed due 
to the combined effect of endogenous and exogenous factors, many scholars cling to 
recurrent myths to explain the institutional woes in Africa.  Since these myths often 
drive the diagnosis on which the international community tends to base their 
prescriptions for state collapse, I will discuss the two dominant myths.  These include: 
a) neo-patrimony is inherent to Africa; and b) there is no public and private 
differentiation in Africa.   
 
Neo-patrimony originates from Africa: Chabal and Daloz (1999), Speiser and Handy 
(2005), Reno (2001) and Erdmann (2001) are among the many scholars who allege 
that African leaders dusted out what they claimed was Africa’s arcane patrimonial 
order and merged it with the rational-legal model from the West to produce neo-
patrimony.102  Speiser and Handy argue that while the establishment of African states 
on the relics of colonialism made them inherently fragile, state failure and collapse is 
directly a consequence of neo-patrimony, which African elites erected after 
independence.  While I acknowledge that neo-patrimony and its manifestations have 
undermined post-colonial Africa’s social, political and economic development, the 
claim that it originated in Africa and only gained currency in post-colonial Africa is 
suspect.  Evidence suggests public institutions in African colonies and those at the 
colonial centres were quite different.  Gyekye (1997) contends that colonial governors 
personalised public institutions and ruled through decrees, with no accountability to 
                                                
102
Weber defines neo-patrimony as “a form of organisation in which relationships of a broadly patrimonial type 
pervade a political and administrative system which is formally constructed on rational legal lines” (Clapham, 
2001: 48).  He goes on to point out that in a neo-patrimonial system, the “state is simultaneously illusory and 
informal, the rule of law is feebly enforced, and the ability to implement public policy remains mostly limited” 
(ibid).  Out of a neo-patrimonial order comes clientelism and corruption, both of which have severely undermined 
public institutions in Africa. 
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the governed.   They selected a few chiefs, many of whose communities were in 
revolt against them, and imposed them as proxies of the indirect rule system 
(p.218).103  Secondly, the culture of exploitation and arbitrariness exercised during 
colonialism, coupled with the disconnected yet mutually exploitative relations 
between the colonial capitals and their so-called protectorates, gave way to “…the 
general attitude amongst citizens that it is possible to injure the state without injuring 
oneself…” (Gyekye, 1997: 220).  Gyekye observes that this attitude “…opens the 
floodgates of bribery, corruption, carelessness about state property or state enterprise, 
and other unethical acts deleterious to the development and welfare of the state” 
(ibid).  This is not to excuse the nationalists who, upon assuming state responsibility, 
perfected and perpetuated these vices.  
 
A third observation that escapes the notice of most scholars is the bifurcated attitudes 
most Africans demonstrate when interacting in the state on a ‘public’ level, and 
another when interacting at communal levels.  Gyekye indicates that citizens tend to 
maintain positive attitudes to the community, believing that any injury done to the 
community directly affects oneself (p. 230).  On the other hand, they maintain 
negative attitudes when interacting at the state level.  A participant confirms Gyekye’s 
observation thus:  
“Public space and public goods in Poro societies were defined as sacred… no 
one was allowed to abuse them or claim them as their own… one family did not 
benefit from them in exclusion of others, nor were positions allocated based on 
personal relationship…” (Key Informant, Monrovia, 2006).   
                                                
103For instance, the first general council in which the people of Sierra Leone had some say was established in the 
1958 constitution—3 years before independence (Alie, 1992).  Similarly, freed slaves in Liberia jealously 
protected their settler state from the indigenous majority. The over 95% indigenous population was granted partial 
citizenship in a state to which they were tax-paying subjects only in 1951, nearly 94 years into statehood (Sawyer, 
1992).  It took a bloody coup in 1980 (133 years after independence) for indigenous Liberians to fully experience 
real political franchise and citizenship.  It is important to reiterate here that both Liberia and Sierra Leone operated 
dual legal and institutional systems—for the settler states on the one hand, and the protectorates on the other—for 
well over a century. After independence, the state-protectorate divides simply metamorphosed into a rural-urban 
divide with disproportional allocation of resources in favor of urban dwellers, while the infamous indirect rule 
system now manifests itself as ‘clientelism’ (Herbst, 2000). 
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I argue that resistance104 culture established during colonialism is one reason for the 
demeaning attitude towards public goods.  Fanthorpe (2007) observes well when he 
said that the Poro in Liberia and Sierra Leone have served both as instruments of 
political order and control and instruments of egalitarian resistance to state control 
(p.9).105    Although public cultures and practices in the colonies as described above 
fit very well in Weber’s description of the neo-patrimonial order, some scholars still 
insist that what was left behind was the Western model and that neo-patrimony was 
the outcome of Africa’s adaptation of the model (Speiser and Handy, 2005).  Even 
where they acknowledge the difference between public structures and practices in the 
colonies and metropolises, most scholars insist colonial authorities were constrained 
to adapt the rational-legal model to African conditions, but make no connection 
between the colonial adaptation and post-colonial public culture and structure.106      
 
Lack of public-private differentiation: In Weber’s rational-legal state, it is argued that 
the decision-making capacity and functioning of a state is measured by its degree of 
independence from society (Bayart, 1993; Daloz and Chabal, 1999).  The fragility of 
African states, it is argued, is a consequence of the difficulty (if not impossibility) of 
separating the private from the public in African cultures.  Others insist that it is this 
private-public inseparability that creates the fertile ground for neo-patrimony (Reno, 
2001; Hyden, 1999).  This claim is misleading and it is certainly a consequence of 
either the lack of understanding of, or persistent obliviousness to, the socio-political 
                                                
104In reaction to the British and Liberian authority outlawing the Poro institution, traditional authorities 
spearheaded a number of revolts including war, destruction of facilities belonging to the occupying powers and the 
use of spiritual powers against colonial interests.   
105
Dean and Levi (2003) identify the common forms of resistance which indigenous societies applied against the 
imposing state as “dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander and cynicism, and 
sabotage” (p. 18-20).  These resistance practices were exacerbated when African elites appropriated the state for 
themselves and excluded the general populace.   
106
Chabal, Daloz and Jackson even conclude their works by blaming African elites for “Africanising” or 
“traditionalising” Weber’s rational-legal state, and the colonial masters for leaving Africa in a hurry and 
abandoning the western state model to Africans to be bastardised and thrown into disrepute. 
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and historical realities of Africa.  In my view, authors who make the claim of private-
public inseparability in Africa fail to acknowledge the fact that with the introduction 
of the state, all African societies were subjected to interacting within two or more 
publics—the ‘publics’ constructed in indigenous political systems and those imposed 
through colonialism and the state system produced from it.  Ekeh first introduced the 
concept of ‘two-publics’, indicating the ‘publics’ of indigenous Africa, which 
Fanthorpe (2007) calls “primordial publics”, and the state ‘public’ (Ekeh, 1975).  As 
part of their resistance strategy and fortification of the state, most African societies 
gravitated to the norms and practices of the ‘primordial’ publics, while seizing every 
opportunity to exploit Weber’s ‘instrumental’ macro-public.107   
 
Besides, whether western or indigenous African political systems, the quality of 
private-public interaction, as Migdal (2001) points out, is a consequence of mutual 
consent emanating from the merger and common expression of shared public-private 
values (p.42).   Despite the rigid rules that governed private-public differentiation in 
most African societies, the ‘multi-micro-publics’ enjoy a considerable level of 
cooperation and acceptance primarily because rules governing them are based on 
“explicit or implied consent” (ibid: 34).  The consent is born from the fact that both 
the public and private are products of society, and are not arbitrary constructions or 
impositions.  Peter Evans (1995) reminds us that while private-public or state-society 
separation is necessary for a functioning bureaucracy, public or state structures must 
be anchored within society to ensure their legitimacy and relevance.108  Because there 
                                                
107While Ekeh’s concept of ‘two-publics’ clarifies the confusion that drive the dominant thinking, it tends to also 
lump the range of ‘micro-publics’ in Africa’s multi-ethnic, multi-national states under one rubric.  The researcher 
here proposes to speak of multi micro-publics and the macro-public of the state.  Most African societies gravitated 
to the norms and practices of the ‘primordial’ public while seizing every opportunity to exploit the macro-public. 
108Kimathi (2005) points out that, inheritors of the colonial states furthered the urban bias, marginalising rural 
dwellers while privileging urban dwellers through resource allocation. They continued with the periphery-centre 
flow of resources from the rural to the capital cities and then onward to Western banks for their personal benefits.   
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has been neither merger amongst the multi micro-publics, nor merger between them 
on the one hand and the macro-public of the state on the other, there are fierce 
competitions amongst the ‘multi-micro-publics’ as well as between the ‘micro-
publics’ and the ‘macro-public’.109  While contestation amongst the micro-publics 
undermine societal cohesion, contestation between the micro-publics and the macro-
public weakens the state and sets it on the path of decline.110   
 
2.3.3 Guarantor of Security 
 
2.3.3.1 Security: A Working Definition 
 
Hobbes argues that security is the single most important condition for developing 
civilised and prosperous existence in any society, and that the state is its sole provider 
(MacPherson, 1968, cited in Buzan, 1989).  Although he refers to the aspiration for 
“well-being” and “prosperous” life as the natural outcomes of security, Hobbes claims 
that it is insecurity, not security and the conditions of well-being, which drive rational 
people to shelter together in the commonwealth of the state (Wolfers, 1962: 16-17).  
The degree of insecurity a state faces is, therefore, measured by its perception of fear 
                                                                                                                                      
They also continued with the infamous indirect rule system under a new brand name—‘clientelism’.  The term 
refers to a complex chain of personal bonds between political patrons or bosses and their individual clients or 
followers.  These bonds are founded on mutual material advantage: the patron furnishes excludable resources to 
dependents and accomplices in return for their support and cooperation.  Present day clientelism thus tends to 
flourish in insecure political and economic environments, both rural and urban, and is integral to the politics of 
survival for both patrons and clients (Migdall, 1988).  Martz (1997: 10) has pointed out that clientelism is “an 
enduring mechanism of control in society… identifiable in all times and settings.” As a consequence, the state with 
its control and centralisation of all resources of African societies, as Clapham (2001) notes, has become the biggest 
prize for which African elites continue their violent scramble.   
109
Just as during colonial times representatives of paramount chiefs presiding over rural communities at the behest 
of the colonial authorities had their representatives in the capitals, authorities of the ‘micro-publics’ seem to 
perceive individuals from their communities in the state system as their ambassadors who are expected to represent 
their interests. 
110
I am not attempting to continue the blame game.  The intention of this exercise is to attempt to fully define the 
origin and complexity of the public institutional crisis in Africa (with particular attention to Liberia and Sierra 
Leone).  Also, it would be unfair to claim that whatever was left behind did not have some redeemable elements, 
even if they were introduced in the last few years of colonialism and embedded within the colonial discourse.  
Where I agree with Chabal, Daloz and others is the allegation that African elites failed at independence to 
seriously review the institutions and public values they inherited and make them “appropriate” and “meaningful” 
to conditions and change dynamics, which prevailed in Africa at the time.  Instead, African elites appropriated the 
colonial exploits for their personal benefits (Clapham, 2001). 
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and extent of vulnerability of its territory, institutions, shared values and human and 
material resources (ibid).  While Hobbes’ definition of security seems to suggest that 
collective security is inherent to society, the emergence of the state resulted in the 
usurpation of societal security for state security under the “national security” doctrine 
(Buzan, 1989).  The national security doctrine makes five fundamental assumptions: 
a) security is inherently political and the state is both the sole securitising object and 
guarantor of national security; b) threats to national security are external and reside in 
the intentions and behaviours of other states; c) as a sovereign authority, the state has 
settled the question of order, unification, legitimacy and collective identity on the 
domestic front, thus ensuring domestic peace; and d) the state is benign and will only 
use organised violence in the interest of state-making and consolidation (ibid).  
Nothing in the classical security doctrine makes the distinction between the state and 
the regime, nor were preventive measures put in place to control how state actors or 
regimes exploit the immense powers and instruments of violence put in the care of the 
state.  In fact it was assumed that state violence against its own population was always 
meant for the greater good, for statemaking (Buzan, 1989).   
 
2.3.3.2 Security in Post-independent Africa 
 
The consequences of entrusting the sheltering together for personal wellbeing and 
security to colonially constructed states have been colossal in Africa.  Rather than 
forge cooperation and consensus amongst its pre-colonial authorities, African states 
resorted to regime security, ethno-politics and elitism.  They entrenched themselves in 
power through state terror and patronage, thereby undermined the sheltering together 
under the state tent for ‘wellbeing’ and ‘prosperity’ to which Hobbes refers.  Barely 
15 years into statehood in Africa, Martin van Creveld warned that, “[any] 
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state…which cannot safeguard the lives of its members, subjects, citizens, comrades 
…is unlikely either to command their loyalty or to survive for very long…” (1975: 
42).  Van Creveld’s observation became real in Africa once the superpowers, whose 
proxy war kept the lid on the grievances boiling within most African states, withdrew 
their support.  The myth of the state’s monopoly over violence, as a result, has begun 
to unravel and given way to what du Toit (1999) and Job (1992) refer to as “insecurity 
dilemma”.  Boys and girls aged as young as seven years now march into the public 
realm to lay claims to the predatory state and thereby displace old dictators for new 
warlords, thanks to the availability and efficient use of the AK-47 (Doe, 2001).  The 
random and widespread violence which their long repressed rages have caused them 
to unleash has not only shattered state institutions, but cut at the seams of the fabric of 
society; thus leading to the total collapse of state and society.  These post-Cold War 
developments have prompted international calls for a rethink of the so-called national 
security doctrine, which gave the state the exclusive rights to the security of its 
territory and people.  Holsti (1996) points out that the traditional realist framework 
that singles out the state as the sole securitising object—custodian of sovereignty, and 
defender of society against external threats—is seriously out of sync with today’s 
realities.  He calls for the widening of the security discourse to include non-military 
issues that impact human security (ibid).   
 
An avalanche of concepts and theories has followed since Holsti made his 
groundbreaking call.  Buzan et al (1997) arguably offer the first comprehensive and 
compelling response.   They question the singular and exclusive position of the state 
as the only securitising object, while at the same time remaining the sole custodian of 
security.  They call for widening the scope and content of securitised objects by 
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including individuals, nation and regime as equally salient securitising objects (ibid).  
Buzan et al make the case that just as the state can be mobilised to make the ultimate 
sacrifice to defend itself, similar sentiments should be evoked when individuals and 
their national collectivity are threatened (ibid). The United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) in the 1994 Human Development Report takes the case of 
security for humans to the international policy arena.  The report identifies seven 
threats to security and proposes humans instead of the state as the central securitising 
object.111 The human security approach departs from traditional understanding and 
application of security in three fundamental ways.  First, it returns human beings and 
the threats defined from their perspectives to the centre of the security discourse.  
Second, rather than focus on containment of threats, human security seeks to 
systematically prevent threats before they endanger the wellbeing and prosperity of 
human beings and their communities.  Alkire emphasises that human security “urges 
institutions to offer protection which is institutionalised, not episodic; responsive, not 
rigid; preventative, not reactive” (Alkire, 2003: 2).  The third difference is that the 
human security notion of security seeks to preserve and promote the vital core of life.  
Alkire defines the vital cores as agency (freedom ‘to be’ or the ability and freedom to 
independently determine one’s existence and wellbeing), survival (freedom from 
threats to life), community (freedom to interact and belong to a community), and 
dignity (respect for individuals, their values, beliefs and worldviews). 
 
Aside from calls to rethink the securitising objects, there are also calls to broaden the 
scope of security beyond the national.  Given the proximity and porosity of borders of 
most third world countries, especially in Africa, coupled with the phenomenal rise in 
                                                
111
The UNDP’s seven threats to security include physical, economic, community, environmental, political, health 
and food. 
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transnational organised crime and bad neighbourliness, Buzan et al observe that 
classical international relations is in grave error for confining security to state 
parameters.  They call for complementing the ‘national security’ structure and 
doctrine with ‘regional security’ structure and doctrine (cited in Francis, 2005: 91).  
Agreeing with Buzan et al, Dahl (1999) makes the case that because the 
“…boundaries of a country… are much smaller than the boundaries of the decisions 
that significantly affect the fundamental interests and security of its citizens”, the tent 
under which people shelter must include sub regional and regional tents if effective 
and durable security is to be assured (p. 319).  Dahl argues further that regional 
security brings particular benefits that cannot be obtained through national security.  
For instance, sub regional and regional security can: a) enhance awareness about 
transnational threats; b) reinforce regional cooperation, confidence building and good 
neighbourliness; and c) enhance effectiveness in the security sector by strengthening 
coordination and integrated responses (ibid).   
 
While there are obvious advantages, especially for fragile African states, to shelter 
together under regional as well as national tents, there are also challenges with the 
concept.  In most cases, regional cooperation tends to be an excuse for regional 
hegemons to bully smaller states and extend their authority beyond their borders.  
Rivalries between Anglophone and Francophone West Africa and the visible 
dominance of Nigeria in the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), has led to apprehension amongst countries of the sub region about the 
implications of ceding some of their national responsibilities for security to a sub 
regional body.  This fear was substantiated during the seriously flawed interventions 
of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group 
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(ECOMOG)—the sub regional peacekeeping force established at the behest of 
Nigeria to end wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau.112  
These realities account for the difficulty in the practical application of regional 
security policies, particularly in West Africa, although heads of states appear to be 
positive about the regional proposals (van Nieuwkerk, 1998).  Besides the fear of 
hegemony, Nieuwkerk indicates that too much emphasis on regional security, given 
limited financial support, may leave much needed overhauling work on national 
security institutions undone (ibid).  It may also create the false impression that 
strengthening regional security architecture automatically guarantees national security 
(ibid).   
 
Notwithstanding its disadvantages, today’s threats with their transnational characters 
make a compelling case for regional security, even if a cautious case.  Adebayo 
Oyebade and Abiodun Alao (1998) are more enthusiastic about the concept.  In their 
edited book, Africa After the Cold War: The Changing Perspective on Security, the 
authors argue that the abandonment of African states by Western powers presents a 
golden opportunity to construct a “Pan-African security system”, with economic 
integration and cooperation as well as collective conflict resolution functions (1998: 
189).  Besides, it is important to point out here that African heads of states seem to 
have come to the conclusion long before the concept was written—that with their 
marginal place in global politics and sheer abandonment by world powers, sheltering 
together remains their only option for survival.  All regional and sub regional 
institutions in Africa are actively developing regional security architectures, including 
conflict early warning systems—a domain that was only recently exclusive to the 
                                                
112The researcher extensively elaborates this case in Chapter 3. 
Sam Doe Final Thesis UB No. 04008980 84 
state. ECOWAS, as a case in point, has taken the lead in Africa in overhauling its 
policies and institutions.  Heads of States of ECOWAS revised the 1975 Treaty 
establishing the ECOWAS and a range of other supplemental protocols to establish 
the principle of supra-nationality.  The principle in theory allows the sub regional 
body to intervene in member states in cases of gross human rights violations, internal 
violence with threats to sub regional security, crisis of governance, the forestalling of 
inclusive politics and trans-border insecurity, among others.  The treaty also explicitly 
enjoins upon member states to ensure that all their peoples enjoy their fundamental 
human rights as well as uphold pluralism and market economy.113   
 
2.4 STATE COLLAPSE: CAUSES AND MANIFESTATIONS 
 
The performance thesis, which is the dominant view in the international system, as 
indicated earlier, suggests that a state fails when it ceases to govern or perform its 
three core functions discussed in the previous section.  These include institutional 
reference or public institutions and services, security and collective identity.  As 
institutions decline and state performance falls in doubt, it leads to a crisis of 
legitimacy which often manifests itself in “illegal, informal and criminal use of state 
resources and powers; poor service delivery; corruption and personalisation of public 
assets” (Newman and Schnabel, 2002: 1). Doornbos identifies five salient precursors 
to state collapse: a) the privatisation of state assets; b) the breakdown of the patronage 
system and open protests against the establishment by former allies; c) the mismatch 
                                                
113Numerous authors have adequately addressed the development of regional and sub regional security 
architectures in Africa.  I present this snapshot to link the concept to the growing challenge of state reconstruction.  
While regional security is gaining currency in international discourse, state reconstruction efforts seem to be 
making limited efforts in operationalising the link between regional and national security.  For instance, as will be 
discussed in chapters 6 and 7, the training of the national police forces in Liberia and Sierra Leone as well as their 
armed forces have very little demonstrated links to transnational policing.  Ongoing security sector reconstruction 
in Liberia, in particular, has no emphasis on the development of immigration policies and the training of border 
guards.  There is also no place for cross learning between the police and immigration forces of countries in the 
troubled Mano River basin. 
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between the nature and orientation of state institutions and divisions within society; d) 
deepening conflicts over resources; and e) increased reversion to culture and other 
forms of primordial identities (2003: 34).114  In addition to the precursors to state 
collapse, Zartman argues that the threshold of collapse is determined by societal 
collapse.  Implying a symbiotic relationship between the state and society, Zartman 
posits that it is the simultaneous breakdown of societal institutions—associational life, 
social coherence and the absence of civic support and demand functions—and state 
bureaucracy which consummate the long and degenerative process of state collapse 
(1995: 5-7).  
 
Perhaps one of the strongest arguments in Zartman’s groundbreaking book, Collapsed 
States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, is the claim of the 
symbiotic relationship between the state and its society.  This argument is telling, 
given the all-out war which African statebuilders waged against African societies in 
the hope of dismantling indigenous authorities and gaining legitimacy for themselves 
to consolidate the state.  They seemed to have assumed that the state was potent 
enough to recreate its own society—one that would represent the norms of the 
Westphalian state and imbibe its liberal values.  To the contrary, the exploitation and 
in some instances destruction of societal institutions and systems of relationship, 
inadvertently severely undermine the viability of the state.  I must also add that the 
corruption and destruction of African indigenous systems predates colonialism and 
                                                
114Others identify as salient precursors the decline of rule of law and the security sector, including political 
meddling with rulings of the courts; restrictions on media freedom; identity polarisation and xenophobia; 
dissatisfaction and opposition which then draws increased repression; and the use of security forces to keep order.  
While the numerous structural and accelerating indicators identified by scholars and security experts may precede 
state collapse, it is not a given that their presence is automatically followed by collapse.  Countries like Guinea, 
Burundi, Nigeria and Cameroon, to name just a few, have managed to pull themselves from the brink of collapse 
and are gradually strengthening their respective states, although all the proximate and accelerating factors 
associated with collapse were present.  Arguably what is the common life support during the critical periods of 
these countries was the semblance of authority (military, charismatic, tradition, etc) that remained both in the state 
and society at large.    
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the post-colonial states in most of Africa. The colonial project was built on the 
exploitation of indigenous systems during the slave trade, while post-colonial 
statebuilders perfected the work done during the colonial period. For instance, the 
politics of indirect rule exercised in most of Africa first by the colonial powers and 
later the nationalists, I would argue, originated from the profoundly immoral slave 
trade.  During the trade, indigenous leaders who turned despots abandoned their 
systems of accountability for the whims of their patrons, who anchored along the 
coast awaiting their human cargoes from the hinterlands.  The slave trade period and 
the period of colonialism that followed destroyed most indigenous systems of 
authority and accountability at the seams (Dunn and Tarr, 1988).  Indigenous 
institutions as guarantors of social order became what Arthur Abraham refers to as 
personal amorphous structures ruled by despots.115 Aside from the exploitative 
strategies, earlier stereotypes which reduced Africa to possessing a mere primitive 
nature undermine constructive engagement with political agencies and structures of 
Africa.  As a consequence the African state, arguably, is the least pervasive and 
permeable of the colonial states, compared to those established and contextually 
remoulded in Asia and Latin America.116  
 
However, while I agree with the performance thesis, my proposition is that situating 
state collapse in the performance thesis alone does not tell the whole story.  Besides, 
some of the core assumptions of the performance thesis are not that obvious.  For 
instance, to establish direct causal links between civic disengagement and institutional 
                                                
115
It is important to note that decay of indigenous institutions during these periods vary from context to context, as 
is the case with state decay.  In some African societies, indigenous systems resisted and are relatively intact, while 
in others the corruption led to serious degeneration of indigenous institutions.  The point being made here is that 
collapse is the consequence of the interaction of degenerated societal institutions and the fragile state. 
116Unlike Africa, the recognition of the political agency and structure of Asia allows for state-society “fusion” 
rather than state-society collision in Africa. The consequence was the establishment of dual polities and 
authorities—the colonial polity and ‘hinterland’ polities.  At no time therefore did Africans abandon indigenous 
systems and authorities.   
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decline in my view is suspect.  I will argue that most African states survived because 
of civic disengagement, rather than civic engagement.  Rather than generate the vision 
around which African states could unite their populations, African elites resorted to 
the pursuit of what I call inverse legitimacy.117  Inverse legitimacy is a two-sided 
coin.  On one side is state insulation and fortification and on the other is civic 
disengagement and societal fragmentation.  In justifying the first side of the coin, state 
elites convinced themselves that the state is their personal prize for chasing out the 
colonial powers.  They therefore feel justified to exercise a monopoly over its 
resources.  On the other side, disenchanted with the mismanagement of the state, 
African societies have come to accept that the state belongs to the group of elites who 
speaks its language, wear its costumes and are versed in its polity; hence, they have 
adopted the practice of disengagement and/ or acquiescence. In the view of inverse 
legitimacy, therefore, states actually held together, albeit fragilely, because there was 
no support and demand from their citizens—no legitimacy.  There was also no 
pressure to perform.  Similarly, Martin Doornbos’s direct causal links between 
reversion to primordial materials and state collapse is suspect.  At what time in the 
history of the state did Africans abandon indigenous materials for the service of the 
state? These questions compel us to look elsewhere for more convincing evidence to 
explain the collapse of the African state. 
 
Ottaway (2003), Ghani et al (2006), and Mohan and Zack-Williams (2004), among 
others, seem to offer an alternative explanation that could complete the puzzle.  The 
authors trace state collapse to the crisis of authority—the weakening or death of the 
                                                
117Surhke, 1994; Duffield, 1994; and Kaplan, 1994 aptly refer to the case the researcher makes under this concept, 
although they do not name the situation inverse legitimacy. 
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‘African Leviathan’.118  This crisis of authority is caused primarily by two inter-
related factors.  First, it is caused by the withdrawal of the protection of the rival 
superpowers.  During the Cold War, Ghani et al (2006) indicate, superpowers focused 
more on support to individual leaders rather than building state institutions in 
developing states, particularly in Africa. In the states under “Superpowers tutelage, 
those who agitated for accountability and efficient institutions were demonised and 
sometimes imprisoned, marginalised or repressed” (ibid: 32).  Now that many of the 
states have lost their economic and strategic relevance, the ‘African Leviathan’ is left 
to fend for itself and to ward off its envious, greed-stricken elites and deeply 
aggrieved society.  The exposure of the myth of the omnipotence of the state has 
sparked violent scrambles for its ‘spoils’ (Allen, 1995). Ottaway insists that the 
distinction between crisis of authority and crisis of institution is not semantics.  It is a 
telling indication of what stage most African states were at in their development when 
the superpowers withdrew support.  While performance is one avenue for generating 
authority and legitimacy, it is not the only source.  African elites have depended on 
violence, patronage and loyalty to Western powers for regime survival.  Here 
authority was more negative— colonising their societies through fear while filling the 
bellies of the elites they were unable to eliminate.  In this view, what broke down was 
not performance.  It was exposure of the impotence of the state. 
 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter I revisited the old debates on the origin of the state because I am of the 
view that collapse presents us with the opportunity to start afresh—to ask the core 
                                                
118Mohan, Giles and Zack-Williams, Alfred in their edited book, The Politics of Transition: State, democracy and 
economic development in Africa, James Currey: London (2004) coined the phrase ‘African Leviathan’ to argue the 
relevance of the notion of the Leviathan as propounded by Thomas Hobbes. 
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questions of state formation and statebuilding.  I described how, at their inception, 
African states failed to make themselves relevant to their respective societies.  The 
bureaucracies were neither appropriate nor relevant to the historical, sociological and 
economic realities of their respective societies.  Rather than initiate dialogues with 
indigenous institutions, the nationalists reverted to state fortification and insulation 
after independence.  They continued the colonial campaign of suppressing or 
exploiting Africa’s political and economic agencies. I also noted that corruption in 
African indigenous systems predates colonialism and the post-colonial states in most 
of Africa.  Most importantly, although African states may have gained independence, 
they still have their umbilical coils neatly tied to their former colonial powers.  This 
was more so during the Cold War.  
 
Drawing from this analysis, I contend that collapse is not entirely a bad thing.  It can 
certainly not be a bad thing that the myths of terror and the monopoly over its use by 
a few against the majority are laid bare.  What is worse in my view is to remain 
oblivious to the transformative and state indigenisation opportunities collapse may be 
presenting.  This has so far been the case in most post-war states in Africa.  It has 
certainly been the case in Liberia and Sierra Leone.  In these two countries, as will be 
discussed in subsequent chapters, the fundamentals of statebuilding—mobilising 
political communities, evolving vibrant and responsive institutions, reconciling and 
coalescing the range of micro authorities, etc., remain outstanding tasks despite the 
overwhelming international response to their cataclysmic collapse.  I argue 
throughout the thesis that unless these are addressed deliberately and systematically, 
many African states would continue to collapse or survive on external ‘life-saving’ 
oxygen, which is increasingly shrinking by the hour.  
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CHAPTER 3 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF POLITICAL ORGANISATION AND 
STATEBUILDING IN LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE  
 
The colonial state was a double-sided affair.  Its one side, the state that 
governed a racially defined citizenry, was bounded by the rule of law and an 
associated regime of rights.  Its other side, the state that ruled over subjects, 
was a regime of extra-economic coercion and administratively driven justice 
(Mamdani, 1996: 19)  
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
For more than a decade, Liberia and Sierra Leone shocked the world with horrifying 
images of children aged as young as seven years actively committing horrendous 
crimes of catastrophic proportions.119  This story continued until 2002 (for Sierra 
Leone) and 2004 (for Liberia), when the United Nations joined with West African 
leaders to end the nightmare.  Since then, scholars, policymakers and even ordinary 
people have attempted to find explanations of some sort as to why Liberia (the oldest 
republic in Africa) and Sierra Leone (once known as a haven of peace) would so 
violently disintegrate.120  None of the causal factors enumerated by scholars are 
unique to both countries.  In fact, these can be found in even greater degrees in many 
African countries, compared to Liberia and Sierra Leone, and yet those countries are 
still surviving, albeit dangerously.  Besides, I am of the view that some of the cited 
causes are symptoms of a confluence of causes set deep in the foundations of both 
states and their respective societies.  I argue in this chapter that no one cause can 
                                                
119Journalist Sorous Samora and the Hollywood film ‘Blood Diamond’ captures the pogrom to which especially 
Sierra Leone was subjected.   
120Moran (2006) summarises the dominant theories.  Some say the violent collapse is a consequence of the 
combined effects of unbearable population explosion, rapid ecological degradation, deep-seated tribal feuds, and 
global devaluation of the primary goods on which the states depend; others say it is an expression of relative 
deprivation where the marginalised have displaced the privileged; yet others point to post-colonial ‘politics of the 
belly’, arguing that the neo-patrimony allegedly inherent in African cultures has driven greedy politicians and 
warlords into violent scrambles for the state.  Those who draw on anthropology propose that the perennial ‘politics 
of secrecy’ characteristic of the Guinea Coast of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire reached its dead-
end in Liberia and Sierra Leone; thus, demystifying the states and thereby exposing them to loot and vandal. 
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explain the collapse of any state.  I contend that in order to understand the causes of 
state collapse—particularly in Liberia and Sierra Leone—it is imperative to dig deep 
into the historical, demographic, political, economic and social foundations on which 
the collapsed states were established.  This is necessary if firmer and more durable 
foundations are to be built in the new emerging states and societies.  Therefore the 
chapter offers an in-depth review of the geopolitical contexts, noting political orders 
predating the state, dynamics of state formation and the interactions between 
indigenous political institutions and the fledgling states.  It concludes with discussions 
on how and why the trends of collapse in both Liberia and Sierra Leone could not be 
reversed.   
 
3.2 GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXTS OF LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE 
 
 
Sierra Leone and Liberia are situated on the West Coast of Africa in an area generally 
known as the Upper Guinea Coast.  Sierra Leone covers 27,925 sq. miles (73,326 sq. 
km.) with a population of about 6.2 million inhabitants, while Liberia covers land area 
almost double the size of Sierra Leone (43,000 sq. miles or 111,369 sq. km), but with 
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a population of 5 million (2006 and 2008 estimates, respectively).  Liberia and Sierra 
Leone share borders in the east and south-east (for Sierra Leone) and west (for 
Liberia), while their northern and southern (south-west for Sierra Leone) frontiers 
border Guinea and the Atlantic Ocean, respectively.  Liberia borders Cote d’Ivoire in 
its eastern frontier.  Pedro da Cintra, a Portuguese sailor who travelled in the region 
around 1462, named Liberia and Sierra Leone.121  The territorial integrity of both 
countries was concluded in the first decade of the 20th century both between France 
and Britain, the dominant colonisers of the region, and between the countries and 
colonisers.122  
 
3.2.1 People and Demography 
 
Historical and anthropological accounts suggest that the current territories of Liberia 
and Sierra Leone have been inhabited for at least four millennia, although evidence of 
the earlier inhabitants is at best scanty.  What is for certain though, is that today’s 
inhabitants of both countries are relatively recent migrants.  They migrated to this 
region in the last millennium, with the earliest settling in the region over five 
centuries before being joined by a new wave of migrants, mostly from the collapsing 
Ghanaian, Malian and Sudanese empires.  Arguably, the earliest migrants were the 
Kru (predominantly in Liberia) and Limba (in Sierra Leone) around 1000-1400 AD 
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He named Sierra Leone, Serra Lyoa (lion range) and Liberia, “Malagueta Coast’.  Both countries were named 
based on their natural endowments.  Sierra Leone draws her name from the rolling hills in Freetown, while 
Liberia’s was based on the highly valued malagueta pepper with which it was then well endowed.  Later European 
sailors fondly referred to Liberia as the “Grain Paradise”.   
122
In these negotiations it is reported that Liberia, the only independent African state at the time, ceded most of its 
lands to the French colonies of Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire, and to the British colony of Sierra Leone to avoid the 
complete take-over which both powers threatened if their demands were not met.  More specifically, Dunn and 
Tarr (1988) report that Britain annexed the Gallinas territory to Sierra Leone in 1885, while France expanded 
Guinea into Liberian territories, including the Guegadou and Macenta, and also expanded Cote d’Ivoire into San 
Pedro and Tabou, all of which were areas in the original map of Liberia.  
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(Dunn and Tarr, 1988).123  In the four centuries after 1400 AD, new waves of 
migrants joined the earliest groups.  These included the Baga, Bullom, Krim and Vai 
who settled in the west of Sierra Leone; the Temne and Loko in the north-west and 
the Limba further north in Sierra Leone.  The Banta settled in the south-west (Alie, 
1990).  As for Liberia, the post-1400 migrants included Vai from Sierra Leone, the 
Mano, Kpelle, Belle, Bassa and Dey from the region known today as Ghana.  The 
Grebos, Krahn, Gio and Mandingo were the latest of this group.  They are said to 
have migrated from present day Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea (Dunn and Tarr, 1988; 
Sawyer, 1992).   
 
Barely 100 years after the latest intra-continental migration, a new set of migrants 
from Europe and the New World124 began to arrive, first in Sierra Leone and later in 
Liberia.  They too joined their earlier compatriots in search for freedom from the 
dungeon of slavery and the marginal conditions that the New World and Europe had 
to offer their freed slaves.  Re-captive slaves from the Congo and other parts of West 
Africa increased their population.  Between 1787 and 1808, over 50,000 freed and re-
captive slaves had settled in Sierra Leone (Alie, 1990) while about 17,000 settled in 
Liberia between 1822 and 1867 (Dunn and Tarr, 1988).   
 
3.2.1.1 Demographic Composition 
 
By the time the migration to Sierra Leone and Liberia reached their heights, the 
countries were populated by a peculiar mix of peoples, all—except the Krus and 
                                                
123
The Kru, it is suggested, originated from the Gao and Timbuktu areas of the present day Republic of Mali and 
migrated down south to this region between 1000 and 1400 AD.  Others suggest that they migrated westward from 
the Niger delta (Sawyer, 1992).   The Limba in Sierra Leone do not have any history of migration.  They claim 
they are among the original inhabitants of the region (Finnegan, 1965).  Other accounts suggest that the Mel 
language group, including the Kissi in Liberia and Sierra Leone, like the Limbas are descendants of the original 
inhabitants of the Guinea Coast (Atherton, 1969).  
124A phrase used to refer to the Americas, of which the United States of America is a part.  
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Limbas—with fascinating myths about their journeys to the lands apparently destined 
as refuges for those seeking freedom.  Both countries are populated by 17 ethnic 
groups each, with the Mende and Temne constituting more than half of the total 
population of Sierra Leone and the Kpelle and Bassa ethnic groups constituting over a 
third of the population in Liberia.  Table 3.1 illustrates the demographics of Sierra 
Leone and Liberia. 
 
Table 3.1: Demographics of Liberia and Sierra Leone (Sources: Sawyer, 1992 and Alie, 1999) 
Country Language Group Ethnic Groups Location 
Sierra Leone MANDE Mende Southern and Eastern Provinces 
  Vai/Gallinas Pujehun Coast 
  Kono Kono District 
  Loko Bombali District 
  Koranko Koinadugu 
  Soso North-western Frontiers 
  Mandingo Dispersed over country 
  Yaluka Norther Koinadugu 
    
 MEL Temne South-western, half of Northern Province and 
Freetown 
  Bullom/Shebro Bonthe and Moyamba 
  Kissi Eastern frontier, Kailahun and Kono 
  Gola South-eastern Frontiers 
  Krim Coastal Pujehun and Bonthe 
    
 OTHERS Limba Bombali, Kambia and Koinadugu 
  Fula Bombali, Koinadugu 
  Krio Western Area 
  Kru Freetown 
Liberia MANDE Mende West  
  Vai West  
  Mano North 
  Gbandi North-west 
  Kpelle Central 
  Loma North-west 
  Mandingo North and north-west 
  Gio North 
    
 MEL Gola Western 
  Kissi North-west 
    
 KWA Kru South-east 
  Grebo South-east 
  Dey Central 
  Bassa South-central 
  Krahn South-east 
 Others Freed Slaves Central and Coastal Cities 
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3.2.1.2 Reasons for Migration 
 
Many historians suggest a number of factors for the mass migration towards the south 
from hitherto flourishing empires established in the Sahelian region of Africa.  Some 
attribute the move to invasions by Muslims from North Africa, which led to the 
collapse of the Ghana and later Mali Empires.  The peripheral ethnic groups in the 
empires apparently moved southward and sought protection in the dense forest 
regions of the Upper Guinea Coast—now Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Cote 
d’Ivoire (Banton, 1957).  Others suggest that with the discovery of the coast and its 
sure supply of salt, peripheral tribes in the empires moved south to access this 
valuable commodity (ibid).   Yet others point to the expansion of the Sahara desert 
resulting in shrinking farm and grazing lands.  The dense rain forest with its virgin 
vegetation became an obvious attraction for those seeking greener pastures (Dunn and 
Tarr, 1988).   
 
There are also mixed reasons for the relocation of the freed slaves from Europe and 
America.  Henry Clay, an abolitionist, in his attempt to justify the colonisation project 
of the American Colonisation Society (ACS) to his fellow Americans, maintained that 
repatriating blacks to Africa would “rid America of the useless, pernicious and 
dangerous portion of its population while at the same time spreading civilisation and 
Christianity to benighted and degraded Africa” (cited in Dunn and Tarr, 1988: 32).125  
In England, it was the Sommerset case, in which his lawyer claimed that the “air of 
England was too pure to accommodate slavery”, that accelerated the new moral 
                                                
125He also reminded slave owners that the presence of free slaves in full view of their slaves was a threat to the 
integrity of slavery and a potential source for revolt (ibid).  Finley, another abolitionist, argues that the project 
could atone for “…the injuries inflicted [on the black race] by our fathers…” (cited in Sawyer, 1992: 35).  
American merchants, on the other hand, envisaged unimpeded access to the flourishing palm oil, coffee and ivory 
trade along the West Coast of Africa if they placed their own contact persons in the region (Alexander, 1969).  
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awakening to abandon the slave trade (Seyon, 1977).126  It prompted the 
establishment of a philanthropic group known as the Society for Effecting the 
Abolition of the Slave Trade in 1786.  The sentiment was reinforced at the end of the 
American War of Independence, where many black slaves fought on the side of 
Britain in exchange for freedom (Alie, 1990).  At the end of the war, the number of 
free but impoverished blacks who littered the streets of London increased unbearably.  
The Society responded by establishing the Committee for the Relief of the Black 
Poor, with the responsibility of providing relief to black paupers in London (Asiegbu, 
1961).  The Committee proposed the relocation of blacks to Africa, where they would 
engage in agriculture to provide for their own well-being (ibid).   
 
Beneath the claim to atonement and prospects for proselytising and civilising, Sawyer 
(1992) argues that the project was mostly driven by fear.  Racist United Kingdom and 
the New World were petrified by the prospects of free blacks laying claims for 
centuries of violations meted out against them.  Thomas Jefferson, a strong believer in 
‘divine retribution’, Sawyer points out, attributed the steady increase in the free black 
population to God’s readiness to exact justice for evil done to their race.  Jefferson 
was quoted as saying, “I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just: that 
His justice cannot sleep forever” (quoted in Staudenraus, 1961: 2 and cited in Sawyer, 
1992: 36).  Seyon (1977) makes a similar claim when he cites the Santo Domingo 
slave revolt in Haiti as the key event which spread fear amongst slave owners 
                                                
126In the case of James Sommersett, a slave belonging to Charles Stewart, Lord Mansfield’s landmark 
ruling, which argues that even if there were no laws and statutes against slavery in the United 
Kingdom, slavery was a violation of natural laws, became the mantra for the slave emancipation 
campaign not only in the UK but also in the Americas.  The ruling was passed in 1772.  For more 
information on the Sommersett case, please read Jerome Nadelhaft’s “The Sommersett Case and 
Slavery: Myth, Reality, and Repercussions”, Journal of Negro Hisory, Vol. 51, No. 3 (July 1966) 
available www.direct.gov.uk/en/slavery, accessed May 22, 2006. 
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throughout the New World and Europe (p. 16). 127  From the reasons outlined, one can 
deduce two categories of people who migrated to Liberia and Sierra Leone—those 
who came in order to preserve their freedom and way of life and those who came to 
explore the possibilities of living as free people.  While both consciously made the 
move in pursuit of freedom and security, the distinction in the reasons for their move 
and the conditions from which they began the journey had profound effects on the 
social and political orders they produced, as well as efforts at nationbuilding in their 
new societies, a subject to which I return later in the chapter.   
 
3.3 PRE-COLONIAL POLITICAL ORDER  
 
State-based and stateless institutions constituted political order in the Guinea Coast 
long before the region was exposed to colonialism and the arrival of the freed slaves. 
This section attempts a review of the pre-colonial political systems.   
 
3.3.1 Stateless Political Systems 
 
Stateless societies are basically small autonomous neighbouring units with emphasis 
on mechanisms, as opposed to conferring overwhelming powers on individuals and 
institutions, to regulate individual and group behaviours (Benson, 1996).  Imposition 
and exercise of powers, whether by individuals or institutions, is considered an act of 
tyranny in the extreme, for which stateless people would prefer violent resistance to 
acquiescence (ibid.).  Little is known about stateless societies in Africa and how their 
political systems affected hierarchical, centralised political systems such as the state.  
Benson attributes the dearth of knowledge to Eurocentric prejudice, which equates the 
                                                
127
Seyon cites Dubois, who pointed out that the revolt was “…probably the prime [reason] for the selling of 
Louisiana by Napoleon for a song and… rendered more certain the final prohibition of the slave trade by the 
United States in 1807.” 
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lack of recognisable political institutions in stateless societies to the lack of history 
and the tradition of preserving it.   
 
The Kwa-speaking people created arguably the most sophisticated stateless societies 
in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and yet they are the least studied.  Missionaries mostly 
recorded the few accounts available on the structure of governance of Kwa-speaking 
people.  According to Moran (2006), Methodist Bishop John Payne’s account is the 
most comprehensive.  Having lived nearly two decades amongst the Glebo (now 
known as Grebo) of Cape Palmas—one of the well recognised stateless sub-groups of 
the Kwa-speaking people—Payne was “impressed with the checks and balances, the 
division of civil and religious authority, and the visibility of people of all ages and 
genders in public life and decision-making” (cited in Moran, 2006: 3).  Moran also 
recalls assertions made by Jan Martin that the Kwa political system conformed to 
“recognisably democratic principles [and seems] the purest of democracies” (Martin, 
1968: 15, cited in Moran, 2006: 4).   
 
Generally the Kwa-speaking people live in small, separate and socially as well as 
politically autonomous societies, although these autonomous units tend to forge 
strategic alliances among themselves in times of external threats.  Each unit is headed 
by an elder, usually the oldest of the council of elders. There is also a spiritual priest 
who, it is believed, protects the unit from sorcery and other negative supernatural 
powers.  Unlike Sawyer’s (1992) account, which suggests that women are excluded 
from decision-making related to war, Moran’s (2006) account describing women as 
essentially the security council with veto powers over all major decisions—including 
the decision to go to war—is more accurate.  There is also, just like the Poro, a 
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fraternity of warriors to whom all married men belonged.  These are responsible to 
defend the community (Moran, 2006).  In this view, security is community-based, in 
which each household is represented.  Decision-making amongst the Kwa was and 
still is based on broad participation.  All age groups and genders are invited to an 
open forum to deliberate on all matters, including serious matters such as allegations 
of witchcraft (ibid).  Moran has rightly observed, individual autonomy is highly 
valued by the Kwa-speaking people.  “From the newborn infant to the [frailest] 
elder”, Moran points out, “[everyone] is understood as having individual desires, 
plans and intentions…” which is acknowledged and given space both in the private 
and public spheres (p. 30).   
 
Fox describes the political system of the Kwa as “…rampant and unmitigated 
democracy… swayed by the impulses of malice, revenge or covetousness…and 
anarchically chaotic” (cited in Moran, 2006).  Others refer to them as “unruly natives” 
(Biyi, 1930).  Benson challenges this Eurocentric stereotype of stateless societies.  He 
insists there are rules and institutions to ensure order in stateless societies.  Rules such 
as “cooperative policing, participatory dispute resolution, restitution, ostracism, 
freedom of contract, mutual insurance”, Benson (1996) contends, “offer better 
assurances for stability and durable peace compared to the coercive institutions of 
state based societies” (p. 34).  More importantly, a combination of sanctions and 
incentives and the collective process by which they are applied, Benson argues, make 
it impossible for a so-called “’god-father’ or ‘king’ to emerge and impose 
extortionary structures of governance on stateless society” (ibid).  The fact that the 
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tenets of stateless politics still influence the Kwa-speaking people in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone is ample proof of the durability and stability of the system.128   
 
3.3.2 State-based Political Systems 
 
Of all the groups migrating from the Mali Empire, ethnographic accounts credit the 
Mendes for introducing state-influenced political institutions to the Guinea Coast 
(Liberty, 1977; Kappel et al, 1986; Huberich, 1947).  They adopted the Poro and 
Sande sodality institutions introduced by their Mel cousins, perfected the institutions 
and produced what d’Azevedo described as “political-ritual complexes” (d’Azevedo, 
1961, cited in Sawyer, 1992).  By the 17th century, the sophisticated, highly 
hierarchical and sodality-based political systems of the Mendes, along with their 
excellent military structures, had penetrated most of the other groups in the region, 
except the Kwa-speaking people.  European travellers to the region in the 17th and 
18th centuries were so impressed with the emerging political structure, especially 
among the Mendes, that one of them, Olfert Dapper, reported that “…the local 
population enjoyed a high standard of political and social organisation with strong 
resemblance to those of the North African Berbers, who had been one of the most 
advanced and powerful nations in the world” (Liberty, 1977: 13).   
 
Arthur Abraham indicates that the Mendes operated two types of states—the personal 
amorphous and territorial states (Abraham, 1978).  The personal amorphous state was 
held intact and stability was maintained only according to the ability of the king or 
                                                
128This work is not about stateless societies.  I have engaged with this socio-political system to make the point that 
in Liberia and Sierra Leone, state-based and stateless societies coexisted. Whether one would have assimilated 
with the other is unclear.  
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despot (cited in Alie, 1990).129    The second state system was the territorial state.  
Territorial states had fixed boundaries with well-defined structures of checks and 
balances.  The kings and chiefs operated with lieutenants who, according to Alie 
(1990), were first among equals.  In both the personal amorphous and territorial 
states, an electoral college drawn from the Poro council elected the kings.  Although 
the king provided leadership, the Poro council remained in a supervisory role, 
ensuring that both the king and people upheld customary laws (Abraham, 1978).  
Even though the Mendes are credited for introducing state-like structures in Sierra 
Leone and Liberia, the Temnes, deducing from all accounts, seem to have had more 
structured political systems and larger kingdoms (see Dorjahn, V.R. 1966; Alie, 
1990).  Figure 3.1 illustrates the structure of leadership in all Temne kingdoms.   
Figure 3.1: Political Structure of the Temnes (adopted from Alie’s description of the Temne political 
structure) 
                                                
129D’Azevedo’s (1963; 65) description of the Gola and Vai political systems in Liberia would also fit in the 
personal amorphous category. 
Figure 3.1: Political Structure of the Temne  
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Temne kings ruled with the assistance of a number of lieutenants as described in 
Figure 3.1.  The immediate deputy of the Kapr, or king, was the Kapr Mesim, 
responsible for all intelligence issues.  Alie equates this role to that of the modern day 
prime minister.  The Kapr Mesim served as regent on the death of the king.  Other 
leaders included the Kapr Loya with responsibility for all legal issues and dispute 
resolution; the Kapr Kuma responsible for collecting taxes and tributes and managing 
the finances of the kingdom; the Kapr Gbogboro to supervise agricultural matters;  
the Kapr Fenthe to ensure the health and sanitation of the kingdom; and the Kapr 
Soya to lead warriors during war (Alie, 1990: 14).  Before Temne king and principle 
chiefs were enthroned, they underwent the kantha, an elaborate installation ceremony 
that was administered in the Poro ‘secret bush’ over a period of one year.  The 
Temnes were always particular about the competence and character of their leaders.  
During this intense leadership course, the prospective kings and prominent chiefs 
were taught their responsibilities to the people and how to conduct themselves as 
custodians of the kingdom.  Upon graduation, the king emerged as “custodian of the 
land and keeper of the Sacred Things of Ruler-ship” (Alie, 1990: 18).  Even after the 
kings assumed full authority, the Poro councils still ensured their actions were in 
“conformity with the injunctions and norms of the society” (ibid).  
 
Perhaps of the three dominant political systems in pre-colonial Sierra Leone, the 
Limba’s was least hierarchical and authoritative and seemed to have adopted some 
principles of stateless political systems, including the importance of the individual 
voice in the public realm.  Among the Limba, the Poro was more a social institution 
with emphasis on its educational and spiritual values and less on the political.   
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D’Azevedo, drawing from his extensive work among the Mel language group, made 
far-reaching conclusions about the political systems that existed before states were 
formed in the Upper Guinea Coast.  He argues that political developments in the 
region were largely based on “…intricate ethnic and structural compromises…” with 
four broad categories: the ‘migrant band’, the ‘conservative village chiefdom’, the 
‘exploitative expanding chiefdom’ and ‘confederation’ (cited in Sawyer, 1992: 23). 
Sawyer observes that increasingly in the last half of the 19th century, powerful kings 
such as Siaka, Duma, Dwala, Fagban, Botswain and Sao Boaso established large 
‘personal amorphous’ confederacies, amalgamating kingdoms and exercising 
authority over them.   However, because these were essentially ‘personal amorphous’ 
confederacies, Sawyer (1992) points out, they disintegrated after the death of the 
powerful despots.  As a consequence of the dominant predatory politics at the close of 
the 19th century, the Guinea Coast, according to d’Azevedo and reinforced by Sawyer, 
was in political turmoil prior to the founding of Liberia and Sierra Leone.  Despite 
this claim, Sawyer concludes his work by contending that the Guinea Coast region 
had “well-defined political and social organisations” prior to Liberia and Sierra Leone 
(Sawyer, 1992: 67-69).    
 
Aside from the contradictory conclusion, Sawyer’s, and by extension d’Azevedo’s 
work, is limited in many ways.  First, both fail to discuss the fact that by the end of 
the 17th century and up to the 19th century, there were already extensive external 
interferences in the political development of the Guinea Coast. The thriving slave 
trade that was at its height in the same period in which Sawyer and d’Azevedo situate 
their works, had already had profound effects on political systems in the region, 
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especially in areas where slave raiding was concentrated. The ‘personal amorphous’ 
polity, which essentially means the rule by despots with no accountability to the Poro 
councils, was mostly a consequence of this infiltration.  Dunn and Tarr (1988) sum up 
the physical, moral and institutional degradation caused by the trade thus:  
 
“[The slave trade in the Upper Guinea Coast]… led to increased importation of 
firearms, intensified warfare for slaves, acceleration of political autocracy, and 
economic monopoly, the undermining of many traditional societies, and the loss 
of the most productive population…” (Dunn and Tarr, 1988: 16) 
 
 
Dunn and Tarr contend that the “numbness of conscience” necessary to engage in 
such a profoundly immoral trade had already perverted most cultures and values in 
the region, and transformed indigenous political systems for the worse before 
colonisation and the establishment of the settler states (ibid).  To not keep this 
political development separate from emerging indigenous political systems, prior to 
its pervasive and disruptive effects, I argue, justifies Western claims that African 
cultures and polities were benighted and criminal prior to the redemptive missions of 
the West—whether through the slave trade or its metamorphosis, the nearly two 
centuries of colonialism.  Such a picture ignores accounts by earlier Europeans which 
consistently reported that societies in the Guinea Coast had developed highly 
sophisticated and diverse political systems, including the stratified, hierarchical but 
varied political systems in the north and the egalitarian democracies particularly 
south-east of Liberia.130  
 
                                                
130Besides, description of the Kwa society does not fit in the broad categories of d’Azevedo and Sawyer.  All 
accounts are agreed that the Kwas’ disgust for despots and hierarchy still influence their societies.  This remains 
evident in their revolt against the Liberian state, which imposed the Poro-based hierarchical system within their 
societies (see Dunn and Tarr, 1988 and Moran, 2006).  Besides, even though the Kwa-speaking people had 
encountered Europe long before the Poro-governed societies, they resisted the adoption of autocracy and warlord 
politics.  That consistency, though recorded in numerous literatures both on the region and amongst stateless 
societies elsewhere on the continent, escapes the analysis and generalisations of Sawyer and d’Azevedo.   
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The most important limitation of d’Azevedo and Sawyer’s works is the tendency to 
generalise political institutions in the Guinea Coast.  Brown (1967) observes that even 
though there remained a clear distinction between the social and political 
organisations of the coastal people and those of the interior, this distinction has been 
overlooked in numerous works.  She points out that when the freed slaves and the 
colonial-lord landed along the coast of West Africa, the coastal people they first 
encountered held strong prejudices against the interior people—prejudices which, 
among other factors, delayed penetration into the interior.131  This distinction, she 
insists, cannot be abandoned for the sake of generalisation.  As will be discussed later 
in the chapter, the prejudice also contributed to the delay of state penetration into the 
interiors of both countries.  Benson’s (1996) claim that the bottom-up, voluntary and 
cooperative structure of governance in stateless societies contrasts with state-based 
extractive, political and top-down structure of governance reinforces Brown’s claim.  
Benson goes on to emphasise that the distinction between stateless and state-based 
structures of governance are so extreme that merger between them is difficult (if not 
impossible).  Where I concur with Sawyer and d’Avezedo is their observation that 
neither the colonial powers nor the subsequent statebuilders made efforts to 
comprehend the political dynamics of the region before introducing the Westphalian 
state.   As a consequence, the destructive configuration dynamics between indigenous 
on the one hand and between indigenous institutions and the state on the other, I 
surmise, have undermined the viability of the state to extents less reckoned within 
analyses of institutional causes of state collapse in Liberia and Sierra Leone.   
 
                                                
131In Liberia and Sierra Leone, as a consequence of the divide between coastal and interior people, a dual system 
of governance was established with separate legal systems between the coastal and the interior people.  In Liberia 
the dual state system still persists, while it was abandoned at independence in Sierra Leone, although it strongly 
influences state behavior towards the interior. 
Sam Doe Final Thesis UB No. 04008980 106 
3.4 THE BIRTH OF THE WESTPHALIAN STATE IN SIERRA LEONE 
AND LIBERIA 
 
Although Liberia and Sierra Leone share a common origin, their transformation into 
independent states progressed from different trajectories.  In the case of Liberia, the 
refusal of European traders to recognise the sovereign right of the Commonwealth of 
Liberia to impose levies on commercial activities within its territory and the failure of 
the United States to come to the defence of the settlers, prompted the quest for 
independence (Dunn and Tarr, 1988).  Governor Joseph Jenkins Robert summoned a 
Constitutional Convention to accelerate statehood.  The Convention agreed on a 
constitution, a declaration of independence and a national flag (ibid).132 On 26 July 
1847, after 25 years of colonisation by a philanthropic organisation—the American 
Colonisation Society—the settlers assumed the authority of their newly declared 
sovereign state.  In the Declaration of Independence, the repatriates “affirmed their 
faith in Liberia’s destiny as one nation under God, guided by the Almighty towards 
the achievement of their destiny of liberty and unity…” (cited in Dunn and Tarr, 
1988: 45).  The passionate Declaration of Independence mobilised the “Nations of 
Christendom” so much that one after the other, they accorded recognition to a state 
conceived and assumed by a small band of freed and re-captive slaves (ibid).133   
 
Not only did Liberia’s Declaration of Independence move Europe’s Christendom, 
Azikiwe (1934, cited in Dunn and Tarr, 1988) argues, it provided hope to the black 
race “…[arousing] the lethargy of millions of African… to a realisation of the 
                                                
132Details of the process leading to independence can be found in Anderson, Robert Earle 1952; Boley, G.E. 
Saogne 1983; Cassell, C. Abayomi 1970. 
133On 21 November 1848, Britain was the first to recognise Liberia’s independence.  France, the second colonial 
power in the region followed on April 17, 1852.  She was followed by Germany and Denmark in 1855 and 
Belgium in 1858.  Even though Liberia claims to be a pseudo colony of the United States, it was not until 1862 
that the United States recognised Liberia’s independence.  The Netherlands followed the United States in the same 
year.  Norway and Sweden followed in 1863, with Austria and Spain in 1866 and 1894, respectively.  
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political destiny of the black man in the history of the World” (cited in Dunn and 
Tarr, 1988: 26).  Sawyer (1992) observes differently.  He argues that the declaration 
of independence was more a last resort to preserve economic interests rather than an 
assertion of a spirit of liberation, and as such cannot qualify as the source of 
inspiration for Africa’s struggle for independence.  Whatever the motive, Sawyer 
concedes that one claim to fame that cannot be denied the settlers is the fact that, 
unlike their cousins in Sierra Leone, they braved all odds to declare to racist Europe 
and the New World that the black race had a destiny in self-governance.  “Under the 
divine guardian of Providence and beaming with pride, the settlers reminded the 
World that Liberia was a nation wrought with their own black hands” and which they 
sustained ever since (Miller, 1975: 108, cited in Sawyer, 1992).134   
 
Although Sierra Leone was the first colony for freed slaves and the number of 
repatriates who settled there were five times more than those settled in Liberia, 
independence was only realised in Sierra Leone in 1961 (175 years later).  Three 
mutually reinforcing reasons arguably account for the delay.  First, unlike in Liberia, 
many of the repatriates inhabiting Sierra Leone came from Britain, whose colonial 
policy made it possible to support and co-opt the young colony under the British 
Crown.  Secondly, the demand for self-autonomy amongst the repatriates in Liberia 
was aroused far earlier than amongst repatriates in Sierra Leone.135  As a 
consequence, rather than a declaration of independence as the philanthropic and 
commercial project waned, settlers in Sierra Leone were quick to volunteer 
themselves in 1808 as subjects of the British Crown (see Fyfe, 1962; Wyse, 1989 and 
                                                
134Besides, history reminds us that statebuilding, especially in Europe, was never for the assertion of freedom or 
nationhood.  Rather it was an elitist project aimed at protecting the interest of a few who arrogated to themselves 
the right to rule the mass of people within their defined territory.  Coercion was and still is the prima instrument 
for asserting the state (see Tilly, 1975).   
135This led to fierce resistance to find shelter under the British Empire, when the fragile state was invited many 
times to seek the protection of Britain by hoisting the British flag. 
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1981; Walker, 1976).  Like all of colonised Africa, it was the end of the Second 
World War that triggered the consciousness for independence in Sierra Leone—and 
even this drive did not come from the Krios, who are descendents of the freed 
slaves.136  By the end of 1958, the Sierra Leone political landscape was teeming with 
political parties, many of which were mobilised along ethnic lines (Kandeh, 1999).  
Notwithstanding the fragmentation, all political elites were unified around the demand 
for independence.  Sir Milton Margai capitalised on the point of convergence to 
establish a coalition of political parties, the United National Front (UNF), with the 
aim of pursuing independence.  The UNF sent a delegation to London with a common 
political platform and a single voice for independence in late 1960.   One year later, 
on April 27, 1961 Sierra Leone was accorded independence.137  
 
3.4.1 Foundations of Liberia and Sierra Leone 
 
With juridical legitimacy generously accorded both countries, the statebuilders 
focused on laying foundations for the new states, at varying degrees.  The key pillars 
of the statebuilding project included: a) the formulation of political ideas and the 
nature of the state; b) establishing a constitutional order; c) building political 
institutions; and d) forging national unity.  It is important to point out that this process 
was much more deliberate in the case of Liberia, while Sierra Leone like most 
                                                
136The colonial powers including Britain, realising severe loss of economic and military powers and mounting 
pressure from African independence leaders, embarked on an accelerated process to devolve political 
independence to their colonies.  It is important to note that the British Colonial power in Sierra Leone 
systematically silenced the Krios to avoid them from agitating for independence.  As a consequence, the voices of 
the Krios were absent at independence. 
137The independent state was negotiated within the Commonwealth.  The Queen still remained the Commander in 
Chief represented by the Governor General, who retained the powers to appoint the government including the 
Prime Minister and his cabinet.  The decision created dissent amongst the delegates.  Siaka Stevens, who later 
became the country’s third Prime Minister and longest serving President, was the key member of the delegation 
who rejected the arrangement.  Stevens wanted total independence away from the colonial authority, something he 
later achieved during his leadership.   
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colonised African states simply continued with the polity, social arrangements and 
institutions created by the colonialists.   
 
3.4.1.1 Political Idea of Liberia and Sierra Leone  
 
There were two schools of thought on the political idea of Liberia—the integrationists 
and the assimilationists (Sawyer, 1992).  The assimilationists argued that Western 
civilisation and institutions were far superior compared to “primitive African” 
institutions and cultures, and were therefore destined as the light to which all societies 
must aspire (Sawyer, 1992).  To effectively undertake the civilising project, this group 
argued, it was best for Liberia to remain an exclusive settler state interacting 
selectively with neighbouring African societies and gradually civilising them (ibid).  
The integrationists, on the other hand, maintained that Liberia could not be in Africa 
and be apart from Africa.  Edward Wilmot Blyden, a leading exponent of this school, 
strongly argued thus:  
 
“Can we make a nation without the aid of the aborigines? Were it not for them 
should we have any commerce worthy of the name? When we went before the 
world to ask to be received into the family of nations, did we not base our 
request upon the native population? Was it not them we professed to represent? 
Just as at that time it was to our interest to avail ourselves of their numerical 
assistance to secure national recognition, so now it is our wisest policy, apart 
from philanthropic duties to fraternise with them in order to secure national 
strength and respectability” (Blyden, 1862, cited in ‘The Voice’ Vol.1 No. 1).  
 
The assimilationists, whose argument were based both on their Christian faith as well 
on the fear of being subsumed under the majority indigenous population, prevailed.  
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Consequently, the politics of separation and exclusion became the faithful expression 
of the Liberian state.138   
 
Unlike Liberia, where the debate regarding the political direction of the country 
continued throughout the existence of the state, there is no evidence in the literature to 
suggest that a similar dialogue took place even between the various indigenous 
populations or among the Krio intelligentsia in Sierra Leone, during or after colonial 
rule.  It seems that the polity of the state was considered a given.  From the British 
colonial practice, one can infer that the political idea promoted in Sierra Leone was 
also that of assimilation.  Both the Krio and indigenous communities were simply 
assimilated into the British values and polity.  Alie (1990) alludes to this proposition 
when he pointed out that the founders of the Sierra Leone Colony envisioned a 
‘civilised’ society that would not only terminate the slave trade, but would also evolve 
as “an agency for the social and spiritual regeneration of the whole Negro world” 
(83).  A similar messianic aspiration informed freed slaves in Liberia. 
 
However, unlike Liberia, where the decision for assimilation was made entirely by the 
settler society, the Krios in Sierra Leone were effectively marginalised during the 
colonial era, so much so that their presence at independence was politically 
negligible.  Instead, the Krios, given their intellectual dominance, controlled the state 
bureaucracy while the ‘British-trained’ indigenous intelligentsia controlled politics.  
The distribution of state functions between the indigenous population and the settler 
society minimised the politics of exclusion and the so-called civilised-primitive 
                                                
138Azikiwe (1934), a great admirer of the Liberian project, regretted that the new state and its founders failed “to 
recognise the political acumen and the social and material cultures of indigenous Liberians…”, a failure he claims 
resulted in the persistent insecurity and impoverishment of the indigenous population and thus contributed to the 
generalised social and political malaise which deprived Liberia of the much needed ‘national strength to which 
Blyden referred.   
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divide, which undermined the viability of the Liberian state.  Notwithstanding, the 
early assumption of political powers by the indigenous population in Sierra Leone did 
not translate into the explicit integration of indigenous (particularly Poro and Sande) 
discourse in the polity and notion of governance in the new state.  Instead, the 
intelligentsia class, thanks to the indirect rule system, faithfully assumed the 
messianic project of civilising and Christianising their fellow aborigines.  
Consequently, the political discourse based on which Liberia and Sierra Leone were 
established was deeply embedded in the psycho-political myth of redemption and the 
conversion of heathens into civilised Christians.   
 
3.4.1.2 Constitutional Orders 
 
Having agreed on the idea of the state, the settlers and colonialists embarked on 
building constitutional orders.  Prior to independence, all constitutions in both 
countries vested powers in the colonial authorities (Britain and the American 
Colonisation Society).  This changed, especially for Liberia, during independence.  
The 1847 Constitution was the settler’s first attempt to define their own constitutional 
order, but this did not translate into independent thinking and creativity.  Everything 
about the 1847 Constitution and national symbols were near replicas of those of the 
United States (Sawyer, 1992).  Besides, the process of constitution-making ignored 
the social and political order of indigenous societies.  Rather than explore the political 
orders of the complex societies in the territory, the Constitution-makers enshrined 
dual jurisprudence in law, with the so-called civilised settler societies along the coast 
subject to the Constitution, and the ‘uncivilised lot’ of the interior governed under 
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“hinterland jurisdictions”, whatever they were (Dunn and Tarr, 1988).139  The 1847 
Constitution prevailed, notwithstanding, until 12 April 1980 when the settler state was 
ended in a bloody military coup d’état. 
 
In 1981, under the military authority of the People’s Redemption Council (PRC), 
Liberia had what pundits considered the greatest opportunity for a people-centred 
constitution-making process.  With the apparent breakdown of the dividing walls 
between the ‘primitive’ and ‘civilised’, scholars hoped that the process would afford 
all Liberians the space to hammer out differences and usher in a new dawn filled with 
hope for a united country (Calvert and Johnson, 1997).  Political scientist Amos 
Sawyer, a staunch critic of the 1847 Constitution, was handed the mantle to lead the 
25-member National Constitution Commission (NCC).  The NCC adopted a public-
centred approach to engage Liberians from all walks of life (Sawyer, 2005).  
Momentum gathered, and aspirations nurtured through the constitution-making 
process seemed threatening to the undeclared intentions of the military regime.  As a 
consequence, the broad-based process was terminated.  An opportunity to agree a new 
compact for Liberia and set the state on the path of rule of law became a total 
fiasco.140     
 
Similarly, having been governed under various colonially constructed constitutions, 
Sierra Leoneans embarked on the development of an Independence Constitution in 
                                                
139The divide between the civilised and uncivilised was passed into law in 1848 by the Legislators of Liberia, all of 
whom were Americo-Liberians.  Later, around 1904 under the leadership of Arthur Barclay, the settler state 
enshrine hinterland jurisdiction and imposed it on all societies in the hinterland.  The primary aim of the hinterland 
law was to govern “areas as are wholly inhabited by uncivilised natives in the same manner as if those areas were 
within the Hinterland Districts.  The laws focused on providing protection for so-called civilised travelling into the 
hinterland and those desiring to live amongst the uncivilised (Revised Rules and Regulations Governing the 
Hinterland of Liberia, January 7, 2000).  It is important to note that the hinterland governance system was 
borrowed from the colonial powers in Sierra Leone. 
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1958, although with the colonial authority at the helm.  The constitution, for the first 
time, conferred citizenship rights on all people within the territory, including the 
indigenous population who were hitherto mere subjects of the British Protectorate.  
Prior to this constitution the interior, like Liberia, was governed under a separate 
jurisdiction, while the ‘civilised’ within the Sierra Leone Colony enjoyed the 
protection of laws of the British Empire.  In 1961 an Independence Constitution, 
which was a slight modification of the 1958 Constitution, was approved.  It was 
followed in 1971 by another constitution with primary focus on the transformation of 
Sierra Leone into a republic.  Seven years later, President Siaka Stevens’ government 
rewrote the constitution to transform the country into a one party state.141  In 1991, 
Sierra Leone also had the opportunity to develop a constitution with broad-based 
participation, but even this failed to address foundational governance flaws, which 
have undermined the full expression of the independent state.   
 
Although the 1983 and 1991 constitution-making exercises in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, respectively, provided some space for popular constitution-making, citizens of 
the two countries have never had the chance to engage in what Sawyer calls an 
“enlightened discourse regarding the nature of state and mechanisms and institutions 
of governance that would better meet the aspiration of its people” (Sawyer, 2005: 36).  
The process has been manipulated to address particular idiosyncratic interests of 
political elites.  An effort at engaging societies so as to evolve institutions and 
mechanisms of governance “whose historical, cultural and political development” is 
rooted in the societies has been negligible (Sesay, 1995: 165).  Such a process, I 
                                                
141Each constitution-making process in Sierra Leone had limited broad-based participation of the people and 
focused on serving the particular interest of the political regime of the day.  For instance, the 1971 constitution was 
designed to strengthen Steven’s grip on power while the 1978 constitution entrenched his All People Congress as 
the sole political actor in the country.  
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argue, is critical to state indigenisation after collapse.  The emphasis of ‘constitutional 
choice-making’ or the indigenisation of constitution making is not so much on the 
outcome—the content and text of the law—but rather on the process of making the 
law.  When a people reach consensus on what should guide their interaction and 
define meaningful rules within their own discourse, the likelihood that such laws 
would be respected and collectively monitored increases.142  
 
3.4.1.3 Structure of Governance in the Interiors of Liberia and Sierra Leone  
 
In crafting their structures of governance for the interior, authorities of the Sierra 
Leone Colony and Liberia officially recognised the formidable hold of the Poro and 
Sande on all aspects of life in most of the interior regions of both countries. The 
Tribal Authorities Ordinance of 1938, the Chiefdom Treasuries act of 1938, and the 
Tribal Authorities (Amendment) Act of 1964 all backed by the 1952 Constitution 
define and established the chieftaincy system in Sierra Leone.  Designed to further the 
British Colonial indirect rule policy the chieftaincy system was essentially the 
reinvention of the Poro political and governance structure.  The Kapr (highest Poro 
chief) became paramount chiefs; the concept of the Kapr Mesim whom Alie (1990) 
refers to as the equivalence of prime minister was renamed as speaker although his 
role to enforce laws and directives of the paramount chiefs are similar to those in the 
Poro system.  A council known as “men of note” replaced the Poro Council. The core 
mandate of the chieftaincy system was to keep the peace and extract taxes from its 
subjects. The only difference between the chieftaincy system and Poro governance 
system was the accountability structure.  Rather than being accountable to the Highest 
                                                
142
Benson (1996) and Collins (1995) in their description of the state system in Africa, allude to the need to pay 
attention to the shared theory or discourse which informs the state system in most of Africa. 
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Zoe, councils of zoes, and the ancestors, the paramount chiefs derived their powers 
from the colonial authorities in Freetown.  These new powers were effectively 
exercised with the help of chiefdom police and the court system.  In 1972 in the bid to 
consolidate power Siaka Stevens abolished the local council system and dealt directly 
with paramount chiefs. In the 1937 Native Administrative System there were district 
commissioners, who represented the central government in the interior as 
administrators. While the indirect rule structure of governance was firmly established 
on traditional hierarchical Poro structures the introduction of commercial benefits 
through tax and labour extraction and the use of the chiefdom police to enforce law 
and order transformed the traditional authorities into petty bourgeois and local despots 
(Richards, 1995). 
 
In the case of Liberia efforts to establish local government structures date back to 
1848 when the Department of the Interior (DI) was created to administer the 
hinterland.143  The core mandate of the DI included the institution of rules and 
regulations to pacify and halt hostilities that were rife among the various ethnic 
groups and between the ethnic groups and the settler state in the interior region 
(Sawyer, 1992). In the 1930s President Arthur Barclay expanded on the local 
governance structure by drawing on the Sierra Leone Native Administration system.  
He divided the interior into three (Western, Eastern, and Central) provinces.  The 
provinces were subdivided into districts, chiefdoms, and clans.  This was later 
redefined as Counties, Statutory Districts, Administrative County Districts, 
Chiefdoms, and Clans, while urban entities include: municipalities, cities, and 
                                                
143
The 1949 Revised Rules and Regulations Governing the Hinterland of Liberia defines ‘hinterland’ as “that 
portion of Liberia not included in the organised counties”.  For more information on the divide between the 
interior and settler state administrative systems, please see Draft Profile of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (2005). 
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townships.144  He also invited the colonial authority in Freetown to help Liberia 
establish a Frontier Force similar to the chiefdom police in Sierra Leone to assist in 
the control of the hinterland people.  Liberia also made attempts to reinvent and co-
opt the Poro structure and politics of governance in the new hinterland governance 
structure.  Paramount chiefs were drawn from Poro royal lineage and as was the case 
in Sierra Leone served for life.  Young Poro initiates were enlisted in the Liberia 
Frontier Force.  Unlike Sierra Leone where the local government structure became 
part of the settler state and was enshrine in the 1952 constitution local governance in 
Liberia was purely limited to maintaining order in the disorganized ‘tribal regions’ 
which were never considered part of Liberia until late 1950s.  Therefore provinces 
and their subdivisions did not receive any budget allocation from the Central 
Government. They were also excluded from receiving any logistics that would 
facilitate the discharge of their functions. Like marauding institutions they were given 
sweeping powers backed by the Liberia Frontier Force to extract resources and 
support from their respective local population.  
 
3.4.1.4 Consolidating State Regime in Sierra Leone 
 
As pointed out in the previous section, at independence Sierra Leone had already 
defined territories and dual legal and administrative systems in operation.  Although 
state structures were generally established and handed to the independence leaders in 
Sierra Leone, the challenge was the consolidation and stabilisation of the political 
regime.  As colonial authority declined, tensions between the polarised and ethnic-
based political parties destabilised Sierra Leone barely three years after independence.  
                                                
144In 1964 President William Tubman abolished the idea of provinces and introduced the county system. Today 
Liberia has 15 Counties, 32 Statutory Districts, 119 County Districts, 215 Chiefdoms and 476 Clans; 126 Cities 
with 237 Townships. 
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Arguably the greatest threat to state survival in Sierra Leone was the early 
intervention of the military in the fledgling polity (Zack-Williams, 1997).  Two years 
after the independent leader Sir Milton Margai died in 1964, the succession struggle 
sparked political turmoil in the young state.  The Governor General, Sir Henry 
Lightfoot, with disregard for the political tension, appointed Albert Margai, brother of 
the late Prime Minister, as the successor.  This decision infuriated the political elites, 
including those from Albert Margai’s own Sierra Leone People Party (SLPP).145 With 
persistent resistance to his leadership, Albert sought greater legitimacy by calling for 
early elections, but the strategy further weakened his grip on power (Alie, 1990). 
Three weeks before the election on 8 February 1967, as an apparent intimidation 
strategy, the wounded government uncovered an alleged coup plot in which it 
implicated Deputy Force Commander Colonel John Bangura, a member of the rival 
Temne ethnic community.  The Prime Minister quickly signed a defence pact with 
neighbouring Guinea and fortified the Sierra Leone border with Guinean troops (Fyfe 
1979).  None of his political machinations helped Albert Margai.  His SLPP lost the 
1967 elections to Temne-based rival All People Congress (APC).  In response to the 
overwhelming victory of APC, the Governor General appointed Siaka Stevens, leader 
of the APC, the next Prime Minister.   
 
Following this massive political failure, Albert Margai turned to the military.  Army 
Commander Brigadier Lansana, whom Albert elevated, swiftly intervened, seizing 
power barely a day after Stevens was inaugurated Prime Minister.  He imposed 
martial law and detained the Governor General and the new Prime Minister, but 
Stevens later fled to neighbouring Guinea.  A successful counter coup organised by 
                                                
145Albert responded to the opposition with summary dismissals and reorganisation of the political landscape, 
replacing his brother’s politics of inclusion with Mendeism by populating the echelons of power with Mende 
political elites.  
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Major A.C. Blake and Major B.I. Iai-Samba ended the General’s rule just three 
months after he seized power, and arrested him and Sir Albert Magai.  The new coup 
leaders formed the National Reformation Council (NRC), but dissidents headed by 
Colonel John Bangura, claiming that the NRC were set out to perpetuate themselves 
in power, overthrew them one year later (Keen, 2005).  The Bangura-led Anti-
Corruption Revolutionary Movement (ACRM) immediately recalled the former 
Governor General Sir Henry Lightfoot-Boston, but when he declined they appointed 
Banja Tehan Sie as Acting Governor General (ibid.).  The ACRM commanded the 
Governor General to recall and install in power the All People Congress, victors of 
the 1967 elections.  Siaka Stevens was recalled from exile in Guinea, ostensibly after 
obtaining a crash course on regime entrenchment and totalitarianism from the illusive 
Sekou Toure.146   Immediately after his inauguration, Siaka Stevens clamped down 
heavily on opponents in the Sierra Leone People’s Party, arresting, torturing, 
incarcerating and forcing others into exile. An alleged attempt on Steven’s life by a 
group of soldiers, including John Bangura, the king-maker whose military 
intervention restored Stevens, gave the President the much-needed alibi to finally 
silence his opponents and eliminate all sources of threat to his leadership. Stevens 
wasted no time in hanging the coup plotters, including Brigadier John Bangura.  After 
sending out a clear message of tyranny, Stevens accelerated the transformation of 
Sierra Leone to a republican state on 19 April 1971 and became its all-powerful 
                                                
146Most scholars believe that Stevens’ exiled life in neighboring Guinea, where Ahmed Sekou Toure had 
succeeded in establishing a police state and crushing all dissent, inspired his new political tactics.  This new 
political culture shocked key leaders of the APC and sparked internal revolts.  In 1970, two of the president’s 
closest associates, Dr. M. S. Forna and M.O. Bash Taqi, Ministers for Finance and Development, respectively, 
resigned their membership in the APC and formed an alternative party.  In his letter of resignation to Prime 
Minister Stevens, M. O. Bash Taqi wrote, “It gives me greater pain to see that you have embarked on a road of 
rapid destruction of those high ideals and fundamental principles for which we fought so vehemently over the last 
years.”  In like manner, Dr. Forna described Prime Minister Stevens as the “evil spirit behind the use of force and 
violence” and referred to his acts as “a display of infantile vanity and manifestations of a megalomaniac 
syndrome” (Alie, 1990).  Stevens responded with more violence and suppression, crushing the newly formed party 
and successfully imposing order and presiding over Sierra Leone’s turbulent political landscape for 17 years.    
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Executive President.  Seven years later, the president changed the constitution and 
made Sierra Leone a one party state and himself, its president for life.  
 
3.5 PORO AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL  
 
The birth of the states of Liberia and Sierra Leone, with the inherent Westphalian 
notion for absolute control over territories and peoples, set in motion a long struggle 
between the Poro and state authorities on the one hand and the proselytising religions 
of Christianity and Islam on the other.  Just like the states struggled for survival, the 
Poro’s own survival struggle continued, which in effect it has faced since the days of 
slavery.  The focus here is to explore how the clash between indigenous politics and 
those of the Westphalian state, as well as indigenous notions of religion and 
spirituality and Islam and Christianity on the other, reshaped and recreated societies 
and the Poro and Sande sodalities of the entire Upper Guinea Coast region. 
 
3.5.1 Collisions between State and Poro Political Authority Building 
 
Remaining oblivious to revolts from indigenous rulers, the Legislative Council of the 
Sierra Leone Colony on 31 August 1896 proclaimed the surrounding territories 
Protectorates of the British Crown without consulting the indigenous peoples of the 
interior, while Liberia undertook the incorporation of indigenous societies as subjects 
(not citizens) of Liberia in early 1900.  Both authorities embarked on state expansion, 
primarily to increase sources of revenue, suppress alleged violence and disorder in the 
interior, and stop the lingering West-Atlantic slave trade (Fyfe, 1979).    By the end of 
the 1800s and 1930s, the Sierra Leone Colony and the Liberian government, 
respectively, had sufficiently pacified and firmly established state jurisdiction over 
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indigenous societies around them (Sawyer, 1992).  Despite relative calm in the 
interior of both countries, sovereign authority over the interior still resided with 
indigenous authorities, particularly with the Poro.  To wrest power and authority from 
indigenous institutions, the Sierra Leone Colony and Liberia outlawed all sodalities, 
especially the Poro sodality, and declared it illegal and a criminal offense to employ 
Poro rules as a means of interfering with trade, around 1897 and 1912, respectively 
(Ellis, 1999).  Membership in all sodalities in the case of Liberia was punishable by 
20 years imprisonment, while the government entered and destroyed most Poro 
shrines.  This unleashed long-held grievances and resentments against the colonial 
authorities.  Christopher Fyfe (1962) indicates that the accumulated grievances 
amongst the indigenous population against the colonial government in Sierra Leone 
“broke in a wave of fury to sweep forever all taint of alien influence…” (87).  In the 
case of Liberia, all indigenous sodalities, especially the Poro, increased capital 
punishment of defaulters, sabotage of government programmes and forced initiation 
of government agents in the hinterlands.  The repression and counter resistance 
resulted in generalised chaos, widespread insurrection and full-scale wars between 
indigenous societies and the colonial authorities (ibid).   
 
The British violently crushed revolts by indigenous societies and capitalised on their 
victory to weaken the Poro, especially in its political function and control over trade 
routes in Sierra Leone.147  This was more so after the 1898 Hut Tax War between the 
British colonial authority and Poro authorities.148  The colonial authority however 
                                                
147The contestation between the Poro and the British Colonial rule lays the foundation for conflicts between the 
political class of post-colonial Sierra Leone and the Poro.  The conflict was essentially one of political economy as 
the issue was of control of trade routes and extraction of taxes.  It also had to do with the pervasiveness of Islam 
and the dominance of the Poro in the North. 
148Intransigent kings, chiefs and warriors were either summarily executed or forced into exile.  Large kingdoms 
were splintered into smaller chiefdoms to prevent them from consolidating.  This, however, does not suggest that 
the institution’s influence disappeared completely from the political and especially security arena.    
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recreated the authority structure through the chieftaincy system.  They strengthened 
the authority of the chiefs with the exercise of violence through the frontier police and 
economically through the extraction of taxes and the exploitation of labour.  The 
countervailing authority of the Poro Council was replaced with the colonial authority 
while the kantha process for preparing chiefs to be diligent custodians of the Sacred 
Thing of Rulership was replaced by schools for chiefs, which was established by the 
colonial authority.  Rather than learn to uphold and defend the Sacred Thing of 
Rulership of the Poro communities the new chiefs were schooled to defend the 
interests of the distant colonial authority.   
 
While the colonial powers in Sierra Leone used their victory over indigenous revolts 
to strengthen control over the interior, the apparent failure of the Liberian authority to 
outlaw the sodality forced it to explore an alternative strategy for control—adopting 
the strategy of penetration and co-optation.  The Liberia authority supposed that 
infiltrating and adopting the Poro sodality to the government’s own purposes, while at 
the same time suppressing the much smaller sodalities especially of the Kru and 
Grebo ethnic groups, was a preferred option (Ellis, 1999).  The government 
consequently made a distinction between the Poro and other sodalities, insisting that 
the latter was barbaric and therefore illegal, while embracing the former as partner in 
moulding individuals to social norms, maintaining adherence to traditional values and 
providing security and order in the interior (Brown 1967).  President Arthur Barclay 
made attempts to centralise the hitherto decentralised Poro to facilitate state control of 
the sodality.  The government designated Mt Gibi in Margibi County as the apex for 
all Poro sacred sites.  They also appointed a ‘super-Zoe’, backed by the Liberian 
government, who was to subject all other Zoes to its authority (ibid).  President 
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Arthur Barclay149 also voluntarily underwent the initiation rites and became a member 
of the Poro sodality.  Several of his government officials and all other presidents after 
him joined the Poro sodality (ibid).   By the end of the 1930s, observers indicate that 
the Poro became a state institution almost with equal status as that of the Freemasons 
in Liberia (Gibbs, 1965; d’Adeazo, 1962).150  As will be discussed in a subsequent 
section, the marriage set the stage for political instrumentalisation of the Poro 
sodality, as Poro paramount chiefs and high Zoes joined ranks with the Liberian state 
to exercise repressive authority over their people and thereby enrich themselves.  Poro 
able-bodied men became the foot soldiers of the settler state, and were sent to the 
Southeast to tame the ‘unruly’ Kwa-speaking people. Consequently, most chiefs in 
Poro-governed societies in Liberia also abandoned their roles as custodians of the 
“Sacred Thing of Rulership”.  Instead, they also became proxies of the settler state 
imposing taxes over the interior for their personal benefits, subjecting indigenous 
authorities to the authority of the state; and grouping especially small autonomous 
units of the stateless Kwa-speaking people into large chiefdoms and imposing the 
chieftaincy system on them.151  All this notwithstanding, neither the policy of 
suppression in Sierra Leone or the policy of penetration and co-option in Liberia 
                                                
149President Arthur Barclay (r. 1904-1914) is credited with consolidating the Liberian state and imposing its so-
called hinterland structure of governance on indigenous societies.  His brother Edwin Barclay completed the task 
of state consolidation in 1930-1943, with a focus on building state bureaucracy. Just like Arthur Barclay, who 
ascended to the presidency at the height of colonial infiltration into the interior of Liberia, Edwin Barclay took 
over from President Charles DB King, who was prosecuted for allegation of slave labour. The King scandal called 
into question the viability of the Liberian state and evoked calls to subject Liberia to international trusteeship 
(Dunn and Tarr, 1988). With strong military support through the LFF and backed by the United States military, 
Edwin Barclay took steps to crush internal rebellion.  Declaring and winning the longest battle with the Kwa- 
speaking people in the Southeast, the President once and for all effectively brought all territories of Liberia under 
the sovereign authority of the state.  In 1935 the President designed and supported the Civil Service Act and with it 
professionalised the administrative machinery and insulated it from presidential maneuvering.  Edwin Barclay 
pursued an endogenous economic policy, arguing that a sustainable economy is one that is anchored in domestic 
technology and entrepreneurship (ibid). 
150Harley (1941) indicates that several credible sources exist to suggest striking similarities between the Poro rites 
and those of Freemasonry to suggest a common origin.  It can be suggested therefore that the apparent marriage 
between the Poro authority and the Americo-Liberians whose social and political life was also influenced 
Freemasonry was easy due to the similarity of their respective sodalities. 
151
The hinterland governance strategy arguably sparked widespread discontent and resistance to state authority and 
institutions.  It also destabilised indigenous societies and generated a generalised malaise throughout the Sierra 
Leone Colony and Liberia.  In reaction, the Poro made its boundaries more impervious and intensified repression 
of Poro-dominated communities, apparently to increase the cost of defaulting.   
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insulated the state from encountering and being affected by indigenous institutions, 
especially the Poro sodality.  In fact, while the British might have crushed the war-
making powers of the Poro, they did not diminish its ability to serve as a force for 
counter-hegemonic resistance.  
 
3.5.2. Collisions between the Poro and other Religions 
 
In addition to the violent collision with the state, the Poro has and continues to collide 
with various denominations of Islam and Christianity.  As indicated earlier, one 
theory for the migration of Poro practicing ethnic groups further south in West Africa 
was the conversion of the various monarchies in the Sahelian region of Africa to 
Islam.   The converted empires condemned the Poro as the practice of Satanism and 
proscribed its practice in the empires.  Present day Muslims still condemn the practice 
as Satanism.  They therefore not only avoid the practice but also continue to sabotage 
its operation—seizing every opportunity of inter-group wars to destroy shrines and 
kill the Poro’s spiritual leaders.  The Muslim-dominated Liberia United for 
Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the United Liberation Movement 
(ULIMO) have been accused of systematically attacking Poro shrines and high priests 
and even selling some of the Poro’s sacred masks.152 Similar confrontations exist 
between the Poro and Christianity.  At the beginning of the Liberian and Sierra 
Leonean states, missionaries who established evangelism posts in the interiors began 
with the vilification of the Poro.  Over time, however, mainstream denominations like 
Catholicism, Methodistsm and Lutherans changed their combative approach and co-
opted some aspects of the Poro and Sande practices.  They noted some of the values 
                                                
152A key informant alleged that one of the most powerful symbols of the Power, which was only viewed and 
touched by the highest Zoes, was looted during the war by LURD in Liberia and sold for millions of dollars in 
Mecca. 
Sam Doe Final Thesis UB No. 04008980 124 
of the Poro social regulatory functions and the similarity between some of the Poro 
and Sande belief systems and those of Christianity.  For instance, Christian 
missionaries drew on the Poro’s myth of rebirth, monotheism, the spiritual roles of 
ancestors, etc. to convey the Christian message of sacrifice, rebirth, the power of the 
saints and the belief in life after death.  These similarities facilitated the proselytising 
aim of the Christian missionaries.  Since the 1980s, the fast-growing ‘born-again’ 
groups of Christians have challenged the apparent cooperation between Christianity 
and Poro spirituality.  They too have denounced the Poro as Satanism and any 
association with it as ‘being equally yoked with the devil’, as one Key Informant 
indicated.  The ‘born again’ groups in both countries have forced new converts to 
denounce their association with the Poro and even disassociate from their relatives 
who remain practicing members of the Poro and Sande.  This religious or spiritual 
crisis is having a devastating effect on the social cohesion and coherence of Poro-
dominated communities.  The crisis has intensified since the end of the civil wars in 
both countries.  While collisions in the political spheres of the Poro and the state has 
undermined political stability, a crisis of spirituality and social values engendered by 
collisions between Poro on the one hand and Islam and ‘born-again’ Christianity on 
the other, continues to destabilise or delay the restoration of social foundations.   
 
3.6 NEO-PATRIMONY AND KLEPTOCRACY IN LIBERIA AND SIERRA 
LEONE 
 
A combination of factors including economic bankruptcy, indigenous revolts, and 
threats of encroachments on the territories of Liberia and Sierra Leone progressively 
altered the nature of the colony and settler state.153  In the case of Liberia, by the time 
                                                
153Until the mid-20th century, Liberia operated a “common patrimony” in which each settler had a stake.  The 
‘patrimony’ was managed by a merchant ‘settler oligarchy’ who sustained both the oligarchy and the ‘Common 
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William V.S. Tubman154 ascended to the presidency in 1944, Sawyer (1992) points 
out, “countervailing influences exercised by the norms, customs, and traditions 
associated with the ‘settler state’” and by extension the interior of Liberia, had 
receded (p. 146).  A president-dominated political culture was at work.  Tubman took 
advantage of these opportunistic conditions to establish a fully functioning neo-
patrimonial order.  As a non-Monrovia155 political actor, Tubman was aware of the 
difficulty of penetrating the highly bonded, sodality-based Monrovia political class.  
The indigenous population, whose demand for inclusion in the Liberian state had 
grown louder, provided the ready alternative political base for the president.  He 
quickly moved to announce policies that were popular to the majority indigenous 
population (Dunn and Tarr, 1988).  Tubman called for a “new era of understanding 
and cooperation among the various ethnic communities of Liberia” (ibid: 54).  He 
revised the law to enfranchise women and members of indigenous communities who 
paid taxes and own properties valued over $100 (ibid).  On the economic front the 
president declared an open-door policy—directly opposite to his predecessor, Edwin 
Barclay, who pursued endogenous economic policy.  The economy took a dramatic 
upward trend and Liberia witnessed a phenomenal rise in foreign direct 
investments.156  The large investment in the resources of Liberia helped Tubman to 
transform Liberia’s tax-dependent government to a rent-seeking government.  The 
shift emboldened the President’s grip on power since he crafted policies that favoured 
                                                                                                                                      
Patrimony” through a “combination of religious, economic, and sodalitous allegiances” (Dunn and Tarr, 1988: 
146). The seat of power was primarily established in and controlled by the Monrovia-based settler class until 
William V.S. Tubman, a settler from south-eastern Liberia took over as President. 
154William V.S. Tubman is the 18th and longest serving President in the history of Liberia.  He is also credited with 
instituting and presiding over neo-patrimonial politics in Liberia. 
155
Tubman hailed from Maryland, the latest settler state in Liberia.  It also took much longer before the Maryland 
settlers agreed to joining Liberia.  They were therefore considered outsiders from mainstream politics.  Aside from 
historical dissimilarity, Maryland is in the far east of the country and given the impassable road network, hardly 
interacted with the settler core in Montserrado and Grand Bassa counties. 
156From 1950 to 1961, Liberia’s economic growth was the highest in the world.  With less than 0.3% of the 
continent’s population, the country benefited from more than 13% of all foreign direct investments in Africa 
(Dunn and Tarr, 1988).    
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his full control of the newly found wealth. Tubman reduced the professional and 
functioning bureaucracy he inherited to benevolent pageantry and mediocrity, using 
the immense wealth gained from the economic boom.157     
 
Unlike Tubman, who inherited an all-powerful Executive and instituted a neo-
patrimony, Siaka Stevens created his own political order of presidential dominance, 
and with it institutionalised the politics of kleptocracy.  The kleptocratic order Stevens 
instituted in collaboration with his Lebanese cronies permeated every sector of state 
bureaucracy and became a culture in Sierra Leone.158  Aspiring civil servants had to 
pay recruiting officers for appointments to lucrative posts at diamond mines and 
border points.  By the time Stevens stepped down for his hand-picked successor, 
Joseph Momoh, Kandeh (1999) indicates, the Kleptocratic order conspicuously 
manifested itself in the open involvement of politicians and civil servants in diamond 
mining and smuggling; the profiteering and hoarding of goods; the signing of bogus 
contracts and pocketing of salaries of ‘ghost’ workers; and the stealing of public 
materials and equipment (Kandeh, 1999:351).  The predatory nature of the regime 
undermined the construction of legitimate political institutions and set the conditions 
for “widespread discontent, social disorder, armed insurrections, and eventual state 
collapse” (ibid).     
 
                                                
157
President Tubman boasted of being responsible for the newly found wealth and therefore entitled to its 
distribution.  This in my view helped to dismantle governance rooted in accountability and transparency and 
establish the foundations for predatory governance—the conditions which tend to produce war economies in time 
of instability. 
158Kandeh (1999) alleges that Stevens turned over the diamond and fishing industry to his Lebanese cronies 
headed by Jamil Sahid Mohammed.  Mohammed was virtually the Prime Minister under Stevens.  He attended 
cabinet meetings, occasionally vetoed ministerial appointments, reversed ministerial decisions and routinely 
violated government regulations (ibid).  As chief patron of the APC, Jamil had over 500 Lebanese and Palestinian 
personal security guards.  
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3.6.1 Decline of Neo-patrimony, Kleptocracy and State Decay 
 
Both Tubman and Stevens willed to their chosen successors—William R. Tolbert and 
Joseph Momoh, respectively—economies on the brink of bankruptcy and an outburst 
of hitherto repressed social forces, whether student movements or the so-called 
progressives (Sawyer, 1992; Kandeh, 1999).  In an attempt to create their own 
political identity, both successors made attempts to break away from their 
predecessors.  William R. Tolbert quickly announced himself as distinct from William 
Tubman and declared that the era of ‘father of the nation’ politics was over.  He 
insisted that Liberia’s return to ‘higher heights’ depended on a policy of ‘total 
involvement’ with uncompromising values for hard work and professionalism (Dunn 
and Tarr, 1988).159  To turn towards Africa, Tolbert terminated diplomatic ties with 
Israel and established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and a number of 
socialist countries.  He refocused the economy inward with emphasis on agriculture 
and embarked on infrastructural development.   
 
While Tolbert’s “Total Involvement for Higher Heights” policy was welcomed by the 
intelligentsia of the indigenous class, it was resented by the traditional core who 
accused him of “moving too fast, breaking with tradition, and showing disrespect and 
ingratitude to the old order that had produced and elevated him to the presidency” 
(Sawyer, 1992: 189).  Besides, it was not long before the President began to 
contradict his so-called policy.   His merit system contrasted with the total monopoly 
of the economy by his brothers and cronies.  Calls for public scrutiny of government 
                                                
159Tolbert immediately gave a head start to his ‘Total Involvement for Higher Heights’ policy.  He refurbished, 
modernised and launched Edwin Barclay’s policy of professionalised bureaucracy, emphasising merit as the basis 
for recruitment in the civil service; released all political prisoners of the Tubman era and enlisted some in his 
government; and encouraged scrutiny of public officials (Dunn and Tarr, 1988).    
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performance were limited to those outside of the president’s close rank.  Returning to 
the old order, the president declared emergency powers and reinstituted Tubman’s 
security state (Lowenkopf, 1976). The indigenous intelligentsia to whom he 
gravitated at the inception of his presidency not only abandoned the President, they 
were actively plotting for his removal.  Moves to return to the traditional core also did 
not materialise.  Without a political base and “entrapped by his own inconsistencies”, 
Tolbert remained in limbo; thus exposing the ‘proverbial weak link’ of the settlers’ 
hold on power” (Dunn and Tarr, 1988).  Sooner than later the irrepressible tide of 
change overtook the government, bringing to a bloody end the Tolbert regime and by 
extension the nearly 150-year settler hold on power.160   
 
Similarly Joseph Momoh in Sierra Leone presented himself at his inauguration as a 
‘no nonsense’ president who was determined to break with kleptocracy.  “…Those 
people who made it a habit to ignore stipulated rules and regulations by virtue of their 
standing or connection in society… as from this moment their days have come to an 
end…” he reminded his jubilant audience (Alie, 1990).  The President declared his 
                                                
160One incident, which goes down in history as the primary trigger to the end of Tolbert’s regime was the April 14, 
1979 rice riot.  In April 1979 the Government of Liberia announced a policy to increase the price of a 100 lb bag 
of rice from US$22 to US$30.  The Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL), one of the two160 staunch political 
pressure groups at the time, rejected the government’s policy and threatened to mobilise national demonstrations.  
PAL claimed that the government’s decision was intended to allow windfall profits for the already wealthy 
importers (many of whom were immediate relatives of the president) to the detriment of the “toiling masses” 
(Dunn and Tarr, 1988).  On April 14 1979, in defiance of the Government’s ban on public demonstrations, PAL 
mobilised thousands of disgruntled youths in and around Monrovia to take to the streets.  For the first time in the 
country’s history, the people had taken to the streets to express their grievances.  The police and soldiers, ordered 
by the Government to enforce the ban, disregarded the president’s order (ibid).  More than 100 persons were 
killed, 500 wounded and properties worth millions of US dollars looted.  Even though leaders of PAL were 
charged with treason and imprisoned, the president bowed to pressure and extended executive clemency.  Pundits 
suggest the clemency and subsequent backtracking from executive decisions exposed William Tolbert as a weak 
president, a weakness PAL and other ‘progressives’ unrelentingly exploited until the regime was toppled.  One 
year later, the Progressive Peoples Party (PPP; a political wing of the PAL) called for the resignation of the Tolbert 
government, to be replaced by “a coalition of progressive forces” (ibid).  The announcement invited a nation-wide 
strike until the president resigned.  Calling this an affront to state authority, the pesident arrested and charged the 
PPP leaders with treason.  As they awaited trial, the president invited students and traditional leaders to a public 
forum on the grounds of the Executive Mansion to seek their endorsement for the execution of capital punishment.  
Disapproving crowds, who threw missiles at the president, interrupted the gathering.  Tolbert retreated in 
humiliation from the booing crowd.  Barely a month after that fateful gathering, on 12 April 1980, 17 non-
commissioned officers stormed the presidential residence and assassinated the president, bringing an end to nearly 
150 years of settler oligarchy in Liberia.  A path of self-destruction was charted and maintained ever since.   
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‘New Order’ policy and called on all Sierra Leoneans and foreigners doing business 
in the country to support the new policy.   Unfortunately, unlike Tolbert, Momoh’s 
‘New Order’ was weighed down by the corrupt and opportunistic regime he inherited.  
In addition, the President’s own dearth in political acumen combined with unrealistic 
expectations for political transformation undermined any good intentions he might 
have had.  Rather than persist on the path of political transformation, the President 
simply perfected corruption and introduced a lackadaisical leadership.  Even though 
the declining economy could hardly support a politics of kleptocracy and neo-
patrimony, the Momoh regime entrenched these vices (Kandeh, 1999).  Overwhelmed 
by generalised discontent and military incursions in the East and bogged down by a 
crushing debt burden, the Momoh regime was in a complete state of disorder.  It was 
easy therefore for a band of disgruntled soldiers to march into the state house and 
overthrow the regime in 1992; also bringing to an end 25 years of APC hold on power 
(Zack-Williams, 1997).   
 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
 
So far I have demonstrated that prior to the establishment of the Westphalian state, the 
Upper Guinea Coast was politically dynamic.  In nearly all societies of Sierra Leone 
and a large part of Liberia, there were complex societies bonded by thick and well-
protected boundaries; where a mix of secular and supernatural structures exercised 
absolute sovereignty; and the culture of silence and political ambiguity operated.  The 
introduction of Europe from the days of slavery, to colonialism and later the 
establishment of the Westphalian state, added alien elements to the configuration 
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process by placing emphasis on assimilation and centralised hierarchies.161 I also 
demonstrated that pre-collapsed Liberia and Sierra Leone rested on a social 
philosophy which later found expression in what Dunn and Tarr describe as “Rudyard 
Kipling’s ‘white man’s burden’”, where the freed slaves and the British colonialists 
perceived themselves as “Josephs” destined to redeem Africa from its ‘primitiveness’.   
 
Secondly, like all other state-builders, Liberian and Sierra Leonean state builders 
surmised that juxtaposing the Westphalian State on indigenous institutions was 
achievable with no repercussions for state institutions.  That exercise failed 
monumentally.  The so-called evangelical and civilised state-builders soon adopted 
the Poro mechanisms for generating authority in Liberia, while the British ceded 
power to a recreated version of the Poro in the indirect rule system.  The Americo-
Liberian political class got themselves initiated in the Poro in the hope that they 
would transform the sodality into a political instrument.  While this was the case, 
Poro elites used their newfound position to exploit the state and their people.  As for 
Sierra Leone, although the indigenous intelligentsia who assumed state power claimed 
to be well groomed in British civilisation, they seemed to have demonstrated 
primordial allegiance to their respective communities, as evidenced in the political 
fragmentation that greeted the young independent state.  
 
Thirdly, too often scholars tend to pitch the origin of the African state to so-called 
independence events.  This claim is highly problematic if one considers the definition 
of statebuilding.  Prior to independence and under the authority of the colonialists, as 
seen in the case of Sierra Leone and partly Liberia, African states were broadly 
                                                
161The implications of assimilation and centralisation on the viability of the state and nationbuilding are discussed 
in chapter three. 
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established with defined and internationally agreed borders, bureaucratic institutions 
—although with a periphery-centre socio-economic pattern—and some defined 
authority and government.  What changed at independence was not a shift from 
colony to statehood.  Instead, it was a shift from ‘colonial state to ‘independent neo-
colonial state’.   
 
Fourthly, very few African states including Sierra Leone have revisited the theory of 
statehood, the question of nationbuilding and the nature and structure of governance 
since the colonialists transferred power.  Those who embarked on the foundational 
project have only done so after the colonial state they inherited collapsed through 
bloody coups or civil wars.162 The lack of political dialogue with the range of micro 
sodality-based authorities in especially Liberia and Sierra Leone continues to 
undermine opportunities for evolving shared theories and structures of governance.  
The emphasis on dialogue is not to suggest that dialogue is an end in itself.  It is a 
platform and an opportunity to evolve a social compact that is responsive to the 
context.  As Sawyer points out, many African states including Liberia and Sierra 
Leone still need to embark on national dialogue that will facilitate the reinvention of a 
state that is representative of their historical, demographic, geographical and socio-
economic realities. 
 
Finally, the 1940s (for Liberia) and the 1970s for (Sierra Leone) witnessed a 
significant shift in the political system.  Both William V.S. Tubman and Siaka 
Stevens consolidated the centralised state and perfected the politics of graft and 
                                                
162The case of Uganda and Ghana are classic example.  Tanzania is perhaps among the few, if not the only, 
African states that revisited these questions after independence.  The majority of the states continue the train of the 
colonial state.   The recent end of Apartheid afforded South Africa this rare opportunity to embark on the state and 
nation building project. Rather than claim independence in the 1960s as the beginning of state building in Africa, 
the researcher would argue the period only marked the transition from ‘colonial’ to ‘independent neo-colonial’ 
statehood. 
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patronage.  An economic boom and the growing agitation for political independence 
throughout Africa provided the conditions favourable for kleptocracy and neo-
patrimony.  The decline of these resources coupled with their own political ineptness 
undermined the leadership of Tubman and Stevens’ successors, thereby bringing to an 
end the kleptocratic order in Sierra Leone and patrimonial politics and mediocre 
government in Liberia.  How and why both orders failed and the implication for their 
violent collapse is the subject of Chapter 4.   
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CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL WARS AND INTERVENTIONS 
 
“The phenomenon of state collapse prompts an avalanche of questions: What are the 
significant features of state collapse? How do we define it? What triggers it? Are some state 
systems or contexts more prone to it than others and if so under what kind of conditions? 
What are the implications of collapse both internally within the state system concerned and 
externally with respect to relations with the world outside? … What lies beyond collapse 
and how should we visualise and propose to handle the connections between state collapse 
and state formation or political reconstruction in the contemporary era?” (Doornbos, 2003: 
48) 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Contemporary conflicts such as those waged in Liberia and Sierra Leone defy 
traditional constructs and frameworks for understanding conflict, war and state 
insurrection.  As observed by David Keen (2005), the two-party logic of war is 
inadequate to explain the cocktail of warlords and factions who featured in both civil 
wars.  Secondly, the traditional ‘war as honour’ concept is severely challenged by the 
apparent lack of discernable ideological motives, as well as the random nature of the 
civil wars (Collier, 2003; Misra, 2008).  The dishonour and disrepute such wars have 
brought to the glorified notion of warfare celebrated by Carl von Clausewitz, Niccolo 
Machiavelli, and more recently Frank Fanon has prompted some scholars, especially 
Robert Kaplan (1994), to dismiss contemporary wars as “new barbarism”.  Kaplan’s 
“new barbarism” thesis has been adequately addressed by scholars like Francis 
(2005), Misra (2008), Richards (2001) and Keen (2005), among others.  I have no 
intention to recount its obvious flaws.  However, the point worth noting here is the 
realisation that the global insecurity risks these wars tend to pose have made them too 
costly to ignore.  Most importantly, as Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) argue, how 
we understand the nature and operations of contemporary civil wars is critical to the 
determination of appropriate and effective interventions.  There has therefore been a 
surge in the number of scholars, cynics included, who are in search of explanations of 
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some sort to deepen our understanding of post-Cold War civil wars.  So far the 
explanations are as diverse as they are controversial. 
 
Nevertheless, some of these controversial theories continue to inform both internal 
and external interventions—sometimes with success, sometimes with disastrous 
failure.  In this chapter I engage the dominant causal theories including the greed and 
grievance thesis, ethnicity thesis, culturalist thesis and spillover effects and 
regionalisation of civil wars thesis.  In light of the causal analysis, I review the core 
intervention strategies that culminated in the peace agreements.  Despite growing 
efforts to consign contemporary civil wars to the category of exceptionism and 
peculiarity, I come to similar conclusions made in the late 1970s by Paul Wehr 
(1979)—that there is no one cause but a confluence of causes, which can better 
explain civil wars including those of today.  To set the stage, the chapter begins with a 
sketch of accounts of the civil wars in section 4.2.  It is followed by discussions of the 
dominant causal theories in section 4.3.  Finally, section 4.4 analyses the range of 
peacemaking interventions and their impacts on prospects for durable peace.163   
 
4.2 SKETCH OF THE CIVIL WARS  
 
On 24 December 1989 the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) under a new 
leadership, Charles McArthur Taylor, made a third comeback with 150-armed men to 
topple the tyrannical regime of Samuel Kanyon Doe.164  The NPFL crossed into 
                                                
163I focus the intervention section on all interventions that led to brokering the final peace agreements leaving 
discussions on post-conflict interventions aimed at state reconstruction to Chapter 6 and 7.  
164The National Patriotic Front of Liberia was established and headed by the late Thomas Quiwonkpa, who was the 
second top ranking officer of the 17 non-commission officers who toppled the Tolbert regime.  With increasing 
tensions between him and President Samuel Kanyon Doe, Quiwonkpa was dismissed as Commanding General of 
the Armed Forces of Liberia and appointed as Secretary General of the People Redemption Council.  He escaped 
and went into voluntary exile, where supported by some prominent Liberians, he established the NPFL.  As 
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Liberia through Cote d’Ivoire, into the Gio and Mano towns of Butuo and Karnplay in 
Nimba County.  Already agitated by Doe’s repressive policy against them, the Gio 
and Mano overwhelmingly welcomed the NPFL.  In less than six months, a 
groundswell of popular support engorged the rank of the NPFL—expanding the small 
band of fighters into an army of over 20,000 (Sawyer, 1992).165  As discussed later in 
the chapter, in August 1990 under the name—ECOWAS Peace Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG)—ECOWAS leaders dispatched 4,000 strong peacekeeping troops to 
Liberia.  This marked the beginning of ECOWAS’s long and treacherous journey in 
peacekeeping and the launch of a new ‘peace and security’ chapter in sub regional 
economic cooperation (I return to this subject later in the chapter).166  Seven years 
into ECOWAS’s intervention in Liberia, general and presidential elections were held 
in 1997.  Charles Taylor, the biggest of the warlords, emerged victorious.  However, 
elections, the popular response of the international community to internal conflict, did 
not win the peace.  Disgruntled warlords returned to the bush just about two years into 
Taylor’s leadership.  The Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy 
(LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL)—with apparent 
support from the governments of Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire—mounted sustained 
military pressures on the Taylor Government. Already reeling under a range of 
economic and military sanctions the Taylor government capitulated and Taylor 
himself accepted to go into exile July 2003.  In August of the same year the 
                                                                                                                                      
discussed further in the chapter, the NPFL had made two attempts to topple the Doe regime but failed with 
catastrophic consequences, particularly for the Gio/Mano ethnic groups of its leader, Thomas Quiwonkpa. 
165Like wild fire, the NPFL extended its control to every corner of Liberia, confining President Doe and his ethnic-
based Armed Forces to the Executive Palace and its adjoining military Barclay Training Centre. 
166Amidst fierce combat against NPFL, ECOMOG landed and established itself in Monrovia with support from the 
breakaway Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) and the Krahn-dominated Armed Forces of 
Liberia (Sawyer, 1992).  The alliance with factional troops soon became a liability to the regional peacekeepers, 
when, barely a month into ECOMOG’s arrival in the country, President Samuel Doe was captured by the INPFL in 
the offices of the ECOMOG commander while visiting the latter’s Burshrod Island base, and dragged away as the 
apparently bewildered regional troops looked on.  Nigeria unilaterally dismissed Quainoo, flew him home and 
replaced him with a Nigerian commander (ibid).  Nigeria maintained the leadership of ECOMOG throughout their 
intervention in Liberia after the woeful failure of the Ghanaian leadership. 
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ECOWAS with support from the international community brokered a peace deal 
known as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The United Nations backed 
the CPA with a robust 15,000-strong Peacekeeping Mission, which contributed to 
some political stability and facilitated post-settlement elections.  They continue to 
consolidate stability and the state in Liberia. 
 
Similarly, although Sierra Leone’s own political, economic and social decay had 
reached breaking point, it took the spillover effects of conflict in Liberia to ignite 
another cataclysmic flame of violence in Sierra Leone.  It was March 23, 1991 when 
about 100 fighters calling themselves the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) crossed 
over from territories held by the NPFL in Liberia, into the Kailahun District in eastern 
Sierra Leone.167  Like its counterpart in Liberia, the RUF positioned itself as the 
redeemer who would pull Sierra Leone out of the socio-economic abyss in which 
APC kleptocracy had plunged the country (Kandeh, 1999).  It promised to return 
proceeds from the abundant wealth extracted from rural communities back to the 
communities in a communist style (Reno, 1995).  This rhetoric was initially 
appealing, particularly to the youth from the rural areas and urban slums that swelled 
the ranks of the RUF.168  ECOMOG, also at the behest of Nigeria, intervened in the 
conflict in 1994 and succeeded in brokering a peace deal in 1996. But while the peace 
deal was being negotiated, Sierra Leone held general and presidential elections—
disregarding protests from RUF.  Barely a year after the elections, disgruntled 
                                                
167
The RUF, having co-trained with leaders of NPFL in Libya, joined ranks with the NPFL to first launch what 
became a regional onslaught in Liberia.  From the NPFL bases, the RUF launched their insurgency against the 
deeply entrenched one-party rule of the All People’s Congress (APC). 
168Unlike in Liberia, where the war spread to the capital in six months, it took four years before the RUF incursion 
was felt throughout Sierra Leone, particularly in the populated capital city The war was contained along the 
eastern fringes of Sierra Leone for a long time partly because RUF and its Liberian and Burkina Faso troops 
abandoned their earlier “millenarian appeal” for banditry, murder, torture, mutilation and rape as a way of 
subduing the local population.  They also gravitated towards the diamond fields and abandoned further offensives 
against the SLA. RUF used its stolen wealth to equip itself and launch a renewed and sustained offensive against 
the SLA and its allied forces.  By 1994 the RUF had spread across the country. 
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elements from the Sierra Leone Army—the self-styled Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council (AFRC)— joined ranks with the RUF to depose the government.  It took 
another bloody intervention of ECOMOG, backed by a range of government forces, 
traditional hunters from the Poro and other sodality groups and mercenaries to reverse 
the coup and restore the elected government.  The war persisted until 1999 when 
ECOMOG, backed by the international community, brokered a peace deal known as 
the Lome Peace Agreement (LPA).  ECOMOG, as in Liberia, stayed the course until 
2000 when the UN approved over 17,000 troops to keep the peace and support post-
conflict recovery. The war officially ended in 2002.  Sierra Leone has since been on 
the path to recovery, having had two peaceful presidential elections since the end of 
the civil war.   
 
Much has been written about the chronology of events in the bloody and protracted 
civil wars.169 I have no intention to recount the tragic accounts.  This brief account is 
intended to lay the basis for the detail analysis I embark upon in subsequent sections.  
For now it is worth keeping in mind that even though leaders of the sub region 
intervened in the early stages of the conflict, both conflicts persisted until the 
international community through the United Nations acted concertedly to intervene.  
Secondly, although the conflicts began with single actors who challenged the state, 
during the course of the conflict a range of actors—including 10 warring factions in 
Liberia and dozens of civil militias and mercenary outfits in Sierra Leone—populated 
the war theatres in both countries.  The death toll in Liberia was a colossal 300,000 
(more than 10% of the population), while in Sierra Leone it was estimated at 50,000 
(Human Rights Watch 1997 and 2002, respectively). Physical scars of the wars are 
                                                
169For more chronological accounts of the civil wars, please see Sawyer (1992) The Emergence of Autocracy in 
Liberia-Tragedy and Challenge, Institute for Contemporary Studies Press: San Francisco; and Keen (2005) 
Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone, James Currey: Oxford.  
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also overwhelming, with nearly 35,000 civilian and over 5,000 ex-combatants with 
serious physical disabilities.  What caused the wars and such massive destruction is 
the subject of the next section.   
 
4.3 CAUSAL THEORIES ON LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE CIVIL 
WARS 
 
4.3.1 The Greed and Grievance Debates 
 
4.3.1.1 The Primacy of Grievance 
 
Azar (1990), Gurr (1993), and Kogan and Zisserman-Brodsky (1998) are among 
earlier conflict theorists who postulate that civil wars are an expression of cumulative 
“communal” or “fraternal” grievances (Kogan Iasanyi and Zisserman-Brodsky, 1998: 
212).  Such grievances, according to Azar, are a result of depriving individuals and 
communities from resources to satisfy their “security, development, political access, 
and identity needs” (Azar, 1990, cited in Miall et al, 1999: 73).  Two factors must be 
present before deprivation can be a source of violence mobilisation.   Firstly, Azar 
notes that deprivation must be in relative terms where the deprived coexists with other 
groups who have or are perceived to have privileged access to the satisfiers of needs; 
and secondly there must be the lack of recourse.  Jose Ortega y Gasset contends, 
“Violence is the means resorted to by him who had previously exhausted all others in 
defence of the rights of justice.”  He posits that the absence of recourse is equal to the 
erosion of culture and the erosion of culture unleashes the primitive passion of 
violence (ibid).   
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Did relative deprivation and impunity or the lack of recourse feature prominently in 
the degenerative history of Liberia and Sierra Leone to justify the grievance thesis? 
Kieh (2004), Sawyer (1992), Kandeh (1999), Keen (2005), Abdullah (1998), and 
Richards (1996) seem to agree that grievance had a central role in the conflagrations.  
Kieh observes that at the threshold of the civil war in Liberia, there was a serious 
crisis of need as the “…ruling class could not provide modicum of basic human 
needs” (2004: 65).   Besides, the Samuel Doe regime successfully replaced the 
Americo-Liberian hegemony with his brutal Krahn hegemony.  The exclusive and 
hegemonic politics was further exacerbated by Doe’s violent clampdown on dissent.  
Reflecting on the period leading up to the Liberian civil war, Sawyer recalls that “As 
the rape and plunder intensified…” Doe instituted armed repression and terror (1988: 
4).  In the end, Sawyer notes, “…the populist democratic rhetoric gave way to fascist 
law and order and nationalism gave way to ethnicism…” (ibid).  Most importantly, 
the period after the failed 1985 coup led by Thomas Quiwonkpa170 saw a rise in 
community vigilantism as state security increasingly became the assassination squad 
targeting everyone protesting the Doe regime, especially individuals from the Gio and 
Mano ethnic communities.  Across the country, whatever was left to guarantee 
recourse had completely eroded.   
 
Similarly, in Sierra Leone, Keen (2005) points out, that 25 years of APC centralised 
rule produced generalised frustration, anger and apathy.  As for Paul Richards (1996), 
aside from frustration from exclusion from political decision, the suppression of youth 
by chiefs and Zoes of secret societies in rural Liberia and Sierra Leone was the 
                                                
170Thomas Quiwonkpa, a member of the Gio and Mano ethnic groups, was one of the last remaining members of 
the 17 non-commissioned officers, aside from Samuel Doe, who fled the country when Doe plotted to eliminate 
him, as he did the others. Quiwonkpa returned in 1985 to overthrow the Doe government, but failed after Doe’s 
Israeli-backed squad reversed the coup.  
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primary reason for the youth outburst which culminated in the civil wars (ibid).  The 
youth, he notes, rushed to participate in the rebellion in the hope that change in the 
system would facilitate their return to school, while at the same time settling scores 
with the rotten system which suppressed them for so long.  Kandeh is more emphatic.  
He contends, “…Sierra Leone’s descent into state terrorism…heralded the dawn of a 
‘new barbarism’” (Kandeh, 1999: 350).  Outputs of the wars also strengthen the case 
for grievance.  Consistent evidence of attacks on state and indigenous authority 
symbols and the very nature of the violence is strong indication of revolts against both 
state and indigenous repressive authorities.  Citing a consultancy report on Sierra 
Leone’s National Recovery Strategy, Fanthorpe (2005) notes that: “The extensive, 
wanton damage to government buildings [and Poro shrines and chieftaincy structures] 
during the war is by any logical analysis indefensible, and was part of a systemic 
attack on all symbols of governance…” (p. 30).    
 
4.3.1.2 The Primacy of Greed 
 
Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (1998) lead an emerging thesis, which dismisses as 
irrelevant the primacy of grievance in contemporary civil wars.  Drawing from their 
studies of over 90 countries, the authors contend that greed, not grievance, is the 
central explanatory variable for contemporary civil wars.  They call on scholars to 
“…forget about the political and cultural arguments [of grievance] and focus instead 
on the greed of rebels and especially on their trade in natural resources’ (cited in 
Humphreys, 2005: 510). Collier and Hoeffler surmise that, given the growing failure 
of the state to monopolise violence, the greed-violence nexus is set to flourish (cited 
in Keen, 2005).  Neil Cooper (2003), concurring with the greed thesis, makes an 
emphatic claim: that all today’s warlords and criminals intend is to capture the state 
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and exploit it as “vehicle for enhancing and legitimising profit making” (p. 186). 
Since greed is opportunistic, Collier and Hoeffler emphasise the conditions which 
facilitate greed, including: a) presence of lootable or “diffused” natural resources, b) 
limited economic opportunity for youth, and c) ethnic dominance (2002).   
 
It will not be farfetched to suggest that Collier and Hoeffler may have been inspired 
by the wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, given the closeness of their analysis to both 
scenarios.  The greed-inducing conditions they outline are overwhelmingly evident in 
both countries.  Liberia and Sierra Leone are endowed with abundant lootable 
resources, including alluvial diamonds (in abundance in Sierra Leone and 
considerable quantity in Liberia), gold, bauxite, timber, etc.171 The state in both 
countries—in the 1950s for Sierra Leone and the 1920s and 1950s for Liberia—
transformed their economies from “tax-dependent” to rent-seeking, when they 
discovered a range of natural endowments.  As Francis (2001) observes, the discovery 
of diamond, in Sierra Leone in the 1950s led to the abandonment of the budding agro-
economy in favour of one driven by the ‘precious diamond’.  Similarly, Sawyer 
(1992) indicates that with the launch of the over 2 million acre Firestone Rubber 
Plantation in 1926 and the iron ore mining companies that followed in the 1950s, 
Liberia shifted from agriculture and its thriving mercantile economy.  The shifts were 
not without grave socio-economic, political, environmental, and security 
consequences.  Socio-economically, the shifts affected the quality of the labour force, 
the demography and indigenous social order.  Demand for muscular rock-hewing, 
earth-digging and rubber-tapping young men provided no incentive for education, 
                                                
171Johannes Muntschick in his article ‘The Great War’ calls the lootable resources in Liberia and Sierra Leone, 
“diffuse resources”. He defines diffuse resources as those lootable natural endowments which are widespread and 
easy to access and exploit with unskilled labor.  He notes that most of Liberia and Sierra Leone’s natural 
resources—diamond, ores, bauxite, gold and sometimes timber—are diffuse resources.   
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technological capacity development, entrepreneurship and diversification of the 
economies (Francis, 2001; Sawyer, 1992).  Secondly, movement from one diamond 
field to another “…spurred major migrations and produced a floating population 
[mostly youth]” that was removed from communal values and norms (Keen 2005: 
16).  Thirdly, the pursuit of the precious diamond created interest-seeking atomised 
individuals with whom the value of solidarity—the hallmark of the sodality-governed 
Upper Guinea Coast—had lost its usefulness.  Worst of all the diamond fields and 
rubber plantations became a production ground for communal grievances and 
militarised youth groups.172 Politics also changed fundamentally. Sawyer (1992) 
observes that since the government of Liberia no longer depended on taxes because of 
the abundant wealth, governance was striped of accountability. In Sierra Leone, 
Francis (2001) and Kandeh (1999) indicate that ‘diamond politics’ helped entrench 
the politics of predation and kleptocracy.  Bad governance and gravitation to the 
exportation of primary goods and the unimaginable greed dragged and kept both 
countries below the human development ladder, with Sierra Leone the least of all 179 
countries while Liberia is 176th according to the UNDP 2008 Human Development 
Report.173  As Kandeh points out, the stealing of diamonds by politicians and their 
cronies deprived Sierra Leone not only of revenue, it also hastened its contraction and 
eventual collapse (1999: 352). De Soysa’s observation for resource-rich communities 
in third world countries—that such endowments tend to be more a “curse” rather than 
“blessing”—is overwhelmingly true for communities in especially rural Liberia and 
Sierra Leone (2000: 113).   
 
                                                
172Deeply aggrieved youth and members of host communities berated self-seeking state and local authorities who 
exploited their labor and communal endowments to feed their gluttony. They dreamed of the opportunity for 
revenge.  
173Available on http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/, accessed February 26, 2009.  
Sam Doe Final Thesis UB No. 04008980 143 
The nature and outputs of the war also remove any shred of doubt one could have 
drawn on to challenge the greed thesis.  The predatory socio-political environment 
created the opportunity for greed-stricken warlords to instigate violence and establish 
war economies.  D.F. Davis et al (1997: 2 cited in Kieh 2004) assert that, “Neither 
political philosophy nor long running historical tribal clashes were at the roots of the 
Liberian civil war, instead it was motivated by greed.” Only six months into the war 
in Liberia and less than a month in Sierra Leone did the National Patriotic Front of 
Liberia (NPFL) and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF) establish 
vast machinery to loot resources in the areas under their control.174  The accessibility 
of the “diffused resources” also spurred the proliferation of warring factions, 
including fortune-seeking sub regional and international mercenaries.175    
 
Notwithstanding the strong case made for the greed thesis, there are some flaws.  
Much has already been done to cut to size Collier and Hoeffler’s work from technical 
or scientific points of view.  Nafziger and Auvinen (2002) challenges the selection of 
the data and the reductionist nature of their model; Misra (2008) argues that while 
some of their arguments resonate with some civil wars, the generalisation of the 
conclusions to all contemporary civil wars undermines the validity of the work.  This 
is evident in the failure of their thesis to convincingly explain civil wars in Sri Lanka, 
South Sudan, Cambodia, Palestine, etc.  As for Humphrey (2005), it is the ambiguity 
in their conceptualisation of greed and grievance and the apparent misapplication of 
the greed argument to what is certainly an issue of grievance, which throws the study 
                                                
174
It is estimated that between 1992 and 1996, Taylor personally received $455 million US dollars from the 
exploitation and sale of natural resources in the areas under his control.  He legitimised his greed by getting the 
Liberian legislator to pass a bill which gave him exclusive authority over all resources in Liberia when he became 
president. 
175Nearly a dozen in Liberia and over two dozen in Sierra Leone, including a range of international mercenary 
groups like Executive Outcomes from South Africa, Sandline and Ghuka from Britain and numerous soldiers on 
hire from nearly all countries of the West Africa sub region.   
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in doubt.  In addition to the scientific arguments, and despite the compelling case I 
have made for greed vis-à-vis Liberia and Sierra Leone, there still remain 
fundamental contextual questions.   
     
Firstly, proponents of the greed thesis placed the blame squarely at the feet of 
warlords. Unsurprisingly, the inherent profit-maximising value of liberalism and the 
laxity in its free market system, which favours illicit markets, has gone unnoticed in 
their exposition. While condemning Taylor and Sankoh in the UN Security Council 
and Western capitals, leading Western governments, including some members of the 
Security Council, were Taylor and Sankoh’s business partners (Atkinson, 1997; Ross, 
2003; Global Witness, 2002).  Musah (2003) argue that conditions which favour 
violence and state subversion in Africa cannot only be limited to the presence of 
lootable resources, youth and ethnicity, as Collier and his colleagues would have us, 
believe.  He posit “…the interplay between irresponsible governance, illegitimate 
resource appropriation, and transnational corporate greed…” is integral to war 
economies (p. 167).  As for Mbembe (2001), the blame should be laid squarely at the 
feet of International Financial Institutions for turning the sovereign African state into 
mere markets.  Mbembe contends that: 
 
“Privatisation of the sovereignty of African states largely overlaps the struggle 
to concentrate and then privatise the means of coercion because of the control 
of the means of coercion makes it possible to secure an advantage in the other 
conflicts under way for the appropriation of resources…” (2001: 78).   
 
Mbembe goes further to draw a direct causal link between “…deregulation and the 
primacy of the market” on the one hand, to “…the rise of violence and the creation of 
private military, paramilitary, or jurisdictional organisations” on the other (2001: 79). 
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Secondly, there is no mention of any resemblance of the post-independence politics of 
predation and kleptocracy and the colonial institutions of extraction and plunder, 
which gave birth to the independence states, to the exercise of what is being called 
greed in contemporary wars.  If the arguments of Francis (2005), Clapham (2003), 
Kandeh (1999) and Keen (2005), among others, that the states of Liberia and Sierra 
Leone operated as kleptocracy before the wars is anything to go by, then the so-called 
greed characterisation of war behaviours is simply “politics by other means”.  The 
only difference would be that the plunder is not limited to the privileged elites.  Mass 
men, women, boys and girls are actively participating in the scramble (Doe, 2001).   
 
Thirdly, in Freud’s famous psychoanalysis theory, all humans irrespective of race or 
creed are more likely to pursue the gratification of their insatiable wants in the 
absence of restraints. This view also challenges the claim that greed is a product of 
contemporary wars.  If greed is innate and can only be restrained by effective 
regulatory regimes, shouldn’t the cause of violence-for-greed be found in the lack of 
effective regulators?   
 
Fourthly, proponents of the greed thesis had popularised a dichotomy between greed 
and grievance, although in his subsequent works Collier has conceded that there is a 
place for grievance. He acknowledges that: 
 
“The political entrepreneurs who instigate rebellions may seek start-up 
finance [and labour] from a constituency that is indeed willing to pay for 
vengeance; hence greed may need to incite grievance.  Thus, grievance and 
greed may be necessary for sustained rebellion: grievance may enable rebel 
organisation to grow to the point at which it is viable as a predator; greed 
may sustain the organisation once it has reached this point” (Collier, 2000: 
852). 
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With this acknowledgement, Collier and his colleagues seem to have settled the 
contention.  However, the symbiosis suggested in their proposition provokes new 
questions: at what time does greed beget grievance and vice versa? Even if grievance 
begets greed and greed takes over, what happens to the legitimate grievances? Do 
they get thrown out with the bath water?176  
 
4.3.2 Identity: Ethnicity in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
 
Within and outside the greed and grievance theses, ethnicity has been touted as one of 
the major causes of the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone (see Ellis, 1999; Kieh 
1998; Sawyer, 1988; Ndumbe, 2001).  It is therefore necessary to explore how and to 
what extent ethnicity featured in both conflicts and what lessons can be drawn to 
inform effective responses.  There are two schools which influence the debate on 
ethnicity.  Each school defines the phenomenon differently.  The primordialists, who I 
will refer to as the classical school, define ethnicity as “…solidarity based on 
inheritable attributes such as common culture, belief systems, and practices…” 
(Esman, 2004: 19).  In the view of the primordialists, ethnicity is evoked at the 
irrational, instinctive level.  Its critical mobilising factors are real and/ or perceived 
threats to the “genetic continuity” as well as the “dignity and collective self-esteem” 
of an ethnic group (ibid: 32-33).  The instrumentalists dismiss the claim to a genetic 
basis for ethnicity.  They argue ethnicity is a political construction—a myth on which 
political bigots thrive to further their personal aims.  Following from the greed thesis, 
this view suggests that ethnic conflict is a rational calculation to gain advantage in the 
                                                
176It seems that has become the case in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Dismissal of the wars as “gangsterism” (Sawyer, 
2003) and “lumpenism” (Abdullah, 1998) seems to have led to the glossing over of legitimate grievances that 
instigated the wars.  Post-war Liberia and Sierra Leone have returned to the status quo.  The youths have returned 
to their rock-hewing and rubber-tapping in conditions more appalling then before the wars, while the elites have 
begun to once again distend their bellies with stolen public wealth. 
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control of resources and not in the preservation of group dignity, esteem and genetic 
existence. Claim to these instinctive factors, they contend, is a façade (Crawford and 
Lipschutz, 1998).  The instrumentalists therefore define ethnicity as a “situation 
where different tribal groups oppose one another in the bid to have access to the state 
and the resources it controls” (Kaufmann, 1996: 23).  I am of the view that collective 
or communal grievances are real and comprise genetic and socially constructed 
materials.  I also surmise that these materials are easily manipulated in multi-ethnic 
societies such as Liberia and Sierra Leone, in which all resources are centrally 
controlled by the state.  I contend therefore that the materials that are mobilised to 
ignite ethnic violence exist on a spectrum of primordialism and instrumentalism and 
that the either/ or debate is unnecessary.  The questions we should therefore be 
concerned with in the case of Liberia and Sierra Leone are: was ethnicity a factor in 
the conflicts? If so, to what extent did it lean to the primordial or instrumental end of 
the spectrum?  
 
Keih (1998), Kandeh (1999), and Ndumbe (2001) indicate that ethnicity was a cause 
in both conflicts, but downplay its primordial significance.  Ethno-politics dots the 
political development of Sierra Leone, while class and later ethnic hegemony shaped 
the Liberian state and its political culture.  At its independence, the Sierra Leone state 
was polarised along ethnic lines, especially between the two dominant regionally 
divided Temne (Northern) and Mende (Southern) inhabitants.177  There was also the 
Krio/ upcountry divide—similar to the Congo/ Country divide in Liberia.  Milton 
Maigai, the independence leader, made attempts to downplay ethno-politics, but with 
his early death followed by the leadership of his ‘ethnic-ideologue’ brother Albert 
                                                
177Temne dominate the North and Mende, the South.  This divide has helped characterise Sierra Leone politics as 
Northern and Southern politics.  The two rival parties represent the two ethnic groups—the All People Congress 
(APC) of the Temnes and the Sierra Leone Peoples Party of the Mendes (SLPP). 
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Maigai, the flames of ethno-politics were made more inflammable in the young 
state.178  While ethno-politics was established at the inception of Sierra Leone, settler-
indigene politics defined Liberia.  The Americo-Liberians, as indicated in Chapter 2, 
established ‘Apartheid-like’ dominance over the majority indigenous communities.  
As a consequence of the so-called native-settler divide, all indigenous ethnic groups 
overwhelmingly welcomed the 1980 coup as a victory over the settler Americo-
Liberian class.  The unity the 1980 coup mobilised amongst the ethnic groups was 
however short-lived, as President Samuel Kanyon Doe replaced the settler hegemony 
with his Krahn hegemony.   
 
Notwithstanding the influence of ethnicity in the political development of both 
countries, the role and impact of ethnicity in igniting and sustaining the wars remains 
a subject of contention.  Ndumbe (2001: 1) has argued that the Sierra Leone civil war 
was “…a struggle of various ethnic groups to control the diamond-rich mines…” but 
he fails to substantiate his claim in the evidence of the civil war.  Neither the RUF nor 
the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) was organised along clearly 
defined ethnic lines.  Also, none of the war propagandas in Sierra Leone claimed 
ethnic exclusion and grievances.  Imposing an ethnic tag on the Sierra Leone war 
seems to me an attempt to fit the war into the general stereotype, which tends to 
dismiss all African conflicts as ethnic.  Esman posits that for a conflict to be ethnic, 
three inter-related factors must be present (2004).  Firstly, there must be a leader, an 
ethnic ideologue, who, drawing from history, constructs an ethnic ideology.  The 
ideology, whether primordial or instrumental, must articulate a grievance of exclusion 
                                                
178Under Albert’s leadership, 52% of the officer corps in the Sierra Leone Armed Forces were Mendes, as opposed 
to 26% during the leadership of his brother (Keen 2005).   Siaka Stevens and the Northern APC leadership also 
followed suit.  By the time Stevens handed over the affairs of the state to Joseph Momoh, Kandeh (1999) indicates, 
nearly all members of the officer corps were from the North (cited in Keen, 2005). 
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(for the instrumentalists) or threat to the genetic existence or dignity of the ethnic 
group (for the primordialists).  Secondly, there must be a process of formulating a 
discourse or rationalisation for the ethnic struggle—a sort of well-organised 
propaganda that continuously whips up ethnic sentiments.  Thirdly, there must be 
ethnic-based activist groups who are willing and organised to carry out the ethnic 
violence.  And adding a fourth dimension to Esman’s list, I argue there must also be 
evidence of horizontal violence against the perceived rival ethnic group(s).  None of 
Esman’s characteristics were evident in the Sierra Leone civil war.  While there is a 
strong political history of rivalry between the Temne and Mende, there was no 
evidence of confrontations between Temnes and Mendes in the civil war.  The Truth 
and Reconciliation Report in Sierra Leone indicates that membership in all warring 
factions was fluid and that there was no ethnic-dominated warring faction during the 
war.  Contrary to the prevailing stereotype about ethnicity and conflict in Sierra 
Leone, ethnicity and inter-ethnic solidarity was a force for peace.  The long history of 
ethnic solidarity defined and sustained by the range of sodalities, including the Poro, 
proved vital in the formation of a coalition of inter-ethnic militias and civil defence 
forces in defence of the state and the restoration of stability (I return to this subject 
later in the chapter).   
 
While it may be difficult for one to articulate a discernible role of ethnicity in conflict 
instigation, escalation and sustenance in Sierra Leone, ethnicity was one of the initial 
sources of mobilisation in the Liberian civil war.  In Samuel Doe’s ethnic fiefdom, 
people were prosecuted based on their ethnic orientation.  This created a history of 
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ethnic animosity, especially between the Krahn and their Mandingo179 ally, on the one 
hand, and the rest of the ethnic communities in the country, on the other.  There was 
evidence of horizontal violence between Krahn and Gios and Mano, Mandingos and 
Gio and Mano, Lorma and Mandingo, Kpelle and Mandingo, Kru and Sapo, etc.  
These horizontal micro-wars accounted for the pervasiveness of the civil war and the 
magnitude of its impact on all communities in the country.  Notwithstanding the 
strong presence of ethnic sentiments at the inception of the range of warring factions, 
the flame of ethnic violence did not sustain in the Liberia civil war.  Warlords soon 
turned to other motivators, which sometimes attracted soldiers from their so-called 
rival ethnic groups to join their ranks.  
 
Granted that both countries have a history of ethnic tensions and that there were 
glaring manifestations of ethnic violence in the Liberia civil war, the flipside to this 
debate, which has been glossed over, deserves equal attention.  Why was it difficult to 
make the ethnic case in Sierra Leone despite the long and bitter history of ethno-
politics? Why did the range of ethnic-based civil militias and traditional hunters from 
the North and South of Sierra Leone remain cohesive in their revolt against the rebel 
factions, even where the nation’s standing army disintegrated into opposing factions?  
Even in the case of Liberia, why were the ethnic sentiments not enough to drive the 
war?  In the case of Sierra Leone, I argue two inter-related factors intervened to 
undermine the potency of ethnicity as conflict generator.  Firstly, while he rode on 
ethnic sentiments to seize state power, Siaka Stevens manipulated the ethnic card 
without generating horizontal ethnic animosity and hostility.   Stevens’ targets for 
repression were mostly university students and opposition leaders, including 
                                                
179Leaders of the Mandingo ethnic group allied with Samuel Doe in a bid to protect their properties and shield 
themselves from the envy of many ethnic groups who resented their trading practices.  The Mandingoes where 
accused by other ethnic groups of exploitation and price hiking.  
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dissenters in his own APC.  Samuel Doe did the opposite.  His politics was ethnic and 
extremely vindictive.  Secondly, and arguably the most important factor, was a long 
history of ethnic solidarity especially amongst the sodality-governed regions of both 
countries.180  In Sierra Leone, all ethnic communities evoked the solidarity cemented 
in the sodality groups to mobilise Zoes like the Kamajors, Tamaboros, Donzos, etc., 
to defend the ethnic communities and the state against the rebel forces.  Even in 
Liberia, where there was evidence of ethnic violence, it is telling to note that no two 
ethnic groups belonging to the Poro communities fought each other.  The violence 
was either between Poro and non-Poro ethnic groups, or between non-Poro ethnic 
groups.  Attempts to fan religious flames were also thwarted by the organisation of 
the Interfaith Mediation Committee in Liberia and the Inter-religious Council of 
Sierra Leone.  This striking feature of the wars has gone unnoticed and yet it is vital 
to restoring cohesive societies in both countries.    
 
4.3.3 Culturalist Thesis 
 
Sawyer (2005) notes that the wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone lacked an organised 
structure and they exploited cultural symbols to orchestrate anarchy.  But Ellis (1999) 
and Clapham (1998) insist that culture was not just exploited, it defined the nature of 
and practices in the wars (1999).  Generalising contemporary warfare in Africa, 
Clapham traces their logic to pre-colonial tribal warfare where, according to him, the 
motivation was not to occupy and administer territories conquered but to raid, pillage 
or seek revenge (Clapham, 1998: 11).  Aside from the ‘primitive’ logic, Clapham 
further argues that the structure and behaviour of insurgent movements reflect the pre-
colonial political structure and behaviour of the African society from which they 
                                                
180The role of sodality in inter-ethnic harmony and coalition was more evident in Sierra Leone, since nearly all 
ethnic groups in Sierra Leone are governed by sodality groups with the Poro being the dominant group. 
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emerge.  There is no denying that nearly all warring factions drew from perverted 
versions of powers of indigenous sodalities, including the Poro.  The RUF, for 
instance, established an alternative version to the Poro and reinitiated many of the 
fighters so as to benefit from their full loyalty (Richard et al. 2004).  As will be 
discussed in the intervention section, deposed chiefs under the leadership of Hinga 
Norma mobilised the range of sodality groups into counter-insurgent movements 
against the RUF.  While recognising that the nature and dynamics of insurgencies 
tend to be informed by the cultures of society where they emerge, I argue that in our 
media-intrusive global village, materials with which cultures are formed are not 
exclusively endogamous.  To single out endogenous pre-colonial cultural materials is 
to suggest that culture is static.  It also suggests that, as practiced in the civil wars, 
pre-colonial warfare in Africa used drugs and other narcotic substances to hypnotise 
their soldiers; that they deliberately tore down old institutions and cultures and 
created new and exclusive communities of violence and lawlessness; and that children 
from the communities publicly maimed, raped and humiliated their own parents, 
siblings and traditional and spiritual leaders (Kieh, 2004).  Sawyer (2003), also 
dismissing the culturalist theory, reminds us that while leaders of the warring factions 
originated from the various African cultures, only few lived and grew up and 
therefore were socialised in their communal areas.  Rather, many of them were a 
product of the sub culture, which Kandeh (1999) and Abdullah (1998) refer to as 
“lumpen” culture.  Tendencies of the lumpen, and not African culture, the authors 
argue, account for the nature and intensity of the violence.181   
                                                
181
Having been socially uprooted and politically alienated by ‘big-men’, ‘lumpenised’ youth are determined to lay 
claims to and dispossess big-men of state wealth of which they were hitherto dispossessed and made destitute.  
Their gravitation to adventurism and the extreme to which they displayed the violence was an apparent attempt to 
exercise their newly found power (Kandeh, 1999).  Alie agrees with Kandeh’s implicit entitlement logic while 
downplaying attribution of blame to only ‘lumpenised youth’.  He prefers to blame “a group of rebellious Sierra 
Leoneans with vast international support” who were determined to seize state power through the mighty AK-47 
(Alie, 2005: 51). 
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If culture had any place in both wars, I agree it was sub cultures created by those 
alienated socially, as well as by the perversion of indigenous institutions.  However, 
laying the blame squarely on marginalised youth as creators of the subculture that 
underpinned the wars would be inaccurate and unfair.  One can argue that political 
leaders who, to the disregard of the values and principles of their societies, connived 
with the Lebanese in the case of Sierra Leone to plunder state wealth; those who 
gravitated more towards Western taste for materialism and therefore subjected the 
state to criminalisation, can also be described as ‘lumpenised elites’, if lumpenisation 
basically means being socially uprooted and disconnected.  The same can be applied 
to the colonially constructed chieftaincy systems, where chiefs gravitated to the 
clientelistic relationship they established with the central government to exercise 
despotic or personal amorphous rule over their respective communities.     
 
4.3.4 Spillover Effects and Regionalisation  
 
A fourth and arguable leading external causal factor associated with Liberia and 
Sierra Leone is spillover effects and regionalisation of civil wars.  Clapham’s (1998) 
claim that contemporary so-called internal wars depend on the porosity of 
transnational borders and the support or permission of governments in neighbouring 
countries. In essence, insurgent movements thrive on ‘bad neighbourliness’ and 
popular discontent. For instance, leaders of Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso seized the 
opportunity of the military campaign in Liberia to settle scores with President Samuel 
Doe for brutally killing the Tolberts.182  Sierra Leone’s involvement in the regional 
                                                
182The stepdaughter of President Felix Houphuoet-Boigny of Cote d’Ivoire, Daisy Delafosse-Tolbert—who 
reportedly later married President Blaise Campaore of Burkina Faso—was the wife of Abraham Benedict Tolbert 
(affectionately known as AB), son of President William R. Tolbert.  It is said that Houphouet-Boigny himself 
pleaded with Doe to spare the life of AB during the so-called post-coup military clean-up exercise.  Instead Doe 
brutally killed the young AB. For many years, Houphouet-Boigny and Delafosse-Tolbert sought opportunities to 
avenge the death of the Tolberts.  
Sam Doe Final Thesis UB No. 04008980 154 
peace enforcement operation in neighbouring Liberia against the NPFL and President 
Momoh’s earlier alleged double-dealing against Charles Taylor underpinned the 
NPFL’s support to the RUF, while the Guinean President maintained sustained 
support for the LURD in retaliation of Taylor’s attempt to destabilise Guinea in 
2000.183 Aside from the dependence on porous borders, mass movement of refugees 
in countries such as Sierra Leone already reeling under conditions of fragility has 
destabilising effects in the form of political instability, environmental disruptions and 
the movements of arms and fighting groups.  The large number of discontented youth 
and disgruntled armed forces across the sub region make it easy to recruit mercenaries 
from neighbouring countries to assist a rebellion, especially one which is based on 
loot and plunder. Another enabling factor for regionalising civil wars is the absence of 
most West African states in the rural areas, particularly in frontier communities.  Most 
importantly, ethnic-based violence against ethnic groups with transnational affinity 
like the Gios, Manos and Mandingoes in the case of Liberia can attract solidarity and 
support from across borders. All these factors converged to regionalise the civil wars 
right from the start; thus challenging the tendency to dismiss contemporary insurgent 
wars as internal (Clapham, 1998).  
 
There are many other causal factors that are mentioned when explaining the Liberia 
and Sierra Leone civil wars, including the role of the military, pressures from the 
international financial institutions (which I discussed in Chapter 2), etc.  As Paul 
Wehr indicated, recently substantiated by Humphreys and Weinstein (2008), aspects 
                                                
183Charles Taylor, through BBC, claimed he was justified to support the revolt of the RUF because the Sierra 
Leone Government had allowed the bases of ECOMOG, the regional peacekeeping force to be erected in Sierra 
Leone.  ECOMOG, which was set up as a peacekeeping, force and dispatched to Liberia based on an ECOWAS-
brokered Banjul Peace Plan, was embroiled in a fierce battle with the intransigent NPFL.  The latter had vowed to 
prevent the sub-regional force from entering Liberian soil.  While there may be some truth to the NPFL 
justification, as the researcher discusses later in the chapter, both NPFL and RUF were part of a grand plan agreed 
in Libya to destabilise some countries in West Africa and replace them with pro-Gaddafi regimes. 
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of all conflict causal theories hold true in contemporary conflicts, including those 
waged in Liberia and Sierra Leone.  Cramer also notes that “…there remains much to 
understand and that there is much to retain from earlier insights into violence, war and 
social change…” (2006: 84). Rather than engage in unnecessary rivalry between 
theories, Brown has indicated that all factors including leadership (agency), 
problematic group relations, and economic problems are always present in nearly all 
conflicts (1996: 597).  In this view, I contend that emphasis should be more on 
analysing the interactions of the causal factors and the magnitude of their composite 
effects.  At what point does a confluence of factors drag a society to breaking point? 
Which of the factors shape the conditions, which generate the dynamics, which make 
the factors combustible and which triggers the flame of war?  And finally, what 
sustains the flames? Collier and Hoeffler make attempts to articulate the weight of 
confluence by indicating that greed-driven civil war are more likely in societies which 
have large numbers of unemployed youth, lootable goods and ethnic dominance. 
Francis, Chabal and Daloz, Kandeh and others argue that embedding all the factors 
are predatory institutional cultures that were prevalent in Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
Paul Wehr indicates the triggering factors are opportunities and will. Musah locates 
opportunistic factors in transnational criminal networks and the primacy of profit in 
liberal culture, which tends to reward greed. Will, Azar insists and Collier seems to 
concede, is mobilised through grievances nurtured by perceived or real relative 
deprivation.  It is also agreed that elites, not peasants or lumpens, drive civil wars.  In 
sum, the structure-agency debate returns as we seek to understand civil wars.  While 
structural factors including institutional arrangement, power relations, social relations, 
etc. nurture conditions that make a society vulnerable to civil wars and state collapse, 
it takes agency like aggrieved youth, war entrepreneurs and adventurous elites to 
Sam Doe Final Thesis UB No. 04008980 156 
ignite the flame.  The point and time when the interactions produce outbursts remains 
a subject for further inquiry. 
 
4.3.5 The Positives of Conflict and Violence 
 
Aside from the negative notion of conflict from which the causal theories are derived, 
there is growing debate to re-conceptualise conflict and civil wars in ways that help us 
appreciate their positive causes as well.  In other words, it is increasingly 
acknowledged that conflict is not only destructive or an aberration, it is constructive 
and integral to societal transformation (Mitchell, 2005).  If this is the case, then what 
causes conflict is not only negative or debilitating as postulated by conflict scholars.  I 
contend that the violent collapse of Liberia and Sierra Leone was not only an attempt 
to further greed, grievance or otherwise, nor was it simply an aberration.  Rather the 
collapse was also a manifestation of the societies’ ripeness for transformation.  All 
commentators on Liberia and Sierra Leone are unanimous on the historical fact that at 
the threshold of collapse, all regulatory regimes as well as the societies’ capacities to 
self-generate had almost disappeared.  It can therefore be surmised that collapse is 
part of the deep change that was in motion in the societies.  Doornbos argues that 
violent collapse of the state should not only be “…viewed as an aberration but 
possibly, a part of the political evolution...” and Pouligny (2003), agreeing with this 
argument, contends that the nature of the collapse of Liberia and Sierra Leone is a 
profound manifestation of a society undergoing deep changes.  The rush to 
intervention and the approaches of intervention pay no attention to this natural 
process of change.  Grounded in the thesis, which defines conflict as an aberration, 
the intervention strategies as will be discussed in subsequent section focus on 
restoring the status quo and not on catalysing and facilitating the change process.  
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This in my view remains the peculiar factor in contemporary conflict resolution.  
While not arguing in favour of Edward Lukas’s call for ‘war to the finish’, 
disregarding the natural change dynamics in conflict analysis tends to distort the 
natural societal and institutional reconfiguration processes. 
 
4.4 CRITICAL REVIEW OF INTERVENTIONS  
 
In Chapter 1 I discussed the debates on intervention from the legal and operational 
points of view.  Chapter 6 will focus on post-conflict interventions and the 
implications for sustainable peace.  In this section I assess the individual and 
combined impact of internal and external interventions on the processes and outcomes 
of peacemaking.  
 
4.4.1 Internal Interventions  
 
Civic response to the civil wars can be divided into two categories.  The first category 
attempted third-party impartial intervention through persuasion, while the second was 
coercive, focusing on mobilisation of civilian counter-insurgency against the rebel 
forces.  I assess the impact of the civic responses on long-term peace and the deep 
change, which I argue, the crises portended.  
 
4.4.1.1 Civic Persuasive Interventions 
 
For the purpose of this work and drawing from Barnes’ (2006) categorisation of civic 
persuasive actions in internal conflict, I identify five persuasive strategies civic 
groups adopted in the bid to get the parties to pursue negotiated settlements.  These 
Sam Doe Final Thesis UB No. 04008980 158 
include: a) activism and advocacy, b) mediation and facilitating dialogue c) 
participation in peace negotiations, d) education and social transformation, and e) 
humanitarian and recovery interventions.  Although all roles were visible at all stages 
of the conflicts, emphasis on one or a combination was largely determined by the 
conflict dynamics.  Initial civic response against the war was activism through public 
protests and mass demonstrations organised by the leading coalitions of civic 
organisations184 in Liberia.  The protests culminated in a large national protest in June 
1990 calling for Samuel Doe’s resignation and the intervention of the United 
States.185 In 2002 the Women Mass Action for Peace, branded by CNN as the ‘white-
t-shirt’ peace activists, mounted a sustained campaign in the second phase of the civil 
war.186  Under the leadership of the Women in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET)187, 
the women maintained a sit-in for nearly two consecutive years (2002-2003) until the 
Taylor regime resigned. Similarly, in Sierra Leone, the coalition of civic groups188 
embarked on a range of intervention strategies, including the courageous boycott of 
the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), which overthrew the elected 
government in May 1997.189 When Foday Sankoh’s Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF) rekindled the Sierra Leone conflict by kidnapping 500 UN troops in 2001, it 
                                                
184The dominant groups in the civic coalition against the war were the University of Liberia Students Union 
(ULSU), the Ecumenical Women Organization (EWO), the Women Development Association of Liberia 
(WODAL), the Liberia Council of Churches (LCC), and the National Muslim Congress (NMC).    
185Civic groups were prompted to intervene because of rumors of mass atrocities being committed by both the 
government forces and those of the rebel NPFL.  This type of third party intervention is what John Paul Lederach 
(1997) refers to as “insider-partial” as civic groups were not distant, unaffected third parties.  Their personal safety 
and well-being was being jeopardised by the ongoing conflict. 
186The women came to the fore out of frustration with the series of failed ECOWAS peace negotiations and the 
realisation that ECOWAS intervention was embroiled in regional intrigues and undermined by limited material 
and financial resources.  Most importantly, increased human rights violations and criminality by the ECOMOG 
troops raised questions in the minds of the public whether the regional force had truly come to liberate the country 
or to join in the looting spree, which the warlords had instituted.  In Sierra Leone, as successive governments 
proved incapable of resolving the RUF question and as the insurgent groups seized major towns and cities—
embarking on child recruitments and horrendous human rights violations Sierra Leone—civic groups realised that 
they needed to defend themselves and agitate for peace.  
187The Women in Peacebuilding Network was a programme established by the West African Network for 
Peacebuilding, the largest civil society network in West Africa which was established and led by the researcher 
from 1997 to 2003. 
188This includes religious and inter-religious bodies like the Council of Churches and the Sierra Leone Muslim 
Congress, the Sierra Leone Labour Congress, the Sierra Leone Teachers’ Union and the Women’s Movement for 
Peace. 
189Civic groups maintained their nationwide protest for nine consecutive months until the AFRC conceded power.   
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was armless civilians under the leadership of the civil society movement that arrested 
the warlord and delivered him to justice.190  Hundreds of human rights monitoring and 
reporting organisations and networks including the media diligently assumed the 
advocacy role.191 Foremost, the media diverted focus away from ethnicity.  They also 
helped in exposing the horror of the war to the outside world.192  
 
Religious leaders in both countries played formidable role in conciliation and 
mediation.  For instance, the National Muslim Congress (NMC) and the Liberia 
Council of Churches (LCC) constituted themselves into the Inter-Faith Mediation 
Committee (IFMC) and offered to mediate between the NPFL and the Government of 
Liberia.193 The religious leaders drafted a peace plan, which, though not implemented, 
became the basis for the regional intervention of ECOWAS.194  Similarly the Inter-
                                                
190The RUF forces killed at least 22 unarmed civilians during the mass demonstration before Sanko’s Freetown 
residence, but this did not deter the crowd.  Foday Sankoh later fled from his house through the windows.  He was 
later apprehended by the angry mob and delivered to the UN peacekeeping force.   This action proved determinant 
to the end of the Sierra Leone conflict. 
191They documented human rights violations including massacres, monitored and reported violations of terms of 
peace agreements and sanction regimes imposed on especially the NPFL and RUF.    
192All national media outlets consistently de-emphasised ethnicity (unlike their Western counterparts) and focused 
more on the gangsterism that was inherent to the warring factions. Attempts to whip up anti-Liberia emotions in 
Sierra Leone for the role of the NPFL in the country were thwarted.  At the community level, the Talking Drum 
Studio of Search for Common Ground in all countries of the Mano River basin, Star Radio, Radio Veritas, FM 98 
and many other FM stations and local newspapers in both countries played critical roles in intra/ inter ethnic 
dialogue and reconciliation. Perhaps the most outstanding contribution of the media in bringing the wars as well as 
the controversial role of ECOMOG to the attention of the international community was the famous “Cry 
Freetown” documentary produced by a local Sierra Leonean journalist and aired on CNN.  The horrid images 
dramatically changed the perception of the international community and prompted concerted international resolve 
to end the carnage. Prominent members of the international community referred to the influence of “Cry 
Freetown” on their decision to unanimously vote for a robust UN peace enforcement mission to replace the sub 
regional force. 
193Throughout the political history of both Liberia and Sierra Leone (more so Liberia), political actors have always 
taken positions of religious leaders seriously.  The Declaration of Independence of Liberia was signed at the 
Providence Baptist Church and many of its leaders were also leaders of the Church.  The political visibility of 
Muslims increased during the Doe regime due to the close alliance between the Government and the Muslim-
dominated Mandingo ethnic group.  As a consequence, both the government of Samuel Doe and the NPFL availed 
themselves of the offer of the newly constituted Inter-faith Mediation Committee (IFMC).    During the critical 
stage of the civil war, Doe proposed many concessions to the Muslim population, including recognition of Muslim 
holidays as national holidays.   This was widely protested by the Christian community.  The point being made here 
is the fact that both religions at the time enjoyed a degree of respect and recognition from all political actors.  This 
made it possible for the IFMC to be judged as impartial and therefore accepted as a mediator by the protagonists.   
194The IFMC peace plan called for: a) immediate ceasefire; b) a mutually agreed international peace monitoring 
force, c) a national round-table conference; d) access for humanitarian relief in all areas of the country; and e) 
respect for human rights. They also presided over the first proposed All Liberia National Conference in August 
1990, which endorsed the interim government of national unity (IGNU). The IFMC (later renamed Inter-religious 
Council) maintained its consultative role throughout the conflict, providing small-scale mediation and facilitating 
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religious Council in Sierra Leone (IRC-SL), inspired by their Liberian counterpart, 
stepped up to the challenge.  Their most outstanding success was to pave the way for 
the Lome Peace Agreement (LPA).195  The Mano River Inter-religious Council, a 
coalition of religious councils in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, was instrumental 
in forestalling trans-ethnic and religious rivalries.  They, along with women’s groups, 
mounted pressure on the heads of state of the three Mano River countries to undertake 
dialogue and promote good neighbourliness.196  
 
4.4.1.2 Civilian Resistance and Counter-insurgency 
 
While civil society organisations maintained persuasive and transformative 
intervention strategies, deposed chiefs with support from prominent Mende 
personalities, mobilised the Poro-governed communities in rural Sierra Leone to 
organise civil defence forces.  The primary aim was to defend their respective 
communities from the RUF and criminal forces of the Sierra Leone Army.  Other 
ethnic communities joined in the Mende-led resistance to form their own community 
defence forces.  By the time the mobilisation campaign was over, about 40,000 
warrior Zoes from the range of local sodalities including the Tamaboros of the 
Kuranko ethnic group, the Gbethis and Kapras from the Temne ethnic group, the 
Donzos from the Kono ethnic group, and the Kamajoisia or Kamajors from the 
                                                                                                                                      
dialogue between warring factions.  It also helped initiate the establishment of the Mano River Inter-religious 
Council.   
195The UN mission in Sierra Leone and the deposed Kabbah Government, Rashid (2000) indicates, relied 
exclusively on the IRC-SL to mediate between the government and the RUF/AFRC alliance.  They succeeded in 
bringing the rebels to negotiation and served as a go-between throughout the peace process in Togo.  
196Women’s groups also played a critical role in mediating and facilitating dialogue.  Prominent examples were the 
Mano River Women Peace Network (MARWOPNET), which was also organised by various women’s groups in 
the Mano River countries to champion the cause of women and to promote dialogue between warring factions and 
governments of the sub region.  MARWOPNET was instrumental in the Rabat Summit held between the heads of 
state of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone.  They were also invited as parties and observers to a number of peace 
negotiations and were instrumental in selecting a female as chairperson of the second 5-person State Council to 
head the interim government in Liberia.  Women’s groups also set up alternative processes near mediation sites 
and engaged in lobbying and other forms of pressure to ensure a settlement was reached. 
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Mende ethnic community and several other youth brigades, were organised under a 
broad rubric known as the Civil Defence Forces (CDF).   They selected Sam Hinga 
Norman, Regent Chief of the Jiama-Nongor Chiefdom, to lead the wide social 
network of civilian counter-insurgency. Similarly in Liberia, as the Mandingo led 
United Liberation Movement turned its weapons onto the Poro-governed Lorma 
ethnic group in Lofa County, Zoes of the Poro organised the Lofa Defence Force with 
warrior hunters and youth brigades. In the South-east of Liberia, in order to defend 
themselves against the Krahn-led Liberia Peace Council (LPC) the Krus and Grebos 
organised the Sinoe (SDF) and Maryland Defence Forces (MDF), respectively.  
However unlike Sierra Leone where the various defence forces organised themselves 
under one rubric, in Liberia the civilian defence forces remain splintered. The CDF of 
Sierra Leone and the range of civilian resistance in Liberia were successful in keeping 
the RUF, ULIMO and LPC away from their respective communities.   
 
Depriving the RUF of its control over most of the interior indirectly contributed to the 
success of the NPRC government in containing the RUF to the frontier communities 
(Alie 2005). Also, the success of LDF, SDF and MDF indirectly gave the NPFL the 
advantage in the war.  When the SLPP-led government came to power in 1996, they 
gravitated to the CDF rather than strengthen the SLA, leaving the already 
factionalised SLA to its own fate.197  The government appointed Sam Hinga Norman, 
                                                
197
It is important to note here that before the SLPP assumed power, the SLA had already gained notoriety for 
being disloyal to the state and participating in loot and plunder in the interior.  Its disloyalty and criminality had 
earned it the name sobel.  Memory of the army’s overthrow of a constituted government might have also played a 
part in the SLPP government’s decision to dissociate from the SLA and find alternative forces for its own 
protection and in prosecuting the war.  The CDF became the best alternative for a number of reasons.  Firstly, it 
was dominated and led by the Mende ethnic community.  Secondly and most importantly, the SLPP had relied on 
sodality-based forces to defend itself from the political thuggery of the Siaka Stevens government.  Throughout the 
long reign of the APC under Siaka Stevens, many SLPP political leaders were protected by forces organised 
through the Poro sodality; hence the relationship between the Poro and SLPP political class was already cemented. 
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leader of the CDF, as Deputy Minister of Defence.198 Also in Liberia, the NPFL took 
advantage of the LDF, SDF and MDF’s success against its rival to co-opt the forces 
into the NPFL. Taylor, after winning the 1997 elections, appointed LDF leader 
Francis Massaquo Minister for Rural Development.199 The CDF expanded its mandate 
beyond defending their rural communities to restoring the deposed SLPP 
government.200 CDF, joined by ECOMOG and a range of mercenary outfits, formed a 
coalition to overthrow the AFRC.  In the same way, when the Mandingo-dominated 
ULIMO metamorphosed into LURD, the LDF joined forces with the Taylor-led 
government to fight against LURD.201 
 
4.4.1.3 Critical Analysis of Civic Interventions 
 
Barnes (2006) observes that conventional approaches to conflict intervention often 
focus on a narrow but crucial task of political negotiations and military intervention. 
Civic groups are neither expected nor invited into both domains.  The argument is that 
                                                
198In addition, the government increased support to the CDF by paying regular remunerations to the forces.  It also 
supported the training of the CDF in the use of conventional weapons and engagement in conventional warfare.   
199Among the Poro-governed Mendes, the Kamajors are a class of male Zoes believed to be selected by the 
ancestors and endowed with supernatural powers to protect the communities from threats of wild animals, 
invaders, marauders and supernatural forces.  Mobilisation of the Kamajors in defence of Mende communities in 
the face of the RUF onslaught against ordinary villagers was not only justified, it was a natural reaction to external 
threats for which the Kamajors were destined.  It is worth noting the organisation of the CDF and LDF follows the 
security strategy and architecture of the Poro sodality.  All recruits first underwent an initiation rite in which they 
pledged their absolute loyalty to the cause of the community.  An important criterion for recruitment was that all 
members in the CDF, according to Alie (2005), must be members of the district and representative of the various 
families.  The character of the recruit was important and the community had to vet each recruit.  Deep Poro values 
of loyalty and the Kamajor slogan of baa woteh, which is aptly translated as ‘do not turn’ or retreat, was critical in 
keeping the CDF cohesive and focused on its mission of protecting the villages.  Hoffman also notes that the 
deeper understanding of this slogan has to do with not betraying the community.  This strong value of loyalty, 
Hoffman observes, contrasts with the Sierra Leone Armed Forces, which disintegrated into disloyal forces in the 
face of the rebellion, earning themselves the name sobels.  However, unlike the CDF, the LDF in Liberia 
disintegrated once the leader was killed, abandoning the communities they were placed under oath to defend.   
200In reaction to the Sierra Leone Government’s preference of the CDF over the SLA, a group of SLA officers, the 
self-styled Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), deposed the elected SLPP government in 1997.  They 
invited the RUF to join them against the government they were constituted to defend. 
201Unlike the CDF in Sierra Leone, which stayed the course and continue to support recovery work in their 
respective communities (to be discussed in Chapter Five), Liberia’s sodality- and non-sodality-led civilian counter-
insurgency forces disintegrated before the job was complete.  They melted into a range of fortune-seeking rebel 
groups and even turned against their own communities.201 Most importantly, while counter-insurgency actions in 
Sierra Leone helped to forestall RUF terror and reinforce inter-ethnic solidarity, civilian-led counter-insurgencies 
in Liberia exacerbated horizontal violence and severely undermine inter-group cohesion and solidarity. 
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while peacemaking required the primary stakeholders,202 participating in peace 
enforcement and peacekeeping only requires military interventions, something that is 
not usually associated with civilian actors.203  Following this line of thinking, none of 
the mediators in the stream of peace processes in both countries recognised the 
prominent roles of the civilian resistance forces in all the peace negotiations. Civil 
society organisations were not invited, although they consistently forced their way, 
into negotiation conferences.  The unorthodox nature of contemporary civil wars, 
particularly those waged in Liberia and Sierra Leone, calls for a rethink of 
conventional intervention theories and strategies. While most of the civic actions 
discussed here may have been away from the limelight of political negotiations and 
peace enforcement, civilian military counter-insurgencies in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
challenges conventional thinking.  It also raises numerous questions, which 
peacemaking and peacebuilding operations tend to overlook. Some of the critical but 
unanswered questions include the following: What is the implication for social and 
political stability in a state in which sodality-based civil defence forces had to come to 
the rescue of the state against its own standing army? In the case of Sierra Leone, 
what accounts for the cohesiveness and staying power of the CDF? Why did their 
Poro-based counterparts, the LDF in Liberia, disintegrate before completing the task? 
And most importantly, what impact does the large-scale militarisation of the Poro and 
other indigenous sodalities have on social order in the interior and the authority of 
post-conflict states?  As will be discussed in Chapter 6, the international state 
reconstruction architects tend to overlook these critical questions in international 
peacemaking processes.   
                                                
202These are often defined as the warring factions, or any group with the ability to derail the peace process. 
203I was part of a delegation that approached the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
(SRSG) in Liberia in 2004 to request the participation of civil society organisations in the disarmament process. 
The SRSG rejected the CSO requested on the ground that the disarmament and demobilisation processes in 
particular were militarily technical and could be jeopardised by the participation of naïve and often-emotive civic 
actors.  
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4.4.2 External Interventions  
 
4.4.2.1 Mercenaries and Private Military Companies 
 
The Government of Sierra Leone, throughout the civil war, relied heavily on private 
military companies to ward off the RUF insurgency.  The notorious groups in Sierra 
Leone included Gurkha Security Group, Executive Outcomes (EO), and Sandline 
International.  The RUF also brought in its own mercenaries, including Ukrainians, 
Belarusians, Burkinabes, Liberians and a range of other traditional mercenaries drawn 
from the sub region.  Unlike Sierra Leone, Liberia’s warring factions stayed clear of 
organised private military companies while enlisting more traditional individual 
mercenaries, drawn especially from the sub region.  Blain (2007) rightly indicates that 
inviting private military companies to help prosecute the civil wars and counter-
insurgencies was one of the factors in the prolongation of the war in Sierra Leone.  He 
observes that once invited, private military companies position themselves as 
entrepreneurs and the civil war as a perfect market (ibid).  Both the Strasser and 
Kabbah governments negotiated the participation of private military companies in 
cash and mining rights to Sierra Leone’s rich diamond fields.204  Between 1995 and 
1996, Blain indicates EO received monthly remunerations of US $2 million from the 
Sierra Leone government.  Negotiations with the Kabbah government alone netted 
EO about US $35 million in two years.  
 
4.4.2.2 Bilateral Interventions 
 
Although Sierra Leone and Britain have a security pact, the latter only assumed a 
significant intervention role in 2000, 10 years into the conflict. Under an operation 
                                                
204For instance in 1996 Branch Energy was among the many mining entities fronting for the private military 
companies who were granted mining concessions to mine the Kono diamond fields. 
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codenamed “Operation Basilica”, Britain dispatched a team comprising a one-star 
officer, a team of military advisors and trainers and an infantry battalion with the aim 
of supporting the implementation of the Lome Peace Agreement and security sector 
reform (Woods and Reese, 2008).  Britain took on a military role when RUF reneged 
on the peace agreement and kidnapped some of the UN Peacekeeping troops and 11 
British soldiers.  The successful rescue operation of the British soldiers and the UN 
troops emboldened the British Command.205 Britain continued the show of force until 
the RUF bowed to a negotiated peace.  The weight of the British forces, including the 
reinforcement of the UN Peace Mission in the country, ultimately helped in 
irreversibly weakening the RUF war-making capabilities.  Similarly, at the signing of 
the CPA in Ghana, the United States dispatched a force of about 250 soldiers to help 
stabilise situations in Monrovia.  However, unlike the British, the Americans left in 
barely a month on claims that their soldiers were threatened with malaria.  America’s 
military involvement after that has been through two private military companies—
DynCorp and PAE.  
 
4.4.2.3 Multilateral Intervention: ECOWAS and the UN  
 
ECOWAS, a sub regional economic cooperation inter-governmental institution, as a 
consequence of the apparent abandonment of Liberia and Sierra Leone by their 
respective Cold War allies, was thrust into peace enforcement, peacemaking and 
peacekeeping roles.  Throughout ECOWAS’s peacemaking, the core of all peace 
agreements included a) time-bound interim power sharing arrangements; b) 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of all combatants; c) reconstitution of 
                                                
205Britain extended their mandate to include establishing sustainable peace and security, stable democratic 
government, poverty reduction, respect for human rights, security sector reform, and supporting the UN in its 
reputation rebuilding.  
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the security sector; and d) presidential and general elections. Only heads of warring 
factions, as practiced in traditional third party mediation, were invited as primary 
stakeholders to all peace talks.  They were also the primary beneficiaries of power 
sharing arrangements.  Aside from persuasion through third party mediation 
ECOWAS, backed by the United Nations and the African Union, also applied a range 
of coercive measures, including sanctions and peace enforcement military 
operations.206 As for the United Nations, its role in the conflicts progressed from 
being observers to donors to the ECOWAS operations, and to technical and financial 
supporters of the 1996 and 1997 elections. It also backed and sometimes expanded the 
scope of the range of ECOWAS sanctions.  The UN also sent peace observer missions 
to support ECOWAS in monitoring the implementation of peace agreements.  The 
UN’s incremental engagements ultimately culminated in the world body assuming 
full responsibility for peace support operations in 2000 (in Sierra Leone) and 2004 (in 
Liberia).207  
 
The long and treacherous peace enforcement, peacemaking and peacekeeping 
journeys in Liberia and Sierra Leone raise a number of issues that deserve reviewing.  
Given that ECOWAS was the lead body in brokering peace, I focus my analysis of 
the multi-lateral peacemaking engagement in both countries on the role of ECOWAS. 
Five years after the decade-and-a-half of ECOWAS’ peacemaking work in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone, the question that still begs explanation is: Why did ECOWAS’s 
                                                
206For instance the ECOMOG Force Commander in Sierra Leone, having led a military campaign against the so-
called People’s Army of the RUF and AFRC, was appointed Chief of Defense Staff for the Sierra Leone Army.  In 
Liberia, at one time or the other, ECOMOG undertook counter-insurgency operations with the Independent 
National Patriotic Forces, the Liberia Peace Council and the United Liberation Movement.  ECOMOG also fought 
against the very factions with whom it mounted joint operations.  These messy strategies severely compromised 
the role of ECOWAS/ ECOMOG throughout the peacemaking phase of the civil wars.   
207The UN through Security Council Resolutions deployed more robust peace support operations of 17,000 and 
15,000 troops, respectively.  The UN continues to support both countries in their rebuilding (a subject I address in 
Chapter 6).   
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carrot-and-stick strategies fail to achieve the desired results? Here I make four 
propositions in addressing this critical question.  Firstly, the assumptions which 
underpinned ECOWAS’s initial response—that the conflict was a result of elite 
grievances which could be resolved through power sharing—failed to take into 
consideration the psychodynamics of the key actors in the conflict.  Neither Doe nor 
Charles Taylor was willing to explore the options of power sharing.  As for Foday 
Sankoh, there were greater incentives remaining with the diamond fields than going to 
Freetown to be outmanoeuvred by the Oxford and Cambridge-trained witty 
politicians.  As for Charles Taylor, considering his rapid advance into the city, he was 
overwhelmingly convinced that full power was in sight and that it made no sense to 
share power with a beleaguered government.  The intervention of ECOWAS was 
therefore perceived as rescuing the Samuel Doe regime in Liberia and SLPP in Sierra 
Leone.  In this view it can be argued that the timing worked to undermine the integrity 
of the intervention.208 A second weakness of the carrot was its focus on power 
sharing.  Barely six months into the conflict, Charles Taylor set up an elaborate war 
economy in areas under his control.  Emphasis on power sharing as a conflict 
resolution strategy was perceived as sharing his war economies with other factions.  It 
can also be argued that the power sharing strategy helped to increase the number of 
factions, since the only criteria for participating in the power sharing arrangement was 
ones’ ability to operate a warring faction.  A third assumption, which argues in favour 
of power sharing arrangements, is the thesis that greed-driven conflicts are resolved 
only through buying peace (Humphrey and Weinstein, 2008).  It therefore assumed 
that legitimising warlords’ control over resources for a defined period in interim 
                                                
208
Some however argued that had ECOMOG allowed the NPFL to enter Monrovia, the death toll would have been 
colossal, although after ECOWAS intervention more combat took place in Monrovia leaving every inch of the city 
desolate and Charles Taylor—the man ECOWAS was determined to stop from assuming power—eventually 
emerged president. 
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arrangements would facilitate peace. This assumption failed in the case of Liberia and 
Sierra Leone primarily because the war economies, which warlords operated outside 
of international scrutiny, were more lucrative than looting through interim 
arrangement.  Charles Taylor was once quoted as saying that “life was easier in the 
bush than in town,” insinuating that in the bush he did not have to deal with issues of 
accountability and public as well as international scrutiny.   
 
In the same way that the carrot failed to induce compliance, the stick seemed too 
feeble to force compliance.  Arguably three reasons underlie the failure of the 
ECOWAS stick.  Firstly, the stick was too weak to be taken seriously. Coercive 
intervention, as Miall et al (1999) indicate, relies on the weight of the threat and the 
ability of the third party to translate the threat into reality.  Sesay (1999) indicates that 
ECOWAS entered Liberia with no explicit vision and operational strategy for 
peacekeeping or peace support operations in general.  It had no clue how much the 
operations would cost, nor was there a map to understand the terrain of the mostly 
urban guerrilla warfare.  The seven countries that sent troops to Liberia had not had 
any experience in joint military operation, nor was there coherence in their colonial-
inherited military doctrines, operations and structures.209  Aside from military 
counter-insurgency, ECOWAS also relied on the imposition of sanctions, but the lack 
of cohesion amongst its members and a large and uncontrolled global war economy 
made implementation of the range of sanctions impossible.  Secondly, inconsistencies 
in the operation once it hit the ground compromised the legitimacy and international 
support that was critical in galvanising a credible force.  For instance, in less than 
                                                
209Troops came from various backgrounds, and while some troop-contributing countries had reasonably trained 
and equipped soldiers in the Liberia mission, some contingents were far less prepared. Some West African states, 
for political or economic reasons, lacked coherent militaries; and what they had amounted to little more than 
‘militias’ or gendarmes.  That the leaders who sent troops to Liberia and Sierra Leone were themselves products of 
the military clearly reflected in the lack of political and civil representation in ECOMOG. 
Sam Doe Final Thesis UB No. 04008980 169 
three weeks of its arrival in Liberia, a warring faction with whom ECOMOG had co-
deployed against the NPFL captured the besieged President Samuel Doe in the office 
of the Commanding General of ECOMOG.  Throughout its 14 years in Liberia, 
ECOMOG failed to redeem its image.  A third factor was the practice of co-deploying 
with one faction against a perceived intransigent faction.  In Sierra Leone, ECOWAS 
fought alongside mercenaries and civil militias and traditional Poro hunters to prevent 
the RUF advance, while in Liberia ECOMOG fought with a range of factions against 
others and then fought those factions along with the factions it had previously 
attacked.   
 
These messy operations not only compromised the integrity of ECOMOG, they also 
contributed to the prolongation and severity of the wars.   To lay bear the realities, it 
is noteworthy to point out that when ECOWAS rushed into Liberia in August 1990, 
the Liberian civil war had gone on only eight months and NPFL and INPFL had 
overrun Samuel Doe’s government, confining him to the Executive Palace.  The 
estimated death toll was put at between 20,000 to 30,000; hundreds of thousand 
Liberians had crossed into neighbouring countries; all public buildings, banks, public 
utility facilities, railroads, etc. were intact; only three warring factions existed; and the 
war was confined to Liberia despite its regional character.  Under the stewardship of 
ECOWAS/ ECOMOG, the wars dragged on for 14 years (in Liberia) and 10 years 
when it extended to Sierra Leone; the death toll in Liberia rose from 30,000 to 
300,000 and 50,000 in Sierra Leone.210  The warring factions proliferated to more 
than a dozen in Liberia and over a dozen civil militias, mercenaries and a fragmented 
                                                
210Even though Taylor had warned that it was planning to punish Sierra Leone for allowing the sub regional force 
to be based in Sierra Leone, ECOWAS only intervened in the Sierra Leone crisis three years later.  While the slow 
response could be explained given the limited resources within which ECOWAS had engaged the Liberian civil 
war, much could have been done to secure Sierra Leone’s borders to prevent the regional spread of the war. 
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army in Sierra Leone.  Worst still, the wars engulfed all the Mano River countries, 
including Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea.  In the end, Charles Taylor and his NPFL 
assumed state power, while the ECOWAS peace agreement endorsed RUF’s control 
of diamond mines.  Also notable is the fact that none of the wars ended under the 
stewardship of ECOWAS.211  
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter I argued that contemporary conflicts have challenged traditional 
theories of conflict analysis and intervention approaches.  Yet, contemporary conflict 
interventions have failed to adapt to changes in the causes, dynamics and motivation 
of civil wars.  For instance, while civil wars such as Liberia and Sierra Leone were 
sustained by greed, peace negotiations continued to be between warring factions 
whose only legitimacy was in their ability to terrorise local communities and not 
necessarily represent local communal grievances.  Civilian resistance forces such as 
the sodality-based CDFs, which actually represented the security interests of local 
communities, were kept out of peace negotiations.  It was assumed that the 
Government of Sierra Leone represented the CDF.  However, when the CDF was 
charged for crimes against humanity, the Government disassociated itself from it.  
 
Secondly I argued that the assumptions that buying peace through power sharing is 
the best way of resolving conflicts driven by greed are fundamentally flawed.  Such 
assumptions fail to take into consideration the large exogenous global war economies, 
which in fact provide the incentives for continuing greedy wars.  As the greed 
                                                
211
These stark realities are yet to prompt deep soul searching in the regional body.  Rather it continues to ride on 
the glory of being the first sub regional economic cooperation to engage in peace support operations and that the 
end of civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone should be credited to ECOWAS.  It continues to argue that the wars 
would have been much worse had it not been for the intervention of ECOWAS/ ECOMOG. 
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theorists argue, greedy wars are sustained by the continued existence of opportunities 
to feed greed. The size of war economies in countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone 
makes it impossible for one to attract warlords to time-bound power sharing 
arrangements.  I argued in the chapter that greed driven wars are best ended through 
robust, concerted coercive responses.  
 
Thirdly, despite the fact that sodality institutions like the Poro had the largest number 
of resistant forces in Sierra Leone, there was no role for sodality institutions in the 
ECOWAS and UN-led peace processes. Fanthorpe and Doornbos’ observation that 
the liberal peace project disregards indigenous mechanisms and resources because its 
sole aim is to replace cultures and indigenous institutions in war-ravaged societies 
with liberal values and institutions, seems the only logical explanation for such 
obvious neglect. The fact that social order in the interiors of Liberia and Sierra Leone 
depend on the authority of indigenous institutions, and considering that these played 
key roles in defending the communities when the states and its constituted army 
abandoned them to their fate, is not acknowledged.  Notwithstanding, in post-war 
Liberia and Sierra Leone, indigenous mechanisms have gained renewed importance. I 
argued therefore that long-term peace depends on understanding and fostering 
stability within indigenous systems.  
 
Finally, I have argued that the proliferation and professionalisation of civil society 
organisations provide opportunities to build more democratic and responsive post-
conflict states. Links between civil society organisations and the international 
community has also reinforced civil society’s capacities to participate in the affairs of 
the state.  Harnessing the organic structures and capacities emerging from the wars 
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guarantees long-term peace.  The theory and strategies for harnessing indigenous and 
organic resources in post-war collapsed states is the subject of Chapter 6.  Chapter 5 
discusses the role of the Poro in state reconstruction efforts in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone. 
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 CHAPTER 5 
POST-CONFLICT STATE RECOVERY AND 
RECONSTRUCTION: THE ROLE OF THE PORO 
 
“The outcomes of these profound changes [resulting from civil wars in Africa] may well be 
the defeat of the state in Africa as we have known it in recent years.  But it might equally 
well be a deepening of the state’s indigenisation…[If the latter is the case] under what 
circumstances will it be possible to produce what type of political order on the ruins of the 
old…” (Mbembe, 2001:68 and 79) 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In previous chapters I argued that the failure of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean states 
to fuse or constructively engage indigenous authorities in both countries led to the 
convenient creation of dual polities and jurisprudences, with the rural provinces (for 
Sierra Leone) and counties (for Liberia) being governed partly by a range of sodality-
based authorities and partly by arbitrary rule of local despots (or chiefs). On the other 
hand, written constitutions, laws and all the other trappings of the Westphalian states 
governed the settler states.  Also, as discussed in Chapter 1 and 3, local chiefs and 
Zoes took advantage of the exploitative relationship between the interior and the 
settler states to transform themselves into repressive personal amorphous authorities.  
Similarly, the settler states gradually transformed into institutions of predation and 
kleptocracy.  As a consequence, both the state and the interior sodality-based 
authority structures were set on the path of degeneration and eventual collapse.   
 
The questions which preoccupy scholars and commentators on Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, and which partly inspired this thesis, are: a) should the rebuilding process 
return to the status quo ante? And, b) if the latter is the aim, is it achievable or will we 
see another era of resistance and mutually exploitative relationships between the state 
and the sodality-governed interiors? These questions are the basis for this work.  
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Specifically, the chapter investigates interactions between sodality-based rural Liberia 
and Sierra Leone and internationally driven ongoing state reconstruction exercises in 
both countries.  Particular research questions the thesis seeks to address include:  
 
• Were the Poro (and Sande) sodalities recognised and engaged during the post-
conflict recovery—particularly in the disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration (DDR) as well as return, resettlement and reintegration (RRR) 
processes?  
• If the Poro and Sande were not officially recognised and engaged, did they play 
any role in the recovery processes?  
• If the Poro and Sande played or are playing any role, how did their natural self-
renewing actions impact on the overall internationally led recovery process? More 
specifically, how did these impact the DDR and security sector reform/ 
transformation and RRR and local governance transformation (LGT)?  
 
Section two of the chapter discusses the role of the Poro and Sande in DDR/SSR 
while section three focuses on the Poro and Sande in RRR/LGT.  I conclude the 
chapter with analysis of the implications of interactions between the liberal peace 
project and the Poro self-renewing processes on long-term peace and the quality of 
the emerging states.  
 
5.2 The ROLE OF THE PORO IN DDR/SSR  
 
The DDR processes in Liberia and Sierra Leone followed the range of peace 
agreements as indicated in Chapter 3.  Full DDR for Sierra Leone began in 1998 and 
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ended in 2002 after a number of interruptions, while for Liberia the 1997 DDR was 
followed by full-scale war from 1999 until 2003, when another peace agreement was 
signed.  Since Sierra Leone had an internationally recognised democratically elected 
government, the government-appointed commission—the National Commission for 
DDR— largely managed its DDR process.  Although Liberia’s power-sharing interim 
government constituted a similar commission, the DDR process there was entirely 
driven by the Joint Implementation Unit (JIU) dominated by the international 
community.  Over the period of September 1998 to January 2002, in Sierra Leone, the 
DDRP disarmed and demobilised 72,490 combatants.212 In Liberia, at the end of the 
DD process 103,019 combatants were disarmed and demobilised.213  Both 
programmes followed their respective DD processes with targeted socio-economic 
reintegration programmes.  About 99,000 of the 103,019 demobilised in Liberia and 
55,000 of the 72,490 demobilised ex-combatants in Sierra Leone registered for the 
reintegration programmes, while 4,019 (4%) and 17,490 (24%) did not register for 
reintegration in Liberia and Sierra Leone, respectively.214  Much has been written to 
assess the design, process and results of the DDR processes using internationally 
accepted standards.  What is missing in all the works reviewed is the role of 
indigenous mechanisms in DDR and how these interacted with the conventional 
processes; hence this review.  
 
                                                
212Of this number 4,651 (6.5%) were women and 6,845 (9.5%) were children. The weapons collected totalled 
42,300 and 1.2 million rounds of ammunition (Kai Kai, 2000).  Although the total number disarmed and 
demobilised was about 61% more than the original number of combatants targeted in the design, women and 
children disarmed and demobilised were far less than the estimated number. 
213Also this was about 171% more than the targeted number.  The number of women disarmed were 22,456 
women, or 22% of adults. and 2,511 girls or 24% of children, (NCDDRR, 2005).  Both countries followed their 
elaborate DD processes with what they call the community arms for development programme.  In this programme 
in Sierra Leone, non-conventional weapons such as hunting guns were collected in exchange for community 
driven projects, although those presenting the traditional weapons did not benefit from the targeted DDR process 
(Miller et al, 2006; UNDP, 2004). 
21438,000 (about 40%) and 12,800 (about 23%) of those qualified for reintegration applied for formal education in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone, respectively.  Only 4% registered for agriculture in Liberia while 17% did in Sierra 
Leone (UNDP/JIU, 2006). 
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5.2.1 Conventional vs Poro and Sande Indigenous Approach to DDR 
 
While there may be consensus on the claim that our understanding of a social problem 
shapes our response strategies, it seems intervention strategies of the international 
system are driven by liberal imperatives rather than contextual realities and 
knowledge of the problem.  This obliviousness to the context is evident in the DDR215 
interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone.  Citing Francis (2005), Hoffman (2007) 
notes that current DDR interventions tend to be fixed on the “universal definition of a 
militia as ‘a kind of private army whose members are enrolled along military lines, 
are subjected to the same discipline as soldiers, like them wearing uniforms and 
badges, ready like them to meet the enemy with weapons in physical combat’” (p 5).  
Insurgent and counter-insurgent groups in Liberia and Sierra Leone sharply contrasted 
with this notion.  Conscription, recruitment, training and production of soldiers by all 
warlords and militias in both civil wars drew mostly from perverted practices of 
indigenous sodality institutions and less from conventional military practices (See 
Ellis 1999; Sawyer 1992; Alie, 2005).  For instance, Alie (2005) describes the 
initiation of an individual into the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) as one, which, just like 
the Poro rite de passage, was shrouded in secrecy.  Rather than a recruitment officer 
being the first line of contact in the various militia groups, traditional High Priests and 
witch doctors were the first line of contact.  These were responsible for applying a 
range of concoctions.  They also, through psychological and spiritual manipulation, 
extracted a pledge of absolute loyalty from the initiates.  It was only after this exercise 
that most initiates were declared fit for combat training (ibid).  Alie goes further to 
                                                
215The recently codified Inter-agency Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) defines 
disarmament as “the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms…” while demobilization is 
“…the formal and controlled discharged of active combatants from armed forces and other armed groups…”. 
Demobilisation according to the IDDRS ends when reinsertion packages are handed to ex-combatants to ease their 
entry back into communities.  
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indicate that each initiate of the CDF was vetted by the community, and was assigned 
a patron to whom he remained loyal and who kept watch over his behaviour (2005).  
Similarly, insurgent groups like the RUF, NPFL, ULIMO, etc tied their foot soldiers 
in webs of sodality-bonded networks (See Sawyer, 1992; Ellis, 1999; Richards et al, 
2004 and 2005).   Richard et al (2004: 26) note that the RUF “…after a short period as 
a modern guerrilla movement with aspirations to capture and reform the state, 
reverted to a more basic type—a forest sodality”.216  
 
Drawing from what we know about insurgent and counter-insurgent groups in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone, we can argue that the DDR processes failed to appreciate the fact 
that disarming ex-combatants in Liberia and Sierra Leone should not have been 
limited to collection of conventional weapons and handing them material packages.  
Certain critical questions remain unanswered, such as what happens to the oaths 
taken, the charms entrusted in their care and the sodality-based network to which they 
were bonded. In a focus group discussion in Lofa County, a participant noted, “…just 
as they were initiated and bonded in a cult-like militarised fraternity, it is important 
for some form of rituals to be applied in their demobilisation…” Another noted, 
“Without this process, ex-combatants still feel tied to the militarised network and 
obligated to laws that guided their so-called charm”.  The implementers of the DDR 
programmes did not heed these concerns.  The DDR processes in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone remained faithful to the conventional, while disregarding the unconventional 
indigenous elements that defined the problems they seek to address.  A closer review 
of the processes in light of indigenous exigencies is necessary. 
 
                                                
216Although the CDF predominantly emerged from the Kamajors, the Poro warrior class, Richard et al notes that in 
order to prevent infiltration by the RUF, which has some Poro initiates as its fighters, the CDF modified the Poro 
codes and introduced new secrets to bond the CDF. 
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5.2.1.1 Disarmament, Demobilisation and the Poro (and Sande) 
 
Despite the fact that a majority of the combatants in both wars did not fight with 
conventional weapons, while others had shared weapons, the criteria for disarmament 
and demobilisation, particularly in Sierra Leone, was insistent on each person handing 
in a conventional weapon to be eligible for the programme. In Sierra Leone, 60% of 
all combatants were members of the CDF, in which core warriors including the 
Kamajors, Donzos, Tamaboros, Kapras, etc. used single barrel guns and other 
indigenous weapons.  For instance, Richard et al (2004) note that of the 16,491 CDF 
fighters in Kenema District of Sierra Leone, only 14% possessed acceptable weapons 
and therefore entered the DDR programme.   Aside from not having the right weapons 
to be eligible, a Key Informant told me that given the Poro notion of Kamajors, many 
of the hardcore warriors were reluctant to disarm.  In the Poro and other indigenous 
sodalities, the communities look to the Kamajors, Donzos, Tamaboros, etc.—the 
tightly knit groups of men who are endowed with powers to defend their communities 
in time of spiritual and physical threats.  This has been their role since the inception of 
the sodality according to an FGI participant in Bo.  Hoffman corroborates this claim 
when he said that, 
 
The Kamajors’ very identity is predicated on the protection of villages.  
Throughout the war the name carried with it the same connotations of 
community defence, entitlement to carry firearms, and the possession of 
secret ‘medicines’ (hale) that was embodied in the pre-war use of the term 
(Hoffman, 2007: 7).   
 
In his testimonial before the Special Court in Sierra Leone, Chief of the Civil Defence 
Forces, the late Chief Hinga Norman, informed the Court about the enduring role of 
the Kamajors in the Poro-governed Guinea Coast thus: 
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My Lord, in this country Kamajors are age old people.  They had existed 
before my own great grandfather.  There is no issue of selecting who to 
become a Kamajor or who not to become a Kamajor.  They’re here 
permanently.  They were, they are, they will continue to be (cited in 
Hoffman, 2007: 21). 
 
Secondly, a critical assumption in conventional DD strategies is that long-term peace 
depends on breaking command structures of insurgent and counter insurgent groups.  
Therefore, DD strategies aimed at providing money and materials that would help 
individual ex-combatants live independent of their militarised networks.  It is 
assumed that the command structures in the Liberia and Sierra Leone civil wars 
resembled those of conventional military structures, which are separate from social 
networks in communities in which ex-combatants reintegrate, and therefore can be 
dismantled.  Richard (2004 and 2005) and Hoffman (2007) have argued that while 
efforts to break command structures and transform combatants into individuals may 
hold true to international DDR practice, and are desirable to guarantee long-term 
peace, breaking them in the case of Liberia and Sierra Leone is not only difficult, it 
poses a dilemma.  In West Africa, particularly its sodality-governed Upper Guinea 
Coast, social collectivism determines individual identity.  As Hoffman observes, 
“Patronage networks which dominate everyday existence in rural [Liberia and Sierra 
Leone] were never replaced in wartime, they were simply militarized” (p. 22).  
Therefore, rather than focus on breaking the networks to emancipate individuals, 
emphasis should be on transforming the networks into productive, peace generating 
and sustaining forces in post-war societies.  Richards et al (2004) note that the CDF 
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are “…back in the villages for which they struggled, more interested in 
agricultural…and the diamond fields instead of violence …”217 
 
While these networks seem resistant to being dismantled because of their rootedness 
in the notion of social collectivism, their lack of transformation poses serious security 
challenges in both countries. Arms-related violence is rife in Liberia, while violence 
using local weapons, including serious disruptions of political processes, continues in 
Sierra Leone.  The evidence thus far suggests that state reconstruction practitioners 
and post-war governments are yet to harness this resource, whether during the 
reintegration or in ongoing security sector reform efforts.  I return to this aspect later.  
One point worth making for now is that disarmament and demobilisation as defined 
by the UN Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards 
(IDDRS) and practiced in post-conflict contexts such as Liberia and Sierra Leone, 
overlooked important unconventional dimensions which contributed to the difficulty 
the project encountered in Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
 
5.2.1.2 Conventional vs Indigenous Poro and Sande Reintegration Strategies 
 
The IDDRS defines reintegration as “the process by which ex-combatants acquire 
civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income…”218 The definition and 
approaches adopted by international actors tend to be implicitly guided by three inter-
related assumptions: a) ex-combatants with employable skills increase their value in 
society; b) ex-combatants with employable skills are more likely to obtain 
                                                
217Aside from being the largest labour force in most of rural Sierra Leone, the CDF maintains their community 
defence networks and continues to keep watch over their communities.   
218It also emphasises the importance of situating reintegration within communities, although many of its strategies 
tend to be targeted at individual ex-combatants.  
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employment; and c) employed ex-combatants having gained a meaningful life within 
the community are unlikely to return to violence.  What underpins these assumptions 
is that ex-combatants went to war because of economic deprivation and, once they are 
employed and are earning adequate income, the problem of violence will be resolved.  
Based on these assumptions, like all DDR programmes, reintegrating ex-combatants 
in Sierra Leone and Liberia focused on vocational training, agriculture, formal 
education and quick employment schemes.  While improving ex-combatants’ 
employability may facilitate reintegration, it has been misunderstood as reintegration 
itself.  As a result, the other critical task of strengthening the absorptive capacity of 
the communities, which would enable them to absorb and employ the skills of ex-
combatants, receives little or no attention.  Besides, the assumption that individual ex-
combatants represent their individual economic grievances seems to be couched in the 
liberal individualist thesis.  Such an assumption downplays Azar’s claim that the 
grievances, which mobilise a group to war, are never ‘individual’.  They are 
‘communal’ or ‘fraternal’.  In Sierra Leone and Liberia, where patronage in social and 
political systems holds sway, many of the ex-combatants were either forcibly enlisted 
in combat, or voluntarily in either the name of their patrons, or based on the 
interpretation of their grievances by their patrons.  This factor is not considered in 
reintegration planning. 
 
The conventional reintegration approach also contrasts with the sequencing of Poro 
and Sande mechanisms for reintegrating ex-combatants.  The first reintegration task 
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in Poro-governed regions of Liberian and Sierra Leone is to facilitate acceptance of 
ex-combatants in the community.219 A key informant in Bo pointed out that,  
 
Until communities recognise and accept the being, which I will define as 
acceptable character and behaviour of the ex-combatant, it is difficult (if not 
impossible) for such a person to be accepted and for the communities to employ 
whatever productive skills he/she might have acquired (Key Informant Bo, 
2005).   
 
Studies conducted by Amnesty International and the Centre for the Study of Violence 
and Torture reveal that all female combatants interviewed in both countries identify 
‘being accepted again in their communities and having the opportunity to get married’ 
as the most important factor in their reintegration (AI, 2003; CVT, 2004).  Being 
accepted or rejected in Poro-governed societies is guided by norms, and not 
necessarily by the economic transformation of ex-combatants, as assumed in the 
IDDRS. For instance, ex-combatants who have killed in combat must undergo 
cleansing rites before taking their place back in the community.  Women who fought 
and were exposed to the dead (whether they killed them or not) as well as those who 
were sexually violated, must be cleansed to be accepted and also be eligible for 
marriage.220  Participants in a focus group meeting emphasised that unless these 
cleansing rituals are undertaken, ex-combatants and rape victims are considered 
unclean or possessed of evil spirits.  “Even when the ex-combatants or rape victims 
are forced to return to the community, community members tend to exclude them 
                                                
219International practice also makes allusions to the importance of an ex-combatant being accepted in his/her 
community.  The difference is that it makes working to foster acceptance secondary to developing ex-combatants 
as economically independent and viable members of the society.  
220The cleansing rituals for women ex-combatants and rape victims are conducted in the Sande sacred places, 
while those of men are administered in Poro sacred places. 
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from all social functions, skilled or unskilled” (Key Informant Interview, Bo, 
2005).221   
 
5.2.1.3 Poro Interventions for Self-renewal in DDR  
 
Poro and non-Poro communities in both countries have assumed their natural roles in 
rehabilitating and reintegrating ex-combatants.  In Liberia, particularly in some 
villages of the Poro-governed Lofa County, remnants of the Lofa Defence Force are 
undergoing ritual cleansing supervised by Poro Zoes as a condition for their return to 
the communities.   While this is not widespread, participants in Lofa strongly 
emphasised the need to undertake nationwide indigenous processes which will not 
only allow for the rehabilitation of ex-combatants, but will restore the sacred health of 
the communities (I will address this in section 6.2.2).  Furthermore, as indicated in 
Box 5.1, the Kwa-speaking people, particularly in south-eastern Liberia, are also 
engaged in indigenous reintegration activities which are outside the limelight of the 
international process.      
 
Box 5.1: Indigenous Reintegration Process amongst the Kwas 
 
In one of the remote villages of Liberia the researcher and other members of the team of evaluators for 
Liberia’s Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Strategy and Implementation 
Framework (DDRR-SIF) met with a group of chiefs and elders and asked them about the state of their 
communities and the relationship with ex-combatants who returned.  One elder explained that in their 
communities they are embarking on reintegration and reconciliation activities to ease the return of ex-
combatants and the recovery of communities.  According to the elder, ex-combatants and their families 
are demonstrating repentance to the entire community while the communities are administering 
cleansing ceremonies and publicly accepting the ex-combatants.  The process according to the elder 
involves the perpetrator and his family providing to the community a goat or in some situations a 
chicken.  The community would use the chicken to cook meals that the entire community would eat 
together after a cleansing ceremony.  During the cleansing ritual the perpetrator would be seated in an 
open square of the town with his immediate family members around him.  Each head of household 
would publicly place his/her hands on the head of the perpetrator surrounded by his family in an open 
                                                
221The isolation of the unclean and unworthy in rural Liberia and Sierra Leone continues to have devastating social 
and economic effects on ex-combatants and former bush wives.  A key manifestation of this problem is the 
increase in the number of urban slums in both countries.  Richard et al emphasised that while international actors 
may not be keen to engage in ritual processes, it is important to acknowledge their impact on perceptions of 
demobilisation, reintegration and reconciliation.   
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space usually under a scourging sun and “say his mind”.  This means graphically describing all the 
pains the perpetrator’s action may have caused him/her, their family, and the entire community.  After 
what seems like a catharsis the victim would grant forgiveness and welcome the perpetrator back in the 
community.  The rest of the community cheered the gesture.  After each household offended by the 
perpetrator’s action had spoken the elder in the community would conclude and in some cases offer the 
perpetrator a parcel of land to work his own farm.  He would then be monitored over a period to 
ascertain whether his repentance is genuine and is shown in a change of behaviour.  The forgiver is 
also expected to be genuine.  It is believed that if the forgiver is not genuine eating the meal of 
reconciliation can be fatal.  
 
After the elder’s explanation the head of the UN DDRR-SIF Programme evaluation team in his 
excitement asked whether the UN could offer the communities a number of livestock to expand the 
process since it was difficult for some family to raise the money for the livestock and rice needed for 
the ceremonies.  The elders spontaneously rejected the offer.  The team was surprised and the team 
leader asked why they were refusing the UN offer.  One of the elders noted that it is the pain the family 
goes through to raise the money for the ceremony that is an indication of the genuine contrition and 
willingness to change.  Besides, another elder noted that the process, which the family goes through to 
gather the resources needed, facilitates their own healing and reconciliation.  He noted that in most 
cases some members being angry with the perpetrator would refuse to contribute.  The rest of the 
family would have to convince the angry person of the value of redeeming the victim and thereby 
restoring the pride of the family in the community.  Providing livestock would undermine the process, 
the elder emphasised.   
 
Another important dimension in indigenous Poro mechanisms for DDR is its gender-
focused approach.  The Sande, being responsible for moulding girls into womanhood, 
is by default responsible for reintegrating female combatants, while the Poro is 
responsible for male combatants. Carol MacCormack, cited earlier, describes the 
critical role of the Sande in Poro-governed society thus:  
  
“Since social grace, good health, fertility, successful childbirth and nurturance 
are not matters to be left to nature but are conditions and events caused by 
Sande wisdom, rites and practical experience, it is an institution that continues 
to assist women throughout their adult life. It is secret in the sense that it owns 
knowledge so valuable that it must be guarded against debasement and 
transmitted only in ritual situations to initiates properly prepared to receive it.” 
(MacCormack, 1973: 183)   
 
At the focus group interview in Bo, a participant corroborated MacCormack’s 
description of the Sande by emphasising that,  
 
“Organising young women to guide their lives is an integral part of the Sande… 
Graduates from Sande bush schools are often placed in age- or livelihood-based 
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groups.  These groups are assigned a guardian, usually an experienced elderly 
woman selected from the soweisia [Sande council of elders] with whom they 
share their challenges in transitioning to adult life, like managing their married 
home, undergoing periods of pregnancy and caring for their first babies…” 
(FGI, Bo, 2006)  
 
Soweisia across rural Liberia and Sierra Leone, a key informant noted, are engaged in 
a range of activities to foster rehabilitation and reintegration of women and children.  
The common activities include adopting ex-combatants and the formation of age- and/ 
or livelihood-based associations for girls.222  There are also women-led orphanages in 
urban communities, which are helping former bush wives with childcare while the 
latter attend vocational training or formal schools.223  The motivation of the women 
initiatives, it is believed, comes from their Sande obligation.  As one participant 
indicated, “If we do not help these girls to get back to normal life it will affect the 
kind of society we create after the war.” (Key Informant, Freetown, 2005)  
 
I argue that DDR processes failed to achieve sustainable results because the 
international system did not engage with the Poro and other sodalities, who define and 
administer the social orders in most of the interiors in Liberia and Sierra Leone.  Rape 
victims among female combatants as noted by Richard et al (2004 and 2005), were 
reluctant to present themselves for DDR for fear that they would expose themselves to 
possible rejection from their local Sande groups.  Also, what better avenue could there 
be for local female ex-combatants to address issues of their personal health, fertility, 
chastity, etc. if not the Sande, which has been involved in such matters for nearly two 
thousand years? The DDR programmes were also keen to “emancipate” individuals 
                                                
222Women in Bo, Kambia, Bong and Lofa have organised themselves in associations which encourage members to 
adopt former child combatants, especially girls.  Some women reported having adopted at least two ex-child 
combatants into their families.    
223While these are not necessarily linked to the Sande process in the interior, one woman insinuated that her 
motivation to establish a day care centre is because “in our tradition we are supposed to help young women 
become better people…” 
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from their so-called sodality-bonded societies.  Fundamental to social collectivist 
societies is the primacy of the community over individuals.  Charles Piot 
unequivocally contends that in West Africa, more so in its Poro sodality region, 
“Individuals do not have relations… they are relations” (Piot, 1999: 18 cited in 
Hoffman, 2007: 13).  Hoffman goes on to argue that “… the social being of an 
individual is measured by the people with whom one has relations of dependence or 
for whom one acts as a patron…” (Hoffman, 2007: 10).  Efforts to transform 
relational beings into atomised individuals in a short time span and in an ad hoc 
fashion exacerbated societal disruptions, instead of aiding recovery.  A third most 
important argument for involving indigenous systems in DDR processes is the 
importance of restoring community balance.  The scale and nature of the violence in 
both countries defied all human imagination, whether indigenous or conventional.  In 
Liberia, all systems of meaning were fundamentally challenged; thus undermining all 
existing regulatory mechanisms in rural societies.  A critical factor in restoring 
balance and security in indigenous communities is to reconstruct the myth and 
narratives in light of the new challenges.  While the liberal project has overlooked the 
importance of a new narrative to replace the war narrative in which children with 
guns became the chiefs and the powers of Zoes were defamed, the Poro, as will be 
discussed in depth in section 5.3, sees the replacement of war narratives as existential.  
For now, I turn to current security sector reform initiatives in both countries and the 
extent of engagement or non-engagement of Poro and Sande in the processes.   
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5.2.2 Poro and Security Sector Reform  
 
The Security Sector Reform projects of Liberia and Sierra Leone are in their 
conclusion phases.  The questions that remain are: a) to what extent are the processes 
and outcomes locally owned? b) What is the quality of the security architectures being 
built?  More specifically, were the very elaborate Poro security architectures, which 
gained renewed salience in both wars, engaged in the conceptualisation, design and 
production of the post-war security architectures? Based on my review of the 
processes I come to the conclusion that both processes leave much to be desired.   
First, both processes are not only driven from outside, they are entirely financed and 
managed externally.  In Liberia and Sierra Leone, security sector reforms have 
become the pet projects of their respective former colonial allies.  The British 
International Military Advisory and Assistance Team (IMATT) has full responsibility 
to restructure the security sector of Sierra Leone, while the contracted private military 
companies—DynCorp and PAE—are overseeing the restructure of the armed forces 
of Liberia.  In Sierra Leone, all institutions within the security sector are being rebuilt 
by IMATT, while in Liberia the project is divided between the US Government and 
the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).   
 
Secondly, both processes were not established on any post-war security strategy.  The 
national security strategies of Sierra Leone and Liberia were developed long after the 
SSR processes began.  The Governance Reforms Commission outside the mainstream 
of security sector reform developed what is called the national security strategy in 
Liberia.  Details of how the security sector, particularly the armed and police forces 
are being built are not mentioned in the SSR strategy. Similarly in Sierra Leone, the 
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security strategy came after IMATT had advanced the police and army reforms.  
Notwithstanding, unlike in Liberia, Sierra Leone’s security architecture to some 
extent drew from the National Security Strategy.    
 
Third, the national security strategies, the police and army reform programmes are 
less known across both countries, given the limited (in Sierra Leone) and no (in 
Liberia) information awareness strategy and campaign on the SSR projects.  In 
Liberia, the only information on SSR is about how to join the police or armed forces.  
What these institutions mean and what role the society in general will play in their 
structuring and performance is not factored in the programming.  A well-respected 
civil society leader in Liberia expressed doubts whether the process would produce 
the quality and size of army that Liberia desperately needs, given its recent past.  He 
notes at a focus group discussion, “How can they train a new army for a supposedly 
new country without a security strategy and doctrine… What is the threat and where 
is it coming from?” (FGI, Monrovia, 2005).  Another FGI participant had this to say: 
“It is so disheartening that no consideration was given to Liberia’s recent past where 
the security was politicised and used as instrument for repression… People have 
never had a say in who becomes a security personnel and how security personnel 
should conduct themselves in this country… People again, having suffered the mess 
resulting from a politicised and insulated security system, are witnessing a repeat of 
history…” Another participant asked, in a huff, “Can you imagine an NGO is training 
a post-war national army of a state struggling to reclaim its sovereignty?” But another 
interjected, also in a huff, “Have you all forgotten that this country was established by 
an NGO, the so-called American Colonisation Society… History always repeats itself 
when people fail to learn from it,” he retorted.   
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Aside from the flaws in the process, engagement with indigenous mechanisms and 
processes were also weak.  As indicated earlier, in Sierra Leone over 60% of all 
fighting forces were from the sodality-created Civil Defence Forces (CDF).  During 
the design of the security architecture in Sierra Leone, the country was divided on the 
question of the extent to which the CDF should be factored into the national security 
architecture.  Some argued that given that the CDF remains providers of security in 
most rural communities, they should be transformed into national militias with 
responsibility for community security.  The contrary view was that involving such a 
large and dispersed group in the security architecture would be difficult to manage.  
Others question the level of discipline in the CDF and argued that recognising the 
CDF as part of the national security architecture could serve as license for human 
rights abuses, especially in the countryside.  Those who were concerned about the 
efficient management of the security sector warned that the CDF would expect to be 
paid, as was the case in the war, and giving the country’s appalling economic 
conditions, this would be a strain on the government.  At the end of the lively debate, 
the National Security Architecture only carries a paragraph recognising the role of the 
CDF during the war, but called on them to refrain from involvement in security 
activities.   
 
While I am not arguing for the legitimisation of the CDF or Poro-governed security 
systems in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the argument of this thesis is the extent of 
engagement with indigenous notions and structures of security.  For instance, while 
some healthy debate took place in Sierra Leone on the CDF, the extent of engagement 
remained at that level.  There is no evidence to suggest that in-depth study was 
conducted to understand the historical and sociological dimensions of the Poro-
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governed CDF and the implication for long-term security in post-war Sierra Leone.  
In the case of Liberia, it is important to note that this post-war SSR process will go 
down in history as the first time when the settler state and the Poro-governed 
hinterland severed relations on the issue of security.  As indicated in Chapter 3, the 
Liberia Frontier Force (LFF) was organised with Poro youth vetted by Poro elders 
serving as the foot soldiers.  Sawyer (1992) notes that such arrangements continued in 
the Armed Forces of Liberia until 1979, when in addition to enlisting Poro-vetted 
cadres, William Tolbert opened the armed forces to the Kwa-speaking non-Poro 
communities in the Southeast of Liberia.224 A key informant noted that “Liberia is 
poised to have its first non-sodality based national army… this looks like a good thing 
but we have to wait and see.”225 The point being made here is that in both Liberia and 
Sierra Leone there are three security and/ or insecurity systems.  These include the 
new and emerging national security architectures, the web of militarised networks and 
the Poro-governed security architecture, particularly the CDF in Sierra Leone.  These 
are bound to interact for a long time come.  The implication for such interactions on 
the conditions of security need to be anticipated and appropriate safeguards put in 
place. The lack of clear strategy for the transformation of the non-state security 
systems could undermine the institutionalisation and stabilisation of the externally 
constructed security architectures in both countries.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
224It is telling to note here that it was some of the initial southeastern recruits in the army who turned against 
Tolbert and overthrew his regime in a bloody coup in 1980.  
225
The LFF and the Armed Forces of Liberia, with their repressive hierarchy and impervious structure were not 
any better. The point is being made to allude to the fact that the Poro was once a player in the design of Liberia’s 
security architecture.  It has been by-passed in the post-war security arrangement. 
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5.3 THE ROLE OF THE PORO IN RETURN, RESETTLEMENT AND 
REINTEGRATION  
 
The civil wars in both countries will go down in history as events which resulted in 
the total dislocation and displacement of the dominant Poro-governed region in 
Africa.  For the first time in almost 1,000 years, the “earth-determined” and ‘locality’ 
grounded Poro-governed rainforest experienced massive displacement and 
dislocation.  Entire districts were emptied of their population for nearly a decade.226 
The population movement followed rural-to-urban demographic patterns established 
in both countries, with large numbers of displaced coming from areas where the wars 
lasted the longest.227  Aside from the dislocation, the gerontocratic orders, which are 
the crux of Poro authorities in Liberia and Sierra Leone, were gravely humiliated as 
warlords and their band of child soldiers drove the High Priests out of their shrines.  
Fanthorpe reports that: 
 
“Many [rural dwellers] were - and remain – profoundly shocked by the 
vicious and apparently motiveless attacks upon civilians by the young Sierra 
Leoneans who fought under the banner of the RUF, and there is still much 
talk in rural areas about these fighters’ fearless transgression of secret society 
laws as they entered village sacred bushes in search of horded weapons and 
food” (Fanthorpe, 2007) 
 
How does such mass dislocation and displacement of people, authorities and systems 
of belief impact the Poro world? What does this portend in determining the strategies 
for recovering and revitalising such communities? And to what extent were 
                                                
226In August 2003, when the CPA was signed, an estimated 600,000 Liberians, nearly all those who had resettled 
after the 1997 elections, were again internally displaced (Global IDP, 2001; Scott, 1998).  Another 300,000 had 
fled to neighbouring countries (UNHCR, 2003).  Similarly, Sierra Leone’s IDP at the signing of the LPA stood at 
2 million and around 250,000 of this number were in camps, while the bulk of the IDPs lived with host families 
across the country (NCRRR, 2001). 
227For instance, in the Poro-dominated Lofa County where the Liberia civil war lasted the longest, and considering 
its proximity to Sierra Leone and Guinea, more than 95% of its inhabitants were displaced (UNHCR, 2005). 
UNHCR February 2005 briefing note cited in IRIN noted that more than a third of Liberia’s 350,000 refugees in 
neighbouring countries and more than half of the million others internally displaced fled from Lofa County. 
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practitioners of state reconstruction in both countries responsive to the unique 
challenges of recovering sodality-governed post-war communities?  The first factor 
any strategy seeking to address return, resettlement and community revitalisation of 
sodality-governed communities must consider is the natural attachment to the notion 
of homeland.  Kris Hardin notes that in Poro-governed societies “Where someone is 
born, where they join Sande or Poro, where their ancestors are buried, and where they 
themselves will be buried…” determine their identity (1993: 27).  While noting that 
such earth-determined reproduction of identity tends to be limiting, Hardin concedes 
that it remains the basis for identity formation and the creation of communities.  He 
indicates that the identity production process in Poro communities is undertaken 
through well-organised rites.228  Ruth Finnegan, based on her study of the Limbas in 
Sierra Leone, makes similar claims.  She indicates that, 
 
“One reason why a man comes back from the more moneyed life down country 
is that the graves of the dead are up there; one reason a chief does not wish to 
leave his town is that the famous chiefs of the past, his ancestors, are buried 
there…[the dead] represent for the Limba the social ties within the village, 
where those living together are thought of as being commonly descended from 
the ancestors commonly prayed to; the dead transmitted and uphold the social 
and political institutions and guarantee this order to their descendants” 
(Finnegan, 1965: 113, cited in Fanthorpe, 2001: 375) 
 
Fanthorpe emphasises that in Poro-governed societies, locality is never taken for 
granted.  From this view it is justifiable to suggest that dislocation has profound 
effects on the individual and collective identities of Poro-governed communities.  It is 
in these contexts that the international community planned and implemented return, 
resettlement, reintegration and community revitalisation. What principles and 
strategies informed the return, resettlement and reintegration in Liberia and Sierra 
                                                
228Kris Hardin, The Aesthetics of Action: Community and change in a West African town (Smithsonian Institution 
Press, Washington, DC, 1993) and Mariane Ferme, The Underneath of Things: Violence, history and the everyday 
in Sierra Leone (University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 2001) also make similar points. 
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Leone? And how did these reinforce or undermine the ‘self-renewing’ agencies of 
Poro-governed communities?  
 
The international state reconstruction architect’s strategy for return, resettlement and 
reintegration focused on the provision of basic material needs to ease return, but not 
necessarily to sustain return and resettlement.  The return and resettlement packages 
more broadly included two-month food ration, household utensils, plastic sheeting 
and transportation to a drop-off point (Mama, 2003).  In some areas, the transitional 
process was followed by a mid-term recovery intervention, including quick 
employment schemes, rehabilitation of basic community infrastructures, support to 
livelihood development and community-based reconciliation.229  The international 
practice paid little attention to the role of indigenous mechanisms, including the Poro 
and Sande in the return, resettlement and reintegration processes. The recovery 
strategies were individual-focused and market-oriented, ostensibly to remain true to 
the conventional humanitarian and development logic of achieving immediate, 
quantifiable and tangible results.  The effects of re-entry and the necessary rites for 
reclaiming ‘locality’ and social reproduction of local subjects in Poro and Sande 
societies did not feature in the return and reintegration processes. Notwithstanding, 
indigenous Poro and Sande communities have been active in their own self-renewal.  
A review of the Poro’s RRR self-renewal process is necessary.   
 
                                                
229At the end of the return and resettlement processes in Sierra Leone, a total of 221,745 registered IDPs and 
245,750 refugees were resettled in five phases, while about twice this number spontaneously resettled in Sierra 
Leone before the Government of Sierra Leone officially declared that all the country’s IDPs were returned and 
resettled in October 2002 (UN OCHA, 2002).  Similarly, when the elected government and the international 
community (IC) formerly closed IDP camps in March 2006, a total of 321,634 IDPs and 95,548 refugees were 
officially resettled in Liberia.  About 350,000 IDPs and refugees reportedly spontaneously returned and integrated 
without any assistance (Wright et al, 2007).  
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5.3.1 Poro’s Self-renewing Interventions 
 
For the Poro, returning to the land requires something more than buckets, food rations 
and basic farming implements.  It is first and foremost about establishing new discursive, 
institutional and relational foundations.  A key informant notes that the primary 
preoccupation of Poro and Sande communities on return has been the restoration of the 
rituals for reproducing locality.  She indicated that locality reproduction in Poro-governed 
communities include consecrating the land, reasserting or recreating narratives that bind 
the webs of relations who are attached to the land or locality, and regenerating the land 
and relationships.  Fanthorpe makes a similar point while referencing the work of Ruth 
Finnegan.  He notes that rebuilding communities or locality amongst the Limbas in Sierra 
Leone is termed “clearing” (methi ma), which literally means “a space authorised and 
made fit for the proper ‘foundation’ (makwi ma) of society” (Fanthorpe, 2001: 375).  A 
key informant made a similar point in Monrovia when he indicated that Poro-governed 
communities in Liberia focus on three areas in recovery:  
 
“First, we must restore the land.  Because too much blood has been spilled on 
the land, we must re-honour the land.  Second, we must appease the ancestors 
by seeking the forgiveness of all the leaders that were unjustly killed. It is after 
the land and the ancestors are appeased that we turn to individuals and their 
families for reconciliation, reintegration and economic revitalisation” (KII, 
Monrovia, 2005) 
 
Deducing from comments of participants in the range of interviews and works done by a 
number of anthropologists, I argue that return, resettlement and community revitalisation 
in Poro-governed societies primarily has spiritual, socio-economic and political 
dimensions. 
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Spiritual Dimension:  The first focus of Poro-governed societies on return is the spiritual 
dimension.  This includes undertaking a range of rituals to ‘clear’ the land and restore 
structures of relationship.  Richard et al. (2004) observes that the first project of most 
returned communities has been the construction of mosques, churches or Poro shrines. 
Citing Durkheim, the authors argue that the sacred is the rallying point for collective 
actions in most indigenous societies.  They note that “respect for cult objects and 
‘medicines’ at the heart of the closed association is in effect respect for the group and its 
values which is the basis for trust, social coordination and collective action” (ibid: 28).  
The restoration of the spiritual edifice is followed by the rites de passage, especially for 
girls.  All returnees in Poro-governed communities rate restoring Sande initiation rites as 
one of the first tasks in community recovery.  Families would go to the extreme of 
borrowing the needed resources to ensure that their daughters undergo the initiation 
process (Fanthorpe, 2007).  Communities whose Sande shrines were destroyed in the 
wars have had to share shrines of neighbouring communities to resume the Sande rites of 
passage (ibid).230  Why is this important to recovery in rural Liberia and Sierra Leone? 
 
In my view, the Sande initiation ceremonies have three primary effects on community 
recovery.  Since the Sande is the life-giving institution and the purifier of womanhood, it 
is regarded as the intersection of the sacred and the social. Communities therefore 
emphasise Sande activities as a basis for the re-normalisation of communities.  Secondly, 
Sande rites de passage reasserts the authority of the collective and of the ‘locality’.  War 
imposes new narratives, which mostly challenge the narratives that hitherto defined the 
communities and conditioned their views of the world.   In post-war indigenous 
communities, more so in Poro and Sande-governed communities, it is vital to impose a 
                                                
230The Sande has centuries of experience on issues such as fertility, chastity and good health.  It plays a central role 
in the social life of all rural women who constitute the largest number of IDPs and wartime bush wives. 
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new or modified narrative to reassert the social order of communities.231  And as tradition 
dictates, the primary source of civic education is the mother in the home.  By ensuring 
that post-war women recreate and imbibe the new post-war narrative guarantees the 
expansion of the civic education process to the rest of society.  And most importantly, the 
rites de passage of the Sande restores the lost dignity of women and the control over their 
own affairs—something that was eroded during the civil war.   
 
All this is not without limitations.  The practice of FGM in the Sande rites of passage 
seriously risks the health of rural Liberia and Sierra Leone.  It also raises the question 
about human rights and a woman’s personal control over her sexuality and freedoms.  As 
a way of addressing such risks, international actors have been supporting women’s groups 
to advocate against the Sande rites de passage.  While I acknowledge the risks, none of 
the campaigns have offered alternatives that would address rural society’s concerns for 
restoring the chastity, fertility, health of women and by extension the health and balance 
of post-war communities.  The reinvention of societal institutions in these post-collapsed 
contexts requires honest dialogue and sustained education and awareness campaigns 
about the weaknesses of the mechanisms and institutions for the restoration of social 
order in Poro and Sande communities.  As Richard et al (2004) rightly observes dialogue, 
not condemnation and violent erasure of indigenous systems, would go a long way to 
transform indigenous societies.    Study conducted by Care International also shows that 
FGM practice in especially Sierra Leone has greater commercial value compared to its 
traditional value.  The fact that FGM did not originate from the Sande sodality nor is it 
practised by practising Poro and Sande communities alone suggests that its 
                                                
231The tension has been whether to reassert the old narrative or to reinterpret the narratives in light of emerging 
realities. 
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transformation or elimination from the Sande should be possible if careful and 
comprehensive transformation exercise is undertaken.   
 
Socio-Economic and Governance Dimension: The socio-economic dimension resides 
in the governance function of the Poro.  As discussed in Chapter 1, Brown (1967) 
emphasised the ability of the Poro to inculcate deference for public assets, to mobilise 
all communities in solidarity and social support systems and to restore the necessary 
balance between the sacred and the secular in the interiors of both countries.  Real or 
civic governance, as Brown terms it, is expressed in Poro and Sande communities 
within the notion of Kuu (in Liberia) or Kombi (among the Mendes in Sierra Leone), 
or Ka-botho (among the Temne).  The Kuu or Kombi is the institution, which through 
the Poro tenets of solidarity ensure that all members of the community enjoy and 
participate in the provision of basic services while collectively preserving shared 
resources. Participants at a focus group interview in Gbarnga, Liberia noted that, 
“Everybody works together in the Kuu system to ensure that no one in the village is 
lacking…” (FGI, Gbarnga, 2005).  In the post-war reconstruction efforts Zoes, chiefs, 
and elders are evoking the kuu to oblige all members of the communities to support 
the economic revitalisation and social reintegration of individual members and 
families. For instance, through rotating work schemes community members are 
collaborating to rebuild one another’s houses and work one another’s farms in Poro 
regions of Liberia and Sierra Leone.232 The widespread campaign of methi ma 
(restoring locality) and economic recovery across the Poro-governed interiors caught 
the attention of many researchers and NGOs in the area. Mama (2003) notes that Care 
                                                
232Richard et al (2004) identify three kinds of rotational labour arrangements guided by the principles of Kombi, 
which are active in local recovery efforts in Sierra Leone.  First, there is the informal agreement among neighbours 
to work together on various cultivation tasks by turn.  No financial payment is expected in this arrangement.  A 
second cooperative work scheme in which each member is obligated to provide fixed man-hours to work on one 
another’s fields is the Bembe.  The Kombi is the largest cooperative scheme with permanent membership.  It is also 
a savings club.   
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International in rural Sierra Leone redesigned their community infrastructural 
development programme to respond to the community Kombi.  Care International 
provided metal roofing sheets to associations of women’s groups who were engaged 
in rotating schemes to rebuild one another’s houses.  Roads leading to villages and 
towns are also being cleared under the norms of the Kuu or Kombi in both countries.  
 
While recognizing the civic functions of the Poro and Sande, some architects of the 
post-conflict state reconstruction projects are cautious about supporting indigenous 
solidarity groups especially those shrouded in secrecy such as the Poro and Sande.  
They argue that any support to such groups would mean sanctioning their exclusive 
and repressive practices (Richards, 2004).  They are therefore keen to accelerate the 
establishment of political governance and civil administration in the interior regions.  
Primary objectives put forward for restoring local governance and political systems 
include: a) ensuring effective service delivery, b) reasserting the dominance of the 
state in the interiors, and c) consolidating peace and security.  The British Department 
for International Development (DfID) and the GoSL made initial attempts in post-war 
Sierra Leone to restore rural governance through re-establishing the paramount 
chieftaincy system (DfID, 2004).  Although consultations leading to the restoration 
exercise overwhelmingly blamed the chieftaincy system for the underdevelopment 
and revolt in the interior DfID and the GoSL went ahead to reconstitute the system 
without addressing its serious weaknesses (DfID, 2001).233  Reminiscent of the 
                                                
233According to Fanthorpe, during the consultations participants blamed the chieftaincy system for persistent 
discrimination of women, youth and other underprivileged families; the undemocratic approach to the selection of 
chiefs, and chiefs’ mismanagement of resources for their respective chiefdoms.  Most importantly, youths singled 
out the corruption in the local justice system, in which the male gerontocratic order consistently denied youth and 
women their rights.  Fanthorpe also notes rampant corruption amongst the post-war newly elected chiefs.  One 
positive, he notes however, is that many of the chiefs are educated and well travelled.  Because they are not 
steeped in Poro tradition, they could become useful partners for development.  Jackson, however, drawing from 
history, sounds a corollary that because these new chiefs are well travelled, their taste for expensive western goods 
as observed among pre-war educated chiefs could heighten corruption.   
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colonial hinterland pacification policy, the GoSL and DfID focused on reclaiming the 
interior from remnants of RUF and restoring security and order as the core objectives 
for re-establishing the chieftaincy system (Fanthorpe et al, 2002).  Fanthorpe note that 
DfID ostensibly was motivated to re-establish the system for “Fear of the 
consequences of a post-war power governance vacuum in rural areas” while the GoSL 
was keen to re-establish political control over the countryside” (ibid: 59).  These 
motivations superseded the need for careful reform of the chiefdom governance 
system and to address nearly 4-decade accumulated grievances it generated amongst 
rural dwellers.   DfID and GoSL justified their decision by advancing three inter-
related arguments. Firstly, that the chieftaincy system despite its excesses remains the 
most legitimate and appropriate political authority which can guarantee social order in 
the interior.234 Secondly, because the chieftaincy system is close to the people and 
therefore understands local needs it is the best vehicle for delivering demand-driven 
aid and basic services.235 And thirdly, because the chieftaincy system is embedded in 
the sodality-based communities it could be effective in addressing issues of 
reconciliation and peacebuilding (ibid).   
 
Notwithstanding these strong justifications, the restoration of the chieftaincy system 
has sparked fierce criticisms among scholars, policymakers, and practitioners.  While 
not discrediting the values of indigenous systems to regenerate their own governance 
system and support recovery, Halone (2005), Richards (2005), Jay and Koroma 
(2004) and Humphrey and Weinstein (2005) argue that the rush to restore the 
                                                
234Some argue that the chieftaincy system resonates with the sodality based indigenous governance and political 
systems in the interior because, as practiced in the Poro sodality, paramount chiefs are selected from Poro ruling 
families and they rule for life. This apparent fusion between Poro and the colonially constructed chieftaincy 
system, proponents argue, accounted for social stability and order in rural Sierra Leone.  They therefore argue it is 
the best vehicle for reclaiming and imposing order in the interior. 
235Widespread initiatives through collaboration between the Poro and Sande governance system and paramount 
chieftaincy, according to Richards et al (2004), seem to reaffirm the pivotal role of chiefs in post-war 
reconstruction efforts. 
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discredited colonially constructed feudal system which was at the heart of the rural 
revolts could have several negative impact on the transformation occasioned by the 
war. Humphrey and Weinstein (2005) remind proponents of the chieftaincy system 
that all analyses on the root causes of the civil war in Sierra Leone identify the 
chieftaincy system as one of the salient causes of the civil war.  The authors indicate 
that the main motivation of youth in the rebellion was to express their dissatisfaction 
of the feudal system in the interior and the nepotism and corruption, which was 
prevalent in public administration across the country (ibid).  Aside from the conflict 
root causes Halone (2005) notes that those who have re-established the chieftaincy 
system failed to consider the war-recreated context in the interior.  Youth, women, 
and former combatants who successfully displaced chiefs and their authorities during 
the war no longer revere the system.  It is observed that the hitherto marginalized 
groups in Sierra Leone have the tendency to openly challenge authorities of chiefs and 
disregard their orders (ibid).  Richards (2004) takes the argument beyond conflict to 
advance the case for human rights and freedoms.  He insists that the colonially 
constructed chieftaincy system in Sierra Leone symbolises the historical model of 
forced labour and slavery which is counterproductive to the liberal values of freedom, 
human rights and the political expression of all people irrespective of their social 
status and family lineages.  Besides, to use the same colonial argument of order, 
pacification, and control of the interior as justification for restoring the chieftaincy 
system is to disregard the cries of youth, migrants, and women for inclusion, 
transparency, accountability, and justice.  Such disregard for the calls for change risks 
undoing the gains made by women and youth for recognition, political rights, and 
freedom through their participation in the civil war.  It could also pave the way for 
possible relapse to war (Pozzoni and Kumar, 2005). Others argue that at the time that 
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Sierra Leone so desperately need accelerated development, reasserting a system that 
encourages the arbitrary control of land and other resources in the rural areas runs the 
risk of slowing down recovery and development efforts (Fanthorpe, 2006). A key 
informant in Freetown indicated that,  
 
Sierra Leone does not need pacified and acquiesced interior but one that will 
actively engage in the political transformation of this country and contribute to 
its accelerated development effort.  And the colonially crafted chieftaincy 
system was not designed for this purpose (KII, Freetown, December 2005).   
 
While being critical to the chieftaincy system none of the critics have called for its 
termination.  In an evaluation exercise conducted among rural dwellers to review the 
impact of the DfID funded chieftaincy restoration project, Fanthorpe et al (2002) 
indicate that although people complained about the vices of the chieftaincy system, 
when asked should the system be terminated, all respondents said no.  At the 
scholarly level, rather than call for the termination of the system, all critics agree on 
two broad recommendations: a) to radically transform the discourse, institutions, and 
cultures of the system; and b) to introduce more egalitarian and democratic local 
governance system that will complement the chieftaincy system. To this end other 
international actors including the United Nations Development Programme supported 
the GoSL to establish the Local Government Act of 2004 (GoSL, 2004).  The Act 
reintroduced the local government council system, broadened the category of people 
who are qualified to vote and participate in the Council including women, migrants, 
and youth—the categories of people who are excluded from decision-making in the 
chieftaincy system (ibid). The Local Government Act mandates the councils to: 
initiate and lead all development projects and determine taxes.  The second structure 
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in the Act is the district administrators (DAs) who represent the central government in 
the interior (GoSL, 2004).   
 
Although architects of the Local Government Act envisioned it as a complement to 
indigenous and chieftaincy governance system, there are ambiguities in the roles and 
functions of the various institutions:  
 
• Paramount chiefs retain the powers to approve assembly of people for any 
purpose within the chiefdom although Local Councils are supposed to conduct all 
development activities through broad based assemblies;  
 
• Councils are to plan all developments but paramount chiefs control all chiefdom 
lands;  
 
• The new Local Government Act promises to protect the marginalized in the 
chieftaincy system but chiefs retain powers to exercise customary justice; and 
  
• The DAs being representatives of the central government insists that it is their role 
to staff and manage offices of paramount chiefs. 
 
These ambiguities are blamed for the continuing governance flux in rural Sierra 
Leone and its negative impact on development efforts.  Jackson (2005) observes that 
there exists a “pattern [and growing trend] of political rivalry between the three main 
groups: the new councillors, the chiefs, and the district administrators.”  The 
introduction of multiple layers of governance structure in rural Sierra Leone may have 
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been intended for transparency, accountability, and inclusivity but in some districts 
the opposite is emerging.  Local government councils are becoming exclusive and 
corrupt fraternities.  They are abusing their powers for personal enrichment.  Most 
importantly Fanthorpe et al (2002) observe that rivalry over roles and authorities has 
led to governance vacuum in some chiefdoms. 
 
Unlike Sierra Leone where the debate on rural governance is on a national scale, 
restoring rural governance in Liberia has received limited attention and resources.  
One reason could be the historically limited role of the chieftaincy system in local 
governance in Liberia and therefore its near absence in the conflict dynamics of the 
country (KII, Monrovia, 2005).236 This notwithstanding, some post-conflict state 
reconstruction architects have made efforts to establish additional layers of local 
governance structure in rural Liberia. The United Nations Mission in Liberia 
introduced the County and District Support system (CSS & DSS).  The CSS and DSS 
serve as coordination mechanisms for the international community’s recovery and 
development support in rural Liberia.  They went further to establish the District 
Development Committees (DDCs) as their own district level interlocutors for 
recovery and development. The structure of the DDCs includes fourteen members 
broadly elected by members of the district.  It operates quota membership system 
including District Superintendents serving as ex-officio.  There are representatives of 
the chiefs, women’s groups, and youth groups on the DDCs.  The DDCs unlike the 
local government councils in Sierra Leone does not have any constitutional authority 
nor is it enacted into law.  Rather, UNDP—the international architect that led the 
                                                
236
Throughout Liberia’s history superintendents directly appointed by the President preside over issues of 
governance with support from their county cabinet and councils.  Although the President and the superintendents 
demand that paramount chiefs report on activities in their respective chiefdoms they are under no obligation to 
give feedback to chiefs and their people. 
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establishment of the structure—defines it as local level development and coordination 
mechanisms that serve as entry point for local level economic development (cited in 
Mitullah, 2005).  Although it is five years since the establishment of the DDC the 
structure operates in only 10 of the 32 statutory districts.  GoL does not channel 
chiefdom development funds through the DDC.  Only UNDP and some members of 
the international community channel development funds through the DDCs.  This 
however does not suggest that the DDC does not have the potential to support 
accelerated development and strengthen the voices of those at the margins of rural 
politics in Liberia.  The point is that, like Sierra Leone, architects of the additional 
layers are yet to define and facilitate structural interaction and congruence.  The 
consequence of this is more confusion regarding who is in charge of the countryside.  
There is therefore the conspicuously slow progress in recovery, development, and 
stability in the rural region.     
 
Overwhelming historical evidence suggests that constructing viable, responsive, and 
capable state in post-collapsed Liberia and Sierra Leone depends largely on: a) how 
both countries dismantle the dual political and governance systems which separated 
the settler states from the interiors; and b) in its place establishing integrated and 
coherent local governance system that is a fusion between indigenous and 
contemporary democratic governance system. Architects in both countries do not 
seem to heed this evidence.  Without any deliberation on the history and need for 
transformation of rural governance Liberia has simply restored its centralized 
executive control of the interior through the centralized executive controlled 
superintendent system. No honest national reflection has taken place on the role of the 
dual polities, which undermined the building of more cohesive and capable state 
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system over the past 160 years.  Sierra Leone on the other hand has had lively debates 
on how and who should govern the interior but this is yet to result in stable local 
governance.  The missing dimension in the lively debate in Sierra Leone and quiet 
layer-adding process in Liberia is the role and function of the Poro and Sande political 
and governance structures and their potential impact (negative or positive) on 
development and the consolidation of peace and security.  A key informant in 
Freetown noted that the silence over the Poro and Sande systems is deliberate and 
necessary.  He contended that these systems are impervious and repressive.  It is 
better therefore to keep them away from the new discourse and structure of rural 
governance in Sierra Leone. The interesting thing is that the decision to sideline 
indigenous systems is against the fact that all international researchers in rural Liberia 
and Sierra Leone recognized the pivotal roles the Sande and Poro are playing in 
recovery and renewal.  The deliberate silence on the Poro and Sande in the 
reconstruction of structure of governance in the interior regions may be convenient 
for international actors but its potential to undermine any new layer of governance in 
the countryside is unavoidably real.  I return to this in subsequent section.  
 
Political Dimension: Given the deliberate attacks on indigenous institutions during 
the war, Poro elders have adopted 19th century resistance strategies to reinforce 
loyalty to the sodality. Reports from Poro-governed regions in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone indicate that Poro High Priests are indiscriminately kidnapping and forcibly 
initiating all young men who have returned to their communities. They blame western 
practices for corrupting young people who have shown gross disrespect for 
indigenous sacred institutions (KII, Monrovia, 2006).  Unlike the Sande process, 
which broadly fosters community healing and unity, the Poro reclaiming of political 
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authority has sparked conflicts between Poro elders on the one hand and youth and 
non-Poro communities like the Muslim communities and Christians on the other in 
Sierra Leone (Concord Times, March 2005; Fanthorpe, 2007).237  The Poro authorities 
are also attacking the schools, apparently to ensure that they control what their 
children learn both in the Poro and western schools.  Reports of the abduction and 
forced initiation of teachers assigned to the rural Provinces in Sierra Leone are 
steadily increasing (ibid).  Another avenue through which Poro authorities are 
asserting themselves is in land redistribution and/ or reclaim.  Young people, 
including ex-combatants who were not initiated before the wars and have become 
adults, are required to undergo initiation rites as a condition for accessing their family 
lands (Richards et al, 2004).  Similarly in Lofa County, the Poro masked High Priest 
who rarely comes to town and cannot be seen by women and non-Poro initiates, now 
frequently comes to town during busy hours.  As a result, non-Poro initiates would 
abandon their daily chores, including leaving their goods in market places.238 During 
my visit to Lofa County for this work, rumours of “devil coming to town” had people 
fleeing public places and hiding in their houses.  Although this was just a rumour, 
people I interacted with in the county indicated that ‘devil coming to town’ which 
refers to the Poro masked high priest had become a recurrent theme.  A key 
informant, a Christian convert and critic of the Poro, noted that current negative 
practices of the Poro authorities appear to be the extension of the war of loot, 
“…which dogged this country for 14 years.”  He alleged that as the Poro masked 
                                                
237Some attributed the spread of the Poro practice to the Western Province, which is home to the Creole (the free 
slaves who inhabited Freetown and its environs) to the mass displacement to and around the capital city.   
238It was reported that these actions were designed to punish the Mandingo community whose forces, through 
LURD destroyed Poro shrines and killed hundreds of Poro priests in Liberia. Fanthorpe reports similar pan-Poro 
anti-Mandingo campaigns throughout Sierra Leone.  Richard et al have noted that unlike Liberia where the anti-
Muslim sentiments are a consequence of the actions of LURD, in Sierra Leone it is an attempt to control the 
economic powers, which the Mandingoes and Fullahs—the so-called strangers—enjoy. In March 2005, it was 
reported that Muslims in Bo Township had protested en masse to local government officials following the forced 
initiation of a local Imam (Fanthorpe, 2007). 
Sam Doe Final Thesis UB No. 04008980 207 
priests come to town, people flee the market places and the followers steal goods from 
market places.”  “This must be stopped,” the key informant emphasised (KII, Lofa, 
2006). 
 
There are strong criticisms against the politics and practices of the Poro, and hence 
justification for its exclusion in the internationally led post-conflict recovery projects.  
Richards et al (2004 and 2005), in their social assessment reports on post-conflict 
recovery in Sierra Leone and Liberia, make contentious generalisations that deserve 
discussing.  Firstly, the authors dismissed the polities of Poro-dominated rural Liberia 
and Sierra Leone as “old-established patrimonial, gerontocratic political culture” in 
which youth, women, and strangers were marginalised (Richards et al, 2004: 28).  
They claim that both civil wars have direct causal links to the privation to which 
youth were subjected in the gerontocratic order of the interior.  The growing struggle 
of the Poro to reassert itself and the approach of forced kidnapping of ‘strangers’ is a 
clear indication of efforts to restore the repressive authority that the Poro exercised 
over the interior.  Secondly, the authors allege that Poro communities are inherently 
fragmented between ruling lineages, dependent lineages and migrants and are 
therefore not capable of evolving the cohesive society necessary for post-conflict 
recovery and development (ibid).  The authors seem to imply that the collapse of 
indigenous institutions and the rise to power of youth and women during the civil 
wars present opportunities to dismantle rural systems, and at the same time complete 
state penetration, which has been impossible since independence due to the 
imperviousness of sodality-governed rural Liberia and Sierra Leone.  State 
penetration, they surmise, will end the complex dual polities in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone (Richard et al, 2004 and 2004).  
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Richard et al’s claim that the civil wars of Liberia and Sierra Leone were caused by 
youth revolt against rural politics is not only inaccurate, it seems an attempt to 
exonerate the Westphalian state from the catastrophes which have befallen both 
countries since the introduction of the settler states.  There is no gainsaying that the 
reluctance of the freed slaves and colonial powers to forge political fusion with the 
interior is at the heart of state degeneration and collapse in both countries.  While the 
authors’ claim that youth attacks against rural ‘big-men’, including chiefs and Poro 
priests, was a protest against repressive and corrupt authorities is accurate, it was not 
necessarily an anti-Poro revolt (Fanthorpe, 2007).  Besides, warlords also orchestrated 
the attacks as a strategy to usurp local authorities and thereby exercise control over 
the interior.  A second point worth discussing is the claim that Poro-governed 
societies are inherently non-cohesive, given their stratification. The authors seem to 
be suggesting an inverse relationship between cohesiveness and stratified societies.  
Poro-governed societies have survived several centuries of deliberate institutionalised 
national and international campaigns to dismantle them.  The glue that held and 
continues to hold rural Liberia and Sierra Leone together remains the Poro and other 
related sodalities. Most importantly, calls for the total erasure of indigenous Poro 
structures is an 18th century colonial myth, which failed disastrously then and is 
unlikely to succeed now.   
 
All this notwithstanding, neither Poro nor their initiates expect the interior and their 
control of it to be the same after the civil wars.  Rural dwellers, many of whom were 
displaced internally and externally, have been exposed to new worldviews, norms and 
practices.  Youth who are now part of militarised social networks are unlikely to 
completely subsume themselves under Poro and Sande as well as chieftaincy 
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hierarchies.  New experiences from their areas of displacement will have to be 
negotiated during the ‘locality-rebuilding’ process.  A female civil society leader told 
me in Freetown that,  
 
“One thing the war in Sierra Leone has done for women is that it has empowered 
us to step out of the home and march into the public domain…We have populated 
the public domain [chuckle]… There is no turning back.  Men will simply have to 
adjust to our presence and voices…” (KII, Freetown, 2006).   
 
This thesis is therefore not asking for a return of the status quo, whether in the interior 
or within the settler states, or for practitioners to indulge in “superstitious practices”.  
The point I make in this work is to remind international state reconstruction 
practitioners that collapse only happens where state and societal institutions and 
mechanisms fail.  Emphasis on reforming the state, as we see in the international 
practice, does not automatically translate into reproduction of societal structures and 
stability.  There is the need to pay attention to societal institutions and mechanisms.  
The response to societal institutions such as the Poro and Sande needs to aim for 
transformation instead of dismantlement.  Emphasis should be placed on establishing 
foundations and platforms for the new state to engage in constructive dialogue with 
societal institutions such as the Poro and Sande, in order to deepen mutual 
understanding and cultivate greater integration and coherence.239 
 
 
 
                                                
239For instance the number of youth who are critical and vocal about their rights and place in rural society has 
increased.  There is also realisation amongst Poro high priests and rural patrons that more respectful relationships 
would be required between them and the youth to guarantee peace and social order in the interior.  At this critical 
juncture, dialogue is the best means to evolve a reconciled new social order. Engaging with indigenous 
mechanisms would help us address questions that arise when recreating the ‘local’.  It may also improve the 
chances of creating both vertical and horizontal links between the local and the national. 
Sam Doe Final Thesis UB No. 04008980 210 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter I have demonstrated the contrasts between the liberal peace project’s 
strategies on recovery and those of the Poro and Sande in Liberia and Sierra Leone from a 
number of angles.  Firstly, the primary goal of indigenous recovery is the restoration of 
the community.  It then looks to the community to rehabilitate and reintegrate its 
individual members.  Secondly, while the internationally led recovery process focuses on 
material recovery, indigenous systems emphasise material-secular and non-material 
spiritual recovery.  Thirdly, I argued that while it is generally agreed that the collapse of 
Liberia and Sierra Leone are traced to the foundations of the states and the extent of their 
interactions with indigenous systems, the internationally led recovery projects failed to 
address foundational issues or engage constructively with indigenous mechanisms.  
Fourthly, in the bid to accelerate recovery and erase indigenous systems, international 
practitioners made attempts to establish parallel structures in communities where there are 
effective and resilient indigenous structures.  These parallel structures have added to the 
already complex institutional environment of both countries and are yet to achieve 
coherence with indigenous and other structures in context.  Aside from the lack of 
engagement of indigenous systems in the recovery and institution building processes, the 
international practices of state reconstruction in both countries have been piecemeal and 
disjointed.  For instance, the DDR strategies in Liberia and Sierra Leone did not link to 
the overall recovery and development as well as the security sector reform strategies.  
Drawing from the experiences of state reconstruction as discussed in this Chapter I 
propose indigenisation, in Chapter 6, as a complement to the liberal peace approach to 
statebuilding. 
Sam Doe Final Thesis UB No. 04008980 211 
 
CHAPTER 6 
TOWARDS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
INDIGENISING STATE RECONSTRUCTION 
 
 
“All societies have at their disposal social modes of regulation and resources able to serve as a 
basis for reconstruction… [It is only by identifying and building on these will we be able to 
achieve sustainable reconstruction of the state]” (Pouligny, 2002: 203).   
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The international approach to state reconstruction and peacebuilding, as Paris (2004) 
observes, is grounded in the liberal peace thesis (2004).  The liberal peace thesis 
posits that democracy and market economies anchored in the promotion of human 
rights, elections, constitutionalism and rule of law, property rights and good 
governance are the most effective guarantees of long-term peace and state viability 
(ibid). Gray (1986) notes that liberal peace is established on four fundamental 
principles.  These include: a) the primacy of the individual over and above social 
collectivity; b) egalitarianism which promotes equality of all humans; c) universalism 
of liberal values; and d) ameliorism, emphasising progress while shunning 
backwardness, historical exigencies and relativism (cited in Liden, 2006).  These 
principles are anchored on the foundations of individual civic rights and freedom, 
representative government, rights to private property and free market (ibid).   Since 
liberalists believe that the ‘absolute’ liberal values can only grow in the liberal world, 
they claim that their God-given duty is to transplant and nurture the growth of 
liberalism in the non-liberal world.240 
 
                                                
240It is this proposition, which, as indicated in Chapter Four, accounts for the liberal view that contemporary wars 
are opportunities to reconstruct non-liberal societies on liberal foundations. 
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The liberal peace thesis, though it remains the dominant approach in international 
peacebuilding and post-conflict state reconstruction, has come under considerable 
scrutiny in recent years. While arguing for the liberal peace project, Roland Paris 
(2004) notes that a critical missing link in contemporary liberal peacebuilding projects 
is the centrality of institution.  He reminds liberal peace practitioners, that the 
replacement of Hobbes “Leviathan” with small but effective government based on the 
rule of law is central to classical liberalism (Paris, 2006). In his proposed 
‘institutionalisation before liberalisation’ thesis, Paris argues that before liberal 
practices are introduced, the international system should focus on erecting and 
administering, over a period of time, liberal institutions that will regulate the 
turbulence that is inherent to liberalism.  But while Paris may have adequately defined 
some of the flaws in the liberal project, his proposal for benign international 
authoritarians to build and grow liberal institutions in non-liberal societies, Liden 
(2006) observes correctly, has “…further complicated matters.” Also, while I 
recognise the value of the liberal peace project and the return of the centrality of 
governmental institutions to the contemporary liberal peace discourse, there are three 
areas where Paris’s thesis is problematic.  Firstly, Paris seems to equate 
institutionalisation with the establishment of institutions, or what Ottaway would 
prefer to call organisations; secondly, there is the implicit assumption that external 
actors are better placed to establish institutions than those for whom they are 
established241; and finally, that by maintaining an enduring presence, the externally 
established institutions will take root.  Institutionalisation is both an aided and natural 
process of achieving congruence in the institutional environment.  It is more about 
                                                
241The three extremes on this subject range from no international leadership (de Waal, 2006) to Brahimi’s “light 
footprint” concept, where he accepts international leadership but light enough to facilitate quick domestic 
leadership (2007: 13) to Roland Paris’ ‘Institutionalisation before Liberalisation’ which calls for full international 
stewardship until liberal institutions are erected and strong enough to keep liberalism in tact (2004).    
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nurturing structures to growth, rather than just setting up structures and keeping watch 
over them.  Perrow (1986) indicates that organisations are institutionalised when they 
transcend their incentive functions to become sources of identity242, while Scott 
(1995) notes the infusion of values in organisations as the basis for 
institutionalisation. The value-laden and incentive-transcendent requirements of 
institutionalisation beg a number of questions, which Paris fails to address.  For 
instance, a) who establishes state institutions? b) what values are being 
institutionalised and what are their origin? and c) what systematic strategy is in place 
for institutionalisation? A second point, which Paris also overlooks, is the institutional 
environment.  How will the new institutions be negotiated to establish institutional 
congruence amongst the myriad of conflict-recreated institutions in the context?243 
Besides, it is yet to be established whether one can achieve an institutionalised stable 
state under the trusteeship of the cocktail of international actors who are the purveyors 
of the liberal peace project. The anarchical institutional framework and conflicting 
values they manifest compromise the goals of institutionalisation and the effective 
governmentality that is a hallmark of classical liberal peace thesis.244  
 
Other equally compelling critiques of the liberal peace thesis come from the 
communitarians and critical theorists.  Macmillan, basing his argument in the critical 
theory point of view, dismisses the liberal peace actors as “…the most conservative 
strand and crusading wing of the wider liberal tradition” who perpetuate the unjust 
global power imbalance (2004: 473).   As for the communitarian, it is the claim to 
                                                
242
To identify with any institution, one must first and foremost feel a sense of ownership.  This means that the 
institution represents not only incentive structures but also the expression of the core values of the people it is 
intended to serve.  
243
Perrow emphasises that adapting institutions to the values of the internal groups and those external in its society 
is a sine qua non in achieving the institutionalisation process. 
244
In post-conflict collapsed states, intervention draws on an abundance of players, many of whom are contracted 
by states or multilateral agencies to further their respective interests.  Whether states can actually be reconstructed 
by such scrambles for power, visibility and influence, both sides agree, is highly suspect. 
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universality, which weakens the liberal project.  They argue that by failing to take into 
consideration the experiences, cultures, identity and context where the liberal project 
is being undertaken “…resembles the mission civilisatrice” of colonial times in which 
Europeans believed that they were commissioned by God to civilise the rest of the 
world (Duffield, 2001: 83).  Communitarians insist post-conflict peacebuilding and 
state reconstruction should emerge from the life experience of the host-country (ibid).  
Swazo (2002 cited in Liden 2006) contends that rebuilding state and society, which he 
refers to as ‘organism’, is “concerned with self-renewal”.  He notes, “…it is only by 
the process of self-renewal can an organism be healed” (2006).  In this perspective, 
the communitarians argue that post-conflict peacebuilding and state reconstruction is 
only durable when “…it cultivates and fertilises seeds of peace, healing, and 
institution rebuilding…rather than replace them” (ibid). They insist the onus is 
therefore on the liberal peace project to reinvent itself as a “non-universalising 
political idea” (Dunne, 2001: 179). 
 
At the backdrop of the conceptual underpinning of liberalism discussed above, this 
chapter begins with a review of how the liberal project is operationalised in post-war 
states in Section 2.  This is followed by in-depth discussion on the conceptual 
framework for my proposed indigenisation thesis in Section 3.  The final section 
offers a framework of inquiry of indigenisation of post-conflict state reconstruction. 
 
6.2 CURRENT PRACTICE OF STATE RECONSTRUCTION 
 
A flurry of definitions exists for post-conflict reconstruction.  Anderlini and El-
Bushra (2004) define the concept as any actions taking place immediately after the 
signing of a peace agreement or the official declaration of an end of civil war.  This 
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definition falls short of determining when such actions cease to be called post-conflict 
reconstruction.  The Centre for Strategic International Studies attempts to fill the gap 
created by Anderlini and El-Bushra’s definition by adding that the actions fall 
between peace agreement or declaration of war’s end, and normalisation.  They go 
further to characterise normalisation as a time when large scale outside help is no 
longer needed; structures of governance and the country’s economy have begun to 
function on a self-sustaining basis; and interpersonal and intergroup relations are 
guided by generally acceptable norms (CSIS and AUSA, 2002: 2).  Call and Cousens 
(2007) indicate that the international community tends to approach post-conflict state 
reconstruction from a number of angles, including political, sociological, security or 
economic angles.  The political approach focuses on restoring political authority, 
democratic culture and structures of governance; the security approach focuses on the 
restoration of rule of law, order and institutions such as army and police to repress 
violence.  The sociological approach tends to focus on reconciling society, revisiting 
and renewing social compact and rebuilding social fabrics of society.  And the 
economic approach focuses on resuscitating a country’s economy and ensuring its 
return to the global market. This often entails “…revenue generation, the rule of law 
and the creation of an investment environment” (ibid).  
 
Irrespective of what angle is taken the general international practice is to adopt a 
template approach in which “multiparty elections, constitutionalism, rule of law, 
human rights, gender equality, good governance, economic liberalisation and security 
sector reform” feature prominently (Paris, 2004: 58).  The overwhelming list of tasks, 
as indicated in Figure 6.1, tends to be undertaken in three interlinked phases: a) 
humanitarian emergency, b) recovery, and c) institution building and state 
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consolidation.  Although humanitarian emergency intervention is the door through 
which the international system enters post-conflict collapsed states, this work does not 
discuss this phase.  I focus instead on the recovery and institution-building phases, 
since my emphasis is on statebuilding and not immediate life saving services provided 
in the humanitarian phase.  This of course is not to suggest that outcomes of the 
humanitarian interventions do not affect recovery and long-term institution building. 
 
Figure 6.1: Contemporary International State Reconstruction 
 
 
 
6.2.1 From Emergency to Recovery Phase of State Reconstruction 
 
The United Nations Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery (CWG-ER) divides 
the recovery process into early recovery and recovery, where early recovery is defined 
as “a multidimensional process that builds on humanitarian programmes while 
catalysing opportunities for sustaining nationally owned resilient processes for post 
crisis recovery” (CWG-ER, 2008: 9).  On mid-term recovery, Rothchild (2001) notes, 
the process is one whereby international actors lay the foundation for long-term 
institution building and socio-economic development in post-conflict contexts.  
Deducing from the two definitions one can say that early recovery stabilises the post-
humanitarian environment while recovery focuses on foundation building.  Michailof 
et al (2003) describes the early recovery context where stabilisation is emphasised as 
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a context where: a) physical infrastructure lies in ruins; b) human capacities have 
either sought refuge, killed or psychologically impaired; c) fiscal resources and 
financial management systems are weakened; d) networks of civic engagement are 
either weakened or destroyed; e) service delivery capacities are reduced or 
nonexistent; and f) accountability structures both in society and the state are 
disarticulated (p. 16).  Early recovery practitioners argue that such a context would 
require some healing and stabilisation before building firm foundations on which the 
post-war society is established; hence, the introduction of early recovery in its grand 
strategy.  Macrae (2001) identifies the following as indicators that suggest that early 
recovery and recovery aims are met: a) restored national capacities, b) a secured 
environment, d) developed and functioning mechanisms for conflict management, and 
c) an established foundation for long-term institution building.   
 
While in the humanitarian phase the international community tend to appropriate the 
space and drive the process,245 in the recovery phase the focus is on the gradual 
withdrawal of the massive international presence while supporting national ownership 
and leadership. The core tasks almost universally referred to, and for which the 
international community has developed prescriptive tools and ‘best practices’ include: 
a) the restoration of some authority (political and security); b) repatriation, 
resettlement and reintegration of refugees; c) dealing with the past through some 
transitional justice processes, restoring rule of law and improving human rights.  
Stedman et al (2002) observe that a major weakness in the liberal project is its 
ambition to address all post-war problems without strategically prioritizing areas that 
                                                
245Because the international community has assumed that post-conflict local contexts are technically, 
materially and financially deficient, leadership in the recovery phase is arrogated to the international 
system—although the international stewardship approach, as indicated at the beginning of this chapter, 
is the most contentious in the critiques of the liberal project. 
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will have greater effect for stability and durable peace.  He suggests that clearly 
defining the sub-goals with the greater impact is key to intervention.  While not 
attempting to define the strategic sub goals for the purpose of this work I discuss three 
of the prominent sub goals in international post-conflict state reconstruction: 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration and security sector reform (the 
security domain) and local governance (the political and economic domains).246  
 
6.2.1.1 Restoring Security  
 
The first task that immediately follows the cessation of hostility in all post-conflict 
setting is the restoration of security (Brahimi, 2005).  Aside from the deployment of a 
robust force to keep the peace, the primary responsibility of UN peacekeeping 
missions has been to support the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
(DDR) of former combatants.247  The 2004 report of the UN High-level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change singles out DDR as the determining factor for the 
stabilisation of any post-conflict society.  Spear (2002) concurs and adds, “[DDR] is 
the only means by which instruments of war are removed and confidence in the 
security condition is restored” (p. 143).  To achieve the goal of DDR the international 
community tends to emphasize persuasion more than coercion.  As Brahimi (2007) 
emphasises, commitments of former warring factions is critical to the success of any 
DDR.248  He goes on to argue that the United Nations is only a moral guarantor and, 
where necessary, a provider of incentives that encourage warring factions to live up to 
                                                
246In the case study that preceded this chapter I expanded these two areas to look include community revitalisation.   
247International best practice also mandates peacekeeping operations to build confidence amongst former enemies 
and the frightened society, support the operation of a power sharing transitional authority, disarm, demobilise and 
reintegrate ex-combatants, support the restoration of civil order and the rule of law, help resuscitate the economy, 
and support repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of refugees and IDPs. 
248These include disarmament—the “collection, documentation, control, and disposal of small arms, ammunition, 
and heavy weapons”; demobilisation—the formal discharge of combatants from ‘military’ structures to civilian 
life; and reintegration—the process whereby ex-combatants acquire civilian status and are sustainably employed 
(ibid).  
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commitments made through a peace process (p.12).  While DDR processes have had 
partial success, including significantly reducing the circulation of dangerous weapons, 
symbolically bringing real and psychological closure to civil wars, and most 
importantly returning conscripted children to their families and communities, the 
current international practice is fundamentally flawed in two senses: a) it is built on 
flawed assumptions and b) it lacks proper sequencing.   
 
Myths of internationally led DDR: Drawing from my research, I come to the 
conclusion that the international DDR process is based on the false assumption that all 
contemporary armed conflicts, though generally unanimously defined as 
unconventional, can be adequately addressed with conventional models. Even though 
telling evidence from situations in Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the DR Congo, 
where majority of the killing were done with basic farming implements, has 
challenged this assumption, significant change is yet to take place in the best practice 
toolbox of the international system.  Some of the dominant myths on which DDR 
toolbox is established are discussed here:  
 
1. Delineation of community and battlefield is possible: While all agree that 
contemporary civil wars are fought everywhere, emphasis on encampment, 
demobilisation and reintegration is based on the conventional notion that 
separates battlefields from communities. That more than 60% of combatants in 
most civil wars in Africa barely leave their communities, and that almost all 
combat operations take place in both urban and rural communities, is not 
factored into the thinking and strategies of DDR.  
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2. Targeted vs. Community Based: Macmallian (1998) and Gray (1986) remind 
us that the core aim of the liberal project is the emancipation of the individual 
and the elimination of social collectivity.  The conviction that the individual 
will survive without the burden of the collective underpins the way DDR 
programmes are designed. The success of the programme is measured in the 
number of combatants disarmed and reintegrated, with very little support to 
the communities in which they are to be absorbed.  Evidence-based studies of 
DDR programmes consistently point out that sustainable rehabilitation and 
reintegration of ex-combatants depends on the leadership of empowered, 
economically self-generating and socially cohesive communities.   
 
3. Universalisation and “Technicisation” of DDR: Swazo (2002) notes that the 
liberal notion that ex-combatants can be rehabilitated and reintegrated into 
their societies with ‘techne” or prefabricated packages has proven to be a 
misunderstanding of what constitutes the rehabilitation of an organism.  He 
contends that the ‘techne’ approach is oblivious to the notion of “self-
renewal”, which is inherent to the recovery of an organism, including humans 
and their society.  Organism’s self-renewal is first and foremost based on its 
inherent agencies and then on the context before the intervener.  In this view I 
argue that self-renewal is impossible for ex-combatants without factoring in 
the social-cultural dimensions of warfare, healing and reintegration drawn 
from their respective contexts.  All agree that contemporary warfare draws on 
the perverted versions of the respective culture (Ellis, 1999; Sawyer, 1992).  
Yet the liberal project with its principle of ‘ameliorism’ downplays cultures 
and indigenous systems.  In international DDR programmes, indigenous 
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processes of healing, demobilisation, cleansing and restoration of ex-
combatants are rarely considered in planning, programming and 
implementation of DDR.  Even in Sierra Leone and Liberia, where the entire 
indigenous society including all sodality institutions were mobilised as active 
soldiers in defence of their communities, and (in the case of Sierra Leone) the 
state, the DDR processes and the security architecture that followed, as we 
discussed in Chapter 5, brushed aside civil militias and traditional sodality-
based warriors and the indigenous processes which influenced them.249 Doyle 
(1998) reminds us that because the liberal project is based on the belief that 
non-liberal societies are incapable of producing liberal values, and since the 
aim is to usurp the irredeemable cultures of non-liberal societies, it makes no 
sense to pay attention to cultures in post-war contexts.  Ayoob (1995) 
challenges the liberal approach of cultural erasure. He contends indigenous 
institutions and cultures have major stakes in DDR interventions because the 
“…proliferation of small arms undermines not only central authority, but also 
the traditional foundation for order…” (p. 43).  In an apparent communitarian 
stance, Ayoob insists that the best strategy would be “…to strengthen existing 
tribal structures, norms and governmental laws as sources of restraint, 
[healing, and restoration] rather than attempting to impose norms from 
without” (ibid).   
 
The Problem of Sequencing: Strategies of the liberal project, Paris (2004) also 
observes, tend to be ad hoc, piecemeal and fragmented. In the case of the DDR 
process, there is the tendency to place a greater emphasis on disarmament.  I surmise 
                                                
249
A good example of the consistent silencing of indigenous voices in DDR is the lack of mention of their role in 
the recently published UN Inter-agency Integrated Guidance Note and Standards for DDR. 
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that this emphasis is because in the DD process, it is easy to programme targeted 
individual-based intervention with quantitative indicators of success.  In fact, a 
number of donors judge the value of their money spent by the number of weapons 
collected, rather than the long-term goals of stabilisation, community restoration and 
reconciliation.  As a consequence, although combatants have undergone years of 
brainwashing, during which warlords constructed and implanted in most children 
perverted social and political worldviews, demobilisation—a stage where 
psychosocial healing and the first orientation for renewed citizenship and civilian life 
takes place—lasts only a few weeks.  In this period, aside from the challenges of 
organising camps, getting ready reinsertion packages and addressing behavioural 
issues, war-scarred combatants undergo 3-5 days of western style clinical counselling.  
Brahimi (2007) admits that the international system needs “…new creative thinking to 
ensure that ex-combatants become stakeholders in society with well-defined social 
and economic relationships that will reconstitute the fabric of society and engender 
citizenship” (p. 12).  This certainly cannot be achieved in makeshift camps and 
hurried rehabilitation processes.   
 
By the time the process reaches the reintegration stage, in most cases the international 
community is at the end of the recovery phase and is preparing to hand over to an 
elected government.  So-called vocational programmes are hurriedly established.  Ex-
combatants undergo these makeshift training exercises and then are awarded 
certificates as trained carpenters, tailors, etc.  They are then handed over to their 
communities in big ceremonies as agents of the rebuilding process.  At the end of the 
glamour of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, post-conflict societies are 
left with the burdens of the residual effects of a poorly planned and implemented 
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DDR process—organised crime, homicide, vigilantism, etc.  It is post-conflict elected 
governments—already reeling under the burdens of high expectations, ruined 
institutions and almost non-existent capacities—that often take the blame for the 
insecurity that is the direct outcome of DDR programmes, while the international 
community relocates with their toolboxes to yet another failed or collapsing state.   
 
6.2.1.2 Restoring Political Authority  
  
In a post-conflict setting, where state and societal institutions have collapsed and 
political as well as military vacuums are fiercely contested for by warlords, the liberal 
peace project has made restoration of some sort of political authority the second 
priority after security.  The common practice is to establish or legitimize, through 
peace agreements, extra-constitutional environment and time-bound, power-sharing 
transitional authority.  It is important to investigate the rationale for and impact of 
creating or legitimizing extra-constitutional environment and establishing power 
sharing transitional authorities on reconstructing viable states.  
 
Extra-Constitutional and Quasi-governance Context: The notion of starting on a clean 
slate, which embeds the liberal peace project, also finds expression in how authorities 
are restored in post-war contexts, especially where the state has collapsed and the 
peace is negotiated.  The inter-related arguments on which establishing or legitimising 
extra-constitutional environment seems justified include: a) pre-war constitutions are 
often obstacles to negotiated settlement; b) that the very nature of the peace, which is 
often negotiated between state and non-state actors, necessitates the creation of an 
extra-constitutional context, and c) that the state has collapsed calls for a critical 
review of the constitutional foundations on which it was established.  Extra 
Sam Doe Final Thesis UB No. 04008980 224 
constitutional environment is an incentive to encourage post-war societies to craft 
new post-conflict constitutions (Rainford and Satkunanathan, 2009).   
 
While I recognise the case for extra constitutional recovery context the case of Liberia 
and Sierra Leone raises some questions about its efficacy.  Rather than the extra-
constitutional governance encouraging dialogue for renewed social compact as 
envisaged by international state reconstruction practitioners, post-settlement 
governments in Liberia and Sierra Leone have simply restored their pre-war 
constitutions.  No one asked whether the infrastructures and mentalities created 
during the wars and in the recovery phases would impact the re-instituted pre-war 
constitutional order. The underlying political, economic and social corrosives, many 
of which are rooted in the executive-dominated and elite-driven constitutions of 
Liberia and Sierra Leone, respectively, are apparently embraced as foundations for 
post-war polities.  As Ihonvbere (2005) argues, it is “…impossible to construct a new 
platform for democratic politics and good governance… without re-compacting the 
constitution and establishing new rules of politics” after civil wars (p. 103). Most 
importantly in their creation of the extra-constitutional environment, the peacemaking 
practitioners gave no consideration to the dual constitutional orders —the colonial 
state jurisprudence and indigenous Poro jurisprudence in the interior—that operate in 
both countries.  There is not a single mention in the LPA and CPA of the effects of 
the wars on indigenous constitutional environment and what is required for their 
recovery or non-recovery.  The lack of recognition of the indigenous constitutional 
order and structures of governance in the post-conflict state reconstruction projects in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone, as discussed in Chapter Five, has contributed to increased 
social disorder in the interior regions.   
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Power sharing Transitional Authorities: The second practise of political transition in 
the recovery phase is to establish power sharing transitional government. Humphreys 
and Weinstein (2008) have argued that greed-driven wars are best resolved by buying 
peace.  And awarding warlords time-bound free rein through transitional power 
sharing arrangements has become the common strategy for buying peace in the 
international state reconstruction toolbox.  Aside from its peace-buying aim, it is 
argued that power sharing transitional governments serve two other important aims 
including: addressing the twin questions of domestic and external legitimacy (Doyle, 
2002); and helping to “…build institutional frameworks that bind especially former 
belligerents in self-restraint and mutual cooperation…” (Lyons, 2002: 224).  Liberia 
and Sierra Leone’s post-conflict recovery experience raises doubts about the 
prospects for buying peace, ensuring restraints and promoting cooperation amongst 
belligerents through power sharing arrangements. In both countries instead of 
achieving the stated aims the project contributed to the prolongation of the conflict 
and the proliferation of warlords.  For instance, each time transitional governments 
were formed, new warlords joined in the fray.  Legitimacy building also inadvertently 
became more of capitulating to the power of brute force.  Orr (2005), drawing from 
these developments, warns liberal practitioners not to delude themselves that warlord 
power-sharing governments are legitimate or can foster legitimacy.  These 
governments should be treated for what they are—a compromise and pacification for 
peace (ibid).  Others argue that beneath the claims to buying peace, fostering 
legitimacy, and ensuring belligerent restraints is the unspoken aim of clearing post-
conflict contexts of its foundations for statehood in order to allow the international 
community enough latitude to reconstruct the state as they see fit.  Constitutional 
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governance, a key informant claimed, tends to stifle externally driven recovery efforts 
by complicating decision-making.  “Extra-constitutional framework removes all such 
impediments” (KII, Monrovia, 2005). Another key informant in Monrovia sums the 
predicaments with the practice of quasi-legal governance in extra-constitutional post-
conflict environment thus: 
 
This country is a free for all…everybody is doing his own thing.  The National 
Transitional Government of Liberia has already discredited itself and thereby 
provided the justification the international community needed to brush it aside 
and move on with recovery as they see it…[hmm, laugh] as for Liberian civil 
society organisations, especially the NGOs that I call fortune chasers, they are 
aligning with the international counterpart from whose table more crumbs are 
falling.  With no constitution, no credible political authority, we simply have no 
sovereign basis to ask for what we want and how we want it… (KII, Monrovia, 
2005) 
 
 
6.3 INSTITUTION BUILDING AND STATE CONSOLIDATION 
 
The final phase of the liberal peace project in post-conflict societies is institution 
building and state consolidation.  Based on a range of studies and growing debates on 
the subject of statebuilding, Barnett (2004) has come up with indicators for the state 
reconstruction outcomes which seem applicable to the international post-conflict state 
reconstruction more broadly. He indicates that successful state reconstruction is one 
in which: a) a new vision and social compact that is broadly understood and accepted 
is generated; b) horizontal and vertical social networks are made stronger, compared 
to their pre-war conditions; c) indigenous and conventional productive networks are 
linked; d) governmental institutions at local and national levels are well capacitated in 
terms of technical and human resource capability; e) local and national authorities are 
more cohesive and mutually reinforcing; and f) local agencies for food self-
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sufficiency are harnessed more compared to their pre-war conditions.250  As for Paris 
(2004) institution building and state consolidation enjoin international state 
reconstruction practitioners to commit to the institutionalization of post-conflict state 
structures instead of just establishing them. Ghani et al (2006) and Michialof et al 
(2003) focus on the peace-sustaining and development-generating values of 
rebuilding institutions in post-conflict contexts.  
 
In order to appreciate the critique of the liberal peace approach to institution building, 
it is prudent to digress and review the concept of institution and institutionalisation.  
O’Rordan and Jordan (1996) describe institution as “structure of power and 
relationships manifested in its members, clients, knowledge, culture and worldviews” 
(p. 65).  While O’Rordan and Jordan offer a sociological understanding of institution, 
Michailof et al (2003) focus on its managerial and/bureaucratic interpretation.  In this 
view they define institution as a “…legal, administrative, and customary 
arrangements for repeated human interactions” (p. 25).  The bureaucratic notion of 
institution is given full interpretation by Max Weber.  Weber views institutions as 
instruments to which atomised interest-seeking individuals subject themselves only in 
exchange for some benefits (cited Ostrom, 1999).  In this view, an institution operates 
within the “logic of consequentiality” (Christensen and Rovik, 1999).  O’Rordan and 
Jordan’s sociological definition leans towards the normative institutionalists’ 
interpretation of institutions which emphasises the culture building, social relations 
conditioning, and meaning making and sustaining functions of institutions.  Rather 
than the logic of consequentiality, the normative school argues institution is based on 
the “logic of appropriateness” (ibid).  While both schools agree that institution is a 
                                                
250Barnet’s benchmarks turn upside-down the common notion of ‘end justifying means’ towards ‘means justifying 
end’.  All the benchmarks suggested in his work point to the importance of the process of rebuilding collapsed 
states.  
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routinised, value-laden and penetrating organism, the normative institutionalists lay 
more emphasis on the appropriateness and value-transcendent nature of institution.  
Selznick (1949) cited in Christensen and Rovik (1999) avers institutions are created 
when an organisation is “infused with values greater than would be necessary simply 
to achieve their formal purposes” (p. 24).  Another characteristic of institution worth 
noting is its interactive capability.  Elgie and McMenamin (2005) note that 
institutions exist in a complex formal and informal institutional environment.251  They 
contend that institutions reach full maturity only after they are integrated in the 
institutional environment.  The rationalists on the other hand argue that integration is 
desirable, but not a requirement.  They focus on the aggregate (or calculating the total 
impact) of institutions in the institutional environment, rather than focus on their 
coherence or congruence.  Supporting the integrative argument, Migdal contends that 
the “…multiple layers of the body politic and the multiple connections between the 
political and non-political realms” need to be reconciled in order to achieve 
congruence in the institutional environment (p. 36).   
 
As we move on to reflect on the internationally led institution building project it is 
worth keeping in mind McMenamin’s (2005) elegant summary that institution 
building is only concluded when organisations are characterised by “system-
ness…[which] exercises ‘embedded decisional autonomy’ and exhibits ‘value 
infusion’” (p. 43).  Most importantly, all institutions are institutionalised when 
they manifest their own distinct public image and presence” which must resonate with 
the general culture in context (ibid).  With this description in mind, let us turn to the 
                                                
251Within western discourse all indigenous and traditional institutions are regarded as informal, while those 
established within the state system are considered formal.  The fact that within indigenous societies formal or 
public as well as private or informal institutions exist, also in complex interactive dynamics, is not considered in 
dominant scholarly thinking.  Whatever the categorisation, it is recognised that formal state institutions and 
informal indigenous institutions interact in context. 
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institution-building project of the international system.  Again, as was the case in the 
recovery section, I focus on security (security sector reform) and political authority 
(building democratic institutions, and public sector or civil administration) as cases in 
point.  
 
6.3.1 Building Post-conflict Security Authority 
 
Rebuilding security institutions within the international discourse has come to be 
called “security sector reform”.  The concept is based on the assumption that 
structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and 
oversight of security in post-war countries have either weakened or totally collapsed 
(Hendrickson, 1999).  Most importantly security institutions, particularly the armed 
forces and police, had bloated due to wartime recruitment and demand for inclusion 
of non-state forces in the security sector.  It is in these conditions that security sector 
reform in post-conflict collapsed states is often introduced.  Its primary tasks as 
defined by the international community include “re-establishing the armed and police 
forces, reasserting civilian control of the security sector, and ensuring control of the 
proliferation of small arms and light weapons” (ibid).    Security sector reform, 
though not a new concept, has witnessed a different post-Cold War approach.   
Williams (2000) notes that unlike the Cold War approach to SSR, which primarily 
focused on state security with emphasis on physical security, the post-Cold War 
security sector is situated in the development and democracy discourses of the liberal 
peace thesis.  It aims to “…promote human rights, good governance and the culture of 
accountability and transparency...” (p. 1).  Based on a review of a number of security 
sector reform projects in post-conflict states, Williams’ (2000) categorises current 
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SSR practices as minimalist and maximalist approaches and concludes his work with 
a recommendation for what he calls the pragmatist approach.  The author describes 
the minimalist approach as interventions, which focus on restoring the statutory 
forces, like the armed forces, police and paramilitary and militia organisations, where 
appropriate, while the maximalist approach focuses on both institutions for physical 
security and those of the criminal justice systems in general.  In his “pragmatist” 
approach, Williams proposes the reform of both statutory and non-statutory bodies 
like guerrilla groups and traditional forces of the kind I mentioned in Chapter 4.   
 
Although I subscribe to Williams’ categorisation, the exclusive focus on ‘who to 
include’ as a basis for deciding a maximalist or minimalist approach seems limiting to 
me.  Besides, the inclusion of guerrilla groups as integral to SSR is particularly 
problematic. Rather than focus the notion of minimalist and maximalist on the actors 
who are engaged in SSR, as suggested by Williams, I propose to judge the process as 
maximalist or minimalist from a process point of view.  Laurie Nathan’s description 
of South Africa’s security sector reform process, as indicated in Box 6.1 below, 
provides a good basis to argue the case for process orientation rather than actor 
orientation.  
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Nathan outlines a number of key processes, which inform the South African SSR 
process.  These include: First, the SSR was firmly established in the post-war 
constitution; second, the entire security architecture was defined in a comprehensive 
national security strategy which was produced through broad bottom-up consultative 
processes; third, the design of the security architecture reflected the current security 
threats, which were also carefully analysed in a number of independent studies; 
fourth, civilian oversight of the security sector was firmly established in the 
constitution.  There was also a publicly generated Defence Act and military code. And 
finally the entire architecture was translated into civic education programmes.252  This 
detailed process is what I would refer to as a maximalist approach.  The maximalist 
approach is more often than not driven from within with substantial percentage of 
resources required for the project internally sourced.  The minimalist approach, on the 
other hand, ranges from conducting crash courses for individuals randomly selected 
and enlisting them as members of the new army and police forces through an 
                                                
252Nathan and others identify South Africa and Zimbabwe as the only two countries in Africa where the 
maximalist approach to SSR was applied (although nearly two decades after the comprehensive approach) but did 
not translate into meaningful human security, even if it has forestalled the meddling the military in politics.   
Box 6.1: South African Experience with SSR, by Laurie Nathan 
 
Arguably the South African experience is the nearest example of internally and to some extent 
indigenous approach to security sector/system transformation.  Laurie Nathan indicates that as part of 
the rebuilding of post-Apartheid South Africa the people and the ANC led government took a 
comprehensive and transformative approach to security.  The first focus on the project was the 
revisiting of the constitution—to codify the norms around which the sector will be designed—noting 
the exact circumstances in which the armed forces could be deployed and how it is to fulfill its 
functions.  They also agreed on clear constitutional provisions for parliamentary oversight of the 
security sector.  Once the constitutional basis was agreed the South Africans turned to the 
development of Defence Act, Military Discipline Code, Code of Conduct, and civilian Defense 
Secretariat.  They also established human resource policy, which deals with military trade unions, 
equal opportunity and affirmative action, non-discrimination on grounds of race, ethnicity, gender and 
sexual orientation, and the abolition of conscription.  Civic Education Programme to promote 
awareness and respect amongst the military personnel for the core values of democratic South Africa 
were designed and launched. 
 
Source: Herbert Wulf (2000) “Security Sector Reform brief No. 15, Bonn International Centre 
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externally managed process as seen in Liberia and Sierra Leone.  The approach tends 
to by-pass tasks of establishing the constitutional basis and institutional arrangements, 
as well as public participation in the design of the post-conflict security architecture 
design.  While the maximalist approach as I suggest may seem ambitious, the decay 
of the security sector and its primacy in the reconstruction of the collapsed states 
makes investment in the maximalist approach a necessity.  
 
Judging from the above understanding of the construction of the security sector, I 
argue that current practices as seen in Liberia, Sierra Leone and other contexts where 
the project is entirely financed by external actors, there are a number of fundamental 
flaws. First, we have to recognise that security is the life-blood of the state.  It has 
always been the most protected and secretive function of the state.  The 
internationally driven minimalist SSR project seem to threaten tenets of the ‘national 
security’ doctrine, which still remains the guiding principle for security thinking at the 
level of the state.  Aside from the challenge to the status quo, the donor-driven nature 
of SSR and the fact that SSR is explicitly tailored to third world countries by the 
industrialised and formal colonial centres, reinforces the suspicion that SSR is a neo-
colonial and imperialist project.  These realities justify suggestions made by skeptics 
that the SSR project is a subtle way for the ‘security-paranoid’ industrialised world to 
prod into security structures, strategies and secrets of third world or developing 
countries.   
 
Second, in all states whether industrialised or third world, the security sector has 
come to be a sort of fraternity.  It is opaque and impervious.  There is a clear 
distinction between insiders and outsiders.  Over the years, each security institution 
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even in the same state has developed its own discourse and language.   In the case of 
Africa and specifically Liberia and Sierra Leone, champions of security sector reform 
as proposed in this concept are primarily academics and civil society organisations.  
Their language is sometimes not only different; it contradicts the discourse within 
particularly the core structures of the security sector.  Aside from speaking and 
working across purposes, many of the civil society actors and academics who claim to 
be reforming security sectors are purely outsiders.  They have no inside experience of 
this dense fraternity.  Their apparent ignorance undermines the claims to 
professionalisation and effectiveness not to speak of their acceptability in the 
fraternity. 
 
A third limitation of post-Cold War SSR to which Williams and others also allude, is 
the direct association between reducing the security sector and improvement in human 
development.  Williams notes that post-Cold War SSR policies and practices are 
based on the assumption that efficient management of the security sector of 
developing countries frees up funds for development.  This assumption is highly 
suspect.  He observes that there is no evidence that the reduction in military and 
police personnel and armoury leads to a simultaneous increase in development 
spending (ibid).  In fact the opposite is true for Africa, where downsizing the military 
in Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone sparked and/ or reignited bloody civil wars.  
Even the claim that post-Cold War SSR is oriented towards development of the 
receiving country can be challenged, given Western paranoia about terrorism and how 
this impacts decisions for SSR assistance (Speiser and Handy, 2005).   
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Notwithstanding, proponents of SSR have made some (albeit skewed) progress, 
especially in strengthening oversight bodies like parliaments and civil society 
organisations.  Although it is important to stress that such progress has been 
extremely limited with the core security institutions and groups.  Even this access to 
parliamentarians and civil society is most obvious in post-conflict contexts like 
Liberia and Sierra Leone, rather than with fragile states, which have not escalated into 
full-blown violent conflicts.  This leaves me to wonder whether the responsiveness of 
post-conflict societies is not temporary.  It will not be farfetched to assume that access 
and cooperation currently enjoyed from post-conflict states is a consequence of the 
lack of clarity and control the states currently exercise over the security sector, and 
that once that is achieved principles and dialogue and egalitarian oversight of state 
security architectures championed from the outside would be abandoned.   
 
In sum, it is important to re-emphasise the particular challenges in African contexts, 
which the liberal peace practitioners who are implementing SSR projects tend to 
overlook, but on which the success of the project hinges.  Historically the security 
sector, particularly the military in Africa, has always viewed itself to be older and 
better organised than the post-independence states, having served under the command 
of the colonial lords prior to independence.   More importantly, barely a year after 
independence in Africa did the armed forces march to the political scene, exercising 
their monopoly over violence to displace post-independence regimes.253  The 
militarisation of politics also gave rise to the militarisation of society.  The 
phenomenon not only corrupted the state, it has to a large extent perverted indigenous 
authority systems—creating micro authorities established and sustained through the 
                                                
253It is important to also point out that most post-independence African countries invited the wrath of the military, 
having adopted violence as the sole means by which they ruled their respective states.  
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might of the AK-47.  In this context, singling out reestablishment of the military and 
police forces without in-depth stocktaking of historical and sociological effects of 
security institutions and practices is a stop-gap and minimalist measure.  Such stop-
gap approaches, Nathan avers, is a consequence of the “… lack of vision, [internal] 
expertise and resources and the abiding tendency to view security as authoritarian and 
militaristic” (p. 26).  Critical of all, he observes, is the manipulative posture and 
cynicism which core military leaders and politicians have adopted towards foreign 
donors who are champions of the concept.  These realities have convinced some 
skeptics to suggest that SSR is another sensational theme that will soon be consigned 
to history.  
 
6.3.2 Building Political Authorities 
 
Citing Huntington, Roland Paris (2004) notes that “…political stability is a 
precondition for political liberty and that political stability requires the existence of 
effective authoritative political institutions…” (p. 187).  Paris has alleged that the 
current approach to building such authoritative political institutions have been 
problematic because these have failed to “institutionalise” before “liberalising”.  I 
review what this portends in this section.  I divide the authoritative political 
institutions, which liberal practitioners tend to rebuild in three interlinked 
‘architectures’: a) democracy, b) public sector, and c) economic governance.  In this 
work, as discussed in Chapter 5, I focus on the first two and therefore devote this 
section to their theoretical review.  
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6.3.2.1 Architecture for Democratisation 
 
Building democracy in post-conflict society is broadly defined as re-establishing 
electoral institutions and laws, creating the space for multi-party politics, and capacity 
building support to parliament as well as civil society organisations (particularly 
women’s organisations).  While the international community has done well in the 
support of civil society organisations, capacity building for post-conflict parliaments 
and the establishment of independent electoral commissions and electoral processes, 
little has been done for political party development.  Building democratic institutions 
while avoiding political parties is like building a house without a foundation.  Reilly 
and Nordlund (2008) point out correctly when they say that political parties form the 
cornerstone of a democratic society.  A similar point was made earlier by Huntington 
(1968), when he asserted that political parties are the prerequisite for political stability 
in modernising countries.  Political parties are the engines for democracy building.  
They groom future leaders.  They are also the primary channels for people-centred 
policymaking, as well as for ensuring accountability and transparency in a democracy 
(UNDP, 2008).  Over the years, the international community has turned to the 
development of civil society organisations as a substitute, rather than a complement of 
the roles of political parties—to be the dissent voice.  There is now a growing 
realisation that the roles of civil society organisations and political parties are 
different and complementary.  While civil society is “equipped to stir up popular 
momentum around a transition process or ensure public accountability…political 
parties carry out tasks such as policymaking and the aggregation of public 
interests…” (UNDP Handbook, 2008).  In this view, civil society is on the demand 
side while political parties are the supply side of all functioning democracies (ibid). 
Observers note a number of reasons why the international community shies away 
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from supporting the rebuilding of political parties.  Some say investing in political 
parties is a risky venture which brings the international community too close to the 
political cleavages and acrimonies characteristic of transitioning states such as post-
war Liberia and Sierra Leone (Reilly and Reynolds, 1999).  Others argue that it is too 
premature to get involved with political parties in transitioning societies, given the 
immaturity with which party politics is carried out (ibid).   
 
A third limitation, which I would consider a dilemma, is the value of egalitarianism, 
which the liberal project argues is the pillar of democracy.  In nearly all post-war 
communities, international state reconstruction practitioners are turning blind eyes to 
hierarchies, especially in rural societies.  DDCs are formed with youth, women, 
elders, etc. as equal members.  Meetings are held publicly with each member valued 
based on his or her inputs and not their status. The elder councils are increasingly 
sidelined ostensibly to defeat gerontocracy.  The number of women and boys who 
now speak frequently at development or town meetings measures the success of 
international statebuilders. Besides, as observed by Romeo (2002), the collapse of 
state more often than not leads to the sprouting of new micro authorities in rural 
communities as witnessed in Liberia and Sierra Leone.  These developments have 
shaken to the core the status quo in rural Liberia and Sierra Leone whether it is the 
colonially constructed chieftaincy system of the Poro and Sande sodalities.  One elder 
told me “…if district development committees mean disrespect for the voices of 
elders then I think we will have more problems in the future…” While this comment 
could easily be dismissed as disquiet from the beleaguered status quo, it raises 
question about the way post-conflict states are being rebuilt.  Should post-war 
democracy building at local level displace indigenous micro authorities or should the 
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exercise aim for a comprehensive transformation?254  Transforming micro-authorities 
into vibrant local democratic structures is not the same as establishing alternative 
structures to overlay indigenous and war-induced local authorities as discussed in 
Chapter 5.  
 
A final and most important question, also a dilemma, is the notion of individual 
suffrage.  While I allude to the primacy of the individual in this work, how he/ she is 
defined varies from context to context and this informs the nature of democracy as 
well.  In the Poro-governed world, as we discussed in Chapter 5, the individual melts 
in the collective.  Over the years, despots have used this avenue to strengthen their 
bargaining power as they exercise patronage over social collectives.  As patrons, they 
instruct their subjects to vote their choice.  When the power of the patron is cemented 
through sodality as discussed in Chapter 3, the issues seem more complicated.  For 
instance, does democracy in the Poro-governed world become an overlay and a recipe 
for strengthening the hand of Zoes and chiefs, who simply instruct their community 
on who to elect?  In other words, very little has been done to understand the impact 
liberal individualistic electoral democracy has had on indigenous communities, where 
social collectivism is the primary mode of political organisation and participation.  
Not much has been done to understand how indigenous systems are remoulding 
liberal democracy by redefining individual suffrage as social collectivism.  
 
 
 
                                                
254
We are also reminded that rebuilding the state from the local allows for building and entrenching horizontal 
rather than vertical relations between state and society.  This, as discussed earlier, enhances ownership, fosters 
national solidarity, and most importantly builds cohesive societies. 
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6.3.3 Public Sector Reform 
 
While putting in place political authority resolves the violent contestation for power, 
civic stability only takes place when the post-collapsed state resumes service delivery 
in efficient and responsive ways (North, 1990).  It is like resuscitating the heart or 
engine of the state.  Efficient and responsive civil service delivery, it is argued, can 
accelerate the rebuilding of national cohesion, legitimacy and public trust (Michialof 
et al, 2003). The international community defines public sector or civil administration 
rebuilding as the process of a) re-establishing the statutory basis of civil 
administration, b) redesigning management arrangement, compensation schemes and 
disciplinary procedures, and c) building the capacity of civil servants through training 
exercises and provision of equipment (2003).  Clearly, over the years international 
state reconstruction practitioners have focused public sector reform or transformation 
on restoring the technical capacity of the public sector.  It assumes that a competent 
civil service equals an effective and responsive civil service.  Key activities generally 
implemented to achieve competence in post-conflict civil administration include 
training workshops, provision of equipment and in some cases seconding international 
staff to government ministries.  Technological capacity development has been 
amplified in international discourse to the extent that some leaders of the United 
Nations have suggested what is called “Government out of a Box” (GooB; Orr, 2004).  
The GooB concept proposes the development of predesigned templates like payroll, 
civil service codes, database systems and terms of reference for key posts in the civil 
services.  Such predesigned tools could be handy in post-conflict societies where 
capacities to respond to international financial institutions in particular are in short 
supply.  Orr also proposes the mobilisation of what he calls the “coalition of the 
capable”.  These would be exiled professionals of the collapsed states who could be 
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readily deployed with support from the international community to help resuscitate 
civil administration in war-ravaged states (ibid).   
 
Technological capacity development is certainly an urgent need in post-conflict 
contexts.  This is more so given the complicated requirements of international 
financial and other lending institutions for post-conflict states to demonstrate 
competence as condition to access loans.255  Notwithstanding, the technical and 
restorative approach fails to address the political and sociological dimensions of 
institution building. The politics of institution, especially in patronage systems such 
as those that have collapsed, cannot be by-passed (North, 1990).  One may obtain the 
best technological sophistication to run state institutions, but the lack of ‘political 
will’ to enable the sophisticated institutions to function often frustrates the process.  It 
even forces already trained technocrats to immigrate reinforcing the phenomenon of 
brain drain.   
 
A second consideration is the sociological dimension of institution building.  Ghani et 
al (2004) have rightly pointed out that successful reconstruction of the public sector is 
“…rooted in human psychology… [it is about] tackling questions of attitudes and 
mindsets” and this, they maintain, is the most important aspect of post-conflict 
institution building.  The collapse of the state is a telling indication of the collapse of 
public as well as social trust.  It is also a manifestation of the presence of destructive 
attitudes within the public sector.  Thirdly, even though it is claimed that the number 
of women participating in the public sector tends to increase in post-collapsed states, 
it does not necessarily translate into engendering the public sector.  It is important not 
                                                
255In this view many observers argue that the international accent on competence to the disregard of other critical 
factors required in evolving responsive and efficient civil administration is primarily aimed at meeting the needs of 
the international community and not people within the emerging state. 
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to forget the patriarchal origin of all institutions of the state, particularly the colonial 
states.  The gender dimension of the structure, values and practices in the new 
institutional arrangement should be well articulated at the outset.  A fourth limitation 
is the top-down over-centralised approach of the project.  The technical capacity 
building project rarely trickles down to building capacity of local institutions, 
including indigenous institutions such as the Poro, which, though not recognised as 
part of the state structure, have played and continues to play critical role in societal 
stability.   
 
Aside from the limited focus, Ottaway (2003) alleges that the international project not 
only lacks the expertise, capital and political will, it is ambitious.  She maintains that 
given that institutions are products of discourses constitutive of their contexts, they 
can only be built by insiders and over a long period of time.  Ottaway maintains 
outsiders can only contribute to organisation building, while institutionalisation of the 
organisations they erect in post-war societies will have to be undertaken by local 
leaders.  This in my view is an important learning that is taken for granted in the 
international project.  If post-war organisation building is undertaken with the 
knowledge that the organisations will need to be institutionalised by local actors, they 
will make deliberate efforts to ensure that the new organisations cohere with the 
meaning system, needs, values and aspirations of the society in which they are being 
erected.  This argument in no way detracts from the role of the international 
community.  State decay in Africa cannot be resolved by making state institutions 
more technical and sophisticated, nor will abandoning Western models, which to 
some extents have penetrated the fabrics of society and remained the basis for 
international engagement, solve it.  Indigenisation therefore proposes reconciliation 
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and convergence between western institutions and indigenous institutions in context.  
Its only normative stance is that such engagement must be based on roots established 
in context, not transplanting roots from other contexts.  The concept, principles, 
framework of inquiry and strategies for indigenisation of state reconstruction is the 
focus of the next section.     
 
6.4 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR INDIGENISATION 
 
I agree with Roland Paris that liberal peace practitioners are failing in 
institutionalising liberal values and institutions, which they transplant in non-liberal 
post-war societies.  Where I differ is his support for transplanting prefabricated liberal 
institutions and values without due regard for indigenous resources.  I also challenge 
his suggestion for international trusteeship, which in my view fails to learn from the 
history of colonialism.  As an alternative, I propose ‘indigenisation’ as an approach to 
reconstructing the state.  The conceptual and operational underpinnings of 
indigenisation are the subject of this section.   
 
6.4.1 Defining the Concept 
 
Indigenousness conjures a flurry of meaning and sentiments.  In sociology and 
anthropology, indigeneity refers to a bounded, isolated community of people with 
primordial identity and primary attachments to land and culture (Sillitoe, 1998: 25).  
Sillitoe goes on to say that these cultures have survived “from time immemorial”, 
given their consistent resistance to modern influences (ibid).  This description of 
indigeneity, in my view, assumes that indigenous systems are simply unchanging 
primordial resources.  Murithi (2008) also rejects the notion of staticity and argues 
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that indigeneity is dynamic and responsive to temporal exigencies.  Murithi (2008) 
distinguishes indigeneity and endogeneity by arguing that indigenous refers to that 
which is instinctive while endogenous is that which is produced from within.  
Notwithstanding, while Murithi argues for endogenising, I argue for indigenising.  
My focus on indigenisation instead of endogenisation is because my emphasis is not 
so much about “producing within” as it is about “producing with”.  While 
endogeneity argues that the resources and actors who produce the state or end 
conflicts in Africa be indigenous to the context, my emphasis is on building the state 
with indigenous roots and resources without closing the doors to external support and 
partnership.  I define indigenisation as a process of rebuilding post-conflict states on 
its own social, historical, geographical, demographical and temporal roots.  I base my 
thesis on the argument of critical theorists, specifically critical realism and also draw 
on aspects of the debate of communitarians.  Both schools are unanimous in the call 
for the liberal peace external intervention practitioners to “reinvent” the liberal peace 
project such that it is able to find the seeds of peace emerging from within the post-
conflict context, cultivate and fertilise them, rather than replace them with 
prefabricated liberal structures and mechanisms.256      
 
6.4.2 Conceptual Framework 
 
Indigenisation departs from Weinstein (2005) ‘autonomous’ and ‘aided’ concept of 
post-conflict recovery and institution building. He defines autonomous recovery as a 
process through which post-conflict societies achieve recovery [and institution 
building] in the absence of international intervention, while aided recovery is a 
                                                
256I must also emphasise that indigenising is not the same as localising.  While localising is about contextualising 
or making a new institution to fit into or work within an alien local context, indigenising is about evolving 
institutions and mechanisms on roots inherent to the context. 
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process in which international intervention plays a significant (if not lead) role in 
post-conflict recovery and institution building (ibid: 10).  Indigenisation is both an 
autonomous and aided process.  It emphasises identifying emerging resources in the 
context, fostering internal leadership and ownership, and engaging in meaningful 
partnership with external actors.  There are five broad assumptions on which I base 
the conceptual framework of indigenisation.  These include a) celebration of 
heterogeneity, b) interactivity, c) normativity, d) context centrality, and e) 
regenerativity and emergence. 
 
Celebration of Heterogeneity: Post-colonial statebuilders have over the decades made 
futile attempts to melt all ethnicities and polities in their territories into one national 
identity and polity.  Key strategies of the homogenisation project include assimilation, 
demographic re-engineering and a one party system.  This approach continues to 
influence the liberal peace project, which seeks to homogenise all societies by 
imbuing them with liberal values, institutions and cultures.  Dunne (2001) notes that 
the liberal project will be best served if it rethinks its Universalist stance to uphold 
cultural diversity without compromising human solidarity, which is its core aim 
(2001).257   
 
Interactivity: All institutions exist in what is called ‘institutional environment’ and are 
defined by their interaction with other formal and informal institutions within the 
                                                
257Resonance to the liberal project will vary from context to context.  For instance, while the Kwa-speaking people 
of Liberia and Sierra Leone would best fit into the liberal peace’s value of individual autonomy, it would be 
difficult for such values to resonate in the Poro-governed region where social collectivism is the mode of political 
participation.  An important lesson could be learned from the Poro’s solidarity building strategy, in which it fosters 
intra-ethnic social collectivism while promoting inter-ethnic egalitarian politics. As argued by critical theorists, 
celebrating homogeneity and cultural relativism is no excuse for repressive and violent cultureal elements which 
leaders of indigenous systems such as the Poro exploit to justify their repressive regimes and practices.  My 
argument is emancipation should not be equated to cultural erasure, nor should it be seen as individual 
atomisation.  Human solidarity can find expression in all societies and that violent configuration is an indication 
that the society already has seeds of change which must be cultivated.   
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institutional environment.  Indigenisation, like the normative institutionalists, 
identifies the facilitation of coherence between formal and informal institutions as 
part of the institutionalisation process.  In this view, organisations are institutionalised 
when they achieve congruence in context (Scott, 1998).  Indication of institutional 
congruence includes institutional stability, public respect for, belief in and loyalty to 
the integrity and function of the institution, as well as its impact on the general health 
of the society (ibid). 
 
Normativity:  While Weber’s rational legal institution is based on the pursuit of 
interest and the logic of consequentiality, indigenisation follows the thesis of 
normative institutionalism, which argues that institutions, authority and communities 
are value-laden.  Also institutions, authority and communities are not just secular 
entities that can be constructed as machines (Duffield, 2001).  They are organisms 
imbued with soul.  In this view, these entities go beyond being incentive structures to 
being the embodiment of public values, beliefs and worldviews.  Public belief 
engenders deference for public institutions, for authority and for the sanctity of the 
community.  This is often the case in indigenous societies including Poro-governed 
societies where the ‘commons’, authority and community are held in deference.258       
 
Context Centrality: The nature and function of all institutions be it indigenous or 
conventional, are contingent on context and therefore no two institutions are the same 
(Sawyer, 1992). In other words, does the liberal peace project consider ecological and 
demographic determinants?  Will states ‘liberally’ built in sparsely inhabited and 
                                                
258Value-based societies have their own disadvantages, especially in their tendency to be inflexible.  But at the 
same time institutions, authorities and communities with no defined and agreed values are prone to disintegration.  
This is not to suggest that the liberal peace project is not guided by values.  The challenge is how to reconcile 
liberal values with those in context. 
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sodality-governed dense rainforest such as Liberia and Sierra Leone be the same as 
states built in densely populated and accessible countries?  Shouldn’t these non-
socially produced or reproduced factors be considered in the design of states, or are 
they irrelevant to the project?  In this thesis, I contend non-socially produced 
intransitive objects are critical in constructing the state and therefore efforts must be 
made in understanding them in the design of post-conflict intervention.   
 
Regenerativity: As Swazo argues, institution, authority and community, as organisms, 
are inherently self-renewable. I argue that disruptions to the social and institutional 
fabrics of society do not just empty a society of its structures and systems.  In most 
cases it recreates them.  It is critical to identify resources and seeds of peace, societal 
stability, etc. which emerge from conflict contexts.  These are the basis for self-
renewal which the international community now refers to as resilience’.259  Having 
outlined the assumptions and principles on which indigenisation is based I now turn to 
its framework of inquiry. 
 
6.4.3 Framework of Inquiry for Indigenisation 
 
Indigenising post-conflict statebuilding is a comprehensive and integrated process of 
transformation.  The roots on which the change is established emerge from the 
context—particularly out of the violent configurations in the civil wars and 
peacemaking processes.  By comprehensive and integrated I mean state 
reconstruction should include the technological, sociological and political dimensions 
                                                
259Both World Wars in Europe, for example, produced the enlightened period and the rise of women in the public 
realm.  Similarly, as will be discussed in chapters six and seven, civil wars in West Africa have directly 
contributed to the active engagement of civil society organisations in public affairs.  This is particularly true for 
women and women’s organisations.  It is therefore naïve to assume that post-conflict state reconstruction takes 
place in an empty space.  Conflict does not just destroy; it provides an opportunity to redefine social contracts.  
Indigenisation therefore argues that state reconstruction is transformative rather than restorative.   
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of rebuilding authority, institutions and civic community.  Figure 6.2 below illustrates 
my proposed indigenisation framework of inquiry.  
 
Figure 6.2: Indigenisation Model of Inquiry    
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As indicated in the above diagram, indigenisation is comprehensive and 
transformative.  It is established on emerging roots in contexts and it seeks to 
coherently foster the transformation of the political, sociological and technological 
dimensions of post-war authorities, institutions and communities.  The roots of 
authority, institution and community rebuilding emerge from the context, particularly 
from the violent configurations during the civil wars.  The comprehensive and 
transformative dimensions in the framework deserve some elaboration since I 
discussed authority, institutions and community already in previous sections of this 
chapter.   
 
 
 
 
 
Emerging institutional, social, economic fabrics 
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6.4.1.1 Transformation 
 
Transformation refers to qualitative change of the structures, ideologies and networks 
of relationships (Sztompka, 1993: 25).  It also connotes ideological change, including 
change of the war discourse to one of reconciliation, national unity and shared vision.  
Lederach (1997) indicates that transformation is both descriptive and prescriptive.  
While emphasis on descriptive transformation in conflict contexts tend to be on the 
negative—the militarisation of society, erosion of trust, perversion of power 
structures, straining of social relations—Rappaport (1990) argues that conflicts also 
result in constructive change.  For instance, as was discussed in Chapter 5, the civil 
wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone have led to increased civil society participation in 
the public-sphere; and rearrangement of power structures and relations that fosters 
democracy, empowers the disempowered including women, youth, rural dwellers, etc.  
Mbembe reinforces this view when he said that aside from “…the suffering inflicted 
on the human body by war… [We should also be ready for] embracing a whole 
cluster of re-orderings of society, culture, and identity, and [the new] ways power is 
exercised and rationalised” (2001: 66).  Giving that conflict creates both destructive 
and constructive changes, prescriptive transformative interventions goes beyond 
‘fixing’ the destructive changes to also harnessing the constructive changes.  Mitchell 
(2005) argues that real ownership in post-conflict transformation is guaranteed if we 
locate and build on emerging seeds of constructive change. He argues that by 
beginning with emerging resources, international state reconstruction practitioners 
would be able to identify local actors who could serve as ‘co-creators’ in their own 
post-war transformation.  
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How do we know post-war desired change has been realised? Bush and Folger (1996: 
20) focusing on the psychological and social dimensions of transformation identify  
“more empowered” and “empathetic” or compassionate society as indicators of post-
conflict transformation.  They argue that with empowerment comes increased political 
participation and effective governance, and compassion leads to intra-group and inter-
group bridging and bonding which then accounts for reconciliation and the building 
of a cohesive society.  While agreeing with Bush and Folger’s measurement of a 
transformed society, Mitchell (2005) notes that the desired change is not only limited 
to agency, i.e. people.  Transformation is also about structures—policies, institutions, 
constitutions, etc.  In addition, Rupesinghe (1995) adds that structural transformative 
outcomes include “‘…revived indigenous political, social and economic mechanisms’ 
which in addition to providing effective services are able to address future threats of 
social and political violence” (1995: 76).  
 
Transformative response begins with a thorough context analysis.  Key questions that 
are addressed in such analysis include among others the following: a) What and who 
have changed as a result of the conflict? b) What are the nature, intensity, and speed 
of the change process? c) What and who are resistant to change? c) What change is 
more responsive to rebuilding cohesive, responsive and resilient states? d) Who are 
the constructive and destructive change agents and what are their capacities and 
vulnerabilities?  These questions point to the fact that all change processes are first 
and foremost indigenous.  The role of external actors is to harness or enhance 
conditions in the environment to facilitate the change process.  Such a role requires 
careful monitoring and strategic interventions.  It also calls for flexibility to constantly 
adapt to the natural course of the change process. 
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6.4.1.2 Comprehensiveness 
 
State reconstruction is not just technical, as seen in the international practice, nor is it 
limited to institution building.  Weinstein has argued that “…institutions are much 
more than bureaucracy or a set of rules and [technical know-how]” (2005: 9).  They 
are a “…result of a bargain—a social compact between rulers and constituents…” 
which is derived from lived experiences (ibid).  Secondly, institutions and social 
systems, as organisms, are self-renewable.  From this backdrop I argue that all 
statebuilding activities require simultaneous technological, political and sociological 
responses, which not only foster integration but also reinforce internal capacity and 
ownership. The sociological understanding includes, but is not limited to, the 
deliberate processes to build and/ or transform communities.  Indigenous systems 
such as the Poro place a greater accent on the rebuilding of communities at the end of 
disasters.    Robert Putnam (1993) has argued that the most important characteristic of 
a responsive and efficient state is not its technological sophistication or political 
savvy.  It is the degree of “civic-ness” and the horizontal social and political bonds 
established within its community, which is determinant in sustainable state 
reconstruction (p. 87).  He goes on to suggest that civic community “…upholds values 
of public spiritedness, equality of treatment, respect, tolerance and trust of others, and 
cooperation in associations” (ibid: 136).  Putnam maintains that a responsive and 
cohesive state is one with strong horizontal bonds, even if the vertical bond is weak.  
He defines the horizontal bond as mutual solidarity, which constitutes the social 
capital, and the vertical bond as dependency on and exploitation of state institutions 
(ibid).260  This claim resonates with Zartman’s proposition that state collapse is only 
                                                
260While the concept of “civic community” tends to shy away from nationalism and nationbuilding, the concept is 
similar, although it is argued that the depth of emotions invested in ‘nation’ may be far greater than those invested 
in the concept of ‘civic community’.  
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consummated when societal institutions collapse along with those of the states.  It is 
therefore inadequate to invest resources only in restoring state institutions as practiced 
in the international system.  Key questions in understanding the sociological 
dimension of rebuilding institutions, authorities and communities include but are not 
limited to: a) What are the core discourses of institution, authority and community in 
the post-conflict society and how are they affected by the conflict? b) How strong and 
cohesive are inter-group relations? c) What is the general attitude towards authority, 
institutions, and social relations and how have they changed in the war? and d) What 
are the organising capacities and networks of civic associations? These are not 
exhaustive, but they provide an initial window into deeply understanding post-war 
contexts and thereby fostering indigenisation of post-war state reconstruction.   
 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter I reviewed current practices of state reconstruction as a point of 
departure for my proposed indigenisation approach to state reconstruction.  Here it is 
important to re-echo the salient conclusions and observations.  Firstly, from the start 
to the end of the recovery phase in the internationally-led state reconstruction project, 
decision-making remains in the hands of international actors, and claims to “light 
footprints” proposed by scholars often end up as heavy footprints which paralyse 
domestic capacity for regeneration and rebuilding.  Secondly, scholars have observed 
that internationally led state reconstruction interventions achieve little because these 
are uninformed by the critical needs and ongoing transformation in context. They also 
assume that post-conflict contexts are clean slates completely devoid of capacities and 
capabilities.  I made the case that all post-conflict contexts possess seedlings for the 
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emerging society.  They are also distinct, following their own pace and logic of 
transformation.  Unless intervention is based on locating and building on these unique 
emerging structures and agencies at their unique paces, state and society 
reconstruction would simply mean patching together old structures which are likely to 
experience collapse five to ten years down the line.  The chapter also called for 
thorough stocktaking and context analysis as the basis for planning and implementing 
transformative state recovery and reconstruction. Finally, it deserves mentioning 
again that while the support of external actors in state reconstruction is crucial, 
external actors cannot change the destiny of a community.  If post-conflict state 
reconstruction is to be sustainable, it must be led from within.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION: POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR POST-WAR 
INDIGENISATION OF STATE RECONSTRUCTION  
 
 
“Against those theoretical approaches that would reduce the range of historical choices 
gestating in Africa to a stark alternative of either “transition” to democracy and the shift to 
a market economy, or descent into the shadows of war, we must stress against the role of 
contingency, and reassert the hypothesis that the organisations likely to emerge from 
current developments will be anything but the result of coherent premeditated plans” 
(Mbembe 2001: 77). 
 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
I began this journey four years ago to investigate how post-war state reconstruction 
efforts in Liberia and Sierra Leone were interacting with indigenous institutions and 
mechanisms.  I focused on interactions between the liberal project and the Poro and 
Sande in both countries.  I paid attention to the extent to which the Poro and Sande 
were recognised, engaged and/ or given leading roles in the state recovery and 
rebuilding processes.  My desire was to address the critical challenge, which remains 
an existential issue for post-colonial, post-Cold War Africa: How can we construct 
states that are more relevant and therefore congruent with Africa’s realities?  How 
can the appalling death, suffering and destruction of hundreds of thousands of lives in 
the name of civil wars of ‘liberation’ in Africa be recompensed with more 
enlightened, more cohesive, more vibrant states and societies?  Basing the work on 
critical realism, I argued that all social phenomena introduced in context intentionally 
and unintentionally interact with the social forces in context.  And that the introduced 
phenomena recondition the context and are also reconditioned by the context.  I 
surmise that a review of the extent of deliberate or non-deliberate engagement of 
indigenous institutions in the post-conflict state recovery and reconstruction projects 
in Liberia and Sierra Leone would provide clues for the quality of state emerging, and 
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help elaborate clear conceptual and policy proposals for deepening state 
indigenisation in Africa.  Specifically I explored the following questions: 
 
1. Did the international state reconstruction practitioners in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
recognise and/ or engage the Poro and Sande in recovery and rebuilding the 
collapsed states? 
2. How does the international liberal peace state reconstruction practices affect the 
recovery of indigenous systems including sodality institutions? 
3. How do sodality-governed societies in Africa impact on the liberal peace state 
reconstruction sub goals including: 
• Post-conflict disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; 
• Security sector reform; 
• Return, resettlement and community revitalisation? 
• Re-establishing structures of local governance? 
4. What quality of state systems is emerging from the ongoing post-conflict state 
reconstruction efforts and what can be learned for future processes?  
5. What strategies are appropriate for harnessing indigenous resources in rebuilding 
collapsed states and how are these deployed in the liberal project?  
 
This chapter brings together the key findings and new questions emanating from the 
work.  Based on the findings, I proposed policy and operational strategies for 
indigenising post-war state reconstruction in the context of Africa.  
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7.2 KEY FINDINGS 
  
At the end of my journey, I come to conclusions that seem to vindicate Mbembe’s 
warning about contingency.  On the first question as to the recognition and 
engagement of the Poro and Sande in recovery and state consolidation, the findings 
show that the international project made deliberate efforts not only to avoid the Poro 
and Sande but also to dismantle them and free the interior for state penetration and 
control.  Specifically the following actions are among the most observable evidence 
for my claim: 
 
1. Post-war Security Sector Transformation 
 
• On the issue of security, both security architectures of Liberia and Sierra Leone 
the study revealed are externally driven and seem to have been constructed 
without paying serious attention to the security exigencies of the two countries. 
The very powers that created the ones that betrayed the countries and contributed 
to their collapse are driving the reconstruction of the security architectures in both 
countries. The people of both countries so far have not had the opportunity to 
imagine and co-create their new security architecture.     
 
• The role of the Poro in rescuing the state from its own factionalised army, the case 
of Sierra Leone, has been rewarded with token recognition.  In both countries the 
web of sodality-based militarised networks and their pervasiveness across the 
countries are not informing the reconstruction of the security architectures. Nearly 
five years since the various DDR processes, arms-related crimes apparently 
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orchestrated by demobilised and reintegrated combatants in especially Liberia 
have become a national concern.  The study found that many of the youth living in 
conditions of squalor in urban communities are responsible for the crimes.  The 
study also revealed that the youth are languishing in urban squalor because they 
are avoiding their communities for fear that they may not be accepted back in 
their closely-knit communities.  The study concludes that had the DDR projects 
considered the importance of the norms of acceptance in rural communities, 
particularly Poro communities, they would have facilitated the return and 
reintegration of ex-combatants in their rural communities and thereby reduced the 
risks of urban squalor and crimes. 
 
• Most importantly the rise of the Poro and its Civil Defence Force, I would argue, 
present glaring opportunities to conceptualise and operationalise the notion of 
community or citizen security in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In some communities 
in Sierra Leone it was revealed that CDF structure are adopted by communities 
and CDF members are formed in networks to protect their communities.  It seems 
this opportunity is being overlooked because thorough sociological studies are not 
informing the ongoing reconstruction of the security architecture. The concept of 
community or citizen security emphasises prevention and focuses less on crime 
and more on violent behaviours and their impact on the health of the community. 
A strong value of community security is that it emerges from the security 
concerns of the community, which was the case in the establishment of some of 
the village based CDF structures in Sierra Leone.  Community security is 
indigenous in that it grows out of the community’s real life experience.  
Community security also fosters social cohesion because it brings to life Thomas 
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Hobbes’ notion of ‘sheltering together for safety and wellbeing’.  I will also argue 
that people who shelter together under a single tent for their survival and 
wellbeing are more likely to be bonded.  Aside from Thomas Hobbes’ instinctive 
argument, the community-based planning and mutual accountability that is 
inherent to the concept of community security and which was evident in the 
operation of village based CDFs in Sierra Leone helps to strengthen the bonds and 
social networks. 
 
• Given the challenges of access to the interiors of both countries, while avoiding 
the repeat of the ‘frontier force’ mentality of security, I argue that community 
security for all practical purposes is a better alternative to current state-centric 
security architecture being constructed in both countries.  For example in Liberia, 
after nearly five years since the end of the war, more than 50% of the rural 
counties still lack adequate presence of law enforcement structures and personnel.  
What is more interesting is the fact that even though both security architectures 
are oblivious to the notion of community security, many rural communities 
continue to maintain the civil defence forces and other vigilante groups as their 
law enforcement officers.  In sum the increased security consciousness, which is a 
legacy of the war, could have been harnessed to evolve a more effective and far-
reaching security architecture in both countries.  So far it seems the opportunity 
would slip away as the external actors invest millions of pounds and dollars in 
building state-centric security architectures in Monrovia and Freetown.  
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2. Local Governance 
   
• The question of local governance in the interiors of Liberia and Sierra Leone 
remain in flux as various international actors suggest varying ways to establish 
structures of governance.  The former colonial master in Sierra Leone initiated 
programmes to restore the chieftaincy structures while the rest of the international 
community including the United Nations pushed for egalitarian local government 
councils.  The DfID funded chieftaincy project provoked anti-colonial sentiments 
and suffered fierce criticism.  Although it was abandoned after investing over 2 
million pounds, debate on the relevance or irrelevance of the chieftaincy system 
persists.  Some argue there is still some place for the chiefs, while others insist the 
chieftaincy system should be discarded.  Given that the issue is yet to be settled, it 
is not clear whose authority is legitimate in the interior.  For now, the newly 
established councils of local governance, the colonially crafted chieftaincy 
system, and Poro and Sande authority structures are competing for the political 
and governance space in rural Sierra Leone.  In Liberia no question was asked 
about rural governance.  The executive controlled superintendent system is 
restored and the colonial divided between the interior and the settler state is alive 
and well.  
 
• The study also finds that shifts from the rigid hierarchical structures of 
governance through the paramount chieftaincy system in rural Liberia and Sierra 
Leone to the egalitarian structures of local government councils and district 
development committees are not well thought out.  The required sensitivity and 
mitigating mechanisms to respond to the conflicts and tensions from the shift are 
Sam Doe Final Thesis UB No. 04008980 259 
not in place.  While the study makes no excuse for the gerontocratic order that 
reigns in the interiors, my argument is that change requires management if the 
negative consequences are to be minimised.  As ‘strangers’, ‘women’, ‘youth’, 
etc. enjoy their newfound powers it is not clear how the elders and the Poro High 
priests will react.  The scornful conversation I had with an elder in Bo who spoke 
about the local governance council meeting he attended and his discomfort of 
‘loud-mouth’ youth and women, is an indication that gerontocracy is displeased 
with the shift and their discontent is not being addressed.  Post-conflict local 
governance building requires transformation and not usurpation.  In the case of 
Liberia and Sierra Leone the latter remains the strategy.   
 
• Aside from the political dimension of local governance, the study finds that the 
service provision dimension is being strongly managed by the Poro-created 
mechanisms, which have played this role for centuries.  The rotating work 
schemes as well as local banking systems have begun.  The Sande has restored its 
health provision system, including midwifery and traditional herbs, which remain 
the only option for many rural dwellers who are too far from the capitals where 
conventional medicines can be found. Rather than pay attention to the critical role 
of the Poro and Sande in addressing the above issues, international state 
reconstruction practitioners remained oblivious to contextual realities and 
dismissed the values of the Poro and Sande in community restoration, local 
governance transformation and security sector reform.  They are yet to establish 
more viable and sustainable alternative to the civic functions of the sodalities. 
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On the impact of the liberal peace international state reconstruction projects on 
indigenous systems, particularly the Poro and Sande, the study finds that deliberate 
attacks on the Poro and Sande sodalities during and after the wars has forced the 
sodalities to dust off the shelf 19th century counter-hegemonic resistance against the 
states and whatever they stand for.  In Sierra Leone, the indictment of Chief Hinga 
Norman, leader of the Civil Defence Forces by the Sierra Leone Special Court and his 
subsequent death in prison, is regarded in most Poro communities as betrayal at the 
highest level.  An elder told me in a stern voice that “One does not betray a brother 
after taking oath together…but they will see,” he added.  Poro authorities feel that the 
Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP), which has been known since the beginning of 
party politics in Sierra Leone to be the closest to the Poro-governed interior, betrayed 
the Poro by acquiescing in the pressures from outsiders to indict leadership of the 
civil defence forces for war crimes.  This reneging on agreements, Poro youth at the 
Fourah Bay College told me, is rare in Poro values and norms and the consequences 
can be grave.  Many attributed the defeat of SLPP in the 2007 presidential and general 
elections to the Poro community’s way of punishing the SLPP leadership for the 
‘betrayal’.   
 
On the role of the Poro in achieving the sub goals of the liberal peace international 
state reconstruction projects throughout Liberia and Sierra Leone, the Poro and Sande 
are actively undertaking their own self-renewing initiatives to address issues of 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, as well as restoration of the 
communities and larger societies.  The approaches and aims sometimes contrast with 
and other times complement those of the liberal project.  The study also found Poro 
practices that are counter-productive. For instance, efforts to restore the gerontocratic 
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order in the face of youth militarisation stand the risk of escalating violence in the 
interior.  Most importantly, the restoration of the practice of FGM in the face of 
blood-borne diseases like HIV/AIDS is likely to exacerbate the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
and undermine women’s rights and freedoms.  
 
On the fourth question regarding the impact of the self-renewing efforts of the Poro 
and Sande on the outcomes of the liberal project, we arrive at Mbembe’s powerful 
warning some eight years ago now.  He contends that while it may be desirable to 
wipe out all the pre-war indigenous authority so that the liberal project can fully 
express itself, “Fragmentation, break-up, concentration of powers, reproduction of 
lineage or chieftaincy logics within the state, or accentuation of practices reflecting 
dual power are within the range of the possible” (Mbembe 2001: 77).  Liberia and 
Sierra Leone are returning to the pre-war kleptocratic and patronage states, while the 
Poro and Sande claims over the interior regions are emboldened.  Webs of patron-
client relationships between the interior and settler states are being renewed.  The 
hope of the liberal peace project to replace the collapsed state with a liberal state 
system is yet to be realised. 
 
A more worrying situation throughout the study is that all agendas regarding the 
reconstruction of state have been set by the external state reconstruction practitioners 
who are spending their money and other resources to reconstruct the states in both 
countries.  The space critical for citizens of both countries to learn from the civil wars, 
reconcile their differences and evolve a new theory of state that suits their realities has 
been quite limited, if not non-existent.  Without the latitude to dialogue and 
collectively “co-create” the state that suits the sodality-dominated contexts of Liberia 
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and Sierra Leone, the study argues both countries will continue to survive on the 
tutelage of the external actors who are creating them.  Already the United Nations 
missions in both countries continue to extend their stay due to the realisation that they 
remain the life support of both countries.  What have not been realised and seriously 
worked towards are exit and sustainability strategies.  The sustainability strategy that 
stands greater chance in both countries, I argue, is indigenisation.  I therefore 
conclude this work with a proposal on how to foster indigenisation in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone and by extension in post-war state reconstruction more broadly. 
 
7.3 STRATEGIES FOR INDIGENISING STATE RECONSTRUCTION 
 
In order to institutionalise post-war gains, Mitchell proposes deep changes in the 
structures and agencies through what he calls “interactive education” to inculcate the 
change in the society (2005). Building on the works of Mitchell (2005), Ghani et al 
(2006), Michialof et al (2003) and O’Hallaran (1998), I propose two broad strategies 
for indigenisation of state reconstruction.  These include: a) ideational transformation 
and b) institutional transformation.   
 
7.3.1 Ideational Transformation 
 
O’Hallaran (1998) alleges that the current state reconstruction practices assume that 
the state would be restored by modifying institutions and increasing material 
incentives.  This, he argues, is only half the story.  Statebuilding is also about society 
building.  It therefore cannot be divorced from constructing the ideas on which a 
society must craft a state system to regulate their interactions both within and outside 
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with other states. Constructing post-conflict discourse and transforming public 
perceptions is what Closson (2006) refers to as ideational approach and I call 
‘ideational transformation’.  Why is it important to engage mindsets? First and 
foremost, wars are planned in the mind.  Secondly, public attitudes and behaviors are 
conditioned by public perception.  We must not forget that public perception of the 
state in Africa remains conflicting and negative, more so in post-collapsed states such 
as Liberia and Sierra Leone.  For instance, the security sector was an instrument of 
terror during the long and degenerative period, which culminated in civil wars in both 
countries.  Public perception about security and the state being responsible for 
security is severely undermined.  In the case of Liberia and Sierra Leone, there is also 
the predatory attitude and total disregard for what constitutes the public, and for 
public property. The concept of authority and power also becomes schizophrenic.  
Already in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the international state reconstruction 
practitioners are beginning to realise that unless honest ideational transformation 
takes place in both societies, sophisticated state systems will remain subject to 
kleptocracy and predation.  Ideational transformation at a societal level is best 
addressed through two broad mechanisms.  These are a) social dialogue and b) civic 
education.   
 
7.3.1.1 Social and Political Dialogue 
 
Bellamy and Williams (2004: 202) contend that the most effective way to foster 
ideational transformation is the promotion of dialogue. Dialogue is a “process 
whereby people come together to build mutual understanding and trust across their 
differences and to create positive outcomes through conversation” (Pruit and Thomas, 
2007: 19).  Pruit and Thomas also stress that dialogue seeks to address five challenges 
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in especially post-conflict societies.  These include dealing with complex challenges, 
coordinating meaning when meaning systems have collapsed, creating the space for 
innovation where survival is the order of the day, creating an environment for 
deliberation when trust and mutual humanisation has nearly eroded, and producing 
sustainable results.  Dialogue requires “genuine interaction” where the participants 
open themselves to opportunities for change.  Such an interaction creates dissonance 
as participants discover the human sides.  It also provides the opportunities to 
fundamentally reinterpret their worldviews.  This connection with theirs and the 
other’s humanity unleashes empathy and compassion, which Bush and Folger (1996) 
argue foster cohesion and intra and inter-group solidarity.  Dialogue also affords the 
opportunity to create new democratic spaces where ordinary voices that hitherto were 
silent during dictatorships can be heard.  Linklater (1998) goes further to call on 
international state reconstruction practitioners to adopt dialogue as the primary tool 
for post-conflict intervention.  He contends that by engaging post-conflict societies 
through dialogue one is able to address the perennial question of legitimacy.  In order 
for the dialogue to be more meaningful, to be a genuine space where all members of 
society feel they have a stake in the new rules, new institutional architecture and new 
relationships, Bellamy (2004) insists it must be based on dialogic ethics.  She 
suggests the following as a start: a) the concept, process and content of the dialogue 
process must be agreed through open and equal participation at all levels of the 
society; b) the dialogue process itself should include all those that will directly or 
indirectly be affected by the new social compact; c) it should start on the premise 
“fallability”—that no belief and norms are immune to change or questioning.  
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While dialogue is considered an important mechanism for ideational transformation, 
the norms to which Bellamy and others refer will need to be re-conceptualised in 
context.  For instance, how does one define equal participation and egalitarianism in 
sodality-governed rigidly hierarchical communities in rural Liberia and Sierra Leone? 
What would be the quality of dialogue in contexts where people are trained in ifa mao 
(or do not speak of it)?  While these may be considered as dilemmas, I argue that 
dialogue need not be egalitarian and that dialogue also takes place in hierarchical 
societies.  What is therefore required is to investigate the communicative structures 
and mechanisms in post-war societies so as to define the mode and structure of 
dialogue that would be most responsive to the context.  Bellamy’s theory of fallability 
provides room for such re-conceptualisation since it makes the case that no ‘truth’ or 
principle is unalterable.   
 
7.3.1.2 Civic Education 
 
Kruezer and Weiberg (2005) and Xiaomin and Chunfeng (2007), reinforcing the 
notion of ideational transformation, call for new “homegrown” learning that will 
foster “civic communities” based on the principle of solidarity.   The focus of the 
transformational exercise Kruezer and Weiberg indicated should be on the “inner 
structure and content (including values, norms and behavioural guidelines)” of both 
the society and the institutions of the state (p. 3).  This should draw on history, not 
only in learning from events but also from the subjective interpretations which have 
driven the structure of interactions in the society prior to, during and after the conflict 
and collapse (ibid).  The Poro sodality as pointed out in Chapter 1 emphasises 
transformative intervention.  Its ‘rite de passage’ primarily aims to transform the 
individual into a citizen and to integrate him or her in the society in ways that achieve 
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more integrated, more congruent and more cohesive societies.  It also proposes what 
Brown (1967) and Seyon (1977) refer to as holistic education, given its focus on the 
transformation of individual mindsets, attitudes and behaviour; patterns of 
relationships in society; and the institutional environment.     Each member in Poro-
governed communities in Liberia and Sierra Leone was required to undergo 4 years 
(for boys) and 3 years (for girls) of transformational training.  From the school, 
individuals graduate from childhood into manhood, womanhood and most 
importantly into citizens with defined duties to their societies.  In the Poro and Sande, 
boys and girls are placed under oath to show deference to the history of their 
‘localities’ and all ‘commons’ or shared resources in it (Brown 1967).  Another 
important lesson worth noting, given the widespread gross violations especially of 
women during and after the war, is that Poro teaches boys to revere women not only 
for their gender, but also for their role as the intersection between the spiritual and the 
secular, between life and non-life.  While not arguing that international state 
reconstruction practitioners establish or support Poro shrines across the countries as 
avenues for reintegration of ex-combatants and returnees or for remoulding the minds 
of the citizens in both countries, much can be learned from the holistic systems of 
education that the Poro and Sande have managed for centuries.  
 
7.3.2 Institutional Transformation 
 
Mitchell (2005), Lederach (1995) and Rupesinghe (1995), among others, indicate that 
aside from personal transformation emphasis should also be placed on institutional 
transformation.  The conflict theorists are supported by international relations scholars 
and diplomats such as Paris (2004), Michailof et al (2003), Ghani et al (2004), 
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Krasner (2004), Katorobo (2003), Fukuyama (2004) and Weinstein (2005), who 
contend that post-conflict statebuilding will only be sustained if it builds and 
‘institutionalises’ institutions.    Aside from Paris, they also emphasise that such 
institutional transformation should be built on seeds derived from within—a process I 
call indigenising the institution building process.  To achieve the goal of indigenising 
institution building, I draw on the work of Michailof et al (2003) to propose five inter-
linked stages for indigenising institution building.  These include stocktaking, a new 
constitutional order, envisioning the post-collapsed institutional environment, new 
institutional arrangements, and monitoring and accountability mechanism.     
 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Comprehensive and Transformative Institution Building Process adopted from Michialof et al. (2003) 
 
 
 
 
7.3.2.1 Stocktaking Exercise 
 
As alleged by Ghani et al (2004), the liberal peace practitioners tend to by-pass the 
important step of thoroughly analysing the distinct institutional history, patterns and 
environment of post-conflict societies.  They argue it is imperative for all post conflict 
institution-building practitioners, whether insider or outsider, to reflect on the nature 
and character of public institutions and services prior to, during and immediately after 
collapse.  Boin and Hart (2000) concur and add that institutional crisis arises from the 
disjuncture between the values, history and prevailing behaviour of the context in 
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Institutional Order 
New Constitutional Order 
 
Monitoring and 
Accountability Mechanism 
New Institutional Design 
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which it is established.  These contextual realities and the degree to which they impact 
the collapsed institutional arrangement are critical to any new or emerging post-
conflict institutional design.  In addition to focus on the past, Clapham (2003) 
suggests stocktaking should also aim at identifying the natural emerging capacities 
and liabilities of both the state and society and establish the new institutional order on 
them.  The process should include reviewing existing and emerging assets and 
liabilities including human, social, institutional, natural, financial, security, 
informational, physical and political capital (Michailof et al, 2003: 16).   
 
7.3.2.2 Constitutional Basis for New Institutional Arrangement 
 
Michialof et al. also note that the social contract, which preceded collapse, must be 
reviewed and a new social compact either developed or the old revised and 
commitments towards it renewed.  Brahimi (2007) and Sawyer (2005) contend that 
building a new constitutional order where new rules of the game, a new polity, new 
sets of relationship between the state and its citizens and new social contracts with 
regard to the organisation and function of the state and society are established, is a 
sine qua non for building responsive and efficient state institutions.   
 
7.3.2.3 Vision for a New Institutional Order  
 
How shall we be governed? What institutions should regulate our interactions, the 
equitable distribution of our resources, and serve as symbol for our political, social, 
economic, and security collective identity?  These are critical questions that collapsed 
states cannot afford to bypass.  Most institutions in post-colonial Africa were either 
created to serve colonial interests or the interests of the elites who inherited the 
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colonial state.  Generating a shared vision for the nature, character and scope of 
public institutions will establish the foundation for evolving responsive institutions.  It 
is important that the visioning exercise truly represents and is anchored in the 
aspiration of the people and the objectives of the new government. An important 
outcome of such a visioning process in the case of Liberia and Sierra Leone could be 
the fusion of the micro and macro publics.   
 
7.3.2.4 Institutional Design 
 
This is the process of determining what structure should be established to meet the 
vision and efficiently deliver on the expectations of the public.  It includes design of 
institutional and organisational structures, monitoring systems, communication 
networks and codes of discipline. Whether it is security sector or system, governance 
and civil administrative institutions, the design should be efficient, responsive, 
resilient and integrative.  Integrative design takes into consideration context 
exigencies and fosters synergies and comprehensiveness.261 
 
7.3.2.5 Monitoring Regimes 
 
To ensure the routinisation of institution, monitoring mechanisms that are 
comprehensive need to be established at the outset.  This structure could be 
constitutionally empowered to monitor institutional practices, values and efficacy.  It 
is proposed that a four-tiered accountability mechanism be established: a civil society 
structure that will monitor both the international community’s facilitative support, the 
                                                
261Such a process takes into consideration the views of the community in which the new structure will be erected, 
the soil on which it will be erected, the builders who will build the new structures, and the people who will occupy 
it.  The opposite has been the case in the international practice.  Different actors build elements of the architecture 
before even imagining what the whole structure looks like.  
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government’s implementation of the new institutional structure, and their own internal 
organisational and professional capacities; a government monitoring regime to 
monitor support from the international community, civil society behaviours in the 
public sphere, and most importantly internal processes within the public sector.  The 
third independent monitoring regime could be the parliament, while the international 
community could have their own monitoring mechanism.      
 
7.3.3 Harnessing Emerging Resources 
 
The civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone certainly destroyed physical, social and 
spiritual systems.  They left human miseries in their wake.  However tragedy is not 
the whole story.  The wars also unleashed unimaginable human capacities.  As was 
the case in the 1950s,262 ordinary people stood up against forces of violence.  For 
instance, there was a standoff against the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council for 
nine consecutive months in Sierra Leone.  And with the backing of the international 
community, the force of violence bowed to the courage of armless people.  It was the 
people’s movement, which also arrested and handed the RUF leader Foday Sankoh 
over to justice. Similarly, for two consecutive years in Liberia, ordinary women 
maintained their sit-in despite the heartlessness of Taylor’s tyranny.  Religious leaders 
mobilised and introduced a new form of ‘insider-partial’ mediation and conciliation.  
At no time in the history of both countries did civil society become more 
professionalised, more aware and more engaged in the affairs of the state than during 
and after the civil wars.   Also, as indicated in Chapter 3, the successful counter-
insurgency of the Civil Defence Force in Sierra Leone has emboldened the Poro 
                                                
262
In 1955 and 1956, rural people in Sierra Leone revolted against the state.  There was also the Hut Tax War and 
the war against the coup of Brigadier Lansana in 1967.  
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sodality, particularly in its role in maintaining community security.  For the first time 
in its two thousand year existence, the Poro security architecture locally known as the 
Kamajors, Kapras, Donzos, etc. were brought from the hitherto ‘degraded’ and 
‘barbaric’ ‘hinterlands’ to defend the modern settler states.  The Poro also became 
regionalised when it co-deployed with ECOMOG, the West Africa sub regional force.   
 
At the end of the wars, rather than harness the emerging capacities as foundations for 
democracy, security, development and inter-group cohesion, the seedlings are 
disappearing.  The fate of Liberia’s and Sierra Leone’s emerging civic capacities can 
best be described in Hannah Arendt’s observation of the men and women who laid 
down their lives for the French revolution: 
 
They had been visited for the first time in their lives by an apparition of 
freedom, not, to be sure, because they acted against tyranny and things worse 
than tyranny ... but because they had become “challengers,” had taken the 
initiative upon themselves and therefore, without knowing or even noticing 
it, had begun to create that public space between themselves where freedom 
could appear (Arendt, 1993: 4). 
 
This new freedom, new public, new powers for self-preservation, could not be 
sustained.  Once they won the resistance and gained their freedom, they, as Arendt 
succinctly put it, “…eventually lost the spirit they had gained when they were fighting 
something massive and real”  (ibid).  “Life did not feel so charged with importance,” 
once the struggle of restoring peace was achieved (ibid).  The robust civic movements 
that stood in defence of justice in Sierra Leone and Liberia, and the Poro, which for 
the first time in the history of contemporary wars mounted counter-insurgency for 
their communities and the state, are receding into a state of parochialism.  They all 
seem to be disappearing from the public-spheres and handing the stage back once 
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again to greed-stricken politicians to do with it as they did before the wars.  These real 
and fearless liberators seem to be losing account of the history they crafted with their 
blood, tears and sweat as they “retreat into mere private life…” (ibid).  
 
7.4 CONCLUSION  
 
The strategies proposed in this chapter are not independent of the others, nor are they 
necessarily linear. I must also stress that the process Michialof et al. propose and 
which I adopt in this work is not a magic wand.  It is a framework that, in addition to 
the strategies proposed earlier for ‘agency transformation’ could prove useful in 
ensuring the indigenisation of post-conflict states without imposing on them 
international trustees as proposed in Paris’s ‘Institutionalisation before Liberation’ 
thesis.  The new constitutional order, which must form the basis of the new 
institutional order, must be informed by a thorough stocktaking.  This does not 
suggest that stocktaking is a one-time event.  It takes place throughout the cycle.  
Institutional design does not take place without a vision, but it does not mean that we 
stop envisioning once we have a sense of the institutional architecture.  There are also 
links between stocktaking and monitoring and accountability, given the need to 
regularly monitor and keep in check institutional excesses and performance.  
 
Finally, rather than find answers during the study many more questions emerged 
which require further research.  Key among them include the following: 
 
1. How can civic momentum gained during civil wars be harnessed as 
foundations for democracy in post-war societies? 
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2. How can the emerging Poro-governed security architecture inform the 
countries’ new security architectures? 
3. How to interface and promote fusion between the egalitarian liberal local 
governance structure and the hierarchical gerontocratic order of the Poro-
governed world in Liberia and Sierra Leone? 
4. Are there links between locality building and nation building? 
5. What strategies are required to create horizontal and vertical links between the 
micro and macro publics in post-war societies? 
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